Tag: US Market
Business Strategy and Outlook
Post has a unique portfolio of businesses. After spinning off its majority stake in the fast-growing BellRing Brands in March 2022, nearly half of its sales mix is cereal, which is highly profitable, but experiencing declining volumes. The other half of its portfolio consists primarily of egg and potato products, which possess a better growth profile, but carry low profit margins. It is alleged a competitive edge remains elusive, as Post has not demonstrated strong brand equities, preferred relationships with customers, or a cost advantage, which are the most likely moat sources for a packaged food company.
The cereal business has been experiencing declining per capita consumption (prior to the pandemic) as consumers have shifted away from processed, high-sugar, high-carbohydrate fare. Adding to the challenge, no-moat Post, the third-largest player, has had to compete for ever-decreasing shelf-space with market leaders narrow-moat General Mills and wide-moat Kellogg. That said, Post’s cereal business is very profitable, with EBITDA margins around mid-20% and low-30% for the U.S. and European businesses, respectively.
The refrigerated segments (52% of 2021 sales, with 32% food service and 20% retail) consists primarily of egg and potato products, but also side dishes, cheese, and sausage sold under brands such as Bob Evans and Simply Potatoes. While this business has more attractive growth prospects than cereal (growing 1%-2% versus cereal’s modest declines), agricultural commodities are difficult to differentiate and therefore generally do not command a price premium. As a result, this business has relatively low EBITDA margins (16%-18%) and does not offer the firm a competitive advantage, in analysts view.
Financial Strength
Post has a unique capital allocation strategy, preferring to carry a heavier debt load than most packaged food peers. Net debt/adjusted EBITDA has averaged 5.3 times the last 10 years, increasing following acquisitions and gradually declining as the firm uses free cash flow to pay down debt. Leverage stood at 5.5 times at the end of fiscal 2021 including BellRing Brands, and it is being modelled that the ratio remains above 5 times for the duration of experts forecast. Post’s legacy domestic cereal business generates significant free cash flow (about 12% of revenue, above the 10% peer average), although after acquiring the refrigerated foods, BellRing, and private brands businesses, this metric fell to a mid- to high-single-digit average in 2013 and beyond, now slightly below the peer average. Post’s interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest expense) has averaged 2.5 times over the past three years, compared with the 7 times peer average. While this ratio is quite tight, the firm has ample access to liquidity (even considering the uncertain environment caused by the pