Author: lvc-admin

Sage Making Further Progress Toward the Cloud

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 19, 2022
No Comments on Sage Making Further Progress Toward the Cloud

Business Strategy & Outlook

The emergence of cloud-based software in the early 2000s, along with the proliferation of smartphones and tablets and the emergence of software-as-a-service, or SaaS, business models, revolutionized the global software market. Established software providers, such as Sage Group, which historically sold on-premises software via perpetual software licenses, experienced an increase in competition and disruption of established business models. The small and medium enterprise, or SME, accounting software market experienced numerous new cloud-native SaaS providers, such as Xero, which have rapidly grown and won market share from incumbent providers.

Although Sage entered the 2000s as the largest global provider of SME accounting software, the company had grown via acquisition to become a disparate group with numerous products stretched over a large global footprint. This enabled companies, such as Xero, to enter Sage’s domestic U.K. market and rapidly grow, thanks to its modern product, simple and clear value proposition, and a nimble business model.

Sage initially struggled to transition into a cloud-based SaaS provider but finally seems to be making progress. Its acquisition of cloud native accounting software provider Intacct in 2017 was a key step on this journey, which quickly added a strong product and cloud native mindset to the group. The rationalization of the group, both from a geographical and product perspective, is also an ongoing important transition, which will strengthen the group for the new market environment. Sage is likely to experience profit margin compression in the short term as it reinvests into product development and sales and marketing to keep pace with cloud native SaaS providers. However, this should secure the company’s long-term future and eventual profit margin expansion. Despite strong competition, the company is protected by a switching cost based economic moat, and the transition of its customers to cloud based SaaS will protect the business in the long term. Sage’s asset-light business model should enable strong cash generation in the long term, which to underpin dividends and a strong balance sheet.

Financial Strengths

Sage is in good financial shape. As at March 31, 2021, Sage had net debt of GBP 650 million. This implied a net debt/EBITDA ratio of just 1.6 and an EBIT/interest coverage ratio of 14. Generally speaking, Sage’s asset-light business model and economic moat should enable strong cash flow generation, which should support dividend payments and maintain a strong balance sheet.

Bulls Say

Sage has a renewed focus toward its core cloud accounting software offering and intends to exit businesses and products that do not align to this strategy, optimizing its research and development as well as its sales and marketing strategies in the process.

Sage’s software-as-a-service business model has low capital investment requirements and predictable recurring earnings leading to strong free cash flow generation.

The acquisition and integration of Intacct into the Sage group is driving an innovative software culture.

Company Description

Sage Group Plc is a U.K. based provider of accounting and enterprise resource planning, or ERP, software, predominantly to customers in the U.S., Europe, and South Africa. The company was founded in 1981 and historically sold on-premises software products with perpetual software licenses. However, the company is transitioning toward fewer cloud connected and cloud native products, sold via software-as-a-service, or SaaS, contracts. Sage’s main cloud native products include Sage Business Cloud Accounting, for small businesses, and Sage Intacct, which Sage acquired in 2017, for medium-size businesses.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Tags Recommendations

Global stocks

Imperial’s Focused Approach Should Unlock Value

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 19, 2022
No Comments on Imperial’s Focused Approach Should Unlock Value

Business Strategy & Outlook

Stefan Bomhard has a new mantra for Imperial Brands: focus. The CEO unveiled a five-year strategic plan in 2021 that will concentrate investments both geographically and on emerging categories that

are likely to become the largest profit pools in the future. The plan makes sense because it essentially recognizes Imperial’s place in the marketplace–it is a fast follower, rather than a leader,

in most markets, but a highly profitable one with strong cash flow generation potential that should drive returns to shareholders higher in the coming years.

The overarching shift in strategy seems to be that investment will focus on categories and geographies where Imperial has existing strengths, and where consumer demand is likely to be strong. In

the core cigarette business, for example, Imperial prioritizes five tobacco markets (U.S., U.K., Germany, Spain, and Australia) in which it holds significant share and which in aggregate represent

more than 70% of Imperial’s tobacco operating profit. The company has lost share in these markets (except the U.S.) for several years, and increased investments behind its key brands should help stabilize volume declines. Other markets, as well as the firm’s smaller brands, will be managed to maximize cash flow. In next generation products, Bomhard plans to diversify the big bet placed on vaping by exiting vaping markets in which it has not gained traction, in order to target its investments on more profitable

opportunities. In heated tobacco, it is shifting its geographic focus from Japan, where it has very limited share and distribution structure, to Europe, where it has pockets of large shares.

The Bomhard’s plan will unlock value. By making more consumer and capability-centric investments, we expect the financial performance of the company to improve. Imperial has already ceded first mover advantage to Philip Morris International, and the strategy to improve performance seems to depend on regaining share, rather than driving category growth. This is unlikely to come cheap and may require higher spending going forward.

