Categories
Dividend Stocks

Centuria Industrial REIT threatened by declining disparity between capitalisation rates and bond yields

Business Strategy and Outlook

Centuria Industrial REIT is an externally managed Australian real estate investment trust. It owns a portfolio of 84 industrial properties, including distribution centres, manufacturing facilities, and data centres. About 82% of the portfolio by value is in urban infill areas of the major cities, with good prospects for rental growth and potentially redevelopment over the long term for higher and better use, including multi storey industrial, mixed use, residential, healthcare, or bulky goods retail. 

Revenue is defensive and growing. The trust earns rental income from a wide variety of tenants across multiple industries. Weighted average lease term is long, with typically 5% to 15% of leases expiring each year. In fiscal 2022, close to 80% of leases have fixed rent reviews averaging 2.8%, with most other leases linked to CPI inflation. Excluding a handful of properties with very long leases, portfolio rents are close to 10% below market, suggesting positive rent reversion as leases expire. All this adds up to a positive outlook for revenue. 

As with other REITs, operating profit margins are high, but operating costs tend to grow in line with revenue. The trust’s main costs are direct property expenses (which are mostly recovered from tenants under net leases), responsible entity fees, and interest expense. Responsible entity fees paid to the external manager Centuria Capital Group (ASX: CNI) are linked to portfolio size and have tripled in the past five years on rising property values and acquisitions. The trust’s strategy is relatively aggressive. Although the current level of financial leverage is acceptable,  the distribution payout ratio exceeds underlying earnings, interest rate hedging is limited, and management plans to undertake more acquisitions despite being late in the property cycle.

Financial Strength

Centuria Industrial REIT is in sound financial health. At December 2021, gearing was 31%, toward the bottom of its 30% to 40% target range and well below the 50% covenant limit. Likewise, interest cover of 5.7 times is comfortably above the 2 times covenant limit. These measures have been aided by extraordinarily low interest rates and high property values. Other credit metrics appear more aggressive, though are not a major concern. For example, net debt/EBITDA of 7 to 8 times for the medium term is forecasted, broadly in line with most AREIT peers. The trust has a Baa2 issuer credit rating from Moody’s Investors Service. Average debt duration is relatively long at 4.8 years and the trust has only modest debt maturities in the next couple of years. But limited interest rate hedging means the trust is exposed to rising interest rates–weighted average hedge maturity is 2.6 years. The trust is expected to pay out about 95% of funds from operations, which is aggressive as FFO ignores such things as maintenance capital expenditure, leasing incentives, and debt establishment costs. Distributions are anticipated to exceed underlying earnings by about 10%, which could be unmaintainable if property values stop rising. The trust’s portfolio has grown rapidly via acquisitions, requiring substantial equity raisings. Units on issue have increased more than six-fold since 2014.

Bulls Say’s

  • Revenue growth is underpinned by long leases with fixed or CPI-linked rent reviews. 
  • Very low market vacancies in Sydney and Melbourne suggest strong re-leasing spreads. 
  • About 80% of the portfolio is in urban infill areas, which benefit from supply constraints and superior demand from industrial tenants because of good access to customers and employee bases.

Company Profile 

Centuria Industrial REIT owns a AUD 4 billion portfolio of industrial properties, including distribution centres, manufacturing facilities, and data centres. Melbourne and Sydney are its biggest markets at more than a third of portfolio value each, followed by Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide. The trust is externally managed by Centuria Capital Group. 

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Ramsay Health Care: The Board declared a fully franked Dividend of 48.5 cps

Investment Thesis:

  • The Company is currently under a takeover offer at $88.00 per share  
  • It is expected that the demand on waiting lists will start to drive RHC’s earnings higher over FY22-24.
  • RHC has a diversified portfolio with significant scale and leading positions in Australia, France and Scandinavia. Attractive industry dynamics and high barriers to entry 
  • Largest private hospital operator in Australia, with attractive industry fundamentals (aging population). Favorable macro industry trends: ageing and growing population, proliferation of chronic disease, and increasing innovation, treatment, and technologies to drive demand to private hospitals.
  • Supportive government policy (tax incentive to get private health insurance). 
  • Ongoing brownfield program driving earnings and offshore earnings growth.
  • Significant operations offshore provide opportunities for growth outside of the domestic market.

