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Categories
Dividend Stocks

Masco Is Less Cyclical and Interest-Rate Sensitive Than the Market is Giving It Credit For

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Masco’s financial performance over the past eight years has been as much of a self-help story as a story of improving end markets. Masco almost entirely refreshed its senior executive management team in 2014. Since then, it has taken significant measures to build a stronger and more consistent business model. The firm divested its most cyclical and least profitable businesses (it spun off its installation business, now named TopBuild, to shareholders in 2015 and sold its windows and cabinetry businesses in 2019 and 2020, respectively). Management also executed significant cost-reduction initiatives and shored up the firm’s balance sheet. Masco’s sale of its windows and cabinetry businesses was a positive development for the firm because they had long viewed its plumbing and decorative architectural businesses as the firm’s crown jewels and key drivers of the company’s valuation, while Masco’s cabinetry and windows businesses have often been laggards that have been a drag on margins and returns on invested capital.

Repair and remodel spending, and to a much lesser extent, new residential construction, are major drivers of Masco’s financial performance. After divesting its installation, windows, and cabinetry businesses, the firm’s overall exposure to the R&R market is 88% of sales. Over the long term, the repair and remodel market will benefit from several long-term secular tailwinds related to aging housing stock, favorable demographics, increased demand for smart home and energy-efficient products and solutions, and increased spending among minority households. The R&R spending shall grow at about a 5% CAGR through 2030, reaching over a $650 billion addressable market. There is nice growth runway for Masco as the company capitalizes on improving end markets and internal growth initiatives across its remaining plumbing and decorative architectural platforms.

Financial Strengths:

Masco has a sound capital structure, and its consistent free cash flow generation should easily support its debt-service requirements and future capital-allocation decisions. Masco’s balance sheet has improved significantly over the past five years; based on the calculations, net debt/EBITDA peaked at over 4 in 2011 but is now 1.3. Masco plans to maintain a similar leverage ratio to support an investment-grade debt rating. Masco has approximately $3 billion of outstanding debt with maturities staggered through 2051, but the next maturity isn’t until 2028 when $600 million is due.  Masco has ample liquidity, with over $900 million of cash on hand and no outstanding borrowings on a $1 billion credit facility. By the calculations, 2021 marked the 31st consecutive year Masco has generated positive free cash flow since financials were publicly available via the Securities and Exchange Commission website (1991). The company’s ability to generate consistent free cash flow, even in a downturn, demonstrates the durability of Masco’s business model.

Bulls Say:

  • The R&R market is poised for long-term growth, driven by several secular tailwinds, including the aging housing stock and favorable demographics.
  • Masco has well-articulated growth plans for its plumbing and decorative architectural segments. These strategies could drive meaningful top-line growth over the next several years. Furthermore, cost- reduction initiatives have improved profitability.
  • Masco’s brand portfolio enjoys pricing power, which supports margin stability.

Company Description:

Masco is a global leader in home improvement and building products. The company’s $5.1 billion plumbing segment, led by the Delta and Hansgrohe brands, sells faucets, showerheads, and other related plumbing components. The $3.2 billion decorative architectural segment primarily sells paints and other coatings under the Behr and Kilz brands.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

CS: History of Poor Risk Management Drives Discounted Valuation

Business Strategy & Outlook: 

Credit Suisse’s true underlying profitability has been masked for the better part of a decade by multiple restructuring charges and the cost of running down a legacy book of unprofitable assets. The new management team at the helm of Credit Suisse hoped that it addressed all issues during 2020, but new problematic exposures continue to crop up. This suggests a deeper risk management malaise at Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse has some very good, profitable, and generally asset-light business with good long-term secular growth prospects–especially in wealth management/private banking and the Swiss universal bank. The discount that the market has imposed on the rating of Credit Suisse relative to UBS and its other peers should, however, remain in place until Credit Suisse can convince investors that it has addressed its risk management deficiencies. 

Credit Suisse will have to report several quarters of results free from the large non-recurring items that have historically marred its results. There is a strong long-term secular trend that sees the wealth of high-net-worth individuals and families growing ahead of global nominal GDP. The ultra-high net worth and family office segment, where Credit Suisse has focused most of its attention, is a particularly attractive segment. The threat of digital disintermediation is reduced and the need for bespoke solutions and strong relationship between banker and client remains. The current negative interest rate environment obscures the benefits of Credit Suisse’s very strong deposit franchise that provides it with ample surplus liquidity. Currently, this is damaging to Credit Suisse’s net interest income–it needs to invest its excess liquidity in short-term risk-free assets that currently pays no or negative interest. Credit Suisse has, however, starting passing on these costs to selected clients.

Financial Strengths:

Credit Suisse has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.4% currently, ahead of its own internal capital target of a 14% common equity Tier 1 ratio. This is comfortably ahead of its regulatory minimum capital requirement of 10%. However, Credit Suisse’s leveraged ratio of 4.2% is more of a constraint, with a regulatory minimum requirement of 3.5% and an internal target of 4.5%. Credit Suisse intends to pay out 25% of its earnings as a dividend and it has not announced new share buybacks.

Both Credit Suisse’s liquidity coverage ratio and its net stable funding ratio are comfortably above 100%, which indicates sound liquidity. These ratios, while helpful, do not fully capture the quality of a bank’s funding. One should also consider the structure of a bank’s funding–where the relatively lower importance of wholesale deposits in Credit Suisse’s funding mix is a clear positive. However, private banking/wealth management clients will typically be more sophisticated than the average retail banking client and therefore more likely to withdraw funds in times of stress. The private banking deposits are as sticky as general retail deposits, although they remains stickier than wholesale funding.

Bulls Say:

  • Credit Suisse looks set to emulate UBS and transform its business model into a wealth manager with a complementary investment bank, which would increase profitability and reduce earnings volatility.
  • Credit Suisse has run down a massive book of EUR 126 billion to EUR 45 billion over the past four years, incurring pretax losses of EUR 16 billion in the process. This has obscured the performance and profitability of the core business.
  • Credit Suisse generates the bulk of its earnings in stable and low-risk private banking/wealth management and Swiss commercial banking.

Company Description:

Credit Suisse runs a global wealth management business, a global investment bank and is one of the two dominant Swiss retail and commercial banks. Geographically its business is tilted toward Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

ABN Amro Has a Solid Position in the Attractive Dutch Market

Business Strategy & Outlook:

After emerging from outright government ownership ABN Amro is one of the simpler banks in Europe. It is essentially a retail and commercial bank with limited capital markets activities. Its strong retail deposit base supported above-average profitability until negative interest rates started to bite. Having a lending book dominated by fixed-rate mortgages does not help either. The long-duration lending book forces ABN Amro to use more expensive long-term funding in order to manage liquidity risk, which then compounds margin pressure in a declining interest-rate environment. ABN Amro offers investors exposure to the oligopolistic Dutch banking system where ABN Amro and its two main rivals hold more than 90% of all Dutch current accounts. This is in sharp contrast to the fragmented banking markets that are the norm in much of the eurozone. Historically this concentration supported higher levels of profitability for ABN Amro and its Dutch peers.

ABN Amro has a solid competitive position in Dutch retail banking with a 20% market share in Dutch personal current accounts and a 25% share of business current accounts. This provides ABN Amro with cheap, sticky funding and forms the base from which ABN Amro can cross-sell other products. In a negative interest-rate environment what should be a major competitive advantage has turned into a major headache. In a negative interest-rate environment banks earn negative interest on their surplus liquidity and with essentially a zero interest-rate floor on some of their deposits this leads to a margin squeeze. The injection of liquidity via monetary and fiscal interventions from central banks and governments following the coronavirus pandemic has just amplified this problem as banks are faced with even more deposits from clients flush with cash. ABN Amro cannot pass on negative interest rates to smaller depositors without damaging client goodwill. It is increasingly passing on higher costs to larger clients. Interest-rate hedges only provide protection against interest-rate volatility, not to a long-term decline in interest rates, especially not when rates go negative.

Financial Strengths:

Even after taking into consideration the more onerous capital guidelines under Basel IV ABN Amro is one of the best-capitalised banks in Europe. At the end of 2020 ABN Amro indicated that on a Basel IV basis it has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of over 15%, compared with its internal target of 13%. With an enviable retail deposit base ABN Amro is one of the banks in Europe with the soundest liquidity profile. Retail deposits tend to be sticky as retail depositors are less likely to move to other banks in the search of higher yields. Wholesale funding are much more likely to disappear during periods of stress in the funding markets. Wholesale funding makes up only around 26% of ABN Amro’s total funding.

Bulls Say:

  • ABN Amro is one of the three leading banks in the oligopolistic Dutch banking sector.
  • It has an attractive funding mix with low reliance on wholesale funding.
  • It has a simple, clear, and focused business model and strategy.

Company Description:

ABN Amro Bank is a Dutch bank, and the Netherlands accounts for around 90% of its operating profit. Operationally, retail and commercial banking contributes the bulk of its operating profit, while ABN Amro continues to reduce its exposure to corporate and investment banking. It views private banking as one of its key growth areas.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Vivendi Looks to Canal+ and Havas for Growth with Further M&A on the Horizon

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Vivendi’s transformation into a pure-play media firm, completed in 2014, left it with two primary business units: Canal+, the largest pay-TV company in France, and Universal Music Group, the largest global music label. However, controlling shareholder Vincent Bollore has dragged Vivendi back to its inglorious past as a conglomerate, exemplified by the purchases of Havas, the world’s sixth-largest ad agency holding company, and Editis, a French-language book publisher. Bollore also led the spinout of UMG, the firm’s crown jewel, in September 2021 with Vivendi holding on to a 10% stake in the music label. As a result of the UMG transaction, Canal+ is now the largest segment for Vivendi, representing 60% of revenue. While Canal+ appears to be returning to growth after years of decline, the core French pay-TV business remains a drag on growth. The growth for Canal+ will continue be driven by overseas operations via subscriber growth and new country launches. 

Canal+ is attempting to transition from a traditional pay-TV business to a content aggregator. Companies that depend heavily on buying or aggregating content from other creators may find themselves squeezed, particularly in markets with multiple aggregators. Now the second-largest segment with roughly 25% of revenue, Havas is heavily leveraged to Europe and North America, which account for over 80% of revenue. Havas competes against larger players in these regions; the only GDP-level growth in these mature markets and further expansion into Asia-Pacific and Latin America, largely via acquisitions of local agencies. Editis now generates roughly 10% of total revenue for Vivendi. The firm is the second-largest French-language publishing group, with 50 publishing houses covering everything from children’s books to popular literature to dictionaries to manga. 

Financial Strengths:

While Vivendi has done an admirable job of cleaning up the mess from the early 2000s, it remains in flux in terms of how to use its cash and where it invests. The large number of divestitures, including the sale of 30% of Universal Music, over the last few years has left the company with a net debt position of only $1.9 billion as of June 2021. However, management continues to use cash to buy stakes in firms in peripheral industries such as the Telecom Italia and Mediaset. The firm will look for additional acquisitions over time to releverage the balance sheet. The firm shall rush into an acquisition and overpay for it.

Bulls Say:

  • The spinout of Universal Music Group should reduce the conglomerate discount that has plagued the stock.
  • StudioCanal is a leading studio that benefits from the increased global demand for French-language original content.
  • Vivendi will return much of the cash from the UMG sale to shareholders via special dividends.

Company Description:

Vivendi’s transformation into a pure-play media firm was completed in 2014, but recent acquisitions and the spinout of Universal Music Group have again changed the firm. The company now operates multiple divisions with one very large core segment: Canal+, a leading producer and distributor of film and TV content in France, produces over 80% of revenue. It also owns Havas, the world’s sixth-largest ad agency holding company; Editis, a French-language book publisher; Gameloft, a mobile game publisher; and minority stakes in multiple companies in Europe.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Dividend Stocks

Kering SA: Online Penetration is growing at a solid pace

Investment Thesis:

  • Solid momentum in the core Gucci brand, aside from the disruption caused by the Coronavirus. 
  • Sales momentum will be assisted once international tourism returns. 
  • Leveraged to increasing consumer consumption in Asia (China, India). 
  • Leveraged to tourism flows (international travel) as consumers seek out experiences. 
  • New upcoming brands.
  • Strong cash flow generation and solid dividend yield.
  • Strong balance sheet, which provides the Company flexibility.  
  • Key cornerstone investor (Pinault Family) provides stability in the share register.  