Financial Strengths

With net debt/adjusted EBITDA standing at 2.2 times at the end of fiscal 2021, Imperial’s balance sheet is roughly in line with most peers, including PMI, although gearing is much lower than that of British American Tobacco. The company has deleveraged from its 2015 acquisitions of U.S. assets from Reynolds American and Lorillard, and now intends to maintain an investment-grade credit rating. Imperial’s presence in developed markets makes it a cash-generating machine, even more so since the U.S. acquisitions. The firm has been operating in recent years on a strongly negative cash conversion cycle, and cash conversion has been up there with the best-in-class performers across the global consumer staples space. The cash conversion (defined as operating cash flow divided by operating income) to run close to 100% over five-year explicit forecast period. Imperial remains on course to return to a more normalized leverage position of below 2.5 times net debt/adjusted EBITDA by 2022, the company’s stated leverage target.

Management abandoned its medium-term guidance of 10% dividend growth in 2019, then went one step further in fiscal 2020 by cutting the second-half dividend by one third. With a payout ratio now below net income, the dividends to grow in line with earnings at a low- to mid-single-digit

rate. This is the right strategy because Imperial had been tying its own hands with the 10% growth guidance, at a time when financial flexibility is necessary to invest in long-term growth.

Bulls Say

The appointment of Simon Langelier, chairman of cannabis oil extract manufacturer PharamCielo, to the board of directors could open the door for Imperial to exploit more liberal legislation in the U.S.

Imperial generates some of the highest margins in the industry on its cigarette portfolio.

If plain packaging legislation spreads, Imperial, through its value portfolio, may be the manufacturer best positioned to benefit.

Company Description

Imperial Brands is the world’s fourth-largest international tobacco company (excluding China National Tobacco) with total fiscal 2021 volume of 232 billion cigarettes sold in more than 160 countries. The firm holds a leading global position in the fine-cut tobacco and hand-rolling paper categories,

and it has a logistics platform in Western Europe, Altadis. Through acquisition, Imperial is the third-largest manufacturer in the U.S. and owns the Winston and blue brands.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

Tags European Market

Dividend Stocks

Transferring Coverage of Narrow-Moat Henkel; FVE Reduced to EUR 80

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 19, 2022
No Comments on Transferring Coverage of Narrow-Moat Henkel; FVE Reduced to EUR 80

Business Strategy & Outlook

In January 2022, Henkel announced the decision to combine two of its business units (beauty care, and laundry and home care) into one consumer unit in an attempt to achieve more synergies in its customer and channel execution after years of subpar performance, especially in North America. While the operating an overall larger portfolio is important in driving customer management and limited upside in terms of growth as there is little marketing and innovation expertise to be shared between the units. Moreover, large competitors in the space are moving in the opposite direction, with Unilever for instance recently announcing that it would move from three divisions to five business groups, with each responsible for end-to-end strategy and execution.

Nonetheless, Henkel’s CEO Carsten Knobel updated the company’s midterm ambition following the announcement of the customer unit formation. The firm now targets midterm organic sales growth

of 3%-4%, up from 2%-4% previously, along with mid- to high-single-digit adjusted EPS growth at constant currencies, free cash flow expansion, and an adjusted EBIT margin of 16%. Notably,

this level of adjusted EBIT margin falls below the peak level of 18% achieved in 2018, signaling that management is recognizing that some of the recent higher investment in marketing and innovation

would not be temporary, with limited margin opportunities remaining. Given the firm’s track record, a 16% medium-term adjusted EBIT would imply an improvement in competitiveness in the consumer space, which one cannot see as likely at this time. That applies to the top line as well, and the measures announced thus far do not warrant an increase in growth expectations. In order to hit its midterm ambitions, that more drastic portfolio decisions must be made, which should include further trimming of the brand portfolio, a clear plan to address the underperformance in North America and in the beauty care segment, as well as providing more clarity regarding the adhesives unit, which has been overlooked to some extent and unjustly punished for underperformance on the consumer side.

Financial Strengths

Henkel has a strong balance sheet, and it has historically been run with very conservative levels of leverage. Even at the time of the acquisition of the Sun Products corporation in 2016, which was financed with debt, debt/EBITDA only increased to about 1 time. It has remained fairly stable at around 1 time since then, with net debt/EBITDA declining, averaging around 0.5 times over the last 5 years,

significantly below large-cap consumer staples peers for which the average is closer to 2.0 times.

Acquisitions have declined in importance since the Sun Products purchase, but remain an integral part of management’s stated strategy. To this point, one of the reasons given for the formation of the Henkel Consumer Brands segment was to enable the company to step up its active portfolio management, both in terms of divestment or discontinuations of noncore brands and businesses, and by creating a stronger basis for acquisitions across the consumer space. The restructuring of the business will only be completed in 2023, so do not expect to see a massive transformative initiative until at least 2024. In the absence of acquisitions, however, Henkel is unlikely to need to raise capital, and even given the unambitious mid-single-digit estimate of EBITDA growth over five-year forecast period should ensure that the net debt/EBITDA ratio remains controlled for the foreseeable future, all else equal.

Bulls Say

The combination of the beauty care and the home care segments under one roof in the consumer segment should result in more rapid and material portfolio decisions.

