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Global stocks Shares

Sysco’s Cost Advantage and Growth Strategy Are Driving Impressive Market Share Gains

Business Strategy & Outlook

The Sysco possesses a narrow moat, rooted in its cost advantages. The firm benefits from lower distribution cost given its closer proximity to customers, complemented by scale-enabled cost advantages such as purchasing power and resources to provide value-added services to its customers. While COVID-19 created a very challenging environment, the U.S. food-service market has fully recovered, with volumes exceeding pracademic levels as of March 2022. Sysco has emerged as a stronger player, in our view, with $2 billion in new national account contracts (3% of pracademic sales) and a 10% increase in independent restaurant customers.

In 2021, Sysco laid out its three-year road map, termed “recipe for growth” which will be funded by the elimination of $750 million in operating expenses between fiscals 2021 and 2024. The plan should allow Sysco to grow 1.5 times faster than the overall food-service market by fiscal 2024. Sysco is investing to eliminate customer pain points by removing customer minimum order sizes while maintaining delivery frequency and lengthening payment terms. It improved its CRM tool, which now uses data analytics to enhance prospecting, rolled out new sales incentives and sales leadership, and is launching an automated pricing tool, which should sharpen its competitive pricing while freeing up time for sales reps to pursue more value-added activities, such as securing new business. Sysco also developed the industry’s first customized marketing tool, harnessing its significant customer data to generate tailored messaging that should resonate with each customer, a tool that has been increasing Sysco’s share of wallet. Further, Sysco has switched to a team-based sales approach, with product specialists that should help drive increased adoption of Sysco’s specialized product categories such as produce, fresh meats, and seafood. Lastly, Sysco is launching teams that specialize in various cuisines (Italian, Asian, Mexican) that should drive market share gains in ethnic restaurants. Looking abroad, Sysco has a new leadership team in place for its international operations, increasing the confidence that execution will improve.

Financial Strengths

The Sysco’s solid balance sheet, with $4 billion of cash and available liquidity (as of March) relative to $11 billion in total debt, positions the firm well to endure the pandemic. Sysco has a consistent track record of annual dividend increases, even during the 2008-09 recession and the pandemic. A 5%-10% annual increases each year the forecast, maintaining its target of a 50%-60% payout ratio. 

Sysco has historically operated with low leverage, generally reporting net debt/adjusted EBITDA of less than 2 times. Leverage increased to 2.3 times after the fiscal 2017 $3.1 billion Brakes acquisition, and above 3 times in fiscals 2020 and 2021, given the pandemic. But the leverage will fall back below 2 times by fiscal 2024, given debt paydown and recovering EBITDA.  Calls for free cash flow averaging 3% of sales annually over the next five years. In May 2021, Sysco shifted its priorities for cash in order to support its new Recipe for Growth strategy. It’s new priorities are capital expenditures, acquisitions, debt reduction when leverage is above 2 times, dividends, and opportunistic share repurchase. Its previous priorities were capital expenditures, dividend growth, acquisitions, debt reduction, and share repurchases. In fiscal 2023-24, as it invests to support accelerated growth, Sysco should spend 1.4% of revenue on capital expenditures, falling to 1.1% thereafter. In fiscal 2021 Sysco completed the $714 million acquisition of Greco and Sons and the $500 million acquisition of The Coastal Companies.To invest about $100 million to $200 million annually on acquisitions thereafter. Finally, the model $500 million-$600 million in annual expenditures to buyback about 1% of outstanding shares annually. A prudent use of cash when shares trade below the assessment of intrinsic value.

Bulls Say

  • As Sysco’s competitive advantage centers on its position as the low-cost leader,  Sysco should be able to increase market share in its home turf over time.
  • Sysco has gained material market share during the pandemic, allowing it to emerge a stronger competitor.
  • The company is performing well under the leadership of CEO Kevin Hourican (in place since 2020), with his Recipe for Growth strategy driving improved sales growth and profit margins.

Company Description

Sysco is the largest U.S. food-service distributor, boasting 17% market share of the highly fragmented food-service distribution industry. Sysco distributes over 400,000 food and nonfood products to restaurants (66% of revenue), healthcare facilities (9%), education and government buildings (8%), travel and leisure (5%), and other locations (14%) where individuals consume away-from-home meals. In fiscal 2021, 83% of the firm’s revenue was U.S.-based, with 8% from Canada, 3% from the U.K., 2% from France, and 4% other.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

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Global stocks Shares

Inflated Raw Material Costs In Conjunction With Significant Market Competition To Impede Growth For Catalent Inc.