Key Risks:

  • The current takeover offer fails to proceed. 
  • Competitive risk (new hospitals, new beds), from listed and unlisted hospital operators. 
  • Brownfield projects fail to deliver the earnings uplift. 
  • Cost pressures (negotiating price increases with private health insurance companies).
  • Change to government policy on private health insurance. 
  • Execution risk (able to get the uplift in earnings from brownfield projects).
  • Snap economic lockdowns due to Covid-19.

Key Highlights:

  • Revenue of $6,687.4m, was up +1.2%; EBIT of $489.2m, is down -16.2%; PAT of $303.7m, is down -23.8%; NPAT of $158.9m, was down -29.1%.
  • Having completed its acquisition of UK’s leading mental healthcare provider, Elysium at the end of January and via Ramsay Santé, several acquisitions of specialist primary healthcare businesses in the Nordic region, RHC’s balance sheet remains strong enough to underpin ongoing investment in brownfield and greenfield expansion.
  • The Board declared a fully franked dividend of 48.5 cps, which is flat relative to the pcp.
  • In Asia Pacific region the Revenue of $2,731.3, was up +0.5%, with EBIT of $285.4m, down -5.9% with RHC’s Australian hospitals. Management estimated the total impact of the disruption caused by Covid in 1H22 was $107m. RHC’s share of profits from its Asian JV, Ramsay Sime Darby of $7.9m was a reversal from the pcp loss of -$18.6m. Ramsay Sime Darby saw +16.4% growth in EBIT due to the acquisition of a new hospital in Malaysia and the contribution of Covid treatment and vaccination activities.
  • In U.K. the Revenue of $512.9m was up +6.7%, but this did not translate to earnings, with EBIT loss of -$35.6, materially down from the pcp, with the segment severely impacted by ongoing pandemic. EBIT also includes A$24.7m in costs relating to proposed scheme of arrangement for Spire Healthcare plc £2.5m, (A$4.7m), which was voted down by Spire shareholders in July 2021 and acquisition of Elysium Healthcare £10.8m (A$20m) completed on 31st January 2022. The segment opened the Buckshaw day surgery hospital in Chorley in October, the third new hospital facility opened during the pandemic.
  • In Europe. In 1H22, Ramsay Santé's hospitals in France remained operating under the French Government's revenue guarantee arrangements which was extended from 1 July 2021 to 31 December 2021 and compensated RHC for the use of facilities and services during the pandemic. Revenue from patients and other income of $3,236.3m is up +2.8%, whilst income from government grants was $203.1m, down -8.8%. EBIT of $239.4 was up +3.3%.
  • In 1H22, Ramsay Santé acquired an ophthalmology business in Sweden, a public primary care business in Denmark and an IVF business in Norway, totalling €38m (A$60m) with further deferred consideration of €48m (A$68.2m) subject performance hurdles.

Company Description:

Ramsay Health Care Ltd (RHC) provides healthcare services. RHC operates hospitals, day surgery centres, treatment facilities, rehabilitation & psychiatric units across countries around the globe.  It operates through approximately 500 locations across Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Italy, and Nordics.

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Masco Is Less Cyclical and Interest-Rate Sensitive Than the Market is Giving It Credit For

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Masco’s financial performance over the past eight years has been as much of a self-help story as a story of improving end markets. Masco almost entirely refreshed its senior executive management team in 2014. Since then, it has taken significant measures to build a stronger and more consistent business model. The firm divested its most cyclical and least profitable businesses (it spun off its installation business, now named TopBuild, to shareholders in 2015 and sold its windows and cabinetry businesses in 2019 and 2020, respectively). Management also executed significant cost-reduction initiatives and shored up the firm’s balance sheet. Masco’s sale of its windows and cabinetry businesses was a positive development for the firm because they had long viewed its plumbing and decorative architectural businesses as the firm’s crown jewels and key drivers of the company’s valuation, while Masco’s cabinetry and windows businesses have often been laggards that have been a drag on margins and returns on invested capital.

Repair and remodel spending, and to a much lesser extent, new residential construction, are major drivers of Masco’s financial performance. After divesting its installation, windows, and cabinetry businesses, the firm’s overall exposure to the R&R market is 88% of sales. Over the long term, the repair and remodel market will benefit from several long-term secular tailwinds related to aging housing stock, favorable demographics, increased demand for smart home and energy-efficient products and solutions, and increased spending among minority households. The R&R spending shall grow at about a 5% CAGR through 2030, reaching over a $650 billion addressable market. There is nice growth runway for Masco as the company capitalizes on improving end markets and internal growth initiatives across its remaining plumbing and decorative architectural platforms.