Henkel offers plenty of balance sheet optionality and should be able to pursue targets ranging from bolt-on to transformative.

Henkel’s clear market leadership in adhesives technologies through its differentiated and customizable offering gives it a unique position to benefit from secular trends around lighter yet strong materials and energy efficiency.

Company Description

Two distinct customer groups comprise Henkel. The consumer segment (around 50% of consolidated 2021 sales) is laundry and home care, including the Persil and Purex laundry detergent brands, and beauty care, including the Schwarzkopf brand in hair care, and the Dial brand in hand soap. The

adhesives technologies segment makes up the remaining 50% of sales. Sales from Western Europe accounted for 30% of the firm’s consolidated total in 2021, while Asia-Pacific and North America accounted for 17% and 25%, respectively.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

Tags Street Talks

Global stocks

Beyond Meat’s first-mover advantage will result in an enduring market leadership position

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 18, 2022
No Comments on Beyond Meat’s first-mover advantage will result in an enduring market leadership position

Business Strategy and Outlook

Beyond Meat is a pioneer in the plant-based meat, or PBM, industry, offering the first burger to look and taste like meat, although it was soon followed by Impossible Foods and many others. Given the rapidly changing marketplace, although it is too early to tell if Beyond’s first-mover advantage will result in an enduring market leadership position.

However, it is still optimistic on the prospects for the meat like PBM market. It is expected that a primary growth driver to be the 20% of consumers willing to adjust their habits to benefit the environment, as Beyond’s products emit 90% less greenhouse gases and require 93% less land, 99% less water, and 46% less energy to produce than their meat equivalents. The PBMs will be very successful abroad, in China and India in particular, the world’s two most populated countries, each with 1.4 billion people. The products offer a great solution for China, which does not have enough arable land to feed its huge population, and a great fit for India’s large vegetarian population. Both countries are highly amenable to the products, with surveys showing 96% of China’s and 94% of India’s populations are likely to try the products, compared with 75% of U.S. consumers. It’s expected the global PBM market will grow from $6 billion in 2021, according to Euromonitor, to $31 billion by 2031 (a 19% compound annual growth rate), as PBMs grow from 1.1% of the ground meat market to nearly 5%. The model Beyond’s market share is increasing from 8.4% in 2021 to 12% in 2031 as PBMs gain a larger share of the overall meat category and Beyond’s brand continues to win with consumers, given its strong performance in taste tests and ongoing R&D investments. Beyond is the global preferred supplier of McDonald’s McPlant patty (expected to launch in various countries in 2022-24) and will co-create products with Yum Brands to be used at KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell across the globe. It is expected that these deals will collectively result in over $200 million in incremental annual revenue by 2025, supporting $72 fair value estimate for Beyond Meat

Financial Strength

In March 2021, Beyond issued $1 billion in 0% coupon convertible notes that expire in 2027. This should provide adequate liquidity until the firm generates positive free cash flow, which is expected to occur in 2026. As of March 2022, Beyond held $548 million cash, which should be sufficient to meet its needs in 2022, specifically about $230 million to fund operations and $50 million in capital expenditures. However, if demand for Beyond’s products falls short of the forecast, or costs exceed the expectations, Beyond could opt to issue additional debt or shares, which could dilute current shareholders. It is continued to expect capital expenditures to be the primary use of cash, as the company will spend a significant portion of sales to build capacity in order to meet growing demand. But the level of investment should moderate from 2021, when Beyond invested $136 million (29% of sales) to build capacity ahead of product launches with McDonald’s and Yum Brands. In 2022 and beyond, it is expected that the capital investments between 6% and 8% of sales annually for the remainder of 10-year explicit forecast (still above the average for packaged food peers as the firm continues to expand capacity). The firm will not initiate a dividend over the next 10 years, but it is expected there will be sufficient cash on hand for moderate share repurchases, which is a model beginning in 2028. It can be viewed this as a prudent use of cash when shares trade below the assessment of its intrinsic value

Bulls Say’s

Plant-based meats should continue to gain share from traditional meat, driven by significant environmental benefits and consumers’ shift away from red meat. Beyond Meat should be a major beneficiary, given its first-mover advantage and strong performance in taste tests.
Europe and Asia represent large opportunities for Beyond, where consumers are more favourable to PBMs than in the U.S., and Impossible Foods is banned in Europe, as its products contain GMOs.
New deals with McDonald’s and Yum Brands should be material catalysts in 2022-24, representing over $200 million in sales

Company Profile

Beyond Meat is a provider of plant-based meats, such as burgers, sausage, ground beef, and chicken. Unlike other vegetarian products, Beyond Meat seeks to replicate the look, cook, and taste of meat, is targeted to omnivores and vegetarians alike, and is sold in the meat case. The products are widely available across the U.S. and Canada and in 83 additional countries as well. International revenue represented 31% of 2021 sales. The firm’s products are available in retail stores and the food-service channel. In 2019, before the pandemic struck, sales were evenly split between these two channels, although mix stood at 70% retail/30% food service in 2021.