Business Strategy and Outlook

Catalent is a leading contract development and manufacturing organization, or CDMO. The company has an extensive network of partnerships with pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms that leverage its expertise and scale to optimize drug production and avoid the risks of in-house drug manufacturing. The challenges and compliance risks associated with changing a drug’s manufacturing process create a sticky relationship for Catalent’s customers. Drug companies tend to stick with trusted suppliers with good track records of regulatory compliance, which makes them unlikely to switch to a different CDMO. Catalent provides a range of development and manufacturing solutions for drugs, protein-based biologics, cell and gene therapies, and consumer health products throughout the entire life cycle of a product from the drug development process to commercial supply. Outsourcing penetration is anticipated to continue incrementally increasing, driven by the complexities of biologics manufacturing. 

Biologics are large, complex molecules such as antibodies, recombinant proteins, vaccines, and cell and gene therapies. Catalent’s biologics segment accounted for 48% of its fiscal year 2021 revenue. The biologics manufacturing process requires around-the-clock maintenance, with an emphasis on maintaining the integrity of the cell and its DNA as well as keeping the cells free of contaminants. The same cell line reproduces to continue making the product until the end of the drug’s life. Therefore, for clients to switch manufacturers would require establishing a new cell line that would result in variations, or transferring the technology, which makes it vulnerable to changes as well. Biopharma customers are likely to continue outsourcing to CDMOs in order to benefit from access to flexible capacity and manufacturing improvements. According to Industry Standard Research, only one third of pharmaceutical manufacturing is currently conducted in-house while two thirds are outsourced.

Financial Strength

Catalent is in fair financial health, and the business is expected to continue providing a steady stream of cash. The company has historically utilized debt, particularly for acquisitions. Catalent ended 2021 with $3.2 billion in total debt after completing several acquisitions over the last few years of biologics-focused businesses, cell and gene therapy companies, and a gummies manufacturer. Catalent is focused on expanding its biologics capabilities to meet increased demand for complex biologics manufacturing and diversify its offerings to customers. The company is expected to be able to meet its financial obligations thanks to continued strong growth. At the end of 2021, Catalent had nearly $900 million in cash and equivalents, which is considered a healthy amount to support additional growth.

Bulls Say’s

  • Contract development and manufacturing organizations like Catalent have sticky businesses with long-term contracts and high switching costs for its customers. 
  • As drug portfolios are increasingly made up of complex drugs like biologics and emerging therapies, Catalent’s biopharma customers will be more reliant on outsourced manufacturing. 
  • With its global scale, Catalent is less dependent on any one customer or drug, which allows it to better absorb unexpected late-stage trial failures or drops in demand.

Company Profile 

Catalent is a contract development and manufacturing organization, or CDMO. It operates under four segments: biologics, softgel and oral technologies, oral and specialty delivery, and clinical supply services. Catalent derives its revenues primarily from long-term supply agreements with pharmaceutical customers. The company provides a range of development and manufacturing solutions for drugs, protein-based biologics, cell and gene therapies, and consumer health products throughout the entire life cycle of a product from the drug development process to commercial supply. Catalent has over 50 facilities across four continents.

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

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Global stocks Shares

Lower Copaxone Sales, US Generic Competition, Unfavorable Exchange Rates Weigh on Teva’s Results

Business Strategy & Outlook: 

Israel-based Teva Pharmaceutical is one of the largest global generic drug manufacturers, with a significant presence in the United States and in Western Europe. Generic drug manufacturers with large exposure to the U.S. have fared very poorly compared with the overall market over the past few years due to factors that resulted in a highly deflationary generic drug price environment. To combat further margin deterioration, the largest, most capable manufacturers have invested more heavily in development and marketing of complex generics and biosimilars, which face much less competition and price erosion than small-molecule generics. 

Founded in 1901, Teva was a small wholesale drug business in Jerusalem that converted into a local drug manufacturer during World War II with the rise in demand. The company consolidated the market in 1960 to create the largest drugmaker; it later expanded into Europe and the U.S. and then into generics in 1984 with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act. In the following 30 years, Teva completed roughly 30 acquisitions to further its position as the largest global generic manufacturer with roughly 90 manufacturing and research and development facilities worldwide. Despite efforts to curb margin deterioration by eliminating unprofitable drugs in the portfolio, Teva’s top and bottom lines have been negatively affected by a 70% decline in sales for its largest specialty drug, Copaxone, following generic entry and competition from new therapies. At its peak in 2013, Copaxone generated $4.3 billion in sales and contributed one fifth of total company revenue. While the company’s specialty drug pipeline is deep and consists of several novel biologic products and biosimilars, the growth is expected to be anemic over the next few years with slow generic revenue growth and a further decline in Copaxone sales. The company forecasts $750 million in Copaxone revenue in 2022.

Financial Strengths:

As of year-end 2021, Teva holds net debt of $20.9 billion, with $1.4 billion due in 2022, $2.1 billion due in 2023, and $2.0 billion due in 2024. The company’s $2 billion in cash and free cash flow generated from operations gives us some assurance that Teva should meet its obligations in the near term. Legal risk from ongoing litigation related to opioids, price-fixing, and Copaxone is also a risk to liquidity over the next several years. The base assumption calls for $2 billion in a cash settlement paid over a period of 15 years.

