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Funds Funds

Fidelity Low-Priced Stock K6

His cool-headedness has been key to its success. As a long-term investor, he looks for resilient companies with staying power and doesn’t chase fads. He tries to avoid firms that lack an enduring competitive advantage, steers clear of those loaded up with too much debt, and scrutinizes their leadership’s integrity and prowess.

The strategy stands out for its sprawling portfolio of 800-plus stocks drawn from across the globe and market-cap spectrum. Once solidly small-cap-focused, it now orients toward mid-caps but distinguishes itself from that category by owning an above-average stake of large caps (34% of assets) and small caps (30%). Its generous helping of European and Japanese firms, which have tended to enhance the strategy’s risk-adjusted returns, also sticks out.

Altogether, foreign stocks regularly soak up more than 35% of the portfolio, typically the highest share in the category. Tillinghast’s partiality for high-quality fare reveals itself through the portfolio’s average returns on equity, which are far higher than the Russell Midcap Value Index’s, and its aggregate debt/capital ratio, which is consistently lower

Focused on the long term.

Manager Joel Tillinghast looks for sturdy, underpriced businesses. Stocks selling for less than $35 or with an earnings yield (12-month earnings per share/share price) at least as high as the Russell 2000 Index’s median are considered to be potential bargains. But his “low-priced” mandate isn’t steered by stinginess. As a long-term investor, Tillinghast wants to own resilient companies with strong profitability, little debt, a defendable market niche, and capable leadership.

He often finds what he thinks are excellent opportunities overseas but reserves serious consideration for foreign markets with democratic institutions and the rule of law.The strategy owned more than 800 stocks at last count, with a large tail of tiny positions. Its huge asset base (more than $41 billion as of April 2021) makes breadth a necessity, as Tillinghast can’t take big positions in the small- and mid-cap names he favors without exceeding ownership limits. In that regard, the fund’s size is a constraint.

Its average market cap is more than triple the Russell 2000 Index’s, but it has remained squarely in mid-cap territory. In recent years, the fund landed in the mid-blend Morningstar Category but most recently moved to mid-value. This doesn’t reflect a change in process but rather where the fund’s holdings have skewed recently

Sprawling but not bland

Despite a sprawling portfolio, the fund has avoided becoming bland or benchmarklike. It has long distinguished itself through a sizable stake in foreign stocks: Its 44% stake as of January 2021 was extraordinary in the mid-cap category, where the average peer invests 2%-4% overseas. Joel Tillinghast works closely with a few analysts who source non-U.S. ideas, including one stationed in Japan, a country that takes up over 9% of assets.

The fund has long favored consumer cyclicals–26% of assets versus the Russell Midcap Value Index’s 13% share–where Tillinghast is better able to find firms with compelling competitive advantages. Its roughly 12% financials stake tends to be below that of relevant benchmarks and peers, driven by Tillinghast’s avoidance of complex banks with leveraged balance sheets. The portfolio usually holds 6% to 10% of its assets in cash, which has acted as a drag on its total returns over the past decade. Comanagers run around 5% of assets, which usually include more than 100 unique names.

Half of that stake is overseen by three sector-based managers, with the remainder split between a quantitatively driven subportfolio and a sleeve featuring global stocks. The crew manages its respective slices with discretion but always under Tillinghast’s philosophical guidance.

(Source: Morning star)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Property

BWP Is a Highly Resilient REIT

It should also get an incremental rental boost from planned upgrades and along with profits from divestments, we expect it to maintain and gradually grow its distributions. There continues to be significant investor demand for warehouse properties. The trust has sensibly not acquired properties at today’s inflated prices. But its strong balance sheet provides it with the flexibility to do so if better opportunities arise.

Key Updates

  • BWP’s defensive and growing distributions are likely to be attractive to investors in the low interest rate environment.
  • The firm’s more than 20-year history in investing in warehouse properties has created significant value for security holders and provides it with the foundation to benefit from Wesfarmers focusing future investments in Bunnings.
  • Although it has not been acquiring properties at current elevated prices, BWP’s strong balance sheet provides it with the flexibility to acquire properties if opportunities arise.

Company Profile

BWP Trust is an Australian REIT focused on owing warehouse/bulky goods retailing properties with relatively large sites and high visibility and access to arterial roads. The portfolio of properties it owns are diversified across most Australian states and are on long-term leases to Australia’s dominant home improvement chain: Bunnings Group. Bunnings is a wholly owned subsidiary of Wesfarmers Ltd. Wesfarmers is a wide-moat, top 10 ASX listed company by market capitalisation. BWP Trust is also externally managed by a wholly owned subsidiary of Wesfarmers and Wesfarmers also owns 24.8% of the units in the trust.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Property

BWP Is a Low Risk REIT

Distribution growth could also be hurt by normalisation of interest rates. The Reserve Bank of Australia and major global central banks plan to keep overnight cash rates low for another couple of years but rising inflation and runaway property prices could trigger an earlier move. Long-term bond yields have already started rising. Australian government 10-year bond yields increased from 0.8% in October last year to 1.6% currently. Regardless of timing, with official interest rates not far above zero and significantly below inflation, the next move is likely to be

up. Rising interest rates should push up the cost of borrowing for all firms, reducing profitability. They should also cause a de-rating of income stocks. But it’s not all bad. Most of BWP’s rents are linked to CPI growth.

BWP’s environmental social and governance, or ESG, risks primarily relate to the environmental impact of its buildings and general corporate governance risks, but we consider these risks to be very low. Therefore, we don’t incorporate ESG risks into our base- or bear-case scenarios, nor do we expect material value destruction from ESG issues to undermine the economic moat. The key risk facing the trust is Bunnings vacating properties for bigger and better sites nearby. But these properties can likely be sold or redeveloped without losing much value. In densely populated areas, the properties could actually have upside potential from redevelopment

Financial Strength

The trust is in a strong financial position. At Dec. 31, 2020, the trust had very low gearing (debt/total assets) of 17.8%, at the bottom of its target gearing range of 20% to 30%. Interest cover (earnings before interest/interest expense) of 8.8 times is also considered conservative. It also has a high investment-grade issuer credit rating of “A3 Stable” from Moody’s Investors Service and “A- Stable” from Standard & Poor’s. Combined with its defensive recurring rental income stream, we believe the trust’s strong balance sheet and investment-grade credit ratings provide it with the flexibility to take advantage of investment opportunities if they present themselves. Average debt duration is relatively short at 2.7 years. But we believe refinancing risk is low given conservative gearing, ample liquidity and defensive earnings.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks Shares Technical Picks

“Can Lives Here” Is No Marketing Gimmick for Commonwealth Bank

Amber markets itself as a provider of cheap electricity, which Commonwealth Bank will promote to its mobile banking customers. Little Birdie will help the bank provide rewards and exclusive offers for Commonwealth Bank customers, probably a way of winning back share from the likes of Afterpay. The initiatives will not appeal to everyone, with these product enhancements likely appealing more to younger demographics who in the future become more profitable home loan customers. Generating annual profit north of AUD 8 billion, the bank has the luxury to: 1) invest in new and even unproven products; and 2) respond to consumer preferences.

It’s hard to say if recent investments will lead to material revenue windfalls, but we think the bank’s relatively small investments make sense as it attempts to build more engaged and satisfied customers. Our buy now, pay later analyst expects the market to grow materially over the next 10 years, but the incumbents will lose share, partly due to the major banks rolling out their own offerings. Commonwealth Bank shares are up over 50% in the last 12 months, and while we agree confidence in the earnings and dividend outlook is warranted, shares trade at a 30% premium to our fair value estimate. The fully franked dividend of AUD 4 per share, or 4% yield is likely attracting retail investors, but we caution against chasing shares for income. It is not hard to imagine the share price falling more than AUD 4 in a tough year, or even a month for that matter. Hopefully the earnings share price volatility of 2020 has not already been forgotten.