Financial Strengths:

Masco has a sound capital structure, and its consistent free cash flow generation should easily support its debt-service requirements and future capital-allocation decisions. Masco’s balance sheet has improved significantly over the past five years; based on the calculations, net debt/EBITDA peaked at over 4 in 2011 but is now 1.3. Masco plans to maintain a similar leverage ratio to support an investment-grade debt rating. Masco has approximately $3 billion of outstanding debt with maturities staggered through 2051, but the next maturity isn’t until 2028 when $600 million is due.  Masco has ample liquidity, with over $900 million of cash on hand and no outstanding borrowings on a $1 billion credit facility. By the calculations, 2021 marked the 31st consecutive year Masco has generated positive free cash flow since financials were publicly available via the Securities and Exchange Commission website (1991). The company’s ability to generate consistent free cash flow, even in a downturn, demonstrates the durability of Masco’s business model.

Bulls Say:

  • The R&R market is poised for long-term growth, driven by several secular tailwinds, including the aging housing stock and favorable demographics.
  • Masco has well-articulated growth plans for its plumbing and decorative architectural segments. These strategies could drive meaningful top-line growth over the next several years. Furthermore, cost- reduction initiatives have improved profitability.
  • Masco’s brand portfolio enjoys pricing power, which supports margin stability.

Company Description:

Masco is a global leader in home improvement and building products. The company’s $5.1 billion plumbing segment, led by the Delta and Hansgrohe brands, sells faucets, showerheads, and other related plumbing components. The $3.2 billion decorative architectural segment primarily sells paints and other coatings under the Behr and Kilz brands.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

CS: History of Poor Risk Management Drives Discounted Valuation

Business Strategy & Outlook: 

Credit Suisse’s true underlying profitability has been masked for the better part of a decade by multiple restructuring charges and the cost of running down a legacy book of unprofitable assets. The new management team at the helm of Credit Suisse hoped that it addressed all issues during 2020, but new problematic exposures continue to crop up. This suggests a deeper risk management malaise at Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse has some very good, profitable, and generally asset-light business with good long-term secular growth prospects–especially in wealth management/private banking and the Swiss universal bank. The discount that the market has imposed on the rating of Credit Suisse relative to UBS and its other peers should, however, remain in place until Credit Suisse can convince investors that it has addressed its risk management deficiencies. 

Credit Suisse will have to report several quarters of results free from the large non-recurring items that have historically marred its results. There is a strong long-term secular trend that sees the wealth of high-net-worth individuals and families growing ahead of global nominal GDP. The ultra-high net worth and family office segment, where Credit Suisse has focused most of its attention, is a particularly attractive segment. The threat of digital disintermediation is reduced and the need for bespoke solutions and strong relationship between banker and client remains. The current negative interest rate environment obscures the benefits of Credit Suisse’s very strong deposit franchise that provides it with ample surplus liquidity. Currently, this is damaging to Credit Suisse’s net interest income–it needs to invest its excess liquidity in short-term risk-free assets that currently pays no or negative interest. Credit Suisse has, however, starting passing on these costs to selected clients.

Financial Strengths:

Credit Suisse has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.4% currently, ahead of its own internal capital target of a 14% common equity Tier 1 ratio. This is comfortably ahead of its regulatory minimum capital requirement of 10%. However, Credit Suisse’s leveraged ratio of 4.2% is more of a constraint, with a regulatory minimum requirement of 3.5% and an internal target of 4.5%. Credit Suisse intends to pay out 25% of its earnings as a dividend and it has not announced new share buybacks.

Both Credit Suisse’s liquidity coverage ratio and its net stable funding ratio are comfortably above 100%, which indicates sound liquidity. These ratios, while helpful, do not fully capture the quality of a bank’s funding. One should also consider the structure of a bank’s funding–where the relatively lower importance of wholesale deposits in Credit Suisse’s funding mix is a clear positive. However, private banking/wealth management clients will typically be more sophisticated than the average retail banking client and therefore more likely to withdraw funds in times of stress. The private banking deposits are as sticky as general retail deposits, although they remains stickier than wholesale funding.

Bulls Say:

  • Credit Suisse looks set to emulate UBS and transform its business model into a wealth manager with a complementary investment bank, which would increase profitability and reduce earnings volatility.
  • Credit Suisse has run down a massive book of EUR 126 billion to EUR 45 billion over the past four years, incurring pretax losses of EUR 16 billion in the process. This has obscured the performance and profitability of the core business.
  • Credit Suisse generates the bulk of its earnings in stable and low-risk private banking/wealth management and Swiss commercial banking.