(Source:MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

Tags US Market

Technology Stocks

Caesars has realized over $1 billion in combined revenue and cost synergies from its merger with Eldorado

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 18, 2022
No Comments on Caesars has realized over $1 billion in combined revenue and cost synergies from its merger with Eldorado

Business Strategy and Outlook

As a result of the acquisition of the legacy Caesars business by Eldorado (closed July 2020), it is estimated Caesars holds more than a 10% revenue share of the domestic casino gaming market; this represents around 100% of the company’s total EBITDA. The acquisition roughly doubled the company’s U.S. portfolio to around 50 properties while lifting its loyalty membership to over 60 million from 55 million (loyalty stood at 65 million at the end of 2021). Caesars has realized over $1 billion in combined revenue and cost synergies from its merger with Eldorado, representing around a 30% increase to pro forma 2019 EBITDAR. Before this recent combination, legacy Eldorado successfully integrated the Isle and Tropicana acquisitions in 2017 and 2018, respectively, with both deals driving about a 30% return on investment, based on calculations. Despite this successful acquisition record, it’s d believe Las Vegas and other U.S. gaming regions contribute to a moat for Caesars. U.S. gaming demand is lower than in Asian regions like Macao and Singapore, where the propensity to gamble is much higher. Also, the 1,000 commercial and tribal casinos in the U.S. serve a total population of 330 million, well in excess of the 41 and 2 casinos found in Macao and Singapore, respectively, with Chinese and Singaporean populations of 1.4 billion and 5.9 million, respectively. Further, supply growth in U.S. gaming is increasing in 2021-23, with two resorts opening in Las Vegas that add a mid-single-digit percentage to market room supply. This compares with negligible additions in either Macao or Singapore, where it is seen there are no additional licenses for the foreseeable future.

Despite this successful acquisition record, it’s not believed that Las Vegas and other U.S. gaming regions contribute to a moat for Caesars. U.S. gaming demand is lower than in Asian regions like Macao and Singapore, where the propensity to gamble is much higher. Also, the 1,000 commercial and tribal casinos in the U.S. serve a total population of 330 million, well in excess of the 41 and 2 casinos found in Macao and Singapore, respectively, with Chinese and Singaporean populations of 1.4 billion and 5.9 million, respectively. Further, supply growth in U.S. gaming is increasing in 2021-23, with two resorts opening in Las Vegas that add a mid-single-digit percentage to market room supply. This compares with negligible additions in either Macao or Singapore, where there are no additional licenses for the foreseeable future.

Financial Strength

Caesars’ debt levels are elevated. In 2019, excluding financial lease obligations, legacy Caesars’ debt/adjusted EBITDA measured a hefty 7.8 times, while legacy Eldorado came in at 3.7 times. It is believed reasonable to include financial lease obligations in the long-debt responsibility of the combined companies (which merged in July 2020). Caesars’ debt/adjusted EBITDA can be seen reaching 8.5 times in 2022 and then 6.9 times in 2023 as global leisure and travel market demand continue to recover from the pandemic, aided by company cost and revenue synergies that is estimated to total over $1 billion. The $7.6 billion are in free cash flow (operating cash flow minus capital expenditures) and it is expected that in 2022-26 is focused on reducing debt levels and investing in the digital sports and iGaming markets, with share repurchases and dividends not occurring until 2025. Caesars has no meaningful debt maturity until 2024, when $4.8 billion is scheduled to come due. That said, EBIT interest coverage is on the thinner side, the forecasted ratio is at only 2.0 on average the next five years.

Bulls Say’s

Caesars’ best-of-breed management stands to generate cost and revenue synergies from its merger with Eldorado.
Caesars has the largest property (around 50 domestic casinos versus roughly 20 for MGM) and loyalty presence (65 million members versus MGM’s roughly high-30 million), which presents cross-selling opportunities.
It can be seen that Caesars’ domestic properties are well positioned to benefit from the $6.2 billion U.S. sports betting revenue opportunity in 2024.

Company Profile

Caesars Entertainment includes around 50 domestic gaming properties across Las Vegas (50% of 2021 EBITDAR before corporate and digital expenses) and regional (63%) markets. Additionally, the company hosts managed properties and digital assets, the latter of which produced material EBITDA losses in 2021. Caesars’ U.S. presence roughly doubled with the 2020 acquisition by Eldorado, which built its first casino in Reno, Nevada, in 1973 and expanded its presence through prior acquisitions to over 20 properties before merging with legacy Caesars. Caesars’ brands include Caesars, Harrah’s, Tropicana, Bally’s, Isle, and Flamingo. Also, the company owns the U.S. portion of William Hill (it plans to sell the international operation in 2022), a digital sports betting platform.