Bulls Say:

  • As a leading global generic manufacturer, Teva enjoys economies of scale over its smaller peers.
  • Teva’s specialty portfolio represents one fifth of sales and diversifies the company from generic drug deflation risk.
  • Teva’s biosimilar for Humira is anticipated to launch in the U.S. in 2023, which should bolster specialty segment sales.

Company Description: 

Based in Israel, Teva is one of the world’s largest generic drug manufacturers, with over 3,500 products marketed in over 60 countries. While a majority of its revenue is attributed to prescription generic drugs, Teva develops and markets its own branded specialty and biopharmaceutical products, primarily in the U.S. and in Europe. The company’s branded portfolio generates one fifth of total revenue and consists of patented therapies targeting central nervous system conditions (Austedo, Ajovy, Copaxone), oncology (Bendeka/Treanda), and respiratory conditions (ProAir, Qvar). While global competition has facilitated the commodification of small-molecule generic drugs, Teva’s portfolio rationalization has resulted in less overall price erosion versus peers.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

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Global stocks Shares

Vehicle Repair Demand Continues to Strengthen, Benefiting LKQ’s Q1 Results

Business Strategy & Outlook

LKQ is the top alternative vehicle-parts provider to repair shops in North America and Europe. The company has built scale-driven cost advantages in its business. Customers value LKQ’s consistent parts availability across a wide range of products and quick delivery. LKQ helps customers complete repairs faster, boosting productivity. The company’s strong distribution network will support its ability to keep order fulfilment rates high in both aftermarket and salvage products.

The company’s strategy focuses on being a one-stop shop for repair professionals, ranging from salvage products to aftermarket and remanufactured parts. LKQ’s parts are a strong alternative to original equipment manufacturers’ parts, exhibiting high quality in comparison. While insurance companies aren’t usually direct customers, they do have sway over which parts are used in vehicle repairs. LKQ’s alternative parts allows insurance companies to reduce their cost base while also reducing the cycle time for repairs. Historically, the company has used acquisitions to build up its capabilities and footprint, but that has changed over the past few years. LKQ has shifted its focus to integrating its businesses and improving its cost structure, and it will aim to make smaller tuck-in acquisitions as opposed to larger deals.

 LKQ is well positioned to compete as electric vehicle adoption increases. The shift to EVs will present new revenue opportunities for the company. In both hybrid and full-electric vehicles, new parts will be needed to keep vehicles on the road. For example, to see increased demand for battery-related parts and a need for remanufactured or refurbished batteries.

LKQ has exposure to end markets with attractive tailwinds. The demand for repair work will be strong in the near term, largely due to vehicle owners taking in their cars for overdue servicing (delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic). The high average age of vehicles will also support demand for repair work.

Financial Strengths

LKQ maintains a sound balance sheet. Its debt balance stood at $2.8 billion in 2021, down from $3.7 billion in 2019. LKQ’s management team has been focused on strengthening the balance sheet over the past few years. The company’s net leverage position (net debt/EBITDA) has steadily improved, declining from nearly 3 times to under 2 times in 2021. This resulted in LKQ reaching investment-grade status.

In terms of liquidity, the company will be on solid footing over the long term. In 2021, LKQ had a cash balance of nearly $300 million, but this will likely increase over the forecast, given the company’s shift in its acquisition strategy. In the past, LKQ was more willing to acquire companies to expand its capabilities and footprint. Going forward, the company will focus on small tuck-ins, freeing up more cash to reinvest in its business, repurchase shares and grow its dividend. A stronger cash position will help LKQ quickly react to a changing operating environment as well as meet any near-term debt obligations (no major maturities until 2024). The comfort in LKQ’s ability to access $1.2 billion in credit facilities. LKQ’s solid balance sheet gives management the financial flexibility to run a balanced capital allocation strategy going forward that mostly favours organic growth and also returns cash to shareholders.

 LKQ can generate solid free cash flow throughout the economic cycle. The company to generate over $1 billion in free cash flow in midcycle year, supporting its ability to return free cash flow to shareholders through share repurchases and dividends. Additionally, free cash flow growth over the next decade will be supported by improving EBITDA margins in LKQ’s Europe business, which to be in the low-double-digit range over the next five years.

Bulls Say

  • Growth in miles driven increases the wear and tear on vehicles, requiring more maintenance and repair work to keep them on the road, benefiting LKQ.
  • LKQ’s collision business could see rising demand from increasing auto claims as more drivers return to the road following the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Increasing adoption of hybrid vehicles presents new revenue opportunities for LKQ, such as new battery related parts, in addition to its ICE-related parts.

