Categories
Shares Small Cap

Airbnb Limiting Pebblebrook To Push Its Rates

Business Strategy and Outlook

Pebblebrook Hotel Trust is the largest U.S. lodging REIT focused on owning independent and boutique hotels. After Pebblebrook merged with LaSalle Hotel Properties in December 2018, the company owns 53 upper-upscale hotels, with more than 13,000 rooms located in urban, gateway markets. Pebblebrook’s combined portfolio has a higher revenue per available room price point and EBITDA margin than its hotel REIT peers. 

The recent merger with LaSalle provides Pebblebrook some new avenues to create value for shareholders. The company doubled in size while taking on only a portion of the general and administrative costs, making the combined company more efficient. Pebblebrook’s CEO, Jon Bortz, previously ran LaSalle and acquired many of the hotels in that portfolio. His knowledge of those hotels combined with management’s demonstrated ability to maximize margins should allow him to implement cost-saving initiatives that drive up margins. Additionally, management has begun an extensive renovation program across both the LaSalle portfolio and the legacy portfolio that will drive EBITDA gains over time. 

In the short term, the coronavirus outbreak significantly affected the operating results for Pebblebrook’s hotels, with high-double-digit revPAR declines and negative hotel EBITDA in 2020. However, the rapid rollout of vaccinations allowed leisure travel to quickly return, driving high growth in 2021. It is held the company should continue to see strong growth in 2022 and beyond as business and group travel eventually returns to 2019 levels by 2024 in analysts base-case scenario. However, there are several factors that will remain headwinds for hotels over the long term. Supply has been elevated in many of the biggest markets, and that is likely to continue for a few more years. Online travel agencies and online hotel reviews create immediate price discovery for consumers, preventing hotels from pushing rate increases even though it is nearing full occupancy on many nights. Finally, while the shadow supply created by Airbnb doesn’t directly compete most nights, it does limit Pebblebrook’s ability to push rates on nights when it would have typically generated its highest profits.

Financial Strength

Pebblebrook is in solid financial shape from a liquidity and a solvency perspective after the merger with LaSalle, but it is alleged that additional assets sales will put the company in great financial shape. The company seeks to maintain a solid but flexible balance sheet, which is anticipated will serve stakeholders well. Pebblebrook does not currently have an unsecured debt rating. Instead, it uses secured debt on its high-quality portfolio and takes out unsecured term loans. Debt maturities in the near term should be manageable through a combination of refinancing and the company’s free cash flow. Additionally, the company should be able to access the capital markets when acquisition opportunities arise. It is projected 2024, the year it is likely operations will fully return to normal, net debt/EBITDA and EBITDA/interest will be roughly 7.4 and 4.2 times, respectively, both of which are slightly outside of the long-term range for the company but should continue to improve over time.As a REIT, Pebblebrook is required to pay out 90% of its income as dividends to shareholders, which limits its ability to retain its cash flow. However, the company’s current run-rate dividend is easily covered by the company’s cash flow from operating activities, providing plenty of flexibility for capital allocation and investment decisions. It is held Pebblebrook will continue to be able to access the capital markets given its current solid balance sheet and its large, higher-quality, unencumbered asset base.

Bulls Say’s

  • Potentially accelerating economic growth may prolong a robust hotel cycle and benefit Pebblebrook’s portfolio and performance. 
  • The acquisition of the LaSalle Hotel Trust portfolio provides management many renovation opportunities to drive revenue and margin growth. 
  • After the merger, Pebblebrook’s larger size could increase the company’s negotiating power with online travel agencies.