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice. The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities. Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document. The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Tags Street Talks

Global stocks

JD’s Special Dividend Doesn’t Imply Long-Term Commitment to Recurring Dividend

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 18, 2022
No Comments on JD’s Special Dividend Doesn’t Imply Long-Term Commitment to Recurring Dividend

Business Strategy and Outlook

JD.com has emerged as a leading disruptive force in China’s retail industry by offering authentic products online at competitive prices with speedy and high-quality delivery service. JD’s mobile shopping market share increased from 21% in 2016 to an estimated 27% in 2020. JD adopted an asset-heavy model with self-owned inventory and self-built logistics, while Alibaba has more of an asset-light model. JD is a long-term margin expansion story driven by increasing scale from JD direct sales and marketplace, partially offset by the push into JD logistics in the medium term. JD is the largest retailer in China by revenue. Among listed Chinese peers, JD’s net product revenue in 2020 was 2-3 times higher than for Suning, the second-largest listed retailer. JD’s increasing scale in each category will allow it to garner bargaining power toward the suppliers and volume-based rebates. Since 2016, JD no longer fully reinvests its gains from improving scale and is committed to delivering annual margin expansion in the long run. The increase in mix from higher-margin third-party platform business and efficiency of scale will also help lift margins.

In the medium term, investment into community group purchase and JD logistics is anticipated, and the higher mix of lower-margin supermarket categories will hold back some of the margin gains. Starting in April 2017, the logistics business became an independent business unit that opened its services to third parties. Management is squarely focused on gaining market share instead of profitability at this point, and to do so, it has invested heavily in supply chain management, integrated warehouse, and delivery services to penetrate into less developed areas. As the logistics business gains scale and reaches higher capacity utilization, gross profit margin improvement is projected. Management believes it is not time to turn profitable in the supermarket category in order to be a category leader in China.

Financial Strength

JD.com had a net cash position of CNY 135 billion at the end of 2020. Its free cash flow to the firm has continued to be positive at CNY 8.1 billion in 2020. JD has not paid dividends. JD.com has invested heavily in fulfillment infrastructure and technology in recent years, leading to concerns about its free cash flow profile and margin improvement story. Management will put more emphasis on growing revenue per user, expansion into lower-tier cities and the businesses’ profitability. Therefore, JD will not invest in new areas as aggressively as before, so JD will be able to maintain a positive non-GAAP net margin versus being unprofitable before. Its financial strength will improve in future. Most of the initial investments in the third-party logistics business have been carried out, and utilization of the warehouses has picked up. Its technology team is already in place without the need to add substantial head count. JD will also be cautious in its investment in the group-buying business and new retail, given a profitable business model has not been established in the market. JD has tried to improve its asset-heavy model by transferring a portfolio of warehouses to establish a CNY 10.9 billion logistics property core fund in partnership with the sovereign wealth fund of Singapore, GIC. JD will own 20% of the fund, lease back the logistics facilities, and receive management fees for managing the facilities. The deal will be completed in phases with the majority of them completed in 2019.

Bulls Say’s

JD.com’s nationwide distribution network and fulfillment capacity will be extremely difficult for competitors to replicate.
The partnership with Tencent could allow JD.com to gain significant user traffic from Tencent’s dominant social-networking products in China.
JD is now the largest supermarket in China; the high frequency FMCG categories have attracted new customers from less developed areas and can drive purchase of other categories.

Company Profile

JD.com is China’s second-largest e-commerce company after Alibaba in terms of gross merchandise volume, offering a wide selection of authentic products at competitive prices, with speedy and reliable delivery. The company has built its own nationwide fulfilment infrastructure and last-mile delivery network, staffed by its own employees, which supports both its online direct sales, its online marketplace and omnichannel businesses.

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

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Five9 Makes Investment In AI Technology And Public Cloud To Capitalize On Strong Operating Leverage

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 18, 2022
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Business Strategy & Outlook:

Five9 provides cloud-native contact center software that enables digital customer service, sales, and marketing engagement. A long growth runway and massive market opportunity is projected but also expect no-moat Five9 to require a high degree of investment activity moving forward as it squares off against larger competitors. Five9’s Virtual Contact Center, or VCC, platform combines core telephony functionality, omnichannel engagement capabilities, and various software modules into a unified cloud contact-center-as-a-service, or CCaaS, platform. Five9’s artificial intelligence and automation portfolio supplements and enhances the firm’s core CCaaS offerings, including solutions for digital self-service, agent assist technology, and workflow automation. VCC is expected to become increasingly critical for enabling omnichannel interactions amid a secular acceleration of digital-first customer engagement.

With only 15% to 20% of contact center agents in the cloud, the residual opportunity around uncaptured communication data is significant. The increasing automation of contact center labor also presents an additional opportunity for Five9 and expect the firm’s rapidly growing AI and automation portfolio to enable both scale and efficiency gains for customers’ call center operations. Attach rates for these solutions are rising within each tier of customers, and higher attach rates in incrementally larger enterprises have been observed, a positive as the company advances its penetration in the upmarket. Reflecting the high utility businesses derived from the firm’s offerings, Five9 reports a net retention rate in excess of 120%. This expansion reflects both an increasing monetization of existing customers as well as the capture of new customers— principally driven by the migration of contact centers to the cloud. Nonetheless, the positive outlook has been tempered as heightening competition in the cloud contact center space has been noticed, with the emergence of natively built CCaaS offerings from other industry titans such as Zoom, Twilio, and Amazon.

