Category: Sectors

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Global stocks Shares

Management Is Optimistic About GM’s Future, as shown by the dividend resumption

Business Strategy & Outlook

The General Motors with a competitive lineup in all segments, combined with a reduced cost base, finally enabled it to have the scale to match its size. The head of Consumer Reports automotive testing even said Toyota and Honda could learn from the Chevrolet Malibu. The GM’s earnings potential is excellent because the company has a healthy North American unit and a nearly mature finance arm with GM Financial. Moving hourly workers’ retiree healthcare to a separate fund and closing plants drastically lowered GM North America’s breakeven point to U.S. industry sales of about 10 million-11 million vehicles, assuming 18%-19% share. The more scale to come from GM moving its production to more global platforms and eventually onto vehicle sets over the next few years for even more flexibility and scale. GM makes products that consumers are willing to pay more for than in the past. It no longer has to overproduce trying to cover high labor costs and then dump cars into rental fleets (which hurts residual values). GM now operates in a demand-pull model where it can produce only to meet demand and is structured to do no worse than break even at the bottom of an economic cycle when plants can be open. The result is higher profits than under old GM despite lower U.S. share. It now seeks roughly $300 billion in total revenue by 2030 with about $80 billion from many new high-margin businesses such as insurance, subscriptions, and selling data, while targeting 2030 total company adjusted EBIT margin of 12%-14%, up from 11.3% in 2021 and 7.9% in 2020. The actions such as buying Cruise, along with GM’s connectivity and data-gathering via OnStar, position GM well for this new era. Cruise is offering autonomous ride-hailing with its Origin vehicle, and GM targets $50 billion of Cruise revenue in 2030. GM is investing over $35 billion in battery electric and autonomous vehicles for 2020-25 and is launching 30 BEVs through 2025 with two thirds of them available in North America. Management also targets over 2 million annual BEV sales by mid decade and in early 2021 announced the ambition to only sell zero-emission vehicles globally by 2035.

Financial Strengths

GM’s balance sheet and liquidity were strong at the end of 2021, apart from $11.2 billion in underfunded pension and other postemployment benefit obligations, an improvement from $30.8 billion at year-end 2014. Management targets automotive cash and securities of $18 billion and liquidity of $30 billion-$35 billion. As per the calculation that at June 30, GM had automotive net cash and securities, excluding legacy obligations but including Cruise, of $4.6 billion, about $3.15 per diluted share. Global pension contributions in 2022 are expected at about $570 million, with about $500 million of that amount for non-U.S. plans. Auto and Cruise debt at June 30 is $16.9 billion, mostly from senior unsecured notes and capital leases. Credit line availability is about $17.5 billion across three lines with one of those lines being a 364-day $2 billion line allocated exclusively to GM Financial. The other two automotive lines are a $4.3 billion line expiring in April 2024 and an $11.2 billion line. The $11.2 billion line has $9.9 billion available until April 2026 while the remaining portion is available until April 2023. GM fulfilled its UAW VEBA funding obligations in 2010. As per calculation 2021 automotive and Cruise debt/adjusted EBITDA at 1.3, excluding legacy obligations and equity income. Automotive debt maturities including capital leases are about $463 million in 2022.

Bulls Say

  • GMNA’s break even point of about 10 million-11 million units is drastically lower than it was under old GM. Earnings should grow rapidly as GM becomes more cost-efficient. 
  • GM’s U.S. hourly labor cost is about $5 billion compared with about $16 billion in 2005 under old GM. 
  • GM can charge thousands of dollars more per vehicle in light-truck segments. Higher prices with fewer incentive dollars allow GM to get more margin per vehicle, which helps mitigate a severe decline in light vehicle sales and falling market share.

Company Description

General Motors Co. emerged from the bankruptcy of General Motors Corp. (old GM) in July 2009. GM has eight brands and operates under four segments: GM North America, GM International, Cruise, and GM Financial. The United States now has four brands instead of eight under old GM. The company lost its U.S. market share leader crown in 2021 with share down 280 basis points to 14.6%, but the GM to reclaim the top spot in 2022 as 2021 suffered from the chip shortage. GM Financial became the company’s captive finance arm in October 2010 via the purchase of AmeriCredit.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Reducing the Fair Value for Evercore to $158; shares undervalued though near term will be choppy