Company Description:

Credit Suisse runs a global wealth management business, a global investment bank and is one of the two dominant Swiss retail and commercial banks. Geographically its business is tilted toward Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

ABN Amro Has a Solid Position in the Attractive Dutch Market

Business Strategy & Outlook:

After emerging from outright government ownership ABN Amro is one of the simpler banks in Europe. It is essentially a retail and commercial bank with limited capital markets activities. Its strong retail deposit base supported above-average profitability until negative interest rates started to bite. Having a lending book dominated by fixed-rate mortgages does not help either. The long-duration lending book forces ABN Amro to use more expensive long-term funding in order to manage liquidity risk, which then compounds margin pressure in a declining interest-rate environment. ABN Amro offers investors exposure to the oligopolistic Dutch banking system where ABN Amro and its two main rivals hold more than 90% of all Dutch current accounts. This is in sharp contrast to the fragmented banking markets that are the norm in much of the eurozone. Historically this concentration supported higher levels of profitability for ABN Amro and its Dutch peers.

ABN Amro has a solid competitive position in Dutch retail banking with a 20% market share in Dutch personal current accounts and a 25% share of business current accounts. This provides ABN Amro with cheap, sticky funding and forms the base from which ABN Amro can cross-sell other products. In a negative interest-rate environment what should be a major competitive advantage has turned into a major headache. In a negative interest-rate environment banks earn negative interest on their surplus liquidity and with essentially a zero interest-rate floor on some of their deposits this leads to a margin squeeze. The injection of liquidity via monetary and fiscal interventions from central banks and governments following the coronavirus pandemic has just amplified this problem as banks are faced with even more deposits from clients flush with cash. ABN Amro cannot pass on negative interest rates to smaller depositors without damaging client goodwill. It is increasingly passing on higher costs to larger clients. Interest-rate hedges only provide protection against interest-rate volatility, not to a long-term decline in interest rates, especially not when rates go negative.

Financial Strengths:

Even after taking into consideration the more onerous capital guidelines under Basel IV ABN Amro is one of the best-capitalised banks in Europe. At the end of 2020 ABN Amro indicated that on a Basel IV basis it has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of over 15%, compared with its internal target of 13%. With an enviable retail deposit base ABN Amro is one of the banks in Europe with the soundest liquidity profile. Retail deposits tend to be sticky as retail depositors are less likely to move to other banks in the search of higher yields. Wholesale funding are much more likely to disappear during periods of stress in the funding markets. Wholesale funding makes up only around 26% of ABN Amro’s total funding.

Bulls Say:

  • ABN Amro is one of the three leading banks in the oligopolistic Dutch banking sector.
  • It has an attractive funding mix with low reliance on wholesale funding.
  • It has a simple, clear, and focused business model and strategy.

Company Description:

ABN Amro Bank is a Dutch bank, and the Netherlands accounts for around 90% of its operating profit. Operationally, retail and commercial banking contributes the bulk of its operating profit, while ABN Amro continues to reduce its exposure to corporate and investment banking. It views private banking as one of its key growth areas.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Vivendi Looks to Canal+ and Havas for Growth with Further M&A on the Horizon

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Vivendi’s transformation into a pure-play media firm, completed in 2014, left it with two primary business units: Canal+, the largest pay-TV company in France, and Universal Music Group, the largest global music label. However, controlling shareholder Vincent Bollore has dragged Vivendi back to its inglorious past as a conglomerate, exemplified by the purchases of Havas, the world’s sixth-largest ad agency holding company, and Editis, a French-language book publisher. Bollore also led the spinout of UMG, the firm’s crown jewel, in September 2021 with Vivendi holding on to a 10% stake in the music label. As a result of the UMG transaction, Canal+ is now the largest segment for Vivendi, representing 60% of revenue. While Canal+ appears to be returning to growth after years of decline, the core French pay-TV business remains a drag on growth. The growth for Canal+ will continue be driven by overseas operations via subscriber growth and new country launches. 