Commonwealth Bank’s consumer lending business, less than 2.5% of loans but we estimate around 8.5% of operating income, includes credit cards which are being impacted by growth in the buy now, pay later, or BNPL, sector. It’s not a surprise the bank is fighting back. It owns 5% of Klarna (50% of Klarna Australia), has the CBA BNPL offering, and a no-interest card called Neo.

Company Profile

Commonwealth Bank is Australia’s largest bank with operations spanning Australia, New Zealand, and Asia. Its core business is the provision of retail, business, and institutional banking services. An exit from wealth management is ongoing, with the bank still holding a 45% stake in Colonial First State. The bank has placed a greater emphasis on banking in recent years.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Digital Giants Finally Click Like Button on Nine’s News Content

Management projects the deals to propel an AUD 30 to 40 million EBITDA uplift in fiscal 2022 for the publishing unit. Some of this increase will likely be driven by continuing cost cuts and efficiency improvements. However, we believe the bulk of it is from the new content supply deals—juicy high margin arrangements which finally shift the image of the much-maligned and structurally-challenged division to one that can now much better monetise its (albeit still dwindling) journalistic resources.

Our fiscal 2021 earnings forecasts for Nine are largely intact. But we have increased our EBITDA estimates from fiscal 2022 by 6% on average, giving effect to the uplift from the new content supply agreements (up to three years with Facebook, five years with Google), as well as lifting the expected benefits from management’s relentless focus on costs in the publishing business. More specifically, from our fiscal 2021 publishing EBITDA forecast base of AUD 124 million, we now expect fiscal 2022 EBITDA to be AUD 158 million, up from AUD 120 million. Investors and, more importantly, the journalist community will be keenly watching how these digital platform deals change management’s resource and capital allocation to the publishing division in the future. Judging by the 26% premium that no-moat-rated Nine shares are trading at relative to our intrinsic assessment, it appears investors are betting the publishing unit will become an even bigger cash cow that Nine will milk, in order to fund its growth ambitions for the digital-centric units such as 9Now and Stan. On the other hand, competition is intensifying in the digital space, and we prefer to remain on the conservative side.

Company Profile

Nine Entertainment operates Nine Network, a free-to-air television network spread across five capital cities, as well as in regional Northern New South Wales and Darwin. It also owns Australia’s third-largest portfolio of online digital properties, one that reaches more than 60% of the country’s active online audience. The merger with Fairfax combines Nine’s top-ranked TV

network and the second-largest newspaper group, topped with a collection of quality digital assets in Nine Digital, subscription video on demand operator Stan, and Fairfax’s 59%-owned Domain. It ensures the merged entity remains relevant in the eyes of audiences and advertisers.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Commodities Trading Ideas & Charts

Fletcher’s Turnaround of Its Australia Division Is on Firmer Footing in Late Fiscal 2021

In its home market, Fletcher has strong brands and a leading distribution channel, and it dominates market share in key categories. The building materials segment in general, however, is subject to easy product substitution, low switching costs, and limited pricing power, making a competitive advantage difficult to sustain. Together with a poor track record of acquisitions, Fletcher has been unable to earn a sustainable return above its cost of capital.

Key Aspects

  • A number of Fletcher’s businesses have good competitive positioning, including the PlaceMakers distribution business and its plasterboard operations. But earnings visibility and returns on capital are low, given a complex structure.
  • The recovery in New Zealand and Australian housing construction is nearing. However, the associated cyclical benefit to Fletcher’s earnings is priced in.
  • Fletcher has divested its Formica business and is backing away from commercial construction. But Fletcher could benefit from a more broad-based restructure to refocus on its core businesses.

Company Profile

Fletcher Building is the largest building materials company in New Zealand, after it emerged from the Fletcher Challenge group in 2001. Its diverse range of business interests span building product manufacture and distribution in New Zealand and Australia, as well as commercial and residential property development. Operations have been refocused on New Zealand and Australia, following divestment of the global laminates business in fiscal 2019.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Funds Funds

Fidelity Low-Priced Stock K6

As a long-term investor, he looks for resilient companies with staying power and doesn’t chase fads. He tries to avoid firms that lack an enduring competitive advantage, steers clear of those loaded up with too much debt, and scrutinizes their leadership’s integrity and prowess. The strategy stands out for its sprawling portfolio of 800-plus stocks drawn from across the globe and market-cap spectrum. Once solidly small-cap-focused, it now orients toward mid-caps but distinguishes itself from that category by owning an above-average stake of large caps (34% of assets) and small caps (30%). Its generous helping of European and Japanese firms, which have tended to enhance the strategy’s risk-adjusted returns, also sticks out.

Altogether, foreign stocks regularly soak up more than 35% of the portfolio, typically the highest share in the category. Tillinghast’s partiality for high-quality fare reveals itself through the portfolio’s average returns on equity, which are far higher than the Russell Midcap Value Index’s, and its aggregate debt/capital ratio, which is consistently lower. Tillinghast’s risk-conscious approach doesn’t have much of a thrill factor. It can lead to results that lag well behind its peers during bull markets.

Yet the strategy’s typically subdued volatility and durability in market drawdowns have consistently made up for its seemingly pedestrian results in rallies. Over the past decade through April 2021, its Sharpe ratio (a measure of risk-adjusted returns) beat 95% of funds in either the small- or mid-cap categories (excluding growth funds). The strategy’s ability to maintain its edge, despite its massive asset base of more than $41 billion, underscores its advantages.

The fund’s older version has posted phenomenal absolute and risk-adjusted returns under Joel Tillinghast, who has managed it for more than three decades. From its 1989 inception through April 2021, the fund gained 13.7% annualized, among best showings of any surviving fund in the mid- or small-cap categories. It exhibited lower volatility than relevant benchmarks and the average midvalue and mid-blend fund (its current and former category, respectively) despite an above-average foreign-equity stake. The fund has also consistently preserved capital better than its rivals during stress periods.

For example, during 2020’s pandemic-induced bear market (Feb. 21-March 23), the fund dropped 36.6% versus the Russell Midcap Value Index’s 43.7% loss. The fund’s resilience and steady gains have reliably made for outstanding risk-adjusted returns, despite its at-times less-than-thrilling total returns.

The fund’s gains only matched the index over the past decade, but earned its returns with an ample cash cushion and steadier returns. The strategy’s girth does make outperformance more difficult than in the early years; Tillinghast cannot invest as easily in the smalland mid-cap fare that he favors. He’s done better at Fidelity Series Intrinsic Opportunities FDMLX, which is his smaller, more nimble fund available for investment only by other of Fidelity’s products

Source:Morningstar

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

Ramsay Health Care Ltd

Ramsay’s offer of GBP 2.40 per Spire share represents an enterprise value of GBP 2 billion or EV/EBITDA multiple of 10.9 on pre coronavirus fiscal 2019 earnings. Post-acquisition, our EPS for fiscal years 2023 to 2025 increases by an average of 11%, slightly ahead of the high-single-digit EPS accretion management guided for fiscal 2024. However, we still view the transaction price as fair, with shares still screening as overvalued.

We expect Spire’s revenue to grow at a low-single-digit percent and operating margin to largely be maintained at 10%. In addition, we factor in GBP 26 million in annualised cost synergies from fiscal 2024 through procurement benefits, capacity utilisation and a reduction in administrative costs. The scheme is first subject to a Spire shareholder vote expected in July 2021, followed by a likely 12-month review process by the U.K. Competition Market Authority, or CMA. Ramsay’s 8% market share combined with Spire’s 17% would create the largest independent hospital operator in the U.K., but at most we anticipate CMA may require Ramsay to divest certain hospitals or clinics. Accordingly, we forecast full integration and control in fiscal 2023 and full realization of synergies in fiscal 2024.

We view the acquisition as strategically sound, in addition to extending Ramsay’s geographic reach. Spire provides more exposure to private revenue streams and higher acuity inpatient admissions. This complements and balances Ramsay’s U.K. case mix, which is dominated by day patients and revenue sourced from the National Health Service. We anticipate Ramsay to fund the deal through existing debt facilities and still afford a 50% dividend payout ratio. However, Ramsay indicated potential capital management initiatives or asset sales to deleverage its balance sheet if needed.