Business Strategy & Outlook

Starting in the back half of 2020 and especially after successful COVID-19 vaccines were announced, merger and acquisition volume picked up. Merger volume has been exceptionally strong, and it will normalize lower over the next several years. Evercore frequently has industry-leading productivity and growth. During 2017-21, advisory revenue per senior managing director was over $18 million annually compared with less than $10 million at multiple peers, according to the calculations. The high productivity is largely attributable to the company’s geographic mix being weighted more to the United States, which has had a healthier M&A recovery than the rest of the globe. A disciplined hiring and promotion philosophy also plays a key role. For much of the past decade, Evercore grew faster than peers, but it may be maturing, as it now had around 114 senior managing directors at the end of 2021 compared with about 60 in 2011. The investment management and institutional equities businesses that Ralph Schlosstein began building in 2010 usually accounts for around 20% of net revenue. The ISI Group acquisition in 2014 materially diversified Evercore’s business and was an accelerant to the equities business attaining a profitable scale. Evercore paid a full price for ISI, and much of the deal’s success hinges on whether Evercore can translate ISI’s research strength into equity underwriting deals and an underwriting capability into attracting incremental senior managing directors. While the institutional equities business largely underperformed expectations for years, some strong underwriting quarters and recent senior managing director headcount growth give an indication that the expected synergies are being realized. The company has retreated from institutional asset management and derives the bulk of its investment management revenue from wealth management to high-net-worth individuals.

Financial Strengths

Overall, Evercore appears to be in fine financial health. At the end of 2021, the company had notes payable of about $400 million. Most of the note’s payable don’t mature until 2026 or later. The company also generates significant amounts of free cash flow, as advisory, investment management, and flow-based equities trading are not capital-intensive businesses. Evercore has the ability to continue with its general policy of returning approximately all of its earnings to shareholders via dividends and share buybacks.

Bulls Say

  • Evercore has historically been able to increase advisory revenue faster than peers, and its revenue productivity per senior managing director often surprises to the upside. 
  • The company has significant amounts of cash and investment securities on its balance sheet.
  • Expansion of Evercore’s investment management and institutional equities businesses will provide a modest base of revenue even during a downturn in M&A activity. Additional offices outside the U.S. will help mitigate the company’s current reliance on the U.S. market.

Company Description

Evercore is an independent investment bank that derives the majority of its revenue from financial advisory, including merger, acquisition, and restructuring advisory. It also has institutional equities and investment management businesses that account for around 20% of net revenue. The company was founded in 1996 and went public in 2006. Evercore had approximately 1,950 employees at the end of 2021, and about 75% of its revenue is derived from the United States.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

ARB retained a strong balance sheet with cash reserves of $52.7m and no debt at FY22-end

Investment Thesis:

  • Current trading multiples adequately price in the near-term growth opportunities, in our view. 
  • Experienced management team and senior staff with a track record of delivering earnings growth.  
  • Strong balance sheet with no debt at FY22-end.
  • Strong presence and brands in the Australian aftermarket segment.
  • Growing presence in Europe and Middle East and potential to grow Exports.
  • Growth via acquisitions

Key Risks:

  • Higher than expected sales growth rates. 
  • Any delays or interruptions in production, especially in Thailand which happens on an annual basis.
  • Increased competition in the Australian Aftermarket especially with competitors’ tendency to replicate ARB products.
  • Slowing down of demand from OEMs. 
  • Poor execution of R&D.
  • Currency exposure

Key Highlights:

  • FY22 Results Highlights. Relative to the pcp: Sales of $694.5m, was up $71.5m or +11.5% over the previous year sales of $623.1m. Continuing sales growth was strong, driven by Australian Aftermarket and Export categories, whilst sales to Original Equipment Manufacturers were in line with last year as previously communicated, and considering the significant +33.9% sales growth achieved in the prior year, despite management highlighting “continuing constraints in new vehicle availability and ongoing personnel and supply chain challenges”. Management noted “sales to the Australian Aftermarket and Export markets were significantly impacted in the second half by the emergence of the Omicron Covid-19 variant in January and February 2022, resulting in abnormally high staff absenteeism, and by ongoing limited new vehicle availability. Sales into Export markets were also impacted in the second half by the outbreak of war in Ukraine”. 
  • Profit before tax of $165.7m, up +10.4% was broadly in line with sales revenue growth of +11.5%.
  • Earnings (NPAT) of $122.0m, up +8.1% on the reported NPAT of $112.9m in the previous year.
  • Cash flows generated from operations of $84.6m declined by $18.6m compared with the previous year due to an increase in inventories of $50.7m as ARB looked to mitigate increased supply chain lead times and ongoing disruptions. 
  • ARB currently has a larger than normal capex programme due to the anticipated completion of the new 30,000 square metre factory in Thailand in December 2022, ongoing construction of the corporate head office in Melbourne, Australia, and development of ARB New Zealand site in Hamilton, New Zealand, to consolidate the Beaut Utes and Proform businesses. 
  • The Board declared a final fully franked dividend of 32.0cps, which brings total dividends to 71.0cps fully franked, up +4.4% compared with last year. 
  • ARB retained a strong balance sheet with cash reserves of $52.7m and no debt at FY22-end. 
  • Performance Highlights by Segment. ARB saw strong sales growth of 25.6% in 1H22, which contrasts to a small decline of -1.1% in sales in 2H22, compared with the pcp. Comparing 2H22 versus 1H22: Australian Aftermarket. Sales of $183m in 2H22 versus $191m in 1H22 represent a -4.0% decline. Australian Aftermarket sales remained relatively consistent at 53.8% of ARB’s sales. According to management, “new vehicle sales in Australia declined by 2.1% over the last financial year, however new vehicle sales of ARB’s target vehicles, being four-wheel drive utilities and SUVs, grew by 0.3%. Demand for second hand 4WD vehicles globally continues to be strong and product sales for used 4WD vehicles remains an important part of ARB’s business”. ARB opened four new stores in Melton and Sale, Victoria, in Rutherford, New South Wales, and in Karratha, Western Australia. This brings the total number of ARB stores to 74, of which 30 are Company owned. 
  • Export. Sales grew +17.4% over FY22 and represented 38.7% of ARB’s sales, up slightly on FY21. Sales of $131m in 2H22 versus $138m in 1H22 represent a -5.1% decline.  Over FY22, sales growth was achieved in all regions: the Americas, Asia/Pacific and the Rest of the World, despite constraints in new vehicle availability especially in the UK where ARB’s operations are heavily reliant on product fitment to new vehicles rather than fitment to used vehicles”. 
  • Original Equipment Manufacturers. Segment sales equate to 7.5% of ARB’s total sales. Despite sales of $21m in 2H22 versus $30m in 1H22 representing a -29.8% decline, ARB saw overall FY22 OEM sales growth of +0.2% after a record +73.9% sales increase last year. According to management, the decline in 2H22 OEM sales “was expected and reflects the timing of new contracts and OEMs stocking up during calendar 2021 for new model releases”.

Company Description:

ARB Corporation Ltd (ARB) designs, manufactures, distributes, and sells 4-wheel drive vehicle accessories and light metal engineering works. It is predominantly based in Australia but also has presence in the US, Thailand, Middle East, and Europe. There are currently 61 ARB stores across Australia for aftermarket sales.

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Technology Stocks

IRE offers a defensive earnings profile and trades on a solid dividend yield of ~4%

Investment Thesis:

  • Solid FY22 earnings guidance.
  • 30% of the $100m buyback remains to be complete, which should support IRE’s share price.
  • Growing quantum of superannuation/pension bodes well for IRE’s clients, which bodes well for demand for IRE’s products.
  • IRE’s products are firmly entrenched within Australia, UK and South African financial market players (i.e. IRESS terminals and XPLAN). For instance, in ANZ Wealth Management segment, increasing dynamic of self-licensing by practices, high client retention and increasing demand for integrated solutions, are all key revenue themes. Over 90% of revenue is recurring.
  • Strong continuing momentum in the core growth markets of ANZ Wealth Management, and South Africa and the UK.
  • New product roll-out providing growth opportunities.
  • Solid balance sheet and capable management team.

Key Risks:

  • Less subscription due to declining sell-side and buy-side demand as well as financial planners.
  • Competitive platforms/offering (new disruptive technology); improved features and innovation from competition.
  • Associated risks in relation to system, technology and software.
  • Regulatory and structural changes in the finance sector impacting clients and their needs.
  • Deterioration in equity and debt markets which may have a negative impact on terminal demand.
  • Further deterioration with its Canadian segment.

