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Dividend Stocks Expert Insights

Bega Cheese- Delivers Robust Earnings

Bega benefited from consumer stockpiling and an associated reduction in promotional activity amid the pandemic. The firm was able to leverage production capacity to meet demand quicke than competitors, achieving market share gains in spreads. However, this was offset by a decline in demand for wholesale food products, bulk ingredients, and disruptions to export market supply chains. Underlying EBITDA margins deteriorated to 6.9% from 7.4% in the prior period, which we attribute to elevated input costs, operating inefficiencies and unfavourable mix shift.

Nonetheless, we expect COVID-19 headwinds to be a shortterm issue for Bega, and the outlook for input cost pricing is improving due to more favourable conditions. We forecast operating margins to expand to 6% by fiscal 2025 (on a post AASB 16 basis) from less than 4% in fiscal 2020, underpinned by process optimisation and cost out initiatives. But we expect further margin expansion to be somewhat limited by Bega’s powerful supermarket customer base, and continued substantial contribution from the dairy category despite the firm’s strategic shift towards becoming a diversified branded consumer packaged food business.

We forecast a revenue CAGR of 6% over the five years to fiscal 2025, underpinned by mid-single-digit growth in the branded foods business, low-single-digit growth in the bulk foods business and inflationary price growth. We forecast per capita cheese consumption to remain stable, implying demand will grow in line with population growth.

Bega’s balance sheet is in sound financial health. Leverage, measured as net debt/underlying EBITDA, improved to 2.35 in fiscal 2020 from 2.75 in fiscal 2019, which is comfortably below covenants. Bega utilised robust operating cash flow and effective working capital management to reduce net debt over the period. We expect leverage to improve to sub-1.0 by fiscal 2025 as earnings improve, working capital unwinds and capital expenditure normalises. We anticipate Bega will have the balance sheet capacity to explore potential bolt-on acquisitions and partake in industry rationalisation, although the timing and scale of further acquisitions is uncertain. Regardless, we expect Bega will maintain a dividend payout ratio of 50% normalised EPS.

 (Source: Morningstar)

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Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Global stocks

Fiat Chrysler forecasts long-term average annualized revenue growth

× Management forecasts long-term average annualized revenue growth of 7% and long-term EBIT margin to reach a range of 9% to 11% (five-year plan target to 2022) on the expansion of Jeep, Ram, Alfa Romeo, and Maserati brands. The company’s 2019 forecast includes EBIT of greater than EUR 6.7 billion for a margin of greater than 6.1%. 2019 revenue guidance was not specified, but the EBIT forecast implies at least flat year-over-year revenue.

× Contrast our Stage I forecast and midcycle assumption with management’s five-year plan targets and a 10-year historical annual revenue growth rate of 6% plus adjusted EBIT margin high, low, and median of 6.4%, 2.5%, and 4.3%, respectively.

× Even so, for our model to generate a fair value equivalent to the sell-side consensus and the current market valuation, investors would have to believe midcycle assumptions of 2.5% and 2.1%, below Fiat Chrysler’s 10-year historical range and demonstrating incredulity toward management’s five-year plan targets.

× Including assumptions that are well below management’s five-year plan, our model generates a fair value that represents 99% and 131% upside to the sell-side consensus price target and the current market valuation.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Technology Stocks

Tata Motor narrow-moat rating with Jaguar Land Rover group

× We agree with the market’s concerns, including higher JLR debt levels, exposure to the Europe diesel market, the threat of a no-deal Brexit, degradation in JLR margin on industry-disruptive technology spending, and the downturn in China’s as well as India’s vehicle demand, but these issues do not change our long-term view of the firm’s normalized sustainable midcycle potential.

× Excluding joint venture equity income, Tata’s 10-year historical high, low, and median EBIT margin is 10.2% (fiscal 2011), 0.6% (fiscal 2019), and 7.6%.

× We have assumed a normalized sustainable midcycle EBIT margin of 7.5%.

× To force our model to reach the current INR 168 sell-side consensus price target, we would have to believe a 3.5% normalized sustainable midcycle EBIT margin.

× Indicative of the market’s short-term thinking, at the current INR 110 market valuation, the midcycle would have to be 2.9%.

× We think consensus and market valuations treat the stock as though the effects of weak China and India demand, exposure to Europe diesel, a hard Brexit, and margin compression from higher-than-normal spending are permanent impairments to the company’s profit profile.

Tata Motors Limited is an automobile company. The Company is engaged in manufacture of motor vehicles. The Company’s segments include automotive operations and all other operations. The Company is engaged mainly in the business of automobile products consisting of all types of commercial and passenger vehicles, including financing of the vehicles sold by the Company. The Company markets its commercial and passenger vehicles in various countries in Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia, South Asia, Australia, and Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States countries. The Company’s automotive segment operations include all activities relating to the development, design, manufacture, assembly and sale of vehicles, including vehicle financing, as well as sale of related parts and accessories. The Company’s all other operations segment mainly includes information technology (IT) services, and machine tools and factory automation services.

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Shares Technology Stocks

Tenneco stock ride performance products and systems for light vehicle

× In our opinion, Tenneco stock valuation has been unfairly punished because of the high level of debt after the Federal-Mogul acquisition; the postponement of the separation of DRiV, which implies previously unanticipated integration challenges; as well as transient operating environment and cost issues.

× The company has demonstrated an ability to perform in an unfavorable operating environment while carrying a high debt burden. In 2008 and 2009, total debt/EBITDA exceeded 4.0 times. In 2009, the stock hit a low of $0.70. Since then, shares have traded as high as $68.71 (2016), and total debt/EBITDA reached a low of 1.6 (2014). At the end of the second quarter of 2019, the credit metric was 3.5 times.

× Our forecast assumes 1% pro forma average annual revenue growth from 2017 (the year before the Federal-Mogul acquisition) to 2023 versus a 4% 10-year historical growth rate for old Tenneco. Our Stage I EBITDA margin assumptions average 9.7%, with a normalized sustainable midcycle of 9.6%.

× During the past 10-years, Tenneco’s high, low, and median EBITDA margins have been 9.6%, 7.3%, and 9.1%. In 2017, including targeted $200 million integration cost savings and adding $50 million for public company costs for the eventual spin-off of DRiV, we estimate pro forma EBITDA margin would have been 10.4% versus Tenneco’s as-reported 9.4%.

× We estimate that for our model to generate a fair value equivalent to the sell-side consensus estimate and the current market valuation, investors would have to believe midcycle EBITDA margins of 5.5% and 5.0%, respectively.

Tenneco Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells clean air, powertrain, and ride performance products and systems for light vehicle, commercial truck, off-highway, industrial, and aftermarket customers worldwide. The company operates through Clean Air, Powertrain, Ride Performance, and Motorparts segments. It offers clean air products and systems, including catalytic converters and diesel oxidation catalysts; diesel particulate filters(DPFs); burner systems; lean nitrogen oxide (NOx) traps; selective catalytic reduction (SCR) systems; hydrocarbon vaporizers and injectors; SCR-coated diesel particulate filters systems; urea dosing systems; four-way catalysts; alternative NOx reduction technologies; mufflers and resonators; fabricated exhaust manifolds; pipes; hydroformed assemblies; elastomeric hangers and isolators; and aftertreatment control units. The company also provides powertrain products and systems, such as pistons; piston rings; cylinder liners; valve seats and guides; bearings; spark plugs; valvetrain products; system protection products; and seals and gaskets. In addition, it offers motor parts, including steering and suspension, braking, sealing, engine, emission, and maintenance products, as well as shocks and struts; and ride performance products and systems comprising advanced suspension technologies, and ride control and braking products, as well as noise, vibration, and harshness performance materials. The company was formerly known as Tenneco Automotive Inc. and changed its name to Tenneco Inc. in 2005.

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Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks

Flight Centre Travel– Trading Update Supports Recovery

Furthermore, the cost of maintaining the physical network (wages, rent) is likely to magnify the impact on earnings from just a slight weakness at the top line. However, the corporate travel unit within Flight Centre is more profitable (lower fixed costs, more automated), structurally more resilient (more essential travel volume, longer growth runway) and will become a bigger part of the group going forward.

Key Investment Considerations

  • The company’s ability to thrive in a weakened retail environment demonstrates earnings resilience.
  • History suggests Flight Centre’s earnings do not benefit significantly from a stronger Australian dollar, while the effect of a weak domestic currency is typically offset by airlines lowering fares, travellers substituting lowerpriced overseas destinations such as Bali, and a rise in higher-margin domestic travel.
  • Flight Centre’s offshore initiatives are still paying off, and we remain optimistic that the firm’s highly developed ability to exploit profitable industry niches will generate acceptable returns overseas.
  • A strong balance sheet allows Flight Centre to take advantage of weakness in the economic cycle via opportunistic acquisitions or increasing market share via investment in marketing initiatives. It also enables the development of new products to more effectively address specific market segments.
  • Brand strength provides a potent underpinning for the blended online/physical store offering.
  • Travel agents are customer aggregators. As it is the largest agent in Australia, scale enables Flight Centre to negotiate favourable deals with travel providers.
  • Domestic market success does not guarantee the sustained success of offshore expansion. The firm’s scale in offshore markets is significantly less than in Australia.
  • Occupancy and staff costs reduce the competitiveness of brick-and-mortar travel agents, such as Flight Centre, relative to online-only competitors who contend with much lower overheads. New generations of consumers are increasingly confident about shopping online, which reduces the cost of market entry for new players.

 (Source: Morningstar)

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General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks Shares Technical Picks

Fortescue Metals Group- Iron Ore Price to Strong

There is an approximate one-month delay between shipping the iron ore and prices being finalised. Higher profit versus last year was driven primarily by price, which rose 21% to USD 79 per tonne. Volumes were mildly positive, with iron ore shipments up 6% to 177 million tonnes. The strong result saw Fortescue increase total dividends by 54% to AUD 1.72 per share, slightly ahead of our AUD 1.60 forecast.

We make no change to our AUD 7.70 per share fair value estimate. While the fiscal 2020 result was strong, we struggle to see how the buoyant iron ore price can be sustained. It’s hard to imagine external conditions getting materially better, and we see longer-term downside. On the demand side, we see a coming headwind as infrastructure spending to offset the COVID-19 downturn in China abates and as urbanisation and infrastructure requirements

generally reduce. The peak of urbanisation has passed, and China’s stock of housing and infrastructure is now relatively mature. We expect China’s steel consumption to slow accordingly and for a growing proportion of steel to come from recycling at the expense of iron ore demand.

We see modest supply additions from Fortescue’s Iron Bridge, Vale’s planned 20 million tonne S11D expansion, and the 7 million-8 million tonne Samarco restart. Longer term, the restart of production from Vale’s mines interrupted by the 2019 Feijao tailings dam failure is material. Production in 2020 is likely to be almost 100 million tonnes lower than we expected before the failure, or about 6% of global supply.

Admittedly, the outlook for near-term earnings is very strong. We expect only a 9% decline in earnings in fiscal 2021 from fiscal 2020’s record level. However, the iron ore price is way above its marginal cost, reflecting the dual shocks to supply–primarily from Vale since 2019 –and demand from China’s stimulus.

Year-to-date steel production in China is up a remarkable 2.8% with a sharp recovery from the February COVID-19- related downturn. In July 2020, steel output in China was up 9.1% on the same month in 2019. The uptick in iron ore imports has been even stronger with China imports up 12% to 659 million tonnes in the year ended July 2020. And for the month of July, imports were a record 102 million tonnes and up 24% on July 2019. With China the dominant source of demand for iron ore, accounting for more than 70% of seaborne consumption, strength there has more than offset any weakness everywhere else.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Hongkong Land’s Long-Term Vision Is Maintained After a Century

Over more than a century, it assiduously assembled, maintained and upgraded these assets and turned them into a portfolio consisting of the most desirable office addresses and retail locations in the city. The HK portfolio accounts for nearly 65% of the company’s earnings, all of which stable rental incomes.

HKL is the second-largest office landlord in Hong Kong behind Swire Properties, but one with the most centrally located assets. It is the clear beneficiary of rising demand in the HK office sector, prior to a weakened market in 2020. Driven by strong demand from Chinese corporates establishing presence in the city, corporates are particularly attracted to the high-grade office spaces offered by HKL. Beyond the attraction of modern grade-A office spaces, these assets offer sizable floor plates, unrivalled visibility and prestige, due to their storied histories and locations.

Fundamentally, existing office space and new supply in HK is below that of world financial centers. The small CBD with tight supply was a key driver of the decentralization trend. While office demand weakened in 2020 due to the social unrest and coronavirus pandemic, HKL’s assets maintained near full occupancy, attributable to its selection of blue-chip tenants and lease management. We expect the company’s portfolio in the city to fare well in coming years, underpinned by demand from Chinese corporates and the city’s status as a world financial center.

The company holds investment properties in Singapore, Jakarta, and Beijing. It also currently has development projects in Singapore and China. Given Hong Kong’s current high asset value, acquisitions in recent years include large commercial projects and development projects in several cities across the Asia-Pacific. However, the company’s focus in Hong Kong is clear. During the downturn in 1982, the company disposed most of its overseas assets in a bid to shore up its balance sheet and hold on to its core portfolio in Hong Kong.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers

Our fair value estimate for Hongkong Land is USD 7.20, implying a price/book ratio of 0.5 times, a forward P/E of 20 times, and enterprise value/EBITDA of 22 times. Our valuation is based on a cost of equity of 8.5% and a weighted average cost of capital of 6.9%. Over the next five years, we expect average return on invested capital to average 9%.

As Hongkong Land is a property investor first and foremost, and its development projects in Singapore, China and elsewhere are more opportunistic, we believe the long-term growth is driven by rental growth of its core portfolio in Hong Kong, and to a lesser degree in Singapore. For the Hong Kong office portfolio, we assume spot rental of HKD 110 per square foot per month, compared with an average rental of HKD 120 per square foot per month in 2020. With lease expiry at 4.6 years, we assume 20% annual lease expiry over the next five years. As such, we project blended net rental declines by 1.5% annually over the next two years, before a recovery thereafter.

Average net rent for its retail portfolio was HKD 164 per square foot per month in 2020, due to rental subsidies offered. Excluding the subsidies, rental was HKD 212 per square foot per month. Our spot rental in 2021 factors in a decline of 10%. With lease expiry declining to 1.9 years as retailers are unwilling to commit to longer leases, we expect blended rental to fall 8% in 2021. We assume near full occupancy as most luxury brands’ flagship stores are located in Hongkong Land’s properties in Central. As such, we do not expect any impact from a consolidation of luxury stores to be a negative impact. Further, fitouts for flagship stores are high.

Hongkong Land Holdings Ltd

Hongkong Land is a property investor mainly holding prime commercial assets in Hong Kong and Singapore. The company is the second-largest office landlord in Hong Kong with a portfolio of centrally located assets totalling 4.1 million square feet of office space along with 0.6 million square feet of retail space. It also holds 1.6 million square feet of prime office space in Singapore. Rental income accounts for about 75% of the operating profit, with most coming from Hong Kong. Property development projects in Singapore and China contribute the rest. The company was founded in 1889 and is dual-listed on the London Stock Exchange, with a secondary listing on the Singapore Exchange. It is 50%-owned by Jardine Matheson Holdings.

Source: Morningstar

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Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks Shares

Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd– Uncertainties Remain

While we expect cost control, plans to launch smaller package sizes at higher prices per litre, and an increasing line up of non-carbonated drinks, we forecast volume declines in soft drinks and a negative mix shift from reduced on-the-go sales to drive a double-digit decline in EPS in 2020. Nonetheless, we’re encouraged by the firm’s continued market share gains, and expect earnings growth to rebound in 2021 and beyond. On top of this organic outlook, Amatil has received a non-binding offer to take over the company from fellow bottler CCEP at an attractive price. Uncertainty remains, but we think there is a strong change the deal progresses.