Canal+ is attempting to transition from a traditional pay-TV business to a content aggregator. Companies that depend heavily on buying or aggregating content from other creators may find themselves squeezed, particularly in markets with multiple aggregators. Now the second-largest segment with roughly 25% of revenue, Havas is heavily leveraged to Europe and North America, which account for over 80% of revenue. Havas competes against larger players in these regions; the only GDP-level growth in these mature markets and further expansion into Asia-Pacific and Latin America, largely via acquisitions of local agencies. Editis now generates roughly 10% of total revenue for Vivendi. The firm is the second-largest French-language publishing group, with 50 publishing houses covering everything from children’s books to popular literature to dictionaries to manga. 

Financial Strengths:

While Vivendi has done an admirable job of cleaning up the mess from the early 2000s, it remains in flux in terms of how to use its cash and where it invests. The large number of divestitures, including the sale of 30% of Universal Music, over the last few years has left the company with a net debt position of only $1.9 billion as of June 2021. However, management continues to use cash to buy stakes in firms in peripheral industries such as the Telecom Italia and Mediaset. The firm will look for additional acquisitions over time to releverage the balance sheet. The firm shall rush into an acquisition and overpay for it.

Bulls Say:

  • The spinout of Universal Music Group should reduce the conglomerate discount that has plagued the stock.
  • StudioCanal is a leading studio that benefits from the increased global demand for French-language original content.
  • Vivendi will return much of the cash from the UMG sale to shareholders via special dividends.

Company Description:

Vivendi’s transformation into a pure-play media firm was completed in 2014, but recent acquisitions and the spinout of Universal Music Group have again changed the firm. The company now operates multiple divisions with one very large core segment: Canal+, a leading producer and distributor of film and TV content in France, produces over 80% of revenue. It also owns Havas, the world’s sixth-largest ad agency holding company; Editis, a French-language book publisher; Gameloft, a mobile game publisher; and minority stakes in multiple companies in Europe.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Kering SA: Online Penetration is growing at a solid pace

Investment Thesis:

  • Solid momentum in the core Gucci brand, aside from the disruption caused by the Coronavirus. 
  • Sales momentum will be assisted once international tourism returns. 
  • Leveraged to increasing consumer consumption in Asia (China, India). 
  • Leveraged to tourism flows (international travel) as consumers seek out experiences. 
  • New upcoming brands.
  • Strong cash flow generation and solid dividend yield.
  • Strong balance sheet, which provides the Company flexibility.  
  • Key cornerstone investor (Pinault Family) provides stability in the share register.  

Key Risks:

  • Adverse currency movements, especially EUR strength against the U.S. dollar (USD) and Chinese Renminbi (RMB). 
  • Increased competition from existing players and new emerging brands. 
  • Key brands – Gucci (>70% of revenue), Saint Laurent (>10% of revenue), Bottega (>5% of revenue) – cease to resonate with consumers and growth halts. 
  • Value destructive acquisition of brand(s). 
  • Macro-economic conditions globally deterioration, impacting consumer spending and less tourism movements (i.e. travelers overseas).
  • Geopolitical tensions among regions restricting funds & tourists flow or a breakout of health epidemic impacting tourists flow in Europe / Asia. 
  • Significant change at the senior management level (divisional CEOs or Creative Director).  
  • Significant changes with the key cornerstone investor (leading to influence on long-term company strategy or shareholder outcomes). 
     

Key Highlights:

  • Revenue increased +34.7% over pcp (+35% on a comparable basis with North America up +76%, APAC up +33%, Japan up +21%, Western Europe up +10% and Rest of the World up +48%) and +13% over pre-Covid FY19 to €17,645.2m, driven by outstanding performances from all Houses, which generated revenue of €17,019m, up +34.3% over pcp (+34.9% on a comparable basis).
  • Recurring operating income rose sharply, up +60% over pcp (up +5% over FY19) to reach a new record €5,017.2m, with margin improving +450bps over pcp (down -170bps over FY19) to 28.4%, with recurring operating income from the Houses up +53.7% over pcp to €5,175.3m with margin expanding +380bps to 30.4% despite all Houses continuing to invest significantly in their operations.
  • Capital management – using strong cashflow to deleverage the balance sheet and increase shareholder returns. The Company delivered +87.6% YoY growth in FCF to €3.9bn which combined with proceeds from the disposal of an additional 5.9% in Puma (stake is now ~4%, covering the exchangeable bond due in 2022), saw management reduce net debt by -92.2% over pcp to €168m (debt/equity down -16.6% to 1.2%), resume share-buyback to repurchase 0.7% of shares for €540m (1.3% remaining with second tranche to cover 0.5% and expected to be completed by 26th April 2022), increase dividends by +50% over pcp to €12 and reinforce KER’s eyewear portfolio with the acquisition of LINDBERG.
  • Online penetration is growing at a solid pace. The Company saw online sales continue to grow at an solid pace, up +55% over pcp, leading to a doubling of the online channel’s penetration rate in two years, and now accounting for 15% of total sales in the retail (23% North America, 26% Western Europe, 7% APAC and 5% Japan), as management continued to drive brand engagement with the upcoming generations of luxury shoppers and target new customers through the metaverse by Balenciaga’s appearance on Fortnite and Gucci leveraging a presence on Roblox gaming platform, apart from successful internalization of all brand.com sites, which allows the Company to use e-concession only if complements KER’s own sites and control all the key elements of presence.
  • Outlook – management hints towards price increases and M&A activity. Though no specific guidance was provided for FY22, management flagged Gucci (which increased prices twice in 2020 and in 2021) along with KER’s other labels would again raise prices in a “targeted manner” in the year and pointed towards potential acquisitions to expand the Company’s footprint and bolster jewellery offering, which management believes has high potential.