Key Highlights:

  • FY22 Guidance reaffirmed but expected to be at lower-end. “IRESS affirms the guidance range for full year 2022 of segment profit of $177m – $183m. 2022 segment profit is expected to increase by 7% – 10% versus the pcp. Results are now expected to be at the lower end of the range due to investment in fund registry as part of investment infrastructure, and delayed growth in the UK”. 
  • Segment profit for the year is expected to grow by around +7%.
  • Underlying NPAT (excludes $13-15m pre-tax of investment in IRESS’ single technology platform and significant one-off items in 2021) is expected to grow by around +25% for the year.
  • Underlying EPS is expected to be 40-44cps on a constant currency basis. 
  • Key assumptions: $13-15m (pre-tax) of investment in IRESS’ single technology platform expected in 2022 as disclosed in July 2021. Effective tax rate (ETR) is expected to be in the range of 23-26%. Guidance is presented on a constant currency basis using average 2021 FX rates. Guidance does not include the impact of any potential M&A activity in 2022.
  • 1H22 Results Highlights. Relative to the pcp: (1) underlying revenue of $306.4m, up +6%; reported revenue of $308.2m, +6%. (2) Underlying segment profit of $80.3m, up +6%; reported segment profit of $80.7m, up +7%. (3) Underlying NPAT of $31.8m, up +29%; reported NPAT of $30.6m, down -25%. (4) Underlying ROIC of +9.6%, up +140 basis points or reported ROIC 9.4%, down -110 basis points. (5) Underlying EPS of 17.1cps, up +32% or reported EPS of 16.4cps, down -23%. (6) The Board declared an interim dividend of 16 cents per share, 25% franked.
  • Performance Highlights by Segments. 1H22 Constant Currency Segment Profit up +6%, Underlying NPAT up +29%. (1) IRE saw strong performance in APAC trading & market data and financial advice with revenue of $135.6m, up +8%. APAC trading & market data total revenue growth of +9% to $71.0m, and financial advice growth of +7% to $64.6m, both outperformed the Company’s medium term target (total revenue growth of ~5% per annum). Management noted Xplan user numbers in financial advice are stable. (2) IRE also saw revenue growth of +9% $23.6m as management highlighted recurring revenue is on track to medium term targets, growing +17%, driven by ESSSuper and GuildSuper going live. IRE’s medium term target revenue growth is +18% per annum. (3) U.K saw total revenue of $64.3m, up +2%, driven by Private Wealth management, which outperformed the medium-term targets in 1H22 – recurring revenue up +25% to $10.3m. This was offset by Retail Wealth not meeting expectations, and partly being impacted by changes in specific clients’ business models. IRE’s medium term target total revenue growth is +7% per annum. (4) Mortgages performed well, seeing total revenue increase +18% to $16.1m in 1H22 vs 1H21.

Company Description:

IRESS Ltd (IRE) is an ASX-listed company that specialises in software for the finance industry, with a focus on financial markets, wealth management and superannuation. IRE operates in the Asia-Pacific, UK, South Africa and Canada.

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Global stocks

Keurig Dr Pepper appears poised to augment the positioning of its cold business 60% of sales

Business Strategy & Outlook

The merger of Keurig Green Mountain and Dr Pepper Snapple into Keurig Dr Pepper created a North American beverage behemoth with strong brands and supply chain positioning. Despite being only one third and one sixth the size of Coke and Pepsi, respectively, Keurig Dr Pepper appears poised to augment the positioning of its cold business (60% of sales). However, it will have a more difficult time navigating various structural headwinds plaguing its hot business. Across soft drinks, the firm should be able to maintain a top-three position in its core categories. Although it’s disproportionately exposed to the beleaguered soda category, innovation will continue to resonate, owing to a core consumer gleaning a higher marginal benefit from consumption, affording continued pricing tailwinds. Moreover, the breadth of Keurig Dr Pepper’s selling apparatus facilitates exposure to high-growth segments, as smaller brands (like Polar Seltzer) leverage the firm for manufacturing or distribution.

Merger synergies have fuelled Keurig Dr Pepper’s strategic initiatives, with $600 million in cost savings (around 5% of sales) to be realized by 2022 via consolidated distribution, procurement leverage, and administrative streamlining. Management noted at the 2021 investor day that these savings would be used to fund initiatives surrounding customer acquisition and company-owned delivery. Competition remains robust across Keurig Dr Pepper’s core categories, and growth prospects outside of North American markets are encumbered by the firm’s lack of ownership rights to key trademarks internationally. Still, its resonant brands, distribution prowess, and partner networks will allow the company to maintain its positioning.

