Category: Small Cap

Companies that are listed on a stock exchange like the ASX can be categorized according to their size, which is most frequently measured by market capitalization, or market cap. The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries index represents ‘small caps’, those members of the S&P/ASX 300 Index that sit outside the S&P/ASX 100 index. It is a benchmark for small cap Australian shares.

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Shares Small Cap

Sprout’s Turnaround is Unlikely to Result in Much Profitability Improvement Due to Competition

Business Strategy & Outlook:   

Sprouts has capitalized on a natural, health-oriented positioning aligned with culinary trends, but the company believes it faces a competitive onslaught as conventional grocers, mass merchandisers, hard discounters, and online sellers target the same themes. Without the cost leverage of the largest grocers, Sprouts will face continued intense price pressure. Amazon’s 2017 purchase of Whole Foods remains a threat, as the digital juggernaut’s procurement strength and distribution efficiency can fuel price cuts that upend Sprouts’ value proposition (a produce-oriented store featuring fresh, affordable items). Sprouts has room for store growth, but the company believes the ensuing cost leverage will need to be used to keep pace with price cuts in an industry favoring larger firms that can spread fixed costs and omnichannel investments over the broadest possible sales base. 

Sprouts relies on Instacart for its delivery and click-and-collect efforts. While the partnership is prudent given Sprouts’ size, it imposes costs that larger firms can mitigate by fulfilling digital orders internally. Delivery can extend Sprouts’ appeal to customers that do not regularly drive past a store, but the channel is margin-dilutive even for firms that are able to scale costs over a much larger sales base. Although the COVID-19 outbreak has lifted near-term demand as shoppers spend more time at home, increased digital transactions could linger, shifting sales into a less lucrative channel long term. New leadership began revitalization work in earnest in early 2020, attempting to stabilize declining operating margins (6.8% in 2014 versus 3.9% in 2019) and optimize an inefficient expansion strategy. While it is expected that the management will hit its long-term low-single-digit comparable sales growth goal, its low-double-digit adjusted EPS expansion target will be harder to achieve, even after considering share buybacks (forecast is in the mid- to high single digits). Nonetheless, the efforts should provide ammunition to fight unending price battles against intensifying competition as large retailers encroach on Sprouts’ natural and health-oriented turf.

Financial Strengths:  

Sprouts’ financial health strikes us as sound. Net debt was around 1.4 times adjusted EBITDA at the end of fiscal 2019, before the pandemic-related sales spike nearly erased Sprouts’ net debt by the end of fiscal 2020 (with a similar outcome at the end of fiscal 2021) Sprouts will continue to open stores, although management slowed growth in fiscal 2020 as it optimized new unit size and layout. Company foresees mid- to high-single-digit percentage unit count expansion annually over the next decade, with Sprouts exceeding 700 stores (from 374 at the end of fiscal 2021). Store opening costs are modest (roughly $3.6 million net cash investment for the average new unit; the number should dip to around $3.2 million as new management favors smaller, simpler locations), and Sprouts to fund its growth internally. Company expects capital expenditures to average 3% of sales long term. Despite the growth, free cash flow to the firm should average 2%-3% of sales long term (similar to fiscal 2019’s 3.2%; 2020-21’s 5% average mark was inflated on account of the pandemic) amid intense competition. Sprouts enjoys flexibility as it can adjust store growth plans to suit market conditions; while it spent $81 million in fiscal 2021 on capital expenditures (net of landlord reimbursements), it is suspected that about half was for new stores, leaving roughly $40 million for sales initiatives, remodels, infrastructure, and maintenance (which is sufficient as its stores are fairly new). It is anticipated that management will direct excess cash to share repurchases. The model assumes 45% of operating cash flow is dedicated to buybacks long term. Sprouts could also consider bolt-on acquisitions to accelerate its store growth; the forecast does not incorporate such transactions due to their uncertain timing and nature.

Bulls Say: 

  • Sprouts’ health and value-oriented concept is on trend, consistent with customers’ desire to eat foods that are less processed and contain more naturally derived ingredients. 
  • As a fairly new chain, Sprouts’ relatively small stores feature layouts that are consistent with newer consumer demand trends, such as centrally located fresh produce and robust prepared food and grab-and-go offerings. 
  • Sprouts has ample room for growth as it boosts its penetration in existing markets and extends its footprint elsewhere in the United States.