Profile.

Ramsay Health Care is the fifth-largest global private hospital operator with approximately 480 locations in 11 countries. The key markets in which it operates are Australia, France, the U.K., Sweden and Norway. It is the largest private hospital group in each of these markets other than Norway where it is number two and the U.K. where it ranks fourth. Ramsay Health Care has a history of acquisitive growth, with the most recent acquisition being that of Stockholm-listed Capio AB in November 2018. 51%-owned Ramsay General de Sante is listed on Euro next Paris. Ramsay Health Care undertakes both private and publicly funded healthcare.

Source:Morningstar

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Funds Funds

Invesco Intermediate Term Muni Inc

This is one of the larger muni credit teams in the industry, with 16 portfolio managers and 24 muni research analysts. It has grown primarily by way of Invesco’s acquisitions, though, and the current research configuration doesn’t have a significant history navigating market turbulence together. Veteran muni manager Mark Paris, Invesco’s muni-bond head, manages this strategy alongside nine other portfolio managers. The muni research team is large, and given this team’s preference for nonrated deals, the effort is adequate for this mandate.

The strategy absorbed a legacy Oppenheimer counterpart in mid-May 2020, though the portfolio’s profile largely remained intact over the past year. This team has a long-standing specialization in high-yield munis, and this portfolio can hold up to 35% of assets combined in below-investment-grade and nonrated bonds per its mandate. Over the past five years, the portfolio has maintained anywhere from 8% to 14% exposure to below-investment-grade munis and a similar range in nonrated issues. The team’s preference for smaller nonrated bonds can carry more liquidity risk than the typical muni national intermediate portfolio does. The team aims to minimize risk through sector diversification and limits issuer specific risk by keeping position sizes relatively small.

The strategy’s Y shares gained 3.6% annualized from October 2015 through April 30, 2021, modestly outpacing the typical muni national intermediate Morningstar Category peer’s 3.4% annualized gain, though it was also more volatile, with a top-quartile standard deviation over the same period.

Adequate for a higher-yielding offering

The process employed here combines top-down macro analysis and bottom-up credit research with a focus on below-investment grade fare, though it lacks a distinctive competitive edge. The 10-person management team running this strategy is responsible for portfolio construction and risk monitoring, which is essential as the managers regularly invest in nonrated bonds. Analysts provide long- and short-term outlooks and assign proprietary ratings to each bond. The credit research team leads also meet as needed to review any changes to these ratings as well as any special circumstances around distressed securities in the portfolio

This team has a long-standing specialization in high-yield muni bonds, and this portfolio can hold up to 35% of assets in below-investment-grade and nonrated bonds. Over the past five years, the portfolio has maintained anywhere from 8% to 14% exposure to below-investment grade munis and a similar range in nonrated issues. The team’s preference for smaller nonrated bonds can carry more liquidity risk than the typical muni national intermediate portfolio does. The team aims to minimize risks through sector diversification and limits issuer-specific risk by keeping position sizes relatively small.

Portfolio – Credit-oriented

As of March 2021, the portfolio’s largest sector exposures were industrial development and pollution-control (12%), hospital (12%), and dedicated tax (12%) revenue bonds. Life-care and higher education bonds were the next largest sectors at 8% and 7%, respectively. This portfolio has historically had a larger stake in nonrated fare than its typical muni national intermediate peer. As of March 2021, the portfolio’s 14% nonrated stake was more than 3 times its typical peer’s 3% stake. This exposure primarily comprises revenue bonds in continuing care retirement communities, hospitals, charter schools, and toll roads. The portfolio also has substantial exposure to tobacco settlement bonds; its 5% exposure is higher than the typical peer’s 1% exposure as well as the 0.4% in its S&P Municipal Bond Index benchmark.

Performance – Behaves as expected

The strategy’s long-term record under lead manager Mark Paris is decent, though it has seen more volatility than its typical national intermediate muni peer. Its Y shares gained 3.6% annualized from October 2015 through April 30, 2021, modestly outpacing the typical muni national intermediate peer’s 3.4% annualized gain, though it also had a top-quartile standard deviation over the same period, suggesting a more volatile ride than most.