Financial Strengths

KDP’s financial position is manageable, though far from stellar. Keurig was considered the acquirer from an accounting perspective for the merger and funded the purchase of DPS’ assets with roughly 60% debt. The net debt/adjusted EBITDA for the combined entity rose above 8 times in 2018 after the merger, precariously higher than peers. Still, the stability of its industries, in conjunction with its profitability and management team, has allowed the company to manage its debt load, which will continue. KDP’s net debt/adjusted EBITDA ratio fell to 2.9 times as of December 2021, completing management’s goal of sub-3 times by 2021. Leadership aims to remain above the investment-grade threshold, and the material reduction in Keurig’s debt levels subsequent to being taken private lends credence to its ability in this regard. Though business prospects remain bright despite COVID-19, management used the opportunity to restructure its debt profile through extended maturities and lower rates, which gives us even greater confidence that the firm will be able to maintain its investment-grade credit rating (Moody’s also upgraded the debt outlook from negative to stable in

February 2021). Liquidity should also not be an issue, as in addition to over $550 million in cash (as of June 2022), the firm has ample access to short-term liquidity by way of commercial paper and its structured payables program.

Bulls Say

  • Cost synergies realized from the merger are allowing the company to invest in customer acquisition and other strategic assets like company owned distribution.
  • The firm still touts the dominant ecosystem in the North American single-serve coffee category, which yields several self-perpetuating advantages.
  • With a formidable distribution system, KDP is able to gain exposure to secularly advantaged categories through partnerships with upstart brands.

Company Description

Keurig Dr Pepper, the product of a 2018 merger between Dr Pepper Snapple and Keurig Green Mountain, is the third-largest non-alcoholic beverage company in North America. In addition to the eponyms, the firm’s flagship brands include 7UP, Canada Dry, Schweppes, Mott’s, and Bai. The company situates itself at different positions of the value chain depending on the segment (it reports four operating segments) and the product. It is primarily a brand owner in its beverage concentrates and Latin America beverages segments, as well as for the single-serve brewers within its coffee systems segment, and owns integrated production and distribution operations in its packaged beverages segment as well as for its K-cup pods.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Technology Stocks

TPG Telecom’s price-leader strategy still sees the company delivering solid subscriber and market share performance

price of btc is going to breakout

Business Strategy & Outlook

TPG Telecom is grappling with structural changes in the Australian telecom industry. Rollout of the national broadband network, or NBN, and take-up of high-traffic products such as internet protocol

television and video streaming, will increase the demand for broadband and backhaul capacity. However, the NBN will also force TPG Telecom to become a reseller, impacting its consumer broadband margins. TPG Telecom’s price-leader strategy still sees the company delivering solid subscriber and market share performance. Product bundling has also become a key segment in the market, with all players using broadband as a lead-in product and cross-selling voice, mobile, pay-TV, and digital streaming services.

The ownership of submarine cable between Australia and Guam offers the group broader cost advantages. Pricing is mainly a function of demand and supply, available capacity, and the length of cable. Economies of scale play a large part in pricing where costs are measured on per unit of volume. A longer cable results in increased material and maintenance costs, meaning cost per unit is higher. Cables with large capacity reduce costs per unit, as costs such as fixed construction and rollout costs are spread across a larger base. A sharp price decline in international traffic remains a risk. Contracts are structured in typical 15-year leases, providing some certainty in revenue. Clients are allocated a fixed bandwidth and have the right to on-sell capacity. The 2020 merger with Vodafone Australia (the third-ranked mobile player in the country) is one-way TPG Telecom is trying to limit the impact of the NBN. Mobile offers a critical strategic path to future-proof the group in the face of onslaught from the NBN. The government entity is already wreaking havoc on the narrow-moat-rated group’s retail fixed-line broadband and could even potentially impact the lucrative enterprise segment.

Financial Strengths

TPG Telecom’s financial health is solid. Historically, management has used debt to finance acquisitions and demonstrated a capacity to pay it down in due course. As at the end of June 2022, net debt/EBITDA was 2.0 times, below the covenant limit of 3.5 times.

Bulls Say

  • Cross-selling opportunities remain for both consumer and corporate markets.
  • The merger with Vodafone Australia increases the scale of the combined entity and allow it to better compete against Telstra and Optus in the Australian market.
  • Further rollout of its fiber network also boosts growth, while incremental cost from an additional user is small.