Company Profile 

Pebblebrook Hotel Trust currently owns upper-upscale and luxury hotels with 13,247 rooms across 53 hotels in the United States. Pebblebrook acquired LaSalle Hotel Properties, which owned 10,451 rooms across 41 U.S. hotels, in December 2018, the company current Pebblebrook CEO founded in 1998, though management has sold many of those hotels over the past few years. Pebblebrook’s portfolio consists mostly of independent hotels with no brand affiliations, though the combined company does own and operate some hotels under Marriott, Starwood, InterContinental, Hilton, and Hyatt brands. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Qantas Airways – Omicron impact on 2H22 underlying EBITDA of ~$650m

Investment Thesis:

  • Attractive way to play the Covid reopen trade for investors.  
  • Aiming for all segments to deliver return on invested capital > weighted average cost of capital.
  • Strong position in the domestic market (Qantas Domestic and Jetstar continue to remain the two highest margin earning airlines in the domestic market).
  • Jetstar is well positioned for growth and rising demand in Asia. 
  • Partnership with Woolworths for Loyalty bodes well for membership and earnings.
  • Oil price hedging in FY22 could contribute to performance.
  • Increased competition in the international segment.
  • Relative to peers, strong balance sheet strength; investment grade credit rating.

Key Risks:

  • Disasters that could hurt the QAN brand.
  • Earnings recovery gets pushed out again due to travel restrictions or return of another Covid-19 variant. 
  • Ongoing price led competition forcing QAN to cut prices affecting margins.
  • Leveraged to the price of oil. 
  • Adverse currency movements result in less travel.
  • Labor strikes. 
  • Depressed economic conditions leading to less discretionary income to spend on travel. 

Key Highlights:

  • Omicron impact on 2H22 underlying EBITDA of ~$650m (after mitigations) with operating expenses for 2H22 to include ~$180m of inefficiencies and ramp up costs.
  • Domestic capacity to be 68% of pre-Covid levels in 3Q22, increasing to 90-100% in 4Q22, equating to total FY22 capacity of ~60%.
  • International capacity to be 22% of pre-Covid levels in 3Q22, increasing to 44% in 4Q22, equating to FY22 capacity of 18%.
  • Loyalty on track to deliver more than $1bn gross cash receipts in FY22 and remains committed to its target of $500-600m underlying EBIT by FY24 after returning to double-digit growth by end of CY22.
  • Net capex (excluding land proceeds) in FY22 of $850m and in FY23 of $2.3-2.4bn.
  • Underlying D&A in FY22 of $1.8bn.
  • Net debt within the $4.4-5.5bn target range by end of FY22 and at the bottom half of range from FY23 onwards.
  • The Recovery Plan delivered $840m in savings since the start of the program and remains on track to deliver greater than $900m by the end of FY22.
  • Balance Sheet repair continued with net debt reduction of -9.8% over pcp to $5.5bn (now within target range), refinancing A$300m bond maturing in May 2022.
  • Total liquidity of $4.3bn including $2.7bn cash and committed undrawn facilities of $1.6bn maturing in FY23 and FY24.
  • Investment grade credit rating of Baa2 from Moody’s maintained. 
  • Shareholder distributions remain on hold. 
  • 1H22 fuel cost declined -75% compared to pre-Covid-19 to $0.5bn, primarily due to a -74% reduction in fuel consumption. 

Company Description:

Qantas Airways Ltd (QAN) provides passenger and freight air transportation services in Australia and internationally. QAN also operates a frequent flyer loyalty program. QAN was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Mascot, Australia.

(Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
LICs LICs

PTM reported revenue of $128.7m with attractive dividend yield

Investment Thesis

  • Trades on an attractive dividend yield.
  • PTM is in a position to attract net inflows as value oriented strategies may make a sustained comeback. 
  • Recent decision to reduce fees from 1.35% to 1.54%, represents ~9% decline in revenue. In our view, we expect further pressure on the funds management industry and fees (as a result of industry and super funds building inhouse capabilities and passive investing with significantly lower fees/asset allocators becoming more of the norm). 
  • Significant key man risk. Particularly poignant as Kerr Neilson has stepped down from CEO, and whilst he has not signaled plans to leave altogether, it remains a possibility.
  • New distribution channels present growth runways for PTM’s core funds.
  • Transition risk as the new CEO takes over. 