The team’s preference to court more credit risk in this strategy than its typical peer means it may lag when muni credit markets get rough and benefit when risk is rewarded.

(Source: Morning star)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Funds Funds

Diamond Hill High Yield Inv

Bill Zox joined Diamond Hill in 2001 as an equity analyst. He was named a portfolio manager on Diamond Hill Corporate Credit DHSTX in April 2006 before taking over lead management in 2008. John McClain joined the firm in June 2014 as a credit analyst and was also named comanager of Diamond Hill Corporate Credit in February 2015.

The strategy’s investment approach stands out relative to its high-yield bond Morningstar Category peers’. The team focuses on relatively small issues and tends to make sizable bets on its best ideas (up to 10% per issuer), thereby increasing idiosyncratic and liquidity risk. The portfolio has on average about 30% of assets concentrated in its top 10 positions. That said, the team offsets those risks somewhat by treading lightly in the market’s lowest-quality names and limiting how much it will own of an individual issue. This process combines an intrinsic value-driven and contrarian approach to build a high current income portfolio with the opportunity for capital appreciation targeting a high-yield Morningstar Category best-quartile return over rolling five-year periods. While the portfolio’s concentration and idiosyncratic risks are material, the managers’ analytical rigor and responsible balancing of its risks provides comfort.

A distinctive and disciplined investment process

This process combines an intrinsic value-driven and contrarian approach to build a high current income portfolio with the opportunity for capital appreciation targeting a category best-quartile return over rolling five-year periods and a 150 basis points gross excess return over the ICE BofA U.S. High Yield Index benchmark.

Comanagers Bill Zox and John McClain execute a disciplined value approach: They buy issues when their market prices are lower than the team’s estimate of intrinsic business value and sell them when their initial thesis has played out or when there are better opportunities in the market. When valuations get rich and opportunities get scarce, the managers may run a larger-thanpeers allocation to investment-grade bonds to reduce the portfolio’s market risk

The team focuses on relatively small issues and tends to make sizable bets on its best ideas (up to 10% per issuer), thereby increasing idiosyncratic and liquidity risk. The portfolio has on average about 30% of assets concentrated in the top 10 positions. That said, the team offsets those risks somewhat by treading lightly in the market’s lowest-quality names and limiting how much it will own of an individual issue

An opportunistically managed portfolio driven by valuations

In response to the 2019 credit rally, the team raised its investment-grade bond exposure up to 20% at the end of that year, its highest level since the strategy’s January 2015 inception, leaving the strategy in a relatively good position to face the coronavirus-driven sell-off that started at the end of February 2020. As the market plunged, the team rotated capital and pushed the portfolio’s credit quality profile even higher as it found numerous investment-grade opportunities in names that included Nvidia, TJX, and Sysco. At the end of 2020’s first quarter, bonds rated BBB or higher represented close to 34% of assets.

After riding the Fed’s wave of purchases and betting on the economy reopening through the second half of 2020, the managers shifted gears. As valuations got rich, they rotated the portfolio out of some higher-rated longer-duration fare into shorter-maturity higher-yielding securities. At the end of March 2021, investmentgrade bonds represented less than 5% of the strategy’s assets, and its allocation to BB-rated bonds went down to 35% from almost 42% at the end of 2020 while bonds rated B moved the other way to 48% from 41% over the same period.

A category leader with a best-in-class long-term volatility-adjusted record

The team’s attention to valuations together with strong credit selection have helped the strategy hold up better than most rivals during high-yield sell-offs. For instance, despite the energy-led sell-off that started in June 2015, an investment in McDermott International MDR was the largest contributor that year, and the portfolio’s energy stake was the largest relative contributor to the strategy’s 0.3% return, which bested 90% of its category peers. Likewise, the strategy outperformed its typical peer by 184 basis points in the last quarter of 2018 and ended that year ahead of 97% of competitors.

(Source: Morning star)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.