Company Description

TPG Telecom is Australia’s third-largest integrated telecom services provider. It offers broadband, telephony, mobile and networking solutions catering to all market segments (consumer, small business, corporate and wholesale, government). The group has grown significantly since 2008, both

via organic growth and acquisitions, and in July 2020 merged with Vodafone Australia. It owns an extensive stable of infrastructure assets.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Swiss Re Is an Undervalued and Fairly Run Reinsurer

Business Strategy & Outlook

Swiss Re has a history of overly aggressive expansion and typically too much leverage. The first example of this can be seen in the acquisition of General Electric Insurance Solutions in the earlier part of the new millennium. This was financed through a combination of debt and share issuance, a historic and largest Swiss Re acquisition in that period. Furthermore, Swiss Re continued down a path of building out its reinsurance securitization offering, structuring pools of credit, mortality and natural catastrophe risk. This did not work out well because the Swiss Re increased correlation and dependence and when financial markets fell so did the value of these securities. Swiss Re’s leverage position and problems with its securitization program led the business to complete a capital raise and take on Berkshire as a preferential terms’ investor. This investment built on a previously established relationship where Berkshire reinsured substantially all of Swiss Re’s yearly renewable-term United States mortality book, another area where Swiss Re had run into difficulties. 

The latest round has been aggressive expansion for commercial insurance and this came back to bite the business. What is a business that is still overleveraged and one where the levels of debt do need to be addressed? However, from an operational perspective one can see a company that is focusing on building a cleaner and more traditional reinsurance business, one that focuses on underwriting and shifts away from reliance on investment returns to fund unprofitable long-tailed lines of underwriting. One can see a turnaround in corporate solutions starting to come to fruition and the nascent stronger move into more specialist lines of business and find the management team to be a lot more disciplined. However, one would like to see the business reign in its buybacks and concentrate more on building out the long-term profitability of this business.

Financial Strengths

Swiss Re does not have a particularly strong balance sheet. It would help the business immensely if management chose to pay down more debt. Swiss Re has around $11.2 billion of debt. The majority of this is long term, and the most substantial portions don’t mature for a few years. The shape of the debt isn’t well balanced, with the vast majority issued as subordinated. This means there are some pockets of very high interest rates and this is reflected in the broader group’s interest. Swiss Re pays an annual dividend that it intends to grow annually in line with long-term earnings growth and maintain the prior year’s dividend as a minimum level. The business also actions buybacks, though given the macro uncertainty it would be prudent if the business held off over the next few years from doing this.

Bulls Say

  • Swiss Re looks to be on the cusp of producing consistent results in the long term under the performing commercial insurance division. 
  • The quality of Swiss Re’s investment portfolio is high. 
  • Swiss Re pays a good dividend.

Company Description

Swiss Re was established in 1863 in Zurich. Since then, the business appears to have cycled through quite a few strategies. Namely in the early part of the millennium Swiss Re took on an investment banker who eventually led the business. Over the next 10 years CEO Jacques Aigrain built Swiss Re’s financial solutions into a powerhouse and helped the company complete its first securitization, finalized in 2005 for credit reinsurance. This division became a leader for Swiss Re but then disaster struck during the global financial crisis. Swiss Re mothballed this unit and approved a CHF 5 billion capital raise. Now the business concentrates more fundamentally on property and casualty, life and health reinsurance. Swiss Re also has a good commercial insurance offering named corporate solutions.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Technology Stocks

Roper Looks Strongly Positioned to Continue Compounding Cash as it Remakes Its Portfolio

Business Strategy & Outlook

Roper acquires software companies with large amounts of deferred revenue. Large quantities of deferred revenue exist because many software businesses receive cash far in advance of when services are rendered. Roper uses this cash to invest in businesses at incrementally higher rates of return. Its targets have large bases of recurring revenue in oligopolistic, niche markets with small total addressable markets. That revenue base is protected by strong switching costs that frequently post customer retention rates greater than 95%. Roper’s businesses typically don’t own their own infrastructure, which further contributes to its asset-light business model. From 2003 through today, Roper’s net working capital as a percentage of sales has dropped from 18% to negative 13%. Skeptics point out three criticisms: Roper purchases businesses that have little strategic rationale with one another; it is starving its businesses for capital; and the business model carries a lot of execution risk since the company will eventually run out of targets to purchase. All three of these criticisms miss the mark. First, purchasing unrelated businesses is an advantage. While competitors frequently purchase targets to either eliminate competition or buy distribution, Roper screens all opportunities based on how each business will add to long-term cash returns, a key reason is the stock has beat the returns of the S&P 500 by about 2 times since 2003. Second, Roper’s businesses don’t require capital to continue growing. The maintenance capital expenditures are less than 1% of sales. Even so, free cash flow conversion consistently hovers well over 100%. Finally, capital allocation has been integrally tied to Roper’s culture since the early 2000s. The firm also does not try to extract aggressive synergy targets from acquisitions, choosing instead to focus on opportunity cost. Private equity also provides Roper with a continuous revolving door of potential investment opportunities. Following portfolio changes, one can still believe Roper is poised to continuously compounded cash for many years, and it can anticipate mid teens EPS growth through the cycle.