Key Risks

  • Trades on an attractive dividend yield.
  • PTM is in a position to attract net inflows as value oriented strategies may make a sustained comeback. 
  • Recent decision to reduce fees from 1.35% to 1.54%, represents ~9% decline in revenue. In our view, we expect further pressure on the funds management industry and fees (as a result of industry and super funds building inhouse capabilities and passive investing with significantly lower fees/asset allocators becoming more of the norm). 
  • Significant key man risk. Particularly poignant as Kerr Neilson has stepped down from CEO, and whilst he has not signaled plans to leave altogether, it remains a possibility.
  • New distribution channels present growth runways for PTM’s core funds.
  • Transition risk as the new CEO takes over. 

1H22 result highlights

  • Fee revenue increased +2% over pcp to $133.6m, with Management fee revenues increasing +3% over pcp due to the increase in average FUM and changes in product mix (average fee up amid higher portion of retail FUM) partially offset by -32% over pcp decline in Performance fee revenues to $2.5m. Other income declined from a $35.7m gain in pcp to a $4.9m loss due to unrealized losses on seed investments. 
  • Expenses increased +15.8% to $43.2m, primarily driven by +39.6% YoY increase in share-based payments expense as share-based payments expenses normalized after being relatively low in pcp due to rights forfeited during that period, and +42.3% increase in business developments costs mainly due to advertising and the launch of the Platinum Investment Bond. 
  • NPAT declined -33.6% over pcp to $60m, primarily driven by unrealized losses on seed investments, including share of associates losses, which contributed losses before tax of $7.4m compared to income before tax of $35m in pcp. Excluding gains and losses on seed investments (net of tax), underlying NPAT declined -1.2% over pcp to $65.1m. 
  • FUM declined -6.4% over 2H21 to $22bn (down -7% over pcp), driven by net outflow of $900m and negative investment returns of $500m primarily from the Asia ex-Japan investment strategy ($400m). 
  • The Board declared a fully franked interim dividend of 10cps, down -16.7% over pcp and equating to annualized yield of ~7.4% (using 31 December 2021 share price of $2.70).

Company Profile

Platinum Asset Management (PTM) is an ASX-listed, Australian based fund manager which specializes in investing in international equities. PTM currently manages ~A$23.6bn. 

 (Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
LICs LICs

Post Holdings Inc Not Able To Command Price Premium

Business Strategy and Outlook

Post has a unique portfolio of businesses. After spinning off its majority stake in the fast-growing BellRing Brands in March 2022, nearly half of its sales mix is cereal, which is highly profitable, but experiencing declining volumes. The other half of its portfolio consists primarily of egg and potato products, which possess a better growth profile, but carry low profit margins. It is alleged a competitive edge remains elusive, as Post has not demonstrated strong brand equities, preferred relationships with customers, or a cost advantage, which are the most likely moat sources for a packaged food company. 

The cereal business has been experiencing declining per capita consumption (prior to the pandemic) as consumers have shifted away from processed, high-sugar, high-carbohydrate fare. Adding to the challenge, no-moat Post, the third-largest player, has had to compete for ever-decreasing shelf-space with market leaders narrow-moat General Mills and wide-moat Kellogg. That said, Post’s cereal business is very profitable, with EBITDA margins around mid-20% and low-30% for the U.S. and European businesses, respectively. 

The refrigerated segments (52% of 2021 sales, with 32% food service and 20% retail) consists primarily of egg and potato products, but also side dishes, cheese, and sausage sold under brands such as Bob Evans and Simply Potatoes. While this business has more attractive growth prospects than cereal (growing 1%-2% versus cereal’s modest declines), agricultural commodities are difficult to differentiate and therefore generally do not command a price premium. As a result, this business has relatively low EBITDA margins (16%-18%) and does not offer the firm a competitive advantage, in analysts view.

Financial Strength

Post has a unique capital allocation strategy, preferring to carry a heavier debt load than most packaged food peers. Net debt/adjusted EBITDA has averaged 5.3 times the last 10 years, increasing following acquisitions and gradually declining as the firm uses free cash flow to pay down debt. Leverage stood at 5.5 times at the end of fiscal 2021 including BellRing Brands, and it is being modelled that the ratio remains above 5 times for the duration of experts forecast. Post’s legacy domestic cereal business generates significant free cash flow (about 12% of revenue, above the 10% peer average), although after acquiring the refrigerated foods, BellRing, and private brands businesses, this metric fell to a mid- to high-single-digit average in 2013 and beyond, now slightly below the peer average. Post’s interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest expense) has averaged 2.5 times over the past three years, compared with the 7 times peer average. While this ratio is quite tight, the firm has ample access to liquidity (even considering the uncertain environment caused by the pandemic), including $1.2 billion cash and $730 million available via on its credit revolver as of December 2021. Post has no intention to initiate a dividend. Instead, the firm plans to balance debt repayments, share repurchase, and acquisitions. Although it is likely that the firm will acquire additional businesses over the next several years, given the numerous uncertainties regarding these transactions, experts have opted to model free cash flow being used instead for share repurchase, which is foreseen as a good use of capital assuming it is executed at a value below analysts assessment of its intrinsic value.

Bulls Say’s

  • The refrigerated foods segment, half of Post’s business, is benefiting from consumers’ evolving preference for fresh, unprocessed high-protein eggs, and fresh and convenient side dish options. 
  • Although growth in the cereal business has been stagnant, it reports attractive profits and cash flows. 
  • Despite inflation and the uncertain economic environment that could ensue, demand for Post’s products should be relatively stable.

Company Profile 

Post Holdings operates in North America and Europe. For fiscal 2021 (restated for the separation of BellRing Brands), 47% of the company’s revenue came from cereal, with brands such as Honeycomb, Grape-Nuts, Pebbles, Honey Bunches of Oats, Malt-O-Meal, and Weetabix. Refrigerated food made up 52% of sales and services the retail (20% of company sales) and food-service channels (32%), providing value-added egg and potato products, prepared side dishes, cheese, and sausage under brands Bob Evans and Simply Potatoes. Post also holds a 60% stake in 8th Avenue, a private brands entity and a 14% stake in BellRing Brands, with protein-based products under the Premier Protein and Dymatize brands. Post launched a special purpose acquisition corp in 2021, but has not yet executed a transaction. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
ETFs ETFs

Large- to mid-cap exposure to US equities at an attractive fee

Approach 

This fund uses full physical replication to capture the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index. The fund owns–to the extent that is possible and efficient–all the underlying constituents in the same proportion as its benchmark. 

Portfolio 

The S&P 500 is a free-float-adjusted market-capitalisation-weighted index of 500 US companies that offers both large- and mid-cap exposure. With a total value of over USD 40 trillion, the index covers around 80% of the free-float-adjusted market capitalisation of the US equity market. The US Index Committee maintains the S&P 500 and meets monthly. It aims to minimise index membership turnover. If a constituent no longer meets the entrance requirements, the committee will not remove the member immediately if it deems the change temporary. The index rebalances quarterly in March, June, September, and December. The largest sector exposure is information technology (29%), followed by healthcare (13%) and financials (12%). With the inclusion of Tesla TSLA and the continued success of many of the largest stocks in the index over 2020, the top 10 now represent over one fourth of the index. That said, concentration risk concerns remain subdued as the top 10 companies traditionally drive around 20% of the return, a fair attribution for many market-cap-weighted strategies.

Performance

Funds that track the S&P 500 Net Return Index have consistently outperformed the category average by a range of 0%-4% on a yearly rolling basis, making a strong investment case for low-cost passive instruments such as this when seeking broad US equity exposure. Further evidence is found in the superior risk-adjusted return profile of the S&P 500 relative to the average peer in the category. Passive funds in this category have generally had better or equal Sharpe ratios over short and long periods. In fact, this strategy has routinely captured more of the upside and less of the downside. Tracking error has also generally been tight, sitting at around 3-5 basis points. Valuations between large and small caps have shown some dispersion as US large caps rerated significantly following the volatility that markets saw in first-quarter 2020, suggesting that outperformance of larger companies over the last few years has come with steeper degrees of price risk.

Top Holdings of the fund

About the fund

The Fund employs a passive management – or indexing – investment approach, through physical acquisition of securities, and seeks to track the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index.The Index is comprised of large-sized company stocks in the US.

The Fund attempts to:

  • Track the performance of the Index by investing in all constituent securities of the Index in the same proportion as the Index. Where not practicable to fully replicate, the Fund will use a sampling process.
  • Remain fully invested except in extraordinary market, political or similar conditions.

 (Source:Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
LICs LICs

PPT delivered strong earnings growth for 1H22; Positive momentum in all of its divisions going and scaling globally

Investment Thesis 

  • Trades below our valuation and represents >10% upside to current share price. 
  • PPT is a diversified business with earnings derived from trustee services, financial advice and funds management.
  • PPT has an opportunity to increase FUM via its Global Share Fund, which has a strong performance track record over 1, 3 and 5-years and significant capacity, whilst PPT continues to maintain FUM in Australia equities which is near maximum capacity. This equates to flattish earnings growth unless PPT can attract FUM into international equities, credit and multi-asset strategies (and other incubated funds).
  • Retail and institutional inflow of funds is expected to be solid especially from positive compulsory superannuation trend and flow from Perpetual Private. 
  • Potential for Perpetual Private to drive growth in funds under management and funds under advice.
  • Cost improvements in Perpetual Private and Corporate Trust.

Key Risks

  • Any significant underperformance across funds.
  • Significant key man risk around key management or investment management personnel.
  • Potential change in regulation (superannuation) with more focus on retirement income (annuities) than wealth creation.
  • Average base management fee (bps) per annum (excluding performance fee) continues to be stable at ~70bps but there are risks to the downside from pressures on fees.
  • More regulation and compliance costs associated with the provision of financial advice and Perpetual Private.
  • Exposure to industry funds which are building in-house capabilities (~15-20% of total PPT funds under management). 

1H22 Results Summary :

  •  Operating revenue increased +37% to A$384.9m, primarily driven by the full contribution of Barrow Hanley Global Investors (Barrow Hanley), strong relative investment performance, higher average equity markets and continued growth in both Perpetual Corporate Trust and Perpetual Private. 
  • Underlying expenses increased +31% to A$275.3m, mainly due to the addition of expenses relating to newly acquired businesses Jacaranda Financial Planning, Laminar Capital and a full six months of Barrow Hanley, as well as higher variable remuneration and investment in technology.
  • Underlying profit after tax (UPAT) increased +54% to A$79.1m, which combined with +16% increase in significant items (comprised of transaction and integration costs associated with the acquisition/establishment of Barrow Hanley, Trillium and other acquisitions, as well as the amortisation of acquired intangibles) delivered +113% growth in NPAT to A$59.3m. 
  •  The Company ended the half with cash of A$130.9m, down -24%, primarily due to reduction in FCF (resulting from international expansion, tax and interest payments) and investment in growth initiatives/acquisitions. Liquid investments increased +16% to A$154.8m, reflecting an increase in seed fund investments relating to ETFs and mutual funds. 
  • Borrowings increased +13% to A$248.1m, reflecting the draw-down of debt to fund strategic initiatives with additional capacity remaining for further investment, leading to gearing ratio (debt/debt+equity) increasing +150bps to 21.5%. 
  •  The Board declared a fully franked interim dividend of 112cps, up +33% and representing a payout ratio of 80%, in line with Company’s dividend policy of 60-90% of UPAT on an annualised basis.

Company Profile

Perpetual Ltd (PPT) is an ASX-listed independent wealth manager with three core segments in (1) Perpetual Investments which is one of Australia’s largest investment managers; (2) Perpetual Private which is one of Australia’s premier high net worth advice business; and (3) Perpetual Corporate Trust which provides trustee services. PPT manages ~$98.3 billion in funds under management, ~$17.0 billion in funds under advice and ~$922.8 billion in funds under administration (as at 30 June 2021.

(Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Norwegian liberally accessing the debt and equity markets since the start of the pandemic

Business Strategy and Outlook

Changes to consumer behavior surrounding travel–cruising in particular–as a result of the coronavirus could alter the economic performance of Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings over an extended horizon. As consumers resume cruising after the 15-month sailing halt that began in March 2020, cruise operators have had to add COVID-19-related protocols to reassure passengers of the safety of cruising in addition to the value proposition the holiday provides. On the yield side, it is anticipated Norwegian could intermittently see pricing competition to entice cruisers back onto the product once operators are back at full deployment. Further, there could be some pressure from the redemption of future cruise credits through 2022. On the cost side, higher spending to implement cleanliness and health protocols and oil prices could keep spending inflated. And the entire fleet will not be deployed until the second quarter of 2022, crimping near-term profits and ceding some scale benefits.

These concerns lead to average returns on invested capital, including goodwill, that is viewed, are set to fall below analysts’ 10.4% weighted average cost of capital estimate over a multiyear period, supporting analysts no-moat rating. While it is alleged Norwegian has carved out a compelling position in cruising thanks to its freestyle offering, the product still has to compete with other land-based vacations and discretionary spending for wallet share. It is resisted that it could be harder to capture the same percentage of spending over the near term, given the perceived risk of cruising, heightened by previous media attention. 

While liquidity issues remain concerning for cruise operators, Norwegian has liberally accessed the debt and equity markets since the beginning of the pandemic. Such capital market efforts signal Norwegian’s dedication to weathering a return to normalcy for demand. Given that the firm indicated cash burn is set to escalate to $390 million per month as it restarts the fleet, the $1.5 billion in cash of Norwegian’s balance sheet at year-end buys it sometime (even if there is no associated revenue) to facilitate a tactical full deployment strategy.

Financial Strength

Norwegian has accessed significant liquidity since the beginning of the pandemic, raising around $8 billion in debt and equity. In analysts’ opinion, these efforts signal Norwegian’s dedication to attempt to weather the duration of COVID-19. Given that the firm indicated cash burn should rise to around $390 million per month as it digests higher costs to restart the fleet, cash available to the firm should allow Norwegian time to successfully execute a tactical re-entry to sailing the seas, offering liquidity even in a tempered revenue scenario in 2022.With Norwegian’s 28 ships at the end of 2021, it is likely solid capacity expansion once cruising resumes, although it is likely some growth could be reconfigured, given shipyard closures. However, including recent debt and equity raises, Norwegian is likely to remain above its 2.5-2.75 times net debt/adjusted EBITDA target it had previously sought to achieve.  It is not seen Norwegian reaching around this range until 2028. The firm surpassed its debt/capital covenant of less than 70%, ending 2021 at around 84% (with restrictive covenants waived into 2022). The company is set to remain cash flow negative in 2022, but it is alleged could achieve positive EBITDA performance in the second half of 2022 (delayed a bit by omicron’s impact).Longer term, it is still held  that management will continue to order ships for delivery approximately every 18 months (and at least one per year in 2022-27) at its namesake brand and will opportunistically finance new ships through either compelling pricing in the debt markets or low-cost export credit agency guaranteed loans.

Bulls Say’s

  • As Norwegian is smaller than its North American cruise peers, it has the ability to deploy its assets nimbly as cruising demand rises, allowing for strategic pricing tactics. 
  • The rescission of restrictive COVID-related policies could allow cruises to appeal to a wider cohort of consumers, leading to near-term demand growth faster than is currently anticipated. 
  • Norwegian has capitalized on leisure industry knowledge from its prior sponsors as well as the addition of high-end Regent Seven Seas and Oceania brands, gathering best practices and leverage with vendors.

Company Profile 

Norwegian Cruise Line is the world’s third-largest cruise company by berths (at nearly 60,000), operating 28 ships across three brands (Norwegian, Oceania, and Regent Seven Seas), offering both freestyle and luxury cruising. The company is set to have its entire fleet back in the water in the second quarter of 2022. With nine passenger vessels on order among its brands through 2027 (representing 24,000 incremental berths), Norwegian is increasing capacity faster than its peers, expanding its brand globally. Norwegian sailed to around 500 global destinations before the pandemic. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

InterContinental Hotels Group PLC with over 100 million loyalty members

Business Strategy and Outlook

It is alleged InterContinental to retain its brand intangible asset (a source of its narrow moat rating) and expand room share in the hotel industry in the next decade. Renovated and newer brands supporting a favorable next-generation traveler position as well as its industry-leading loyalty program will drive this growth. The company currently has a mid-single-digit percentage share of global hotel rooms and 11% share of all industry pipeline rooms. It is seen its total room growth averaging 3%-4% over the next decade, above the 1.8% supply increase is projected for the U.S. industry. 