Financial Strengths:

Five9 is in a decent financial position. As of March 2022, Five9 held $477.7 million in cash and short-term investments versus $737.9 million in debt. In May 2018, Five9 issued $258.8 million in 0.125% convertible senior notes, due 2023 and convertible at $40.82 per share. As of March 2022, approximately $2.3 million of the 2023 notes remained outstanding. In June 2020, Five9 issued an additional $747.5 million in 0.5% convertible senior notes, due 2025, convertible at $134.34 per share, and entirely outstanding as of March 2022. While there are no material concerns about Five9’s ability to finance this debt, the firm is expected to require future financing given the liquidity imbalance.

Five9 has yet to achieve GAAP profitability, as the company remains focused on reinvesting excess returns back into the company, primarily on an organic basis, to build out the platform and enhance future growth prospects. Five9 has invested heavily in internal innovation in recent years, building a sophisticated AI and automation portfolio in sales and marketing to build an enterprise-specific direct sales team in its professional services organization to enable an enterprise-heavy go-to-market motion and its public cloud to enable international growth. Five9 does not pay a dividend, nor repurchase stock, and for a growing company within an increasingly competitive market, an appropriate strategy would be the company focusing capital allocation on reinvestments for growth. Healthy growth in free cash flow is expected as industry tailwinds around digital transformations lead to long-term growth for Five9. Five9 reached non-GAAP profitability in 2017, posting both a positive non-GAAP operating margin and positive non-GAAP earnings from then on. As the company scales, non-GAAP operating margins are expected to reach into the low-40% range at the end of the 10-year forecast period, up from 14% in 2021. These positive results should translate to profitability on a GAAP basis by 2025.

Bulls Say:

Five9 has strong user retention metrics, with net dollar retention above 120%.
As the firm continues to expand its growing AI and automation portfolio, Five9 should benefit as automation of contact center labor will enable a larger incremental market opportunity, and AI-based technology commands a higher ASP per seat.
Five9 has a large residual market opportunity, with only about 15% to 20% of contact center agents having moved to the cloud so far.

Company Description:

Five9 provides cloud-native contact center software that enables digital customer service, sales, and marketing engagement. The company’s Virtual Contact Center platform combines core telephony functionality, omnichannel engagement capabilities, and various software modules into a unified cloud contact-center-as-a-service, or CCaaS, platform. Five9’s artificial intelligence and automation portfolio supplements and enhances the firm’s core CCaaS offerings, including solutions for digital self-service, agent assist technology, and workflow automation. Five9 also offers workforce optimization products that optimize call center efficiency through workforce management solutions, manage interaction quality, and track agent performance.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

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Narrow-Moat Alcon Has Defensive Characteristics, Refractive Is Most Exposed To Recession Risks

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 18, 2022
No Comments on Narrow-Moat Alcon Has Defensive Characteristics, Refractive Is Most Exposed To Recession Risks

Business Strategy and Outlook

As a global leader in eyecare, Alcon provides products and equipment for various vision conditions such as refractive errors, cataracts, and advanced vitreoretinal problems. The firm is the second-biggest player in contact lenses and has a robust portfolio in liquid eyecare solutions for allergies and dry eye. Despite a strong market position, Alcon remains in turnaround mode following years of underinvestment as a Novartis subsidiary. The company has committed significant capital to the turnaround program with greater sales and marketing spending, and capital expenditures that are expected to total over $1.5 billion over the next three years. Looking past expected lumpiness of near-term results, management’s turnaround efforts will largely pay off and there is a positive view of the outlook on the core business.

Alcon’s strategy centers on growth in premium product lines, implementing cost-saving initiatives to drive margin expansion, and capitalizing on secular long-term growth in global eyecare. Specifically, the firm has identified three main areas of growth for the business: advanced intraocular lenses (PanOptix, Vivity), premium daily contact lenses (Total1, Precision1), and liquid eyecare (Systane, Pataday). Within each of these markets, Alcon has a premium product that should allow for near-term above-market growth. Alcon’s leading position in phacoemulsification for cataract surgery, with a 50% market share, helps pull in demand for standard intraocular lenses, or IOL, from bundling, and Alcon now holds a greater-than-50% share in IOLs, as well. The firm recently launched a value-priced phaco system that should generate share gains in emerging markets, which have been slower to adapt phaco because of higher up-front costs. Alcon’s standard IOL business is expected to grow about in line with market, and the introduction of PanOptix to the U.S. market should enable above-market growth for the advanced lens portfolio. PanOptix is the first trifocal in the U.S., and this lens has benefited from its first-mover advantage, with the product achieving 75% share of advanced IOL sales in the U.S. and Japan.