Key Risks:

  • Adverse currency movements, especially EUR strength against the U.S. dollar (USD) and Chinese Renminbi (RMB). 
  • Increased competition from existing players and new emerging brands. 
  • Key brands – Gucci (>70% of revenue), Saint Laurent (>10% of revenue), Bottega (>5% of revenue) – cease to resonate with consumers and growth halts. 
  • Value destructive acquisition of brand(s). 
  • Macro-economic conditions globally deterioration, impacting consumer spending and less tourism movements (i.e. travelers overseas).
  • Geopolitical tensions among regions restricting funds & tourists flow or a breakout of health epidemic impacting tourists flow in Europe / Asia. 
  • Significant change at the senior management level (divisional CEOs or Creative Director).  
  • Significant changes with the key cornerstone investor (leading to influence on long-term company strategy or shareholder outcomes). 
     

Key Highlights:

  • Revenue increased +34.7% over pcp (+35% on a comparable basis with North America up +76%, APAC up +33%, Japan up +21%, Western Europe up +10% and Rest of the World up +48%) and +13% over pre-Covid FY19 to €17,645.2m, driven by outstanding performances from all Houses, which generated revenue of €17,019m, up +34.3% over pcp (+34.9% on a comparable basis).
  • Recurring operating income rose sharply, up +60% over pcp (up +5% over FY19) to reach a new record €5,017.2m, with margin improving +450bps over pcp (down -170bps over FY19) to 28.4%, with recurring operating income from the Houses up +53.7% over pcp to €5,175.3m with margin expanding +380bps to 30.4% despite all Houses continuing to invest significantly in their operations.
  • Capital management – using strong cashflow to deleverage the balance sheet and increase shareholder returns. The Company delivered +87.6% YoY growth in FCF to €3.9bn which combined with proceeds from the disposal of an additional 5.9% in Puma (stake is now ~4%, covering the exchangeable bond due in 2022), saw management reduce net debt by -92.2% over pcp to €168m (debt/equity down -16.6% to 1.2%), resume share-buyback to repurchase 0.7% of shares for €540m (1.3% remaining with second tranche to cover 0.5% and expected to be completed by 26th April 2022), increase dividends by +50% over pcp to €12 and reinforce KER’s eyewear portfolio with the acquisition of LINDBERG.
  • Online penetration is growing at a solid pace. The Company saw online sales continue to grow at an solid pace, up +55% over pcp, leading to a doubling of the online channel’s penetration rate in two years, and now accounting for 15% of total sales in the retail (23% North America, 26% Western Europe, 7% APAC and 5% Japan), as management continued to drive brand engagement with the upcoming generations of luxury shoppers and target new customers through the metaverse by Balenciaga’s appearance on Fortnite and Gucci leveraging a presence on Roblox gaming platform, apart from successful internalization of all brand.com sites, which allows the Company to use e-concession only if complements KER’s own sites and control all the key elements of presence.
  • Outlook – management hints towards price increases and M&A activity. Though no specific guidance was provided for FY22, management flagged Gucci (which increased prices twice in 2020 and in 2021) along with KER’s other labels would again raise prices in a “targeted manner” in the year and pointed towards potential acquisitions to expand the Company’s footprint and bolster jewellery offering, which management believes has high potential.

Company Description:

Kering (KER), listed on the Euronext Paris (Paris stock market), is a global luxury group made up of iconic brands in Fashion, Leather Goods, Jewellery and Watches. The Company designs, manufactures and markets its goods globally. The group’s core brands are Gucci, Saint Laurent and Bottega Veneta. 

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Commodities Trading Ideas & Charts

Rolls-Royce Holdings reflects Strong Liquidity Position of £7.1bn, including £2.6bn in cash and £4.5bn in undrawn committed facilities

Investment Thesis:

  • Very high barriers to entry and Covid-19 is likely to improve industry structure (consolidation)
  • Consumer pent up demand for travel will return with a vaccine. 
  • Liquidity concerns have been addressed with the GBP5bn recapitalization program.  
  • Ongoing focus on R&D and innovation, which will drive further efficiencies.
  • Cost efficiency program to drive savings to support earnings. 

Key Risks:

  • Covid-19 impacts are deeper and more protracted than expected.
  • The Company fails to hit its near-term guidance. 
  • Defense and Power Systems fails to deliver organic growth. 
  • Economic downturn leading to reduced demand from airlines.  
  • Brexit uncertainty. 
  • Adverse currency movements outside hedging strategies. 
  • Regulatory / litigation risks. 