With 99% of rooms managed or franchised, InterContinental has an attractive recurring-fee business model with high returns on invested capital and significant switching costs (a second moat source) for property owners, as managed and franchised hotels have low fixed costs and capital requirements, and contracts lasting 20-30 years have meaningful cancellation costs for owners. 

It is anticipated InterContinental’s brand and switching cost advantage to strengthen, driven by new hotel brands, renovation of existing properties, technology integration, and a leading loyalty program, which all drive developer and traveler demand for the company. InterContinental has added six brands since 2016; it now has 16 in total. InterContinental announced in August 2021 a new luxury brand, with details to be provided soon. Additionally, the company announced a midscale concept in June 2017, Avid, which the company sees as addressing an underserved $20 billion market with 14 million guests, under a normal demand environment. Also, InterContinental has recently renovated its Crowne Plaza (13% of total room base) and Holiday Inn/Holiday Inn Express (62%) properties, which will support its brand advantage. Beyond this, the firm has over 100 million loyalty members, providing an immediate demand channel for third-party hotel owners joining its brand.

Financial Strength

InterContinental’s financial health remains good, despite COVID-19 challenges. InterContinental entered 2020 with net debt/EBITDA of 2.5 times, and its asset-light business model allows the company to operate with low fixed costs and stable unit growth, which led to $584 million in cash flow generation in 2021. During 2020, InterContinental took action to increase its liquidity profile, including suspending dividends and deferring discretionary capital expenditures. Also, the company tapped $425 million of its $1.3 billion credit facility, which has since been repaid. As a result, InterContinental has enough liquidity to operate at near zero revenue into 2023. It is likely banking partners would work to provide InterContinental liquidity as needed, given that the company holds a brand advantage, which will drive healthy cash flow as travel demand returns. InterContinental’s EBIT/interest coverage ratio of 5.4 times for 2019 was healthy, and it is held for it to average 9.1 times over the next five years after temporarily dipping to 3.4 times in 2021. It is projected the company generates about $2.3 billion in free cash flow (operating cash flow minus capital expenditures) during 2022-26, which it uses to pay down debt, distribute dividends, and repurchase shares (with the last two starting in 2022).

Bulls Say’s

  • InterContinental’s current mid-single-digit percentage of hotel industry room share is set to increase as the company controls 11% of the rooms in the global hotel industry pipeline. 
  • InterContinental is well positioned to benefit from the increasing presence of the next-generation traveler though emerging lifestyle brands Kimpton, Avid, Even, Hotel Indigo, Hualuxe, and Voco. 
  • InterContinental has a high exposure to recurring managed and franchised fees (around 95% of total operating income), which have high switching costs and generate strong ROIC.

Company Profile 

InterContinental Hotels Group operates 880,000 rooms across 16 brands addressing the midscale through luxury segments. Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn Express constitute the largest brand, while Hotel Indigo, Even, Hualuxe, Kimpton, and Voco are newer lifestyle brands experiencing strong demand. The company launched a midscale brand, Avid, in summer 2017 and closed on a 51% stake in Regent Hotels in July 2018. It acquired Six Senses in February 2019. Managed and franchised represent 99% of total rooms. As of Dec. 31, 2021, the Americas represents 57% of total rooms, with Greater China accounting for 18%; Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa make up 25%. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

ARB Corporation Ltd reported strong 1H22 results, reflecting strong sales and earnings growth

Investment Thesis

  • Experienced management team and senior staff with a track record of delivering earnings growth.  
  • Strong balance sheet with little leverage.
  • Strong presence and brands in the Australian aftermarket segment.
  • Growing presence in Europe and Middle East and potential to grow Exports.
  • Growth via acquisitions
  • Current trading multiples adequately price in the near-term growth opportunities.