Financial Strength

Alcon’s financial strength is satisfactory. The firm took on $3.5 billion of debt in early 2019 related to the spin-off from Novartis, and the company ended 2021 with a moderate degree of leverage (debt/EBITDA ratio of 2.6). Interest coverage is a moderate concern to us in the near term given that interest expenses are projected to exceed operating income in 2021. This is partly due to the refinancing of $2 billion of debt in 2019, which resulted in higher interest expense. Still, this also lengthened the maturity of the debt, giving Alcon improved longer-term financial stability. Given current assumptions about operating income growth over the coming years, interest coverage is not anticipated to be a long-term concern, and the coverage ratio is expected to surpass 10 times by the back half of the 10-year forecast period. In early 2019, about a month before Alcon once again became a public firm, the company acquired fluid-based intraocular lens maker Powervision for $285 million. The firm is likely to make a few similarly sized tuck-in acquisitions over the next few years, in the range of $50 million to $500 million, such as the $475 million acquisition of Ivantis in November 2021. With Alcon’s total market cap at around $35 billion, this acquisition range is meaningful but not necessarily material to the overall business, and the company has enough free cash flow to pursue acquisitions of this size. Positive free cash flow to the firm is projected throughout the 10-year explicit forecast period, indicating the firm has ample financial flexibility.

Bulls Say’s

Alcon stands to benefit from several secular trends in eyecare: an increasing prevalence of myopia, demand for better eyecare from a growing middle-class in emerging markets, and growth driven by an aging population.
As a stand-alone public firm, Alcon will have the necessary financial flexibility to make investments for the longer term, and patient investors could be well rewarded.
Alcon’s product pipeline (fluid-based intraocular lenses, accommodating contact lenses, Systane line expansion) will help the firm maintain and expand its position as the global leader in eyecare.

Company Profile

Alcon, headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, is the global eyecare leader with a diverse portfolio in ophthalmology including contact lenses, eye drops, surgical equipment, and related surgical products. Novartis purchased Alcon from Nestle in 2010 and, following nine years as a Novartis subsidiary, the company was spun-off as a public company in April 2019. The company reports five distinct segments: implantables (16% of revenue), consumables (31%), equipment (9%), contact lenses (27%), and ocular health (17%). The company is geographically diversified, with only about 40% of revenue from the U.S. market, and the firm has a strong presence in the European Union and Japan.

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

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Rocket’s Earnings Fall in Q1 as Higher Rates Bite Into Refinance Volumes; Fair Value Estimate to $14

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 18, 2022
No Comments on Rocket’s Earnings Fall in Q1 as Higher Rates Bite Into Refinance Volumes; Fair Value Estimate to $14

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Business Strategy and Outlook

While Rocket Companies offers a variety of products and services, the firm is best known for its Rocket Mortgage segment, which provides Rocket with most of its revenue. The mortgage industry is fractured and highly competitive, but Rocket has distinguished itself by operating as an entirely digitally lender, originating and servicing its mortgages through its mobile app and website. Rocket has made substantial investments in automating the mortgage process and has been an industry leader in increasing loan processing speed and removing pain points for consumers. These investments along with its control over the appraisal and titling process, through its ownership of Amrock, have allowed the firm to offer an industry-leading mortgage experience to borrowers while also enjoying a cost structure advantage over its competitors.

As a digital lender Rocket is able to scale its capacity for mortgage volume up or down quickly since each loan requires less manual attention. This flexibility will be needed as rising mortgage rates push mortgage origination volume well below their 2020 and 2021 highs. Rocket is particularly exposed to this trend as it is strongest in refinance activity and price sensitive first-time homebuyers. As origination activity is curtailed by higher interest rates, Rocket’s revenue and earnings is anticipated to fall from 2021, particularly as pricing in the mortgage secondary market has cooled down. That said, through the full cycle Rocket is expected to gain market share from other lenders. Consumers have become more comfortable with conducting their finances digitally during the pandemic, and digital lenders, like Rocket, have benefited from this tailwind. Rocket has had strong success in expanding its partner network. New partnerships with firms like Mint and Morgan Stanley, in which these firms offer Rocket’s mortgages to their customers, will help drive growth. While Rocket’s revenue and earnings will likely remain volatile, a symptom of the cyclical nature of the mortgage industry, the company’s strong competitive position and trends in consumer behavior will provide it with long-term secular growth.

Financial Strength

Rocket operates in a highly cyclical industry, as a result its revenue and earnings have the potential to drop sharply due to economic factors completely out of its control. While Rocket does resell the mortgages it makes within days of origination, the sheer volume of mortgages that Rocket creates means that the company has billions in mortgage debt on its balance sheet at any given point in time. At the end of December, Rocket had more than $19 billion in mortgages, which were financed by equity and less than $13 billion in funding facilities. The combination of volatile revenue and substantial funding needs means that Rocket’s financial strength is an important factor to watch, particularly during slower markets. Despite this, there are no significant concerns about Rocket’s financial health at this time. The company has a strong balance sheet and has been able to maintain constant profitability, even during slow periods for mortgage origination. Rocket had over $2.1 billion in cash at the end of December 2021 and only $6 billion in debt not directly tied to its mortgage holdings. With net debt of roughly 1.5 times the projected 2023 EBITDA, Rocket should have more than enough financial resources to see it through a slow mortgage market, should one develop.