Key Highlights:

  • Revenue growth of low-to-mid single-digit, supported by a strong order book cover in both Defence and Power Systems and a continuation of gradual improvement in Civil Aerospace, along with an expected increase in spare engine sales, with long-term revenue growth driven by technology and innovation opportunities and rising global demand for sustainable power.
  • Operating profit margin to be broadly unchanged as underlying operational improvement is balanced with increased engineering spend to develop sustainable growth opportunities, with a gradual shift in spend towards New Markets, Defence and Power Systems, with an aim to spend ~75% of R&D investment on lower carbon growth opportunities in the medium term.
  • FCF to be modestly positive, representing a substantial improvement on pcp, despite the concession slips.
  • Balance sheet repair commenced with £2bn in proceeds from disposals (ITP Aero is progressing well and expected to complete in 1H22) together with strong underlying FCF generation to be used to reduce net debt (including leases was up +44.4% over pcp to £5.2bn and excluding leases was up +126.7% over pcp to £3.4bn) with the aim of returning to an investment grade credit profile in the medium term.
  • Strong liquidity position of £7.1bn, including £2.6bn in cash (post payment of €750m bond and the £300m Covid Corporate Financing Facility commercial paper) and £4.5bn in undrawn committed facilities.
  • No dividend payment for the year as some of loan facilities place restrictions and conditions on payments to shareholders, however, the Board will start recommending shareholder payments from FY23.
  • The restructuring program delivered £1.3bn run-rate savings target a year ahead of schedule, reducing the size of Civil Aerospace business by around a third and removing more than 9,000 roles from continuing operations, with focus now on ensuring the benefits are sustained.

Company Description:

Rolls Royce Holdings plc (RR) manufactures aero, marine and industrial gas turbines for civil and military aircraft. The Company designs, constructs, and installs power generation, transmission and distribution systems and equipment for the marine propulsion, oil and gas pumping and defense markets. The Company operates three main segments: (1) Civil Aerospace; (2) Defence Aerospace; and (3) Power Systems.

(Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Uncategorized

Naturgy Well Positioned to Benefit from Skyrocketing Gas Prices

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Networks will account for about 60% of Naturgy’s operating profit by 2026. Around two thirds of networks’ EBIT come from Spain. Naturgy is the global leader in Spanish gas distribution, where it has consistently achieved high profitability and returns leading the regulator to impose a sharp remuneration cut in 2021. Networks’ regulated returns are higher in Latin America although high inflation and local currencies’ declines have been a drag on returns in recent years. Naturgy is one of the largest gas utilities in Europe. Profitability of its liquid natural gas, or LNG, business should be boosted by skyrocketing gas prices in Europe in 2022 and 2023. However, the firm intends to eventually downsize the business because of high earnings volatility. Naturgy massively stepped up its renewable’s ambitions in 2021, aiming to to increase its capacity from 4.60 GW in 2020 to 14 GW in 2025. Accordingly, renewables should be the main earnings growth driver. However, there is some execution risk; the group being a laggard in a competitive sector. 

Naturgy ended its aggressive dividend policy set in 2018. The group will pay an annual dividend of EUR 1.20 per share over 2021-25 with a potential reassessment in 2023. This implies an 76% average 2021-25 payout, below the unsustainable 120% over 2018-22. In 2021, Australian fund IFM made a public offer to acquire a 22.7% stake in Naturgy at EUR 22.07 per share. IFM managed to to buy only 10.8% of the shares. However, IFM continued to buy shares on the market since October, reaching 13.4% of the capital in March 2022 and implying limited free float of 14.5%, fuelling speculation of a delisting. In February 2022, Naturgy unveiled a plan to split its liberalized and regulated businesses into two independent listed entities by year-end. The group argued the split will be value-accretive and increase growth potential through higher flexibility of the liberalized entity and lower cost of capital for the regulated one. While increasing interest rates hit the value of renewables projects, they imply higher future returns of regulated networks, meaning keeping a integrated model provides some hedge.

Financial Strengths:

The group’s net debt is supposed to increase from EUR 12.8 billion in 2021 to EUR 15 billion in 2026 on the acceleration of renewables investments. The dividend will have to stand at EUR 1.20 until 2024 before increasing to EUR 1.23 in 2025 and EUR 1.25 in 2026 involving an average payout ratio of 76%. 

Net debt/EBITDA to increase from 2.7 times in 2021 to 3.1 in 2026 as the net debt expansion will be not be offset by the EBITDA increase. Net debt/EBITDA will average 3 through 2026. The project EBIT/net interest expense to average 5.4 between 2021 and 2026, a healthy level. The forecasted net debt/equity to average 1.5 through 2026 versus 1.45 in 2021.

Bulls Say:

  • Rebalancing of the capital allocation from shareholder remuneration to growth investments will be value- accretive.
  • Limited free float implies a high likelihood of minorities buyout.
  • Profitability of the LNG business should boom in 2022 and 2023 on skyrocketing gas prices.

Company Description:

Naturgy stems from the acquisition of Union Fenosa in 2008. The company operates across the gas value chain, from procurement to distribution and marketing. It owns and operates the largest gas distribution network in Spain and is the leader in retail gas supply. The company also owns and operates gas and electricity distribution networks in Latin America. The company owns 12.60 GW of generation capacity including 4.60 GW of renewables, mostly made of hydro.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
LICs LICs

Blackstone Remains the Go-To Firm in the Alternative Asset Management Segment

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Blackstone has built a solid position in the alternative asset-management industry, utilizing its reputation, broad product portfolio, investment performance track record and cadre of dedicated professionals to not only raise massive amounts of capital but maintain the reputation it has built for itself as a “go-to firm” for institutional and high-net-worth investors looking for exposure to alternative assets. Unlike the more traditional asset managers, who have had to rely on investor inaction (driven by either good fund performance or investor inertia/uncertainty) to keep annual redemption rates low, the products offered by alternative asset managers can have lockup periods attached to them, which prevent investors from redeeming part or all of their investment for a prolonged period of time. 

Blackstone is one of the world’s largest alternative asset managers with $880.9 billion in total assets under management, including $650.0 billion in fee-earning assets under management, at the end of 2021. The company’s portfolio is broadly diversified across four business segments–private equity (24% of fee-earning AUM and 32% of base management fees), real estate (34% and 39%), credit & insurance (30% and 16%), and hedge fund solutions (11% and 13%) –and it primarily serves clients in the institutional channel. With customer demand for alternatives increasing, and investors in alternative assets attempting to limit the number of providers they use, large-scale players like Blackstone are well positioned to gather and retain assets for their funds. That said, investors in Blackstone are betting that the company’s outstanding investment track record and fundraising capabilities will continue into the future. While the confidence in the firm’s ability to earn excess returns over the next 10 years, it will become increasingly difficult for the company to do so longer-term as increased competition from peers (including more traditional asset managers like BlackRock), continued pressure on fees, and a general maturation of the segment (from a solid period of above average growth due to shifting investor demand for alternatives) weigh on results.

Financial Strengths:

Blackstone’s business model depends heavily on having fully functioning credit and equity markets that will allow its investment funds to not only arrange financing for leveraged buyouts and/or additional debt issuances for the companies and properties it oversees but cash out of them once their investment has run its course. While the company saved itself a lot of headaches during the collapse of the credit and equity markets during the 2008-09 financial crisis by having relatively little debt on its own books, debt levels crept up to less-than-ideal levels during 2010-19. Given that asset managers like Blackstone have a high degree of revenue cyclicality and operating leverage, and are generally asset light, they should not maintain more than low to moderate levels of financial leverage. 

The company entered 2022 with $7.6 billion in longer-term debt (on a principal basis) on its books, with 60% of that total coming due during 2030-50. The company also has a $2.25 billion revolving credit facility (which expires in November 2025) but had no outstanding balances at the end of January 2022. Blackstone should enter 2023 with a debt/total capital ratio of 44%, debt/EBITDA (by our calculations) at 1.1 times, and interest coverage of more than 30 times. On the distribution front, share repurchases have been rare over the past decade, with the company repurchasing (net of issuances) just over $3 billion of stock (most of which was bought back in the past four calendar years). Dividend payments, meanwhile, exceeded $25 billion during 2012-21 and are expected to account for 85% of distributable earnings annually going forward.