Company Description

LKQ is a leading global distributor of non-OEM automotive parts. Initially formed in 1998 as a consolidator of auto salvage operations in the United States, it has since greatly expanded its scope to include distribution of new mechanical and collision parts, specialty auto equipment, and remanufactured and recycled parts in both Europe and North America. It still maintains its auto salvage business and owns over 70 LKQ pick-your-part junkyards. Separate from the self-service business, LKQ purchases over 300,000 salvage automobiles annually that are used to extract parts for resale. Globally, LKQ maintains approximately 1,700 facilities.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Global stocks

Increased focus from management on digitalization as Beiersdorf lags its peers in terms of its share of digital sales

Business Strategy and Outlook

Beiersdorf’s strategy, C.A.R.E.+, focuses on three key growth drivers: skincare prioritization, white-space penetration, and an acceleration of digital transformation. Vincent Warnery, the new CEO appointed in May 2021, has emphasized his continued support for the strategy, having been part of Beiersdorf’s executive board at the time it was introduced in 2019. In the past few years, Beiersdorf has put the strategy into action by focusing its innovation program on the skincare category, with an emphasis on facial care, as the fastest-growing subcategory. It is anticipated for this strategy to be wise, given that the facial care segment features both faster growth and higher margins than the body care segment, in which Beiersdorf, and its flagship brand Nivea, have been historically over-indexed. 

Nivea is a EUR 4 billion brand and accounts for about two thirds of the sales in the consumer segment and over half of the group sales. The brand has a long history in Europe and is the largest brand in skincare globally, albeit in a highly fragmented market. Under Warnery, the business is moving toward a more centrally driven model, with a newly appointed global head of Nivea being responsible for all the branding decisions, allowing markets to focus on execution rather than adaptation of communication or brand strategy. However, it is alleged cohesiveness in marketing, repositioning to faster growing segments, and investments in digital are still needed to bring back some of the brand’s lost lustre. 

White-space penetration is another area emphasized by management as the business looks to decrease its reliance on Europe, and looks to expand its business, primarily in the U.S. and China. There is also increased focus from management on digitalization as Beiersdorf lags its peers in terms of its share of digital sales. Given all these initiatives, it is likely for the mix to be the largest contributor to margin expansion over the medium term, while marketing and sales investment will likely remain elevated to enable the implementation of the strategy

Financial Strength

Beiersdorf has one of the strongest balance sheets among consumer staples coverage. The company held EUR 1 billion of cash as well as EUR 4.5 billion in current and non-current securities on its balance sheet at the end of 2021, while debt only amounted to EUR 0.6 billion. This translates into a net debt to EBITDA of negative 4 times, using both cash and securities. The company argues that this conservative financial policy enables management to successfully navigate periods of crisis such as those experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, it is held, this level of cash may be excessive, especially since shareholder distributions have been meagre, with dividends kept flat at EUR 0.70 for over a decade and a lack of share buy-back initiatives. Holding the dividend constant, it is projected the payout ratio (using net income) will decrease from 25% in 2021 to just 14% in five years. Leveraging up to 2 times debt/EBITDA, including cash and securities and the more than 2 EUR billion that Beiersdorf holds in treasury stock, could finance a transformative deal through cash of up to EUR 8 billion. However, given the company’s clear preference for conservative balance sheet management, it is not probable that there will be a significant appetite for a large deal, with management continuing to pursue bolt-on acquisitions and small deals in areas that complement the strategy of expanding their presence in skincare, such as the recent Chantecaille acquisition.

Bulls Say’s

  • Beiersdorf’s clear focus on skincare and the efforts to reposition Nivea into facial care has the potential to pay out in both superior growth and improved margin over the midterm. 
  • The move toward a centrally managed model should benefit the business, with more cohesive marketing and increased digital investment helping to rejuvenate Nivea. 
  • With its low cost of financing, cash and securities of EUR 5.5 billion, slowing global organic growth, and highly fragmented categories, it is likely, Beiersdorf will eventually be involved in industry consolidation.

Company Profile 

Beiersdorf is a Germany-based company engaged in producing personal-care products, with a focus on manufacturing cosmetic products. The company operates through two business segments. Consumer provides skincare and beauty care products and operates portfolio brands such as Nivea, Eucerin, La Prairie, Labello, Hansaplast, Elastoplast, and Florena. The other business segment markets self-adhesive system and product solutions, primarily for industrial customers, under the Tesa brand. Beiersdorf is majority-owned by Maxingvest. 

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

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CS: History of Poor Risk Management Drives Discounted Valuation

Business Strategy & Outlook: 

Credit Suisse’s true underlying profitability has been masked for the better part of a decade by multiple restructuring charges and the cost of running down a legacy book of unprofitable assets. The new management team at the helm of Credit Suisse hoped that it addressed all issues during 2020, but new problematic exposures continue to crop up. This suggests a deeper risk management malaise at Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse has some very good, profitable, and generally asset-light business with good long-term secular growth prospects–especially in wealth management/private banking and the Swiss universal bank. The discount that the market has imposed on the rating of Credit Suisse relative to UBS and its other peers should, however, remain in place until Credit Suisse can convince investors that it has addressed its risk management deficiencies. 