Company Description:  

Sprouts Farmers Market is an American specialty grocer offering an assortment highlighting fresh and naturally derived products. Its offerings are especially focused on produce, which constituted around 21% of sales in fiscal 2021. Founded in 2002, the chain is most heavily concentrated in California, which accounted for over one third of its 374 stores as of the end of fiscal 2021. All of the company’s operations are in the United States, with its stores largely located in the southern half of the country. The firm sells roughly 20,000 products (of which around 70% are attribute driven, such as organic, plant-based, or catering to the keto or paleo diet), with private-label products accounting for about 16% of sales in fiscal 2021. Perishable items accounted for 58% of fiscal 2021 sales.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Small Cap

Winnebago’s Backlog Remains High due to Demand Resetting Higher After the Pandemic

Business Strategy & Outlook:   

Winnebago, which reinvented itself under CEO Mike Happe with the November 2016 acquisition of high-end towable maker Grand Design, sees itself as a leading outdoor lifestyle firm. It now has a marine segment with Chris-Craft and Barletta. Towable is an area the company had long wanted to grow in but had remained very small since acquiring SunnyBrook in 2011. Winnebago’s North American towable share is 12%, up from under 2% before Grand Design, so a long growth runway is forecasted if it can keep chipping into Thor’s and Forest River’s roughly 80% combined share. In fiscal 2021, towable were about 55% of total revenue compared with just 9% in fiscal 2016. High brand equity enabling scale and barriers to entry provide Winnebago with a narrow economic moat. 

Leadership sees opportunities to improve Winnebago’s operations with an intense focus on strategic planning to be faster to market with new products in new segments such as off-roading and lower price points (but not the cheapest in a segment). Models are no longer cloned, which should help dealer profitability, and product will be positioned around a good, better, best framework. A unit is now not manufactured until it has an order, which should mean little to no discounting. Acquisitions in the $700 billion-plus outdoor activity market also play a role, but only for high-end firms such as Grand Design, Chris-Craft, Newmar, and Barletta. Industry data shows that 11.2 million U.S. households owned a RV in 2020, up from 6.9 million in 2001. 60% of first-time campers are under age 40 and have a household income of $100,000 or more versus 29% for all campers. 82% of new campers since the pandemic have children and Hispanic and Black consumers were 25% of all campers in 2020, up from 8% in 2012, so Winnebago has plenty of runway with a wide consumer base if it executes right. Winnebago’s brand equity gives it a good shot at capitalizing on these trends. The pandemic-induced outdoor lifestyle boom has also given the company a $3.6 billion RV backlog at third quarter fiscal 2022, up from about $400 million at the end of fiscal 2019.

Financial Strengths:  

The balance sheet lacks the massive legacy costs that burden some other manufacturers because Winnebago’s workforce is not unionized. Winnebago’s untapped $192.5 million credit line, good through Oct. 22, 2024, coupled with about $238 million of cash should, get the firm through nearly any challenge. A 9% increase in the dividend in summer 2020, despite the pandemic at the time, is a good sign of financial health, as is a 50% increase announced in August 2021. Winnebago’s balance sheet had been free of long-term debt since the mid-1990s. Having no debt limits the downside to equity investors, but new leadership was exploring whether to add debt and did so in fiscal 2017 with $353 million to fund part of the consideration to buy Grand Design. Debt as of May 28 totaled $600 million, before a $49.1 million convertible note discount and $9.4 million of debt issuance costs, and consists of $300 million of 1.5% 2025 unsecured senior convertible notes issued to buy Newmar (along with the company issuing 2 million shares of stock to the seller at $46.29) and $300 million of 2028 6.25% senior secured bonds. The convertible notes are not callable, can be converted any time starting Oct. 1, 2024, and have a conversion price of $63.73 per share. The target range for net debt/adjusted EBITDA is 0.9-1.5 times, but management is willing to leverage up to 3.0 times to make an acquisition. Net debt/adjusted EBITDA was 0.6 times at the end of third quarter fiscal 2022. Winnebago has no significant pension obligations and stopped paying retiree healthcare in 2017. Winnebago expects to be comfortably free cash flow positive in the long term. Company would prefer that it repurchase its shares only when they’re cheap and buybacks be done at a minimum to offset dilution from stock option issuance. Acquisitions and other growth investments are a priority over buybacks.

Bulls Say: 

  • The Grand Design acquisition materially raised Winnebago’s operating margin, and Newmar could do the same. 
  • The company’s strong balance sheet provides financial strength and flexibility to withstand cyclical downturns.
  • Because RV consumers are relatively affluent, rising gas prices would probably not hinder a consumer’s ability to purchase a motor home. A 2016 study by travel consulting firm PKF Consulting found that for a family of four, gas prices would have to exceed $12 a gallon to make RV travel more expensive than other forms of travel.

Company Description: 

Winnebago Industries manufactures Class A, B, and C motor homes along with towable, customized specialty vehicles, boats, and parts. Headquartered in Eden Prairie, Minnesota, Winnebago has been producing recreational vehicles since 1958. Revenue was about $3.6 billion in fiscal 2021. Winnebago expanded into towable in 2011 with the acquisition of SunnyBrook and acquired Grand Design in November 2016. Towable made up 85% of the firm’s RV unit volume, up from 31% in fiscal 2016. The company’s total RV unit volume was 71,015 in fiscal 2021. Winnebago expanded into boating in 2018 with the purchase of Chris-Craft, bought premium motor home maker Newmar in November 2019, and bought Barletta pontoon boats in August 2021.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

The Fast Charge EV Network: Initiating Coverage of EVgo with $7 Fair Value Estimate

20025825 - closeup image of businessman drawing 3d graphics

Business Strategy & Outlook:  

EVgo is a leading owner operator of fast charging direct current, or DC, stations in the United States. The market for public charging of electric vehicles can be divided into high-powered DC charging and lower powered Level 2, alternating current (AC), charging. Charging times to add 100 miles vary from as little as 5-15 minutes with DC charging to as much as several hours with AC charging. EVgo was a pioneer in the buildout of DC charging, which is expected to experience a growing percentage of charging demand. According to Bloomberg NEF, fast charging is expected to constitute 22% of all public EV demand by 2030 versus less than 10% in 2021.