Bulls Say:

  • Blackstone, with $650 billion in fee-earning AUM at the end of 2021, is a “go-to firm” for institutional and high-net-worth investors looking for exposure to alternative assets.
  • The company’s ever-increasing scale, diversified product offerings, long track record of investment performance and strong client relationships position the firm to perform well in a variety of market conditions.
  • Customer demand for alternatives has been increasing, with institutional investors in the category limiting the number of providers they use—both positives for Blackstone’s business model.

Company Description:

Blackstone is one of the world’s largest alternative asset managers with $880.9 billion in total asset under management, including $650.0 billion in fee-earning asset under management, at the end of 2021. The company has four core business segments: private equity (24% of fee-earning AUM, and 32% of base management fees, during 2021); real estate (34% and 39%); credit & insurance (30% and 16%); and hedge fund solutions (12% and 13%). While the firm primarily serves institutional investors (87% of AUM), it does serve clients in the high-net-worth channel (13%). Blackstone operates through 25 offices located in the Americas (8), Europe and the Middle East (9), and the Asia-Pacific region (8).

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Technology Stocks

Accessing lower-costs funds providing SoFi the opportunity to drive net interest income growth

Business Strategy and Outlook

SoFi targets young, high-income individuals who may be underserved by traditional full-service banks. The company is purely digital and engages with its clients exclusively through its mobile app and website. Unlike existing digital banks, which generally have limited product offerings, SoFi offers a full suite of financial services and products that includes everything from student loans to estate planning. The intent is that this will allow its customers to structure the entirety of their finances around SoFi, and the company’s reward structures are designed to encourage its clients to do so. By acting as a one-stop shop for its customers’ finances, SoFi intends to create powerful cross-selling advantages that will reduce its cost of acquisition and give it a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 

In order to meet this goal, SoFi has used a mixture of internal development and external partnerships to rapidly expand the services offered to its clients. The use of partnerships has allowed SoFi to build out its product offerings with impressive speed, transforming SoFi from being a student and personal loan company into a one-stop shop for financial services in just a few years. The company’s expanded product lineup along with increased adoption of digital banking during the pandemic has helped accelerate SoFi’s growth, with the number of members increasing by nearly 90% in 2020. Rapid growth has persisted into 2021, and SoFi remains the only company utilizing a digital full-service model, giving it a clear niche. 

While SoFi has offered its clients banking services for some time, the company itself has only recently become a true bank. Having successfully gained a national banking charter in early 2022, SoFi is now able to retain deposits into its SoFi Money accounts and use them to support its lending operations. Prior to SoFi obtaining a charter, deposits into these accounts were swept out to SoFi’s partner banks, leaving SoFi to finance its lending arms entirely though external financing. Access to these lower-costs funds will give SoFi the opportunity to drive net interest income growth as the firm leans into its unique model for digital banking.

Financial Strength

SoFi is in a good financial position with a strong balance sheet and limited credit risk from its lending operations. During its SPAC merger, SoFi raised $1.2 billion through PIPE financing, which came in addition to the $800 million in liquidity that the company acquired during the SPAC merger itself. SoFi does not pay a dividend or make any kind of shareholder returns. This is expected given where SoFi is in its corporate life cycle. It is not likely, SoFi to commit itself to making dividend payment or to repurchase shares at any point in the immediate future as the company is far more likely to reinvest any excess capital into its business. Additionally, the company’s financial reserves should be more than sufficient to cover any credit losses it may experience. SoFi either sells or securitizes the loans it originates. While historically SoFi has retained some of the securitizations it has made, recently the company has been moving away from this practice and many of the loans it has on its books are “float” from its lending business. In other words, loans that have been made but not yet sold through. Because these loans are recently originated, SoFi experiences limited credit losses, and the company’s write-off expense is low relative to the size of its balance sheet. With low credit losses and substantial financial assets at its disposal SoFi is in a good position financially and should have plenty of flexibility to invest in its business as it sees fit.

Bulls Say’s

  • SoFi has managed to rapidly launch an impressive array of products and services, and the company remains the only firm offering a digital full-service model. 
  • SoFi has enjoyed rapid growth driven by the introduction of new products and broader adoption of digital banking. 
  • The company’s acquisition of Galileo was likely a major win as the number of accounts using Galileo’s platform has risen sharply since the purchase.