Credit Suisse will have to report several quarters of results free from the large non-recurring items that have historically marred its results. There is a strong long-term secular trend that sees the wealth of high-net-worth individuals and families growing ahead of global nominal GDP. The ultra-high net worth and family office segment, where Credit Suisse has focused most of its attention, is a particularly attractive segment. The threat of digital disintermediation is reduced and the need for bespoke solutions and strong relationship between banker and client remains. The current negative interest rate environment obscures the benefits of Credit Suisse’s very strong deposit franchise that provides it with ample surplus liquidity. Currently, this is damaging to Credit Suisse’s net interest income–it needs to invest its excess liquidity in short-term risk-free assets that currently pays no or negative interest. Credit Suisse has, however, starting passing on these costs to selected clients.

Financial Strengths:

Credit Suisse has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.4% currently, ahead of its own internal capital target of a 14% common equity Tier 1 ratio. This is comfortably ahead of its regulatory minimum capital requirement of 10%. However, Credit Suisse’s leveraged ratio of 4.2% is more of a constraint, with a regulatory minimum requirement of 3.5% and an internal target of 4.5%. Credit Suisse intends to pay out 25% of its earnings as a dividend and it has not announced new share buybacks.

Both Credit Suisse’s liquidity coverage ratio and its net stable funding ratio are comfortably above 100%, which indicates sound liquidity. These ratios, while helpful, do not fully capture the quality of a bank’s funding. One should also consider the structure of a bank’s funding–where the relatively lower importance of wholesale deposits in Credit Suisse’s funding mix is a clear positive. However, private banking/wealth management clients will typically be more sophisticated than the average retail banking client and therefore more likely to withdraw funds in times of stress. The private banking deposits are as sticky as general retail deposits, although they remains stickier than wholesale funding.

Bulls Say:

  • Credit Suisse looks set to emulate UBS and transform its business model into a wealth manager with a complementary investment bank, which would increase profitability and reduce earnings volatility.
  • Credit Suisse has run down a massive book of EUR 126 billion to EUR 45 billion over the past four years, incurring pretax losses of EUR 16 billion in the process. This has obscured the performance and profitability of the core business.
  • Credit Suisse generates the bulk of its earnings in stable and low-risk private banking/wealth management and Swiss commercial banking.

Company Description:

Credit Suisse runs a global wealth management business, a global investment bank and is one of the two dominant Swiss retail and commercial banks. Geographically its business is tilted toward Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

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Carnival’s Return to Profitability in Sight Despite Omicron and Geopolitical Speed Bumps

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Carnival remains the largest company in the cruise industry, with nine global brands and 91 ships at 2021 fiscal year-end. The global cruise market has historically been underpenetrated, offering cruise companies a long-term demand opportunity. Additionally, in recent years, the repositioning and deployment of ships to faster-growing and under-represented regions like Asia-Pacific had helped balance the supply in high-capacity regions like the Caribbean and Mediterranean, aiding pricing. However, global travel has waned as a result of COVID-19, which has the potential to spark longer-term secular shifts in consumer behavior, challenging the economic performance of Carnival over an extended horizon. As consumers have slowly resumed cruising since the summer of 2021 (after a year-plus no-sail halt), the cruise operators will have to continue to reassure passengers of both the safety and value propositions of cruising. 

On the yield side, the Carnival is expected to see some pricing pressure as future cruise credits continue to be redeemed through 2022, a headwind partially mitigated by the return of capacity via full deployment of the fleet. And on the cost side, higher spend to maintain tighter cleanliness and health protocols should keep expenses inflated. Aggravating profits will be staggered reintroduction of the fleet through the first half of 2022, crimping near-term profitability and ceding previously obtained scale benefits. As of March 22, 2022, 75% of capacity was already deployed and the entire fleet should be sailing by the important summer season. These persistent concerns, in turn, should lead to average returns on invested capital including goodwill, that are set to languish below our 10.4% weighted average cost of capital estimate until 2026, which supports our no-moat rating. While Carnival has carved out a broad offering across demographics, the product still has to compete with other land-based vacations and discretionary spending for share of wallet. It could be harder to capture the same percentage of spending over the near term given the perceived risk of cruising, heightened by persistent media attention.

Financial Strengths:

Carnival has secured adequate liquidity to survive a slow resumption of domestic cruising, with around $7 billion in cash and investments at the end of February 2022. This should cover the company’s cash burn rate through the end of the redeployment ramp-up, which had run around $500 million or more in recent months due to higher ship startup costs. The company has raised significant levels of debt since the onset of the pandemic with $35 billion in total debt, up from around $12 billion at the end of 2019. The company has less than $3 billion in short term and $2 billion in long-term debt coming due over the next year (as of Feb. 28, 2022).