Company Description:

Kering (KER), listed on the Euronext Paris (Paris stock market), is a global luxury group made up of iconic brands in Fashion, Leather Goods, Jewellery and Watches. The Company designs, manufactures and markets its goods globally. The group’s core brands are Gucci, Saint Laurent and Bottega Veneta. 

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
LICs LICs

Blackstone Remains the Go-To Firm in the Alternative Asset Management Segment

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Blackstone has built a solid position in the alternative asset-management industry, utilizing its reputation, broad product portfolio, investment performance track record and cadre of dedicated professionals to not only raise massive amounts of capital but maintain the reputation it has built for itself as a “go-to firm” for institutional and high-net-worth investors looking for exposure to alternative assets. Unlike the more traditional asset managers, who have had to rely on investor inaction (driven by either good fund performance or investor inertia/uncertainty) to keep annual redemption rates low, the products offered by alternative asset managers can have lockup periods attached to them, which prevent investors from redeeming part or all of their investment for a prolonged period of time. 

Blackstone is one of the world’s largest alternative asset managers with $880.9 billion in total assets under management, including $650.0 billion in fee-earning assets under management, at the end of 2021. The company’s portfolio is broadly diversified across four business segments–private equity (24% of fee-earning AUM and 32% of base management fees), real estate (34% and 39%), credit & insurance (30% and 16%), and hedge fund solutions (11% and 13%) –and it primarily serves clients in the institutional channel. With customer demand for alternatives increasing, and investors in alternative assets attempting to limit the number of providers they use, large-scale players like Blackstone are well positioned to gather and retain assets for their funds. That said, investors in Blackstone are betting that the company’s outstanding investment track record and fundraising capabilities will continue into the future. While the confidence in the firm’s ability to earn excess returns over the next 10 years, it will become increasingly difficult for the company to do so longer-term as increased competition from peers (including more traditional asset managers like BlackRock), continued pressure on fees, and a general maturation of the segment (from a solid period of above average growth due to shifting investor demand for alternatives) weigh on results.

Financial Strengths:

Blackstone’s business model depends heavily on having fully functioning credit and equity markets that will allow its investment funds to not only arrange financing for leveraged buyouts and/or additional debt issuances for the companies and properties it oversees but cash out of them once their investment has run its course. While the company saved itself a lot of headaches during the collapse of the credit and equity markets during the 2008-09 financial crisis by having relatively little debt on its own books, debt levels crept up to less-than-ideal levels during 2010-19. Given that asset managers like Blackstone have a high degree of revenue cyclicality and operating leverage, and are generally asset light, they should not maintain more than low to moderate levels of financial leverage. 

The company entered 2022 with $7.6 billion in longer-term debt (on a principal basis) on its books, with 60% of that total coming due during 2030-50. The company also has a $2.25 billion revolving credit facility (which expires in November 2025) but had no outstanding balances at the end of January 2022. Blackstone should enter 2023 with a debt/total capital ratio of 44%, debt/EBITDA (by our calculations) at 1.1 times, and interest coverage of more than 30 times. On the distribution front, share repurchases have been rare over the past decade, with the company repurchasing (net of issuances) just over $3 billion of stock (most of which was bought back in the past four calendar years). Dividend payments, meanwhile, exceeded $25 billion during 2012-21 and are expected to account for 85% of distributable earnings annually going forward.