EVgo pursues various partnerships to execute its business model. The company partners with retail, grocery stores, and related high-traffic merchants to site its charging stations in desirable locations. This strategy differs from other DC charging strategies which focus more on highway corridor locations. In addition to host customer partnerships, EVgo has partnered with automotive OEMs. One example is with General Motors, which has agreed to help fund EVgo’s buildout of DC charging stations over the next few years. Auto OEM partnerships is viewed as a key customer acquisition strategy for EVgo and would view further partnerships favorably for its competitive position. While public charging for passenger vehicles has historically been EVgo’s focus, and an increasing focus on the fleet market. Vehicle fleets are particularly relevant for DC charging given the higher utilization of the vehicle compared to a typical passenger car. While the long-term attractiveness of the fleet market, and the number of competitors is numerous in this burgeoning arena. In addition to its core focus of owning and operating DC fast chargers, EVgo expanded its digital and software capabilities with its acquisition of Plugshare in 2021. Plugshare is the leading global platform for EV drivers to locate and provide information relating to charging stations. This transaction is viewed as financially immaterial, but highly strategic given its large data capture.

Financial Strengths:  

EVgo’s financial strength received a major boost from its 2021 special purpose acquisition company merger. The merger and subsequent financing added approximately $600 million in cash to EVgo’s balance sheet. This allows for a step change in EVgo’s capital investment compared with a more restrained balance sheet under past private equity ownership. While EVgo possess a relatively strong balance sheet compared to EV charging pure plays, it pales in comparison to select competitors within auto OEMs, utilities, or oil and gas majors. EVgo’s balance sheet is unlevered, which is viewed as prudent given the early stage of its business. Over time, the envision leverage being added as the business matures given its asset-backed nature. EVgo’s asset ownership approach results in a more capital-intensive business model than competing models. The uses of cash to consist operating cash outflows as profitability is not expected in the near-term and growth capital expenditures associated with expanding its fast-charging network. Government subsidies play a crucial role in financing of EV charging stations – helping to offset upfront capital requirements. EVgo notes subsidies can range from 5-50% of typical capital requirements.

Bulls Say: 

  • EVgo is a leading asset owner of fast-charging stations, which are expected to grow faster than slower charge stations.
  • Government subsidies can help fund a material portion of a typical EV charging station’s capital expenditures.
  • EVgo offers exposure to growing adoption of electric vehicles.

Company Description: 

EVgo owns and operates a public direct current fast charging network in the U.S. EVgo’s network of charging stations provides electric vehicle charging infrastructure to consumers and businesses. Its network is capable of charging all EV models and charging standards currently available in the U.S. EVgo partners with national and regional chains of grocery stores, automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), hotels, shopping centers, gas stations, parking lot operators, local governments and independent property owners in order to locate and deploy its EV charging infrastructure.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Ventia has built trust to deliver highly sensitive and complex projects across its sectors

Business Strategy & Outlook

Ventia is a leading infrastructure maintenance services provider in Australia and New Zealand. Through developing strategic relationships and a focus on safety, Ventia has built trust to deliver highly sensitive and complex projects across its sectors. Revenue has a visible stability with 70%-80% of Ventia’s next 12 months of revenue historically supported by work in hand. Work in hand as at July 2021 stood at AUD 15.5 billion. Approximately 85% of revenue comes from Australia with over 13,000 employees at around 350 sites. The 15% balance comes from New Zealand where over 2,000 workers are employed at approximately 50 sites. Ventia also relies upon an additional workforce of around 20,000 subcontractors. With access to such a large workforce, Ventia can leverage a deep pool of talent across Australia and New Zealand. And the subcontractor base allows for flexible staffing, enabling Ventia to scale the workforce up and down on short notice, and provides wide geographical coverage. This plays into Ventia’s capital-light business model with capital expenditure typically less than 1% of total revenue.

Ventia is structured across four sectors including defense & social infrastructure; infrastructure services; telecommunications; and transport. Its capabilities span the full asset lifecycle including operations and maintenance, facilities management, minor capital works, environmental services, and other solutions. In Australia, Ventia services 50% of the private motorways and tunnels, and over 70% of defence sites. In New Zealand, it provides services to over 90% of the electricity transmission network. Ventia is also the number one telecommunications infrastructure services provider in both Australia and New Zealand. Ventia has long-term relationships with a diverse range of public and private sector clients. In 2020, it did work for more than 60 public sector clients at federal, state, and local levels, and 65 private sector clients ranging from medium-size domestic organizations to large national and global corporates.

Financial Strengths

With net debt excluding lease liabilities of AUD 563 million at December 2021, Ventia is in reasonable financial health. Net debt/(net debt plus equity) is high at 59%, but this skewed by Ventia’s capital-light operating model which limits assets on balance sheet. Debt is comfortably serviced with EBIT/interest expense in fiscal 2021 of 7.0 times. The net debt/EBITDA of around 1.6 in 2021, falling to sub-1.0 levels by 2023, all else equal. Ventia boasts robust operating and free cash flows. On a pro forma basis before interest and tax, three-year average operating cash flow to 2020 was AUD 195 million and three-year average free cash flow was AUD 150 million. As per forecast solid free cash flows in the foreseeable future, growing to over AUD 200 million by 2025, which should comfortably support Ventia’s targeted dividend payout ratio of between 60% and 80% of underlying NPATA.

Bulls Say

  • The maintenance services market is expected to grow strongly, supported by the fair winds of population growth, rising outsourcing rates, and increasingly stringent environmental regulation. 
  • Ventia has long-term relationships with a diverse range of public and private sector clients and has maintained many client relationships for decades across its sectors. 
  • Ventia’s client contracts are relatively long in duration with the average contract term at inception over five years. Most contain some form of embedded price escalation.

Company Description

While Ventia is not the largest player with an estimated 7.5% share of addressable markets, it is a leading infrastructure maintenance services provider in Australia and New Zealand. Its capabilities span the full asset lifecycle including operations and maintenance, facilities management, minor capital works, environmental services, and other solutions. And its business model is favorably capital-light via flexing of a large contractor base complementing a deep pool of talented employees. Ventia has long-term relationships with a diverse range of public and private sector clients with many client relationships maintained for decades. Contracts are favorably long with an average five-year duration at inception and most containing some form of embedded price escalation.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Small Cap

Urban Outfitters has operated a wholesale business for more than 35 years, but it accounted for just 6% of sales in fiscal 2022.

Business Strategy & Outlook

The Urban Outfitters lacks a brand intangible asset that would provide an economic moat and pricing power. While its three major apparel brands–Anthropologie, Free People, and Urban Outfitters–remain enticing to their primary demographic of women 18-45 years old, thecompetition has taken a toll. Urban Outfitters grew to be one of the larger specialty apparel retailers in the United States on the strength of its distinctive styles. However, although sales and profits have recovered nicely as the economy has reopened, same-store sales growth and profit margins were inconsistent in the years before the pandemic. While this is partly due to shifting fashion trends, as fragmentation in apparel retail is the primary factor. Urban Outfitters, like many others, has had to resort to markdowns and promotions to compete with wide-moat Amazon and other e-commerce, outlet stores, discount stores, and key vendors’ direct-to-consumer efforts.

Urban Outfitters has strengths, but its strategies as insufficient. The firm intends to prioritize e-commerce, international expansion, Free People Movement, and its nascent Nuuly clothing rental service. To its credit, Urban Outfitters was an early adopter of e-commerce, which has grown at double-digit rates during the pandemic and now accounts for about 50% of its sales. However, digital shoppers have many alternatives and can even find Urban Outfitters’ owned brands through third parties. Meanwhile, Urban Outfitters has operated a wholesale business for more than 35 years, but it accounted for just 6% of sales in fiscal 2022. This business has been challenged by consistently declining sales in U.S. department stores. Urban Outfitters might have growth opportunities in Europe, where it is opening stores, and in China, where it is has a local team to sell through Tmall. However, the potential for international growth is unproven, as neither Free People nor Anthropologie has any real presence outside North America.

Financial Strengths

Although facing logistical challenges and higher costs, the Urban Outfitters is in fine financial shape. The firm closed April 2022 with no long- or short-term debt (apart from $1.1 billion in operating lease liabilities) and $259 million in cash and short-term investments. In March 2020, when Urban Outfitters had to close stores because of the virus, the firm took aggressive action to conserve cash. Among other actions, the company furloughed employees, cut salaries, extended payment terms, suspended rent payments, and cut other discretionary expenses. The firm also borrowed $120 million under its $350 million revolving credit facility (matures in 2024) but has already repaid the loan. While the firm’s free cash flow to equity was just under $100 million in fiscal 2022 as it recovered from the effects of the virus, the annual average free cash generation of about $280 million over the next decade. Urban Outfitters suspended buybacks during the pandemic but resumed them in fiscal 2022. The firm has, at times, repurchased shares at prices well above current levels and the historical fair value estimates. A firm reduces shareholder value when it repurchases stock at prices above the fair value estimates. Urban Outfitters has never paid dividends in its 50-year history. The Urban Outfitters’ average yearly capital expenditures at about 4.3% of sales. Between fiscal years 2012 and 2015, the firm’s capital expenditures averaged 7% of sales as it was expanding aggressively. In fiscal years 2016-22, however, its capital expenditures dropped to 4% of sales as store openings slowed. However, fiscal 2022’s capital expenditures were nearly 6% of sales due to investments in new fulfillment and distribution centers in both the U.S. and the U.K. and the opening of about 18 FP Movement stores.

Bulls Say

  • Urban Outfitters’ robust e-commerce has been a big benefit during the pandemic and now accounts for about 50% of its sales. 
  • Urban Outfitters has many exclusive products, as about 50% of its sales come from its own brands and sourcing. Moreover, the firm carries some exclusive products from national and specialty brands. 
  • The new FP Movement stand-alone stores expand Urban Outfitters’ presence in the red-hot women’s athleisure sector and make it a viable competitor to Lululemon and Gap’s Athleta.

Company Description

Founded in 1970, Philadelphia-based Urban Outfitters is an apparel and home goods retailer that operates about 700 stores and e-commerce in North America and Europe under the Urban Outfitters, Free People, FP Movement, Anthropologie, Terrain, and BHLDN brands. It also sells products through a wholesale operation, owns some restaurants, and operates a clothing rental business. Urban Outfitters primarily markets to young adults and offers products in categories such as women’s and men’s apparel, home goods, shoes, wedding, and outdoors.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

SkyCity’s Earnings are Returning as Restrictions Ease

Business Strategy & Outlook:   

SkyCity to deliver strong earnings growth over the next decade, buoyed by the recovery from current coronavirus-induced lows and solid performance from its core assets in Auckland and Adelaide. SkyCity’s Auckland and Adelaide properties underpin the firm’s narrow economic moat. SkyCity is the monopoly operator in both jurisdictions, with long-dated licenses (exclusive license for Auckland expires in 2048, and Adelaide license expires in 2085 with exclusivity guaranteed until 2035). These properties have performed strongly, thanks to SkyCity’s solid record of reinvestment, resulting in high property quality, stable visitor growth, and earnings resilience. The quality of these assets, particularly SkyCity Auckland, has helped build the firm’s VIP gaming business. 

SkyCity’s exposure to the volatile VIP gaming market is smaller than that of Australian rivals Crown Resorts and Star Entertainment. VIP revenue typically represents over 20% of Crown’s and Star’s sales, compared with SkyCity’s typical 10%-15%. While high rollers have no alternatives when in Auckland or Adelaide, SkyCity effectively competes as a destination casino on a global scale against locations such as The Star in Sydney and Crown Melbourne. The VIP gaming will be a negligible share of revenue in fiscal 2021 amid border closures. However, the segment recovered as border restrictions ease and tourism recovers, to around 15% of revenue. To protect its competitive position and retain appeal, SkyCity is investing in its key properties. Successful execution of the two major projects in Auckland and Adelaide is key. They provide good earnings accretion opportunities, in particular at the core Auckland property. This includes a NZD 750 million upgrade to SkyCity Auckland to be completed by calendar 2025 and a AUD 330 million expansion for SkyCity Adelaide, a transformational project completed in fiscal 2021. Beyond 2025, when these expansion projects come on line in full, SkyCity Entertainment is expected to resume generating excess returns and revert to a strongly cash-generating business on a substantially stepped-up earnings base.

Financial Strengths:  

Despite near-term earnings weakness, SkyCity’s balance sheet remains robust, bolstered by a NZD 230 million capital raise completed at the end of fiscal 2020 and extensions to new and existing debt facilities. The firm received covenant waivers for the first half of fiscal 2022, given earnings weakness, and second-half gearing covenants are to be tested at double second-half EBITDA (rather than for the full year) with a higher testing threshold. While the higher threshold was undisclosed, the forecasted second-half net debt/EBITDA to rise to around 3.0–above the firm’s target range of 2.0 to 2.5, but comfortably below estimated covenant levels of closer to 5.0. The net debt/EBITDA is forecasted below 2.0 in fiscal 2023–below the target range of around 2.0 to 2.5. The completion of the NZD 330 million Adelaide expansion in fiscal 2021 takes some pressure off cash flows, and of the further NZD 500 million in capital expenditure flagged for the NZICC project, around NZD 380 million will be funded by insurance payments to be received following the NZICC fire. SkyCity’s balance sheet shall continue to improve over coming years as earnings recover, with net debt/EBITDA dropping below 1.0 in fiscal 2024 as expansionary projects roll off and earnings recover. SkyCity’s balance sheet will have the strength to continue paying around 75% of underlying earnings as dividends, while still being able to fund expansion projects at Auckland in the meantime.

Bulls Say: 

  • Long-dated exclusive licenses to operate the only casino in Auckland and Adelaide allow SkyCity to enjoy economic returns in a regulated environment.
  • Transformative capital expenditure is expected at SkyCity’s Auckland and Adelaide casinos will lead to a sizable step-up in earnings.
  • SkyCity is well positioned to benefit from the emerging middle and upper class in China.

Company Description: 

SkyCity Entertainment operates a number of casino-hotel complexes across Australia and New Zealand. The flagship property is SkyCity Auckland, the holder and operator of an exclusive casino license (expiring in 2048) in New Zealand’s most populous city. The company also owns smaller casinos in Hamilton and Queenstown. In Australia, the company operates SkyCity Adelaide (exclusive license expiring in 2035).

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Small Cap

Corporate Action: Vote in favor of Ardent Leisure’s Proposed Sale of Main Event and Capital Return

Business Strategy & Outlook:   

Ardent Leisure’s fundamentals is moderated by the wider macroeconomic factors that influence its operations and the current restructuring efforts to restore earnings after the recent upheavals. Of greater concern is the near-term impact of the coronavirus on Ardent’s operations and its financial position, especially theme parks. But cost-cutting and government assistance measures have provided relief. RedBird’s USD 80 million investment in June 2020 for an initial 24.2% preferred equity interest in Main Event secures the U.S. family entertainment chain’s funding position. Furthermore, RedBird has the option to acquire an additional 26.8% interest at a future date, with the valuation to be based upon 9.0 times EBITDA at the time of exercising the option, subject to a minimum equity floor price. However, the Australian theme parks remain challenged. While the facilities have emerged from their forced shutdown in March 2020, the lingering impact of the pandemic is likely to constrain free cash flow. 

Beyond the current coronavirus crisis, Ardent Leisure possesses solid leisure and entertainment assets that all operate in intensely competitive markets. These assets compete for the leisure dollars of consumers who are spoilt with alternatives, especially in this online digital world, where most traditional entertainment activities can now be enjoyed in a virtual setting. Furthermore, most of the group’s businesses are relatively capital-intensive, particularly as Main Event expands its venue footprint and as Ardent strives to keep up with competing leisure options and stay fresh in consumers’ minds. The situation is exacerbated by cyclical factors, with consumer discretionary spending highly leveraged to swings in general economic conditions. The agreed sale of Main Event, announced in April 2022, was struck at a good price and the proceeds will lead to a healthy distribution to shareholders. However, it will leave the group with just the loss-making theme parks unit.

Financial Strengths:  

Ardent has AUD 119 million of net debt on the balance sheet, as at the end of December 2021. This comfortable position with AUD 93 million in available liquidity for Main Event is mainly thanks to Redbird’s USD 80 million (AUD 100 million) capital injection into the U.S. business, in return for a 24.2% preferred equity stake. The Queensland government’s recent tourism-friendly three-year AUD 64 million loan package (plus AUD 3 million grant) also means the Australian theme parks unit now has AUD 18 million of available liquidity.

Bulls Say: 

  • Main Event Entertainment adds growth appeal to Ardent Leisure, as it accelerates expansion into the United States family leisure market.
  • All of Ardent Leisure’s operating businesses enjoy solid market positioning.
  • Ardent Leisure’s balance sheet is solid and bolstered by a string of recent asset divestments and refinancing.

Company Description: 

Ardent Leisure is an owner and operator of leisure assets. Its theme park operations are situated in Australia, including Dreamworld and WhiteWater World on the Gold Coast. The group also runs Main Event, a growing portfolio of family entertainment operations in the United States, offering bowling, arcade and various other leisure activities. The agreed sale of Main Event, announced in April 2022, was struck at a good price and the proceeds will lead to a healthy distribution to shareholders. However, it will leave the group with just the loss-making theme parks unit.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Air New Zealand Poised to Thrive As Borders Reopen

Business Strategy & Outlook:   

The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on the global airline industry. Lockdowns, border restrictions, and social distancing measures have clipped Air New Zealand’s wings. Stringent New Zealand entry requirements for international arrivals have decimated passenger revenues, and despite aggressive cost cuts, and operating deleverage to lead to an after-tax loss in fiscal 2022. Nevertheless, Air New Zealand remains well-positioned to participate in the recovery as skies gradually reopen. New Zealand’s strict policies during the COVID-19 pandemic have effectively eliminated community transmission, and continued international travel restrictions will lead to a boon in domestic tourism. Air New Zealand typically enjoys around 80% market share, to recover to pre-COVID levels by the beginning of fiscal 2023. The international recovery is expected, where the airline derives the majority of revenue, to be more gradual. 

Air New Zealand’s international business remains effectively grounded. While there is room for optimism amid potential travel bubbles and continuing vaccine rollout, and as Air New Zealand has permanently condensed its wide-body fleet, a full recovery to pre-COVID-19 levels of flying in its long-haul business. Air New Zealand’s loyalty program, Airpoints, to some extent cushion earnings volatility in the flying business. Despite a lack of flying activity, the expected loyalty business to be profitable. Airpoints is essentially a capital-light business attached to a capital-intensive flying business. Consumers want to earn loyalty points when they fly, and status benefits are important for corporate passengers. The program generates earnings from the sale of points to partners–notably credit card companies, but also travel-related businesses such as hotels and rental car companies. This offers more ways to redeem and earn points, attracting more customers, which in turn attracts new partners–a network effect but not enough to warrant a moat for the group.