The company is focused on reducing debt service as soon as reasonably possible in order to reduce future interest expense. It has also actively pursued the extension of maturities, limiting the cash demand on debt service over the near term.  Carnival has just over one year’s worth of liquidity to operate successfully in a no-revenue environment. There is no anticipation on an imminent credit crunch in the near term, even with no associated revenue (which the company has successfully resumed capturing), as long as capital markets continue to function properly. Additionally, in order to free up cash to support operating expenses, Carnival eliminated its dividend in 2020 ($1.4 billion in 2019). Another $3 billion in current customer deposits were on the balance sheet, offering working capital that can be utilized to run the business and indicating demand for cruising still exists. And capital markets remain open to financing, with the company announcing a $500 million at-the-market equity raise at the end of January 2022, indicating access to cash is still plentiful.

Bulls Say:

  • As Carnival deploys its fleet, passenger counts and yields could rise at a faster pace than we currently anticipate as capacity limitations are repealed.
  • A more efficient fleet composition (after pruning 19 ships at the onset of the pandemic) may benefit the cost structure to a greater degree than initially expected, as sailings fully resume.
  • The nascent Asia-Pacific market should remain promising post-COVID-19, as the four largest operators had capacity for nearly 4 million passengers in 2020, which provides an opportunity for long-term growth with a new consumer.

Company Description:

Carnival is the largest global cruise company, with 91 ships in its fleet at the end of fiscal 2021, with all of its capacity set to be redeployed by summer 2022. Its portfolio of brands includes Carnival Cruise Lines, Holland America, Princess Cruises, and Seabourn in North America; P&O Cruises and Cunard Line in the United Kingdom; Aida in Germany; Costa Cruises in Southern Europe; and P&O Cruises in Australia. Carnival also owns Holland America Princess Alaska Tours in Alaska and the Canadian Yukon. Carnival’s brands attracted about 13 million guests in 2019, prior to COVID-19.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Global stocks

Through its own operations and through those of its alliance partners, Renault has a solid presence in Eastern Europe, South America, and South Korea

Business Strategy and Outlook

Renault owns 43.7% of Nissan, while Nissan owns roughly 15% of Renault and 34% of Mitsubishi. The alliance is structured as a partnership, with each company operating as an individual entity. Combined, the alliance stands as one of the largest global automakers. The companies benefit from increased scale, purchasing power, and the ability to share vehicle technology and platforms. The group is governed by the alliance board of Renault-Nissan BV, which is 50% jointly owned by Renault and Nissan. Boardroom and management upheaval from the Carlos Ghosn scandal was a huge distraction for the alliance. Renault installed Jean-Dominique Senard (formerly in charge of Michelin) as chairman. The company hired Luca de Meo as CEO (former head of SEAT), who started on July 1, 2020. 

Renault also owns 67.7% of the parent of Russian automaker AvtoVAZ, which makes Lada, the country’s best-selling brand. However, on March 23, 2022, the company said it may write down its Russian assets, another turnaround setback. In addition, Renault owns 99.4% of Romanian automaker Dacia, and 80.0% of Samsung Motors. Nissan holds a 34% stake in Mitsubishi Motors. Renault has organized these companies into an integrated global alliance, sharing purchasing, information services, research and development, production facilities, vehicle platforms, and powertrains. Through its turnaround plan, dubbed “Renaulution” and initiated in 2020, Renault will focus on its geographic market strength and better utilization of alliance cost efficiencies. 

In the Western European new-car market, Renault has the third-largest share, trailing Volkswagen and Stellantis. To its detriment, Renault has only had limited exposure to China, the world’s largest auto market, but upon the formation of a joint venture with Chinese automaker Dongfeng, local production began in 2017. Nissan has successfully penetrated the Chinese market, annually selling more than 1.0 million units. Renault also has production facilities in Brazil, India, Russia, and Turkey. Through its own operations and through those of its alliance partners, Renault has a solid presence in Eastern Europe, South America, and South Korea.