Bulls Say:

  • Blackstone, with $650 billion in fee-earning AUM at the end of 2021, is a “go-to firm” for institutional and high-net-worth investors looking for exposure to alternative assets.
  • The company’s ever-increasing scale, diversified product offerings, long track record of investment performance and strong client relationships position the firm to perform well in a variety of market conditions.
  • Customer demand for alternatives has been increasing, with institutional investors in the category limiting the number of providers they use—both positives for Blackstone’s business model.

Company Description:

Blackstone is one of the world’s largest alternative asset managers with $880.9 billion in total asset under management, including $650.0 billion in fee-earning asset under management, at the end of 2021. The company has four core business segments: private equity (24% of fee-earning AUM, and 32% of base management fees, during 2021); real estate (34% and 39%); credit & insurance (30% and 16%); and hedge fund solutions (12% and 13%). While the firm primarily serves institutional investors (87% of AUM), it does serve clients in the high-net-worth channel (13%). Blackstone operates through 25 offices located in the Americas (8), Europe and the Middle East (9), and the Asia-Pacific region (8).

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Australian Small Caps Small Cap

MYX’s NEXTSTELLIS launch momentum accelerating – Affordable Care Act to be a tailwind over the medium-term

Investment Thesis:

  • Any stabilization (competition or price) in the generic segment will be viewed as a positive.
  • New product launches and healthy development pipeline.
  • While generic brands are going through a tough trading environment at the moment, the long-term outlook remains positive given consumers and regulators need a healthy generics market to keep the price of medication down.
  • Positioning the product portfolio to higher margin products. 
  • Potential industry consolidation on lower growth outlook.
  • Leveraged to a falling AUD/USD.

Key Risks:

  • Intense competition from new products.
  • Lower demand. 
  • New product launches fail to deliver the growth expected by the market.
  • Regulatory changes.
  • Litigation.
  • Adverse currency movement.

Key Highlights:

  • Reported revenues of $196.4m, declined -6%, with +180% increase in BPD, +19.5% increase in MCS and +29.6% increase in MPI more than offset by -19.6% decline in PPD as retail generics business segment continued to erode due to sustained competitive pricing environment.
  • Expenses excluding NEXTSTELLIS launch investment declined -12%.
  • Reported EBITDA of $48.8m, was up +20%, affected by the non-cash NEXTSTELLIS deferred consideration reassessment due to Covid-19 and associated longer time period for physician and patient activation and higher cost of payer coverage and reimbursement (underlying EBITDA was down -38% to $23.7m and underlying EBITDA excluding NEXTSTELLIS launch investment was up +11% to $44.4m).
  • Reported net loss after tax was down -74% to $50.4m despite intangible asset impairment associated with the generic business. 
  • Net debt increased +10% over 2H21 and the Company remained compliant within all bank covenants with a leverage ratio 3.2x (covenant <4.25x), interest cover 7.7x (covenant >3x) and shareholders’ funds of $754m (covenant >$600m).
  • The launch of NEXTSTELLIS continues to gather momentum despite the headwinds of Covid-19 with 2,100 healthcare professionals (HCPs) have now written the product since launch (bulk of which came in the 2Q22) with the aided awareness of NEXTSTELLIS amongst target HCPs grown to 79%, and the Company approaching to acquiring 100 new writers.

Company Description:

Mayne Pharma Group (MYX) Mayne Pharma is a specialty pharmaceutical company focused on applying its drug delivery expertise to commercialize branded and generic pharmaceuticals. Mayne Pharma provides contract development and manufacturing services to more than 100 clients worldwide. Mayne Pharma has an extensive portfolio of branded and generic drugs in multiple therapeutic areas, including women’s health, oncology, dermatology and cardiology.

(Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
ETFs ETFs

iShares S&P 500 ETF: Seamless Execution at an Unmatched Fee

Approach

IVV tracks the S&P 500, a free-float, market-cap-weighted benchmark composed of large-cap US equities. Constituents are determined by a set of criteria and an index committee. The minimum market cap for companies in the index is about USD 5 billion. A slight quality tilt exists because of its conservative eligibility requirements pertaining to unprofitable companies and recent IPOs. Moving away from the cross-listing structure in September 2018, IVV now invests directly into a US-listed version of the strategy. Although it lacks exposure to small and mid-caps, the constituents of this index account for about 80% of the total market cap of the US stock market. Portfolio turnover is expected to be very low, in line with the underlying index. IVV distributes quarterly. IShares can reinvest dividends. Also, the underlying US-listed version engages in securities lending, adding some incremental returns to the Australian vehicle’s overall performance. In terms of its portfolio role, the ETF can be used as a core international equity holding, although it should be paired with an ex US equity offering for full global exposure.