Financial Strengths

Roper is in strong financial health, and it is adequately capitalized to meet its ongoing service obligations. As a result, one can derive a low risk of default in the model’s credit risk assessment, which is slightly better than the moderate risk the rating agencies assign to Roper’s bonds. One reason one is more confident is Roper’s free cash flow conversion, which historically hovers well over 100% of earnings (including 125% in 2020, on an adjusted basis). While the firm does take on leverage when acquiring a target, management has indicated it is absolutely committed to maintaining an investment-grade rating. At an investor conference in early 2019, CEO Neil Hunn indicated his belief that Roper could do a $3 billion-$3.5 billion deal and “easily be inside of investment-grade.” Since that time, Roper has spent over $6 billion in acquisitions and has still managed to maintain its investment-grade credit rating. As of the end of 2021, the firm’s net debt/adjusted EBITDA was about 3.4 times. While one normally doesn’t like EBITDA metrics when assessing a firm’s financial health, one can point out that Roper converts about 82% of its adjusted EBITDA into free cash flow. The firm’s interest coverage (EBIT/interest), moreover, stands at 8.5 times. Unlike other multi-industry conglomerates, the firm has no pension plan. Given that one doesn’t believe Roper requires any restricted cash to operate its businesses, one can add back 100% of Roper’s cash to the net debt calculation, which is also unusual in multi-industry coverage.

Bulls Say

  • Roper’s total returns have doubled the returns of the S&P 500 over the past 15 years. 
  • Roper’s culture is greater than one person, and former CEO Jellison’s framework is safe in the hands of the current CEO and CFO. 
  • The winning formula of using cash from a recurring revenue base to acquire cash-rich businesses at reasonable valuations shows no signs of slowing down, with expected future earnings growing at similar to historical rates as the firm ups its acquisition spending.

Company Description

Roper is a diversified technology company that operates through three segments: application software; network software and systems; and technology enabled products. The firm’s culture emphasizes acquiring asset-light, cash-generative businesses. Roper then reinvests this excess cash in businesses that yield incrementally higher rates of return. While the businesses are managed in a decentralized manner, Roper does not passively manage its portfolio. Instead, Roper manages its businesses through the Socratic method and empowers decision-makers through group executive coaching. Roper has now rotated a clear majority of its business from legacy industrial products into technology software in mature, niche markets with large quantities of deferred revenue.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

Blackmores has seen strong growth in its international segment

Business Strategy & Outlook

Blackmores’ customer profiles are very different in its two key markets, Australia and China. Vitamin-taking Australians tend to be older or females either before or during pregnancy, while in China the market is dominated by young, online shoppers who view international vitamin and dietary supplements as luxury purchases. Nonetheless, the importance of perceived product quality—largely

an extension of brand positioning—is common to both customer groups. Blackmores’ brand intangible assets support its narrow economic moat. Blackmores’ position within the core Australian market as stable and the market as well penetrated. Actual performance in Australia is clouded by informal exports of products purchased for the daigou channel and sent to China. In fiscal 2021, roughly 9% of ANZ sales were ultimately sent to China. While this contribution remaining below 10% due to coronavirus and regulatory changes requiring daigous to register as businesses and pay taxes, this will be offset by growth in the direct China segment.

China presents a large opportunity for Blackmores as it is the second-largest global VDS market after the U.S, and it will contribute roughly 30% of group revenue at mid-cycle. Other than the informal daigou trade, Blackmores primarily distributes into China via cross-border e-commerce where the product is sold on online platforms. Further opportunity lies in establishing a sizable offline retail business, but this hinges on the company obtaining regulatory approval. Blackmores has seen strong growth in its international segment, which now contributes more to earnings than the China segment

and is forecast to remain larger. The segment is largely composed of regions in Southeast Asia including Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Blackmores aims to continue the momentum after entering India in 2021 and gaining halal accreditation to serve Muslim consumers, particularly in Indonesia.