Financial Strengths:  

Despite near-term earnings pressure, Air New Zealand will be able to weather the storm, particularly following the NZD 2.2 billion recapitalisation in fiscal 2022–including an equity raise of NZD 1.25 billion. While raising capital at nearly half the updated fair value estimate is dilutive from a valuation standpoint, the equitable structure of a renounceable rights offer includes most shareholders, meaning investors need not be diluted. The airline is aggressively cutting costs in the short term, including delaying and cancelling NZD 700 million in capital expenditure, suspending dividends, and significant staffing reductions. Fiscal 2021 labour costs were nearly 40% lower than fiscal 2019 levels. Air New Zealand canceled payment of its first-half fiscal 2020 dividend, withholding around NZD 123 million at its disposal, and declared no final dividend. The firm paid no dividends in fiscal 2021, while the government funding agreement is in place, and dividends are not expected until fiscal 2026, as recovering earnings are first used to deleverage the balance sheet. Monthly cash burn was largely been stemmed in the second half of fiscal 2021, but returned at a rate of NZD 51 million in the first half of fiscal 2022 as lockdowns re-emerged–down from around NZD 96 million in the first half. Following the recapitalisation, the airline has around NZD 1.8 billion in pro forma liquidity as at March 25, 2022.

Bulls Say: 

  • As the largest airline in the New Zealand domestic market, new entrants would likely struggle to build Air New Zealand’s scale and route frequency to attract corporate customers. 
  • Air New Zealand’s earnings are highly leveraged to improving macroeconomic conditions and unrestricted air travel.
  • Limited cases of COVID-19 community transmission in New Zealand should benefit Air New Zealand’s domestic business

Company Description: 

Air New Zealand, majority owned by the New Zealand Government, provides air passenger and cargo transport services within New Zealand, as well as to and from Australia, the South-West Pacific, Asia, North America, the United Kingdom, and South America. Air New Zealand also encompasses business units providing engineering and ground handling services. Air New Zealand dominates the local market, with around 80% market share, although the majority of revenue is derived from international and trans-Tasman activity.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Reducing Scotts’ FVE to $130 on Lowered Near-Term Outlook; Shares Remain Undervalued

Business Strategy and Outlook 

Scotts Miracle-Gro is the largest and most recognizable name in the U.S. consumer lawn and gardening market. The firm sells a wide array of products aimed at helping consumers grow and maintain their lawns. The U.S. consumer segment, which consists of lawn and gardening products, generated 65% of total revenue in fiscal 2021. Scotts has generated healthy margins on its products through effective branding, which allows it to maintain favourable product positioning and shelf space in the largest mass-market and home improvement retailers. Scotts has also been able to charge a premium over competitors because of its strong brand equity. While actual product differentiation in the industry is limited, consumers have been willing to pay up for Scotts’ products.

Future demand for gardening products will depend on growth in the housing industry. We expect housing starts to average a little over 1.5 million per year through 2030. While housing starts alone should increase demand for gardening products, we see some secular trends that will offset the growth. Living-preference shifts to smaller lots and urban centers should result in less need for gardening products. Additionally, a greater proportion of gardening products will be sold online. Currently, the vast majority of sales occur at brick-and-mortar retail. Even if Scotts increases its online sales presence, it may lose some pricing power as many products in the gardening industry shift away from brick-and-mortar retailers to online platforms, where Scotts will likely face more low-priced competition. The Hawthorne segment, which includes indoor gardening, hydroponics, and lighting equipment, contributed a little under 30% of revenue in fiscal 2021. Its growth is closely tied to the legalization of cannabis in the U.S., as its products are frequently used by licensed growers. Recent acquisitions in the business should position Scotts to take advantage of growing demand from states where cannabis has been recently legalized. The majority of U.S. consumer sales typically come from Home Depot and Lowe’s. However, this should decline as a percentage of companywide revenue as the Hawthorne segment grows.

Financial Strength

Scotts Miracle-Gro currently has elevated leverage. As of March 31, we calculate net debt/adjusted EBITDA was nearly 5 times, well above with management’s long-term target leverage of 3.5 times. However, the company built up inventory in both the U.S. consumer and Hawthorne businesses in anticipation of improving volumes in the second half of the fiscal year. As the company works down its inventory and uses the cash to repay debt, we see no issues with its current financial position. Further, as the Hawthorne business recovers from the current industry oversupply, we expect EBITDA growth will resume and leverage ratios will fall back to management’s targets. Over the last five years, dividends grew at an average mid-single-digit rate. Management has indicated that it intends to continue raising the dividend, and Scotts should have the free cash flow to do so.