Key Investment Considerations

  • Coca-Cola Amatil is facing declining carbonated beverage consumption and heightened bottled water competition in its core Australian market, which will likely limit the firm’s near-term pricing power. Despite challenges in mainstream soft drinks, Amatil’s distribution deals with third parties, growth opportunities in emerging markets, and launches of smaller package sizes should drive positive annual revenue gains.
  • Amatil aims to pay out more than 80% of its annual earnings in dividends, and we forecast a low-single-digit growth pace. We expect dividends will remain unfranked until 2021, after which we see franking at 50%.
  • Coca-Cola Amatil’s long-standing relationship with The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) and a solid distribution network and retailer relationships in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea, afford the beverage bottler sustainable brand intangible assets and a cost advantage versus its competitors and potential upstarts. However, health-led headwinds in developed markets will likely drive further pressure on Amatil’s carbonated beverage portfolio.
  • The Coca-Cola Company’s nearly 31% ownership in Coca-Cola Amatil solidifies the relationship between the parent company and bottler, and an upcoming shift to incidence-based pricing should further align the firms’ goals.
  • Indonesia is a major long-run growth opportunity for Amatil, given the country’s continued economic development and relatively low rate of packaged beverage consumption.
  • Amatil has opportunities to increase its asset utilisation through additional distribution partnerships, such as recent deals struck with Monster Energy, Molson Coors, and Restaurant Brands.
  • Developments such as container return schemes in NSW and other Australian states, and potential sugary beverage taxes, serve as a price increase for consumers, and likely accelerate the decline of CSD volumes in Australia.
  • Pricing has been dented by both competitors and customers; Amatil has driven costs out of its production system, but a continued inability to pass through raw material inflation to consumers presents a long-term challenge.
  • The Coca-Cola Company owns the rights to Amatil’s major brands, and could negatively alter the pricing consideration for beverage concentrate purchasing.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks

Cochlear Ltd- outlook

As such, we expect growth in this market to fade over the next 10 years.To combat this pressure, Cochlear is actively trying to grow the adult developed market for cochlear implants, which we estimate to be approximately 40% of current annual units. However, the cost of growing awareness and reimbursement support results in minimal operating leverage and the company has specifically guided to flat margins post the initial recovery from the pandemic.

Key Investment Consideration

  • Increasing investment is required to achieve top-line growth resulting in no operating leverage. OThe annuity-like revenue from sound processor upgrades and accessories to growing implant recipient base is set to increase from 30% in fiscal 2020 to approximately 50% of revenue by 2030.
  • Despite forecasting an 11.2% revenue improvement in fiscal 2021 off a depressed base year, we do not anticipate Cochlear to resume paying dividends until fiscal 2022 when it is expected to become free cash flow positive again.
  • There are signs Cochlear is looking to expand beyond the hearing market with the investment in Nyxoah, a company focused on development of a hypoglossal nerve stimulation therapy for the treatment of obstructive sleep apnoea, a large under penetrated market.
  • The annuity-like revenue from sound processor upgrades is an increasingly important component of the revenue stream.
  • Cochlear earns ROICs well ahead of the cost of capital even in our bear case scenario, which is testament to the
  • high quality of the company.
  • Growth in the cochlear implant market is becoming more costly to achieve and the lack of operating leverage limits the potential upside to earnings going forward.
  • The arrival of lost-cost competitor, Nurotron, could disrupt markets other than China should it seek to expand and this could trigger price deflation for incumbents.
  • The COVID-19 crisis could cause a significant outright loss of adult potential cochlear implant recipients as they avoid hospitals and cancel rather than defer elective surgeries. The referral and assessment process takes between nine and 12 months and as such, the impacts will take some time to be visible in the financial results.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Property

Cromwell PropertyLtd – Cromwell FVE Unchanged

We see that as appropriate given gearing was an aggressive 42% as at June 30, 2020. There were some acquisitions on behalf of funds management clients, but these should generate fee revenue for Cromwell without stretching the balance sheet unduly.

We’re now more confident Cromwell’s lease to Qantas is not in jeopardy. We estimate the lease generates rent of AUD 20-35 million per year, which is only a tiny part of Qantas’ approximate AUD 12 billion 2020 cost base. Morningstar views Qantas as able to pay its bills. Furthermore, Qantas itself appears to view the lease as rocksolid because in September 2020 the airline advertised office space at its Mascot headquarters on a sub-lease basis. This suggests to us that Qantas is locked into the lease, and Cromwell will continue to collect rent at least until the lease’s 2032 expiry.

Qantas alone counts for about 15% of Cromwell’s gross rental income. Another 41% comes from federal, NSW, or Queensland government tenants. The landlord code of conduct has been extended generally until the new year, depending on the state. However we don’t view the code of conduct as onerous for Cromwell given SME tenants only represent about 9% of income.

We wouldn’t be surprised to see ARA’s proportional takeover offer price increased given solid performance in Cromwell’s portfolio and a strong market recovery sine the offer was first made. While the offer was only for 29% of each investor’s securities, when combined with ARA’s existing stake, and takeover creep provisions which allow ARA to buy securities on market at certain times, ARA may eventually gain control of Cromwell. The offer price offers no control premium, which is a further reason why we think investors should reject it.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.