Portfolio

The ETF mirrors the composition of the large-cap market, allowing the market to dictate its stock and sector weightings. This allows the ETF to harness the market’s collective view about the relative value of each stock and keeps turnover low, which is among the lowest in the category. As of 28 Feb 2022, the strategy’s top 10 holdings account for about 28% of the total assets, and the largest holding (Apple) accounts for 6.9% of assets, which effectively diversifies firm-specific risk. Information technology has been the largest sector exposure within the index (25.6% as of 28 Feb 2022), reflecting the dominance of tech stocks over the US large-cap space; however, it is underweight compared with the category average.

 The strategy is slightly underweight in technology, consumer cyclical, and communication services and overweight in financial services and healthcare compared with the average rival. The strategy has substantial indirect global exposure given the significant stakes it holds in several multinational companies. With a large chunk of the underlying companies’ asset-weighted revenue generated outside of the US, this feature adds to the geographic diversification of the ETF. The strategy is large-cap-focused with no small and mid-caps within its constituents. 

People

We are impressed with the management team and believe BlackRock’s vast resources give it an advantage. Day-to-day management of the Australia-domiciled ETF is shouldered by Derek Dei and his team located in Hong Kong. The team is responsible for overseeing more than 60 index funds and ETFs operating in the Asia Pacific region. However, the underlying US-listed ETF is managed by Alan Mason and his team of four portfolio managers based out of the US. Mason is the longest-tenured member of the team and has served as a portfolio manager at the firm since 1991. Greg Savage deals with multi-asset strategies, Jennifer Hsui monitors emerging-markets funds, Rachel Aguirre has responsibility for the institutional developed-markets and US funds, and Amy Whitelaw oversees North America and Latin America ETFs.

 These managers interact with a wider team of traders and managers around the globe to execute the fund’s day-to-day operations. The impact of personnel turnover is minimal when it does occur. Most of the portfolio management process is automated, and portfolio managers primarily review and approve trades prior to and after execution. The team employs BlackRock’s Aladdin platform to deliver much of its portfolio management tasks. Global trading desks allow traders to conduct foreign transactions in a cost-effective manner, and the team has maintained tight index tracking

Performance 

VV seeks to deliver the risk/reward profile of the US large-cap equity market via tracking one of the most popular indexes, the S&P 500. In the process, it sets a high hurdle for active managers to beat. BlackRock employs its sophisticated portfolio management systems and trading capabilities to emulate the risk/reward profile characteristics of the S&P 500, achieving low tracking error against the index. Over the trailing 10 years through 28 Feb 2022, the ETF has outperformed the category average by 67 basis points per year, with lower volatility. Much of this outperformance can be attributed to the strategy’s cost advantage; lower-thanaverage cash drag; and more favorable stock exposure in the technology, utilities, consumer cyclical, and consumer defensive sectors compared with the category average. IVV has held up as well as most of its peers during downturns since inception, despite its lower-than-average cash balance. Most actively managed strategies in the category keep larger cash balances on hand to meet redemptions, helping out during bear markets.

About Fund:

As the uptake for US large-cap equities increases, particularly through the passive route, iShares S&P 500 ETF IVV continues to be a very good investment on the back of seamless execution at an unmatched fee. The strategy is expected to outperform its peers over the long term and remains the clear choice for investors to gain US exposure. The underlying benchmark, the S&P 500, is a market-cap-weighted index of the largest 500 companies in the United States. Thus, it offers giant- to mid-cap exposure, covering about 80% of the free-float-adjusted market capitalisation of the US equity market. This results in a well-diversified index, at the stock and sector levels. As such, passive strategies that track the S&P 500 stand as above-average options in a market segment where active managers have generally struggled to outperform. Consisting of highly liquid stocks, material stock-specific valuation information is quickly incorporated into stock prices. 

From an Australian perspective, IVV gives exposure to a broad portfolio of some of the world’s most noteworthy companies, including sectors that are underrepresented in Australia, such as technology and healthcare. The S&P 500’s correlation to Australian equities has come down in recent years, effectively adding to diversification for Australian equities exposure. This vehicle invests into the US-listed version, which engages in securities lending to garner some incremental returns.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.