Financial Strength

Renault’s automotive business has significant financial leverage, but in experts’ opinion, this is not overly burdensome relative to the company’s substantial cash position. With financial services on an equity basis, total debt/EBITDA has averaged 1.0 times during the period from 2011 to 2021 but was negative 9.7 times at the end of 2020 due to operating losses from COVID-19. The ratio was 3.4 times at the end of 2021. Adding in the impact of operating leases and netting cash against debt, net adjusted debt/EBITDAR during the same period averaged negative 0.2 times, with 2020 coming in at negative 4.2 times, and year-end 2021 at 0.9 times.Before 2008, with financial services on an equity basis, total debt/EBITDA was around 1.5 times. On lower EBITDA and higher outstanding debt in 2008 and 2009, the leverage ratio jumped to 3.6 and 20.6 times, respectively. In early 2009, the company received a EUR 3 billion loan from the French government to reduce refinancing risks associated with accessing credit markets at extremely high interest rates. In 2012, Renault also sold its entire stake in AB Volvo to reduce indebtedness. In response to the coronavirus pandemic, the company announced that it would not pay a dividend in 2020 on 2019’s financial results. Also, the company arranged a EUR 5 billion credit line guaranteed by the French government, on which, it drew down EUR 4 billion. At the end of 2020, the undrawn EUR 1 billion was no longer available. Management targets full reimbursement of the French guaranteed loan by the end of 2023. Total liquidity of the automotive group was EUR 17.3 billion at the end of 2021, including a EUR 3.4 billion undrawn credit line and EUR 13.9 billion in cash.

Bulls Say’s

  • Renault’s alliance with Nissan provides scale and purchasing power that the company would otherwise struggle to achieve on its own. 
  • Renault is the largest manufacturer of light commercial vehicles in Europe, excluding pick-ups, with around a 16% share of the market and a 25% share of the electric LCV market. 
  • The company’s low-cost products, like the Dacia Logan, have benefited from increased demand for value-priced vehicles by cost-conscious consumers.

Company Profile 

Renault possesses a global alliance of automotive manufacturing, financing, and sales operations. The company’s alliance partners consist of AvtoVAZ (67.7%), Dacia (99.4%), Nissan (43.7%), Renault Samsung Motors (80.0%), and Mitsubishi (Nissan owns 34%). Total 2021 Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance sales volume of 7.9 million vehicles makes the alliance the third largest vehicle group in the world, behind Toyota at 10.5 million and Volkswagen at 8.6 million vehicles sold. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Narrow-Moat Nordstrom Poised for a Turnaround as Its Strategic Plans Take Hold

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Nordstrom continues to be a top operator in the competitive U.S. apparel market. The firm has, cultivated a loyal customer base on its reputation for differentiated products and service and has built a narrow moat based on an intangible brand asset. While the company was unprofitable in 2020 because of the COVID-19 crisis, its profitability returned in 2021, and its brand intangible asset is intact. Despite a rocky couple of years, the Nordstrom’s full-price and Rack off-price stores have competitive advantages over other apparel retailers.

Nordstrom is responding well to changes in its market. The company has about 100 full-price stores, with nearly all of them in desirable Class A malls (sales per square foot above $500) or major urban centers. This is viewed as an advantage, as some lower-tier malls are unlikely to survive. Moreover, Nordstrom has a presence in discount retail with Rack (about 250 stores) and significant e-commerce (42% of its sales in 2021). Still, the firm’s full-price business is vulnerable to weakening physical retail, and Rack competes with firms like no-moat Poshmark and narrow-moats TJX and Ross.

Nordstrom unveiled a new strategic plan, Closer to You, in early 2021 that emphasizes e-commerce, growth in key cities (through Local and other initiatives), and a broader off-price offering. Among

the merchandising changes, Nordstrom intends to increase its private-label sales (to 20% of sales from 10% now) and greatly expand the number of items offered through partnerships (to 30% from 5% now). The firm set medium-term targets of annual revenue of $16 billion-$18 billion, operating margins above 6%, annual operating cash flow of more than $1 billion, and returns on invested capital in the low teens. Nordstrom will consistently generate more than $1 billion in operating cash flow, achieve ROICs in the teens, and reach $16 billion in annual revenue in 2024. However, they will trend higher, the operating margins will be slightly below 6% in the long run due to intense competition, but this could change if some of the new initiatives are more successful than expected.

Financial Strengths:

The Nordstrom is in good financial shape and will overcome the virus-related downturn in its business. The firm closed 2021 with more than $300 million in cash and $800 million available on its revolving credit facility. Although it also had $2.9 billion in long-term debt, most of this debt does not mature until after 2025. Nordstrom had net debt/EBITDA of a reasonable 2.5 times at the end of 2021. Nordstrom generated $200 million in free cash flow to equity in 2021, but this amount to rise through reductions in operating expenses, working capital management, and moderate capital expenditures. As per forecast an annual average of about $840 million in free cash flow to equity over the next decade. As Nordstrom’s results have improved, it has resumed cash returns to shareholders. In 2021, about $250 million in share repurchases and dividends totaling $0.76/share (23% payout ratio). Also, to conserve cash, Nordstrom has suspended its dividends and share repurchases (used more than $400 million combined in cash in 2019), but to anticipate both will resume in 2022. Over the next decade, the buybacks of about $340 million per year and an average dividend payout ratio of about 23%. Nordstrom’s capital expenditures were quite elevated prior to 2020. Its store count has increased from 292 at the end of 2014 to about 360 today as more than 60 Rack stores have opened

since 2014 and the company has expanded into Canada and New York City. Nordstrom has estimated its total investment in Canada and New York at $1.1 billion for 2014-19. The estimated Nordstrom’s yearly capital expenditures will average about $650 million over the next decade, well below 2019’s $935 million. 