Bulls Say’s

  • U.S. household formation growth will drive demand for gardening products. As the market leader in consumer gardening products, Scotts will benefit from the secular housing trend. 
  • Consumer behaviour has changed as a result of COVID-19, with more consumers engaging in gardening as an activity. As the largest player in the consumer gardening market, Scotts will benefit from this change. 
  • The emerging cannabis industry represents a lucrative opportunity for Scotts, which is well positioned to capture this segment of the market.

Company Profile 

Scotts Miracle-Gro is the largest provider of gardening and lawncare products in the United States. The majority of the company’s sales are to large retailers that include Home Depot, Lowe’s, and Walmart. Scotts Miracle-Gro can sell its products at a higher price point than its competition because of a well-recognized portfolio of brands that include Miracle-Gro, Roundup, Ortho, Tomcat, and Scotts. Scotts is also the leading supplier of cannabis-growing equipment in North America through its Hawthorne business.

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice. The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities. Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document. The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Since fiscal 2016, Cleanaway has invested in excess of AUD 100 million in greenfield materials recovery, waste treatment, and EfW projects

Business Strategy and Outlook

It is a favourable Cleanaway’s strategy, which seeks to maintain its leading position in commercial and industrial, or C&I, and municipal waste collections and to continue to improve its moat profile by investing in midstream materials recovery assets and, where possible, in downstream disposal assets. Cleanaway’s is the leading player in C&I and municipal waste with around 140,000 C&I customers and some 90 municipal council waste collection contracts. The economics of the waste management industry are overwhelmingly local in nature. Cleanaway’s strong presence in all of Australia’s state capital cities is aimed at local market dominance. This local market dominance in turn delivers route density that better spreads fixed costs–an imperative for profit generation in waste collection. 

Cleanaway is a relative latecomer to disposal, biological treatment, and midstream materials recovery with global players waste management competitors Veolia and Suez possessing high-quality disposal assets Cleanaway cannot replicate. An exit from the Australian market by either player would be the only route to materially increasing disposal earnings. As such, the sale of the Lucas Heights Landfill by Suez to Cleanaway–the result of the Veolia-Suez merger–is a rare windfall. It is hopeful about Cleanaway’s growth into materials recovery which feature more favourable economics than waste collection. Under its “BluePrint 2030” capital allocation strategy, the group will continue to focus investment in materials recovery and energy from waste, or EfW. Since fiscal 2016, Cleanaway has invested in excess of AUD 100 million in greenfield materials recovery, waste treatment, and EfW projects. The recent purchase of the materials recovery assets of SKM Recycling represents a further step toward Cleanaway’s goal of moving further into the industries midstream. 

Further diversifying Cleanaway away from waste collection is the acquisition of Toxfree in late fiscal 2018, skewing Cleanaway’s earnings stream away from collections, the most competitive segment of the waste management value chain.

Financial Strength

Cleanaway debt-funded its acquisition of key Australian post-collection assets from Suez. Leverage–defined as net debt/EBITDA excluding IFRS-16 lease liabilities–sits at 2.24 times at the end of the first half of fiscal 2022, up from 1.0 times at fiscal 2021 year-end. Nonetheless, significant headroom to Cleanaway’s leverage covenant on existing debt facilities–calibrated at 3.0 times–exists. Therefore, balance sheet flexibility exists should further acquisition opportunities arise. It is comforting with Cleanaway’s balance sheet amid COVID-19 induced turbulence. Specifically, Cleanaway’s liquidity position is more than ample to secure the business’ operations without external financing through the medium-term. With minimal debt maturities over the fiscal 2021–fiscal 2024 period, Cleanaway’s sources of cash— those being cash at bank, undrawn debt and operating cash flow–are more than sufficient to fund Cleanaway’s ongoing operations over said period. Cleanaway’s earnings exhibit little volatility through the economic cycle. As a result, its conservatively positioned balance sheet provides ample flexibility for further capital allocation to materials recovery and waste disposal assets —whether bolt-on or greenfield–under Cleanaway’s BluePrint 2030 strategy. Return of capital to shareholders could be considered in the absence of suitable mid- or downstream waste asset investment opportunities.

Bulls Say’s

  • Cleanaway is benefiting from industry consolidation. 
  • Municipal waste contracts provide relatively stable cash flows through the economic cycle. 
  • Capital allocation improved markedly under outgoing CEO Vik Bansal’s guidance.

Company Profile 

Cleanaway Waste Management is Australia’s largest waste management business with a national footprint spanning collection, midstream waste processing, treatment, and valorisation, and downstream waste disposal. Cleanaway is active in municipal and commercial and industrial, or C&I, waste stream segments and in nonhazardous and hazardous liquid waste and medical waste streams following the acquisition of Toxfree in fiscal 2018. While Cleanaway is allocating greater capital to midstream waste processing and treatment, earnings remain skewed toward waste collection. Cleanaway is particularly strong in C&I and municipal waste collection with strong market share in all large Australian metro waste collection markets. 

(Source: MorningStar)

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