Key Risks

  • Higher than expected sales growth rates. 
  • Any delays or interruptions in production, especially in Thailand which happens on an annual basis.
  • Increased competition in the Australian Aftermarket especially with competitors’ tendency to replicate ARB products.
  • Slowing down of demand from OEMs. 
  • Poor execution of R&D.
  • Currency exposure

1H22 result highlights

Relative to the pcp: 

  • Sales of $359m, up +26.5%, underpinned by solid customer demand across all segments. Sales Margin was maintained. 
  •  Profit after tax of $68.9m, and NPAT of $92.0m, were both up +27.6% relative to the pcp. 
  • The Board declared an interim fully franked dividend of 39.0cps compared with 29.0cps fully franked last year. Dividend payout ratio of 46% was higher than the 43% ratio in the pcp. 
  • Net cash provided by operating activities of $28.6m in 1H22, was driven by the profit after tax of $68.9m, offset by higher inventory holdings of $40.5m, as ARB sought to increase inventories in a challenging supply chain environment to facilitate continued sales growth. 
  • ARB retained a cash balance of $58.3m, a decrease of $26.4m from the June 2021 financial year end mainly due to expansionary capital purchases of PP&E for $27.0m and dividends paid to shareholders in October 2021 of $25.4m.

Company Profile

ARB Corporation Ltd (ARB) designs, manufactures, distributes, and sells 4-wheel drive vehicle accessories and light metal engineering works. It is predominantly based in Australia but also has presence in the US, Thailand, Middle East, and Europe. There are currently 61 ARB stores across Australia for aftermarket sales.

(Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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MetLife’s Elevated 2021 Variable Investment Income Not Likely to Last

Business Strategy & Outlook:

MetLife, like other life insurers, has its financial results tied to interest rates. It’s unlikely that interest rates will return to pre-financial-crisis levels, and MetLife has forecasted to face this headwind for the future. The returns of equity just shy of 10% over the next five years. MetLife has taken steps to simplify its business. In 2017, it spun off Brighthouse, its retail arm focused on variable annuities. MetLife also is divesting its property and casualty insurance (auto) business, which makes sense as there is minimal strategic benefit to having a small auto insurance business in its portfolio.

MetLife’s business is relatively undifferentiated. Whether sold individually or to employers, the pricing is the primary driver for MetLife’s customers. Given the relatively low fixed costs of an insurer’s income statement, this does not lend itself to MetLife having a competitive advantage. Some of MetLife’s entries into new markets (such as pet insurance and health savings accounts) are potentially more differentiated, but these are unlikely to be material in the near to medium term. In 2012, MetLife launched MetLife Investment Management, which currently manages $181 billion of institutional third-party client assets, a fraction of the $669 billion managed through the general account and a fraction of what some of its peers manage. Asset management is viewed as potentially moaty, but given the size of MetLife’s third-party asset management, it is viewed as material to the firm’s overall financial results.

Financial Strength:

The life insurance business model typically entails significant leverage and potentially exposes the industry to outlier capital market events and unanticipated actuarial changes. MetLife is not immune to these risks, and during the financial crisis, its returns on equity decreased. Overall, MetLife has generally been prudent, but the risks inherent to the industry should not be ignored. 

Equity/assets (excluding separate accounts) was 11.6% at the end of 2021, higher than the 11.1% average since 2010. In Japan, MetLife’s solvency margin ratio was 911% (as of Sept. 30, 2021), well above the 200% threshold before corrective action would be required. The solvency margin ratio measures an insurer’s ability to pay out claims in unfavorable conditions.

Bulls Says:

  • MetLife’s international operations, particularly Asia and Latin America, provide opportunities for growth.
  • MetLife’s reorganization will lead to a more transparent entity that produces steadier cash flow.
  • If interest rates were to rise, MetLife would benefit through higher reinvestment yields.

Company Profile:

MetLife–once a mutual company before the 2000 demutualization–is the largest life insurer in the U.S. by assets and provides a variety of insurance and financial services products. Outside the United States, MetLife operates in Japan and more than 40 countries in Latin America, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.