Financial Strengths

Blackmores is in a solid financial position with net cash of AUD 92 million as at June 2022. It should maintain its net cash position over the forecast period and afford a 45% dividend payout ratio. Free cash flow conversion of net income has averaged 102% over the preceding five years (before acquisitions), above the average 54% dividend payout ratio. Free cash conversion of net income to average 93% over the next five years.

Bulls Say

  • A reputation for quality is fundamental in the VDS market and Blackmores’ reputation is untarnished.
  • Bar fiscal 2020, the company has earned returns on invested capital well above its single-digit cost of capital, demonstrating its brand strength and associated pricing power.
  • Blackmores’ new CEO brings experience in navigating international brand sales and distribution in Asian markets which should allow the company to progress its business outside of Australia.

Company Description

Blackmores is a leading Australian vitamin and health supplement manufacturer and is the larger of two major vitamin brands by market share in Australia. Overseas sales also contribute a significant amount to earnings, particularly from Southeast Asia and the Chinese market via both formal (cross-border e-commerce) and informal (daigou) sales channels.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Technology Stocks

Cochlear is investing significantly to increase awareness as well as funding research to support payer reimbursement

Business Strategy & Outlook

Cochlear is the market leader in cochlear implants with a consistent share of roughly 60% across developed markets. Cochlear implants became the standard of care many years ago for children in developed markets with profound hearing loss or deafness. With this market segment largely penetrated, the company is looking elsewhere for growth with developed-markets adults the next primary focus and emerging-markets children after that. Roughly 70% of units are sold to developed markets and the remaining 30% to emerging markets, where over 90% are for children. Large price differentials in the lower range of products result in 80% of revenue being earned in developed markets and 20% in tender-oriented emerging markets. The average unit prices achieved in developed markets are double those in emerging markets. In the developed-markets children segment, the growth tailwinds from increasing market penetration and the shift from single to bilateral implants over the last 15 years have played out, and forecast growth in this segment to reduce to the birth rate over time.

The adult developed market is more difficult to penetrate, and required investment to expand this segment will restrain significant operating margin expansion. Currently, penetration is still estimated to be under 5%, and Cochlear is at a pivot point as it invests to be adopted more widely by seniors with profound hearing loss. Prevalence of profound hearing loss increases over 65 years and has a steep increase over 80 years of age. As such, an ageing population and low penetration suggest a large opportunity. However, hearing aids, not cochlear implants, are the standard of care. Cochlear is investing significantly to increase awareness as well as funding research to support payer reimbursement. But two main challenges can be seen to accessing this market fully: first, the relatively low willingness of older candidates to undertake such invasive surgery, and second, the improvements

in hearing aids. The hearing aid market is increasing its penetration in the severe hearing loss category, leaving only the smaller profound hearing loss as the cochlear implant niche.

Financial Strengths

The company has typically enjoyed low capital intensity and high cash conversion, affording it to pay out 70% of earnings as a dividend. However, with the confluence of operational weakness due to deferred elective surgeries as a result of the coronavirus, a peak in the capital cycle, and a patent infringement penalty becoming payable, the company faced a liquidity crunch. Consequently, it completed an AUD 850 million equity raise in fiscal 2020, adding an additional 10% to shares on issue and forecast the company to carry no net debt for the foreseeable future. The company is not acquisitive and organic growth is driven by R&D spending of roughly 12% of revenue per year.

Bulls Say

  • There are signs Cochlear is looking to expand beyond the hearing market with the investment in Nyxoah, a company focused on development of a hypoglossal nerve stimulation therapy for the treatment of obstructive sleep apnea.
  • The annuity like revenue stream from sound processor upgrades and accessories is an increasingly important component of the revenue stream.
  • Cochlear earns ROICs well ahead of the cost of capital even in bear-case scenario, which is testament to the high quality of the company.

Company Description

Cochlear is the leading cochlear implant device manufacturer with around 60% global market share. Developed markets contribute 80% of group revenue where cochlear implants are the standard of care for children with severe to profound hearing loss. The company also actively targets the growing cohort of seniors in developed markets. Tender-oriented emerging markets contribute the remaining 20% of group revenue. Main products include cochlear implants, bone-anchored hearing aids, and associated sound processors. In fiscal 2020, 49% of revenue came from the Americas, 35% from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and 16% from the Asia-Pacific segment.

(Source: Morningstar)

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