Bulls Say’s

Rocket has been steadily gaining market share in both its direct-to-consumer and partner network mortgage origination channels.
Rocket’s digital origination model gives it a cost advantage over its peers and allows it to respond rapidly to market developments.
Rocket has been able to sign major partnerships to expand its partner network. Deals with Morgan Stanley and Intuit’s Mint represent major wins for the company

Company Profile

Rocket Companies is a financial services company that was originally founded as Rock Financial in 1985 and is currently based in Detroit. Rocket Companies offers a wide array of services and products but is best known for its Rocket Mortgage business. The company’s mortgage lending operations are split between its direct-to-consumer lending, which sees borrowers accessing the company’s lending arm directly through either its mobile app or website, and its partner network where mortgage brokers and other firms use Rocket’s origination process to offer loans to their customers. The company has rapidly gained market share in recent years and is now the largest mortgage originator in the U.S. as well as the servicer for more than 2 million loans.

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

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Materials Cost Headwinds Now A Major Cost Problem For Toyota But Balance Sheet Remains Strong

Post author By lvc-admin
Post date May 18, 2022
No Comments on Materials Cost Headwinds Now A Major Cost Problem For Toyota But Balance Sheet Remains Strong

Business Strategy and Outlook

Toyota’s vision includes making compact cars a priority for emerging markets with attractive design but lower costs, having designers and engineers as equal partners, and scale from the Toyota New Global Architecture, which develops many vehicles using common parts, something critical for Toyota to keep pace with the likes of Volkswagen. A big change on the parts side is that the company uses more parts on a global standard as opposed to Toyota-specific standards. The long-term goal is for vehicles that share a platform to have 70%-80% common parts. Giving local designers more control is finally letting Toyota make more exciting vehicles. Toyota is thinking about the future with its Monet autonomous vehicle services joint venture with SoftBank and other Japanese automakers, such as Honda, its battery joint venture with Panasonic, and Woven City, a laboratory city of the future in Japan run on hydrogen fuel cells. Toyota is also working on solid state batteries and has an JPY 8 trillion electrified vehicle plan for 2022-30.

More plants outside Japan will also help Toyota deal with foreign exchange risk, which can dramatically affect earnings. In calendar 2021, about 80% of Toyota’s light vehicle sales were outside Japan, but only 61% of production was based outside Japan. The company has long pledged to produce at least 3 million vehicles a year in Japan, but this promise becomes very hard to keep when the yen is strong. Every JPY 1 change in the U.S. dollar affects Toyota’s operating income by an estimated JPY 40 billion, more than twice the impact at Honda. Management has said that the Japanese operations break even at JPY 85/$1, and below JPY 80/$1 is where management has to reconsider its Japanese production levels, especially for compact cars. Still, in May 2020, President Akio Toyoda said 3 million units and Japan employment will be maintained no matter how bad the economic situation is because people make things society needs.

Financial Strength

Toyota is in excellent financial shape, and its balance sheet is one of the strongest in the auto sector. The company has a small debt load and substantial cash holdings. Flexibility is important because it gives the company plenty of room to acquire more capital in the debt markets, if needed. As of the end of fiscal 2022, Toyota’s consolidated cash and cash equivalent balance was JPY about 6.1 trillion. Excluding the captive finance company, the firm held about JPY 4.3 trillion in cash at the end of fiscal 2022, more than offsetting JPY 2.6 trillion of debt. This huge net cash position gives Toyota the capability to invest in many experimental efforts around hydrogen, EVs, and autonomous vehicles without drastically hurting financial health. As of year-end fiscal 2021, the consolidated company had access to about JPY 8.3 trillion of unused long-term and short-term credit lines. Debt/EBITDA excluding the financing arm has fallen to 1.3 after peaking at 2.8 times in fiscal 2009. For fiscal 2022, excluding the financing arm Toyota generated free cash flow equal to about 6.7% of revenue. Toyota does not seem to have any problems meeting debt maturities or raising more capital in a recession should it need the funds. In April 2020, it raised JPY 1.25 trillion in short-term debt to combat COVID-19 damage.

Bulls Say’s

Its popular vehicles usually allow Toyota to use fewer incentives than the Detroit Three, boosting the firm’s profits and improving the resale value of vehicles.
Toyota’s manufacturing process is the gold standard of the auto industry.
Significantly lower pension and retiree healthcare costs give Toyota a cost advantage over the Detroit Three, although this advantage is less than it used to be.

Company Profile

Founded in 1937, Toyota is one of the world’s largest automakers with 10.38 million units sold at retail in fiscal 2022 across its light vehicle brands. Brands include Toyota, Lexus, Daihatsu, and truck maker Hino; market share in Japan is about 52%, while U.S. share is over 15%. The firm also owns large stake in Denso, a parts supplier, at least 16% of Subaru (with a deal to raise that to 20%), and holds investments in many other firms, including shares of Uber Technologies and about 5% in each of Mazda and Suzuki. Fiscal 2022 sales excluding financial services were JPY 29.1 trillion. Toyota also has a financing arm and manufactures homes and boats..

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

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