Bulls Say:

  • ONordstrom’s online sales exceeded $6 billion in 2021, making it one of the largest e-commerce firms in the U.S.
  • ONordstrom suspended dividends and share repurchases   when the pandemic hit but has resumed cash returns to shareholders. The projected annual combined dividends and share purchase above $400 million over the next five years.
  • ONordstrom serves an affluent customer base in its full line stores, which separates it from the many midlevel retailers in malls. Most of its stores are in productive malls that are not expected to close.

Company Description:

Nordstrom is a fashion retailer that operates approximately 100 department stores in the U.S. and Canada and approximately 250 off-price Nordstrom Rack stores. The company also operates both full- and off-price e-commerce sites. Nordstrom’s largest merchandise categories are women’s apparel (28% of 2021 sales), shoes (25% of 2021 sales), men’s apparel (14% of 2021 sales) and women’s accessories (14% of 2021 sales). Nordstrom, which traces its history to a shoe store opened in Seattle in 1901, continues to be partially owned and managed by members of the Nordstrom family.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Global stocks Shares

FedEx Ground Margins Grappling With Wage/Cost Inflation, but Improvement Still Likely

Business Strategy and Outlook

Overnight delivery pioneer FedEx is one of three large national carriers that dominate the for-hire small-parcel delivery landscape–FedEx and UPS are the major U.S. incumbents, while DHL Express leads Europe. Rival UPS has been around much longer in the U.S. ground market, forging a density advantage and higher margins, but FedEx has gradually enhanced its ground positioning over the past decade, with help from its speed advantage over UPS and capacity investment.

Leading up to the pandemic, ground margins were grappling with heavy network investment, the gradual mix shift to lower-margin B2C deliveries, lost Amazon revenue, and a pullback in B2B shipments. That said, the pandemic driven e-commerce shift and related surge in residential package delivery demand, coupled with a massive uptick in parcel carriers’ pricing power drove a resurgence in FedEx’ profitability. Recovering B2B activity has also played a material role. Material labor constraints emerged in recent quarters, setting margins back . Therefore, Morningstar analysts assuming management will be able to mitigate some of these headwinds with increased productivity, and ground margins should see some recovery in the quarters ahead.

In general, FedEx’ extensive international shipping network is extraordinarily difficult to duplicate and domestic/international e-commerce tailwinds should remain favorable for years to come (outside a major recession). Despite Amazon insourcing more of its own U.S. last-mile package deliveries, FedEx continues to bolster its ground and express capabilities and is well positioned to serve the myriad other retail shippers pursuing e-commerce, not to mention its entrenched relationships in B2B delivery. The TNT integration has made headway, and expects efforts to bear more fruit in Europe as FedEx finalizes the integration by May 2022.

Financial Strength

Total debt approached $21 billion as of fiscal year-end 2021 (ended May), down slightly from $22 billion in fiscal 2020. Since May 2017, FedEx has borrowed around $7 billion (net) to finance aircraft purchases, sorting facility expansion and automation, pension funding, dividends, and periodic share repurchases. This partly reflects $3 billion of unsecured debt issued in April 2020 to increase financial flexibility as the pandemic hit, and to pay off part of its commercial paper program. FedEx ended fiscal 2021 with $7 billion in cash and equivalents, up from $5 billion. Total debt/adjusted EBITDA came in near 2 times in fiscal 2021, which represents improvement from 3.3 times in fiscal 2020, as the operating backdrop improved significantly. We expect that metric to hold relatively steady in fiscal 2022. Adjusted EBITDA excludes mark-to-market pension charges and nonrecurring costs.

Bull Says

  • Outside a prolonged recession, FedEx’s U.S. ground package delivery operations should continue to enjoy robust growth tailwinds rooted in favorable ecommerce trends.
  • FedEx’s massive package sortation footprint, immense air and delivery fleet, and global operations knit together a presence that’s extraordinarily difficult to replicate.
  • During its nearly five-decade history, FedEx has weathered multiple economic cycles. While short term results may suffer, the firm’s powerful parcel delivery network is firmly established.

Company Profile

FedEx pioneered overnight delivery in 1973 and remains the world’s largest express package provider. In its fiscal 2020 (ended May 2020), FedEx derived 51% of revenue from its express division, 33% from ground, and 10% from freight, its asset-based less-than-truckload shipping segment. The remainder comes from other services, including FedEx Office, which provides document production/shipping, and FedEx Logistics, which provides global forwarding. FedEx acquired Dutch parcel delivery firm TNT Express in 2016. TNT was previously the fourth-largest global parcel delivery provider.

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.