Company Profile 

SoFi is a financial services company that was founded in 2011 and is currently based in San Francisco. Initially known for its student loan refinancing business, the company has expanded its product offerings to include personal loans, credit cards, mortgages, investment accounts, banking services, and financial planning. The company intends to be a one-stop shop for its clients’ finances and operates solely through its mobile app and website. Through its acquisition of Galileo in 2020 the company also offers payment and account services for debit cards and digital banking. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Upon U.S. federal legalization, Tilray to own 21% of the U.S. multistate operator

Business Strategy and Outlook

Tilray cultivates and sells cannabis in Canada and exports into the global medical market. It also sells CBD products in the U.S. The company is the result of legacy Aphria acquiring legacy Tilray in a reverse merger and renaming itself Tilray in 2021. Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018. Since then, recreational sales have come to represent an increasingly larger portion of sales for producers. The Canadian market is overly crowded with producers, so Tilray faces stiff competition to develop consumer brands that can lead to meaningful pricing power. Buoyed by attractive deal terms, Tilray’s acquisition of HEXO’s senior secured convertible notes could potentially help drive necessary market consolidation.

Legacy Aphria had an extensive international distribution business, which generated the majority of its net revenue, a far larger portion than many of its Canadian cannabis peers. Legacy Tilray had also entered the global medical market. With both companies’ international capabilities intact, Tilray looks well positioned. The global market looks lucrative given higher realized prices and growing acceptance of the medical benefits of cannabis. Exporters must pass strict regulations to enter markets, which protects early entrants. It is foreseen, roughly 15% average annual growth through 2030 for the global medicinal market excluding Canada and the U.S.

In 2020, legacy Aphria acquired SweetWater, a U.S. craft brewery. Legacy Tilray previously acquired Manitoba Harvest to distribute CBD products in the U.S. It finally secured a toehold into U.S. THC when it acquired some of MedMen’s outstanding convertible notes. Upon U.S. federal legalization, Tilray would own 21% of the U.S. multistate operator. Furthermore, Tilray paid a great price while also getting downside protection as a debtholder. It is held, the U.S. offers the fastest growth of any market globally. However, the regulatory environment is murky with individual states legalizing cannabis while it remains illegal federally. It is alleged federal law will eventually be changed to allow states to choose the legality of cannabis within their borders

Financial Strength

At the end of its third fiscal quarter 2022, Tilray had about $710 million in total debt, excluding lease liabilities. This compares to market capitalization of about $4 billion.In addition, Tilray had about $279 million in cash, which will allow it to fund future operations and investments. Management has been deliberate with its SG&A spending given the slow rollouts and regulatory challenges the Canadian market has faced. Legacy Aphria was the first major Canadian producer to reach positive EBITDA, with legacy Tilray reaching positive EBITDA in the quarter immediately preceding its acquisition. However, the combined company continues to generate negative free cash flow to the firm, which pressures its financial health.The proposed deal to purchase $211 million in HEXO senior secured convertible notes is unlikely to add any pressure to Tilray’s financial health.With most of its development costs completed, it is anticipated Tilray will have moderate capital needs in the coming years. As such, it is held, debt/adjusted EBITDA to decline. It is alleged Tilray is unlikely to require significant raises of outside capital. In September 2021, the company received shareholder approval for increasing its authorized shares in order to rely on equity for future acquisitions. This bodes well for keeping its financial health strong.

Bulls Say’s

  • Legacy Aphria’s acquisition of Legacy Tilray created a giant with leading Canadian market share, expanded international capabilities, and U.S. CBD and beer operations.
  • Tilray’s management focuses on strategic SG&A spending and running a lean business model, benefiting its financial health in the early growth stage industry.
  • Tilray management’s careful approach to expansion has allowed it to reach profitability faster than any of its Canadian peers.

Company Profile

Tilray is a Canadian producer that cultivates and sells medical and recreational cannabis. In 2021, legacy Aphria acquired legacy Tilray in a reverse merger and renamed itself Tilray. The bulk of its sales are in Canada and in the international medical cannabis export market. U.S. exposure consists of CBD products through Manitoba Harvest and beer through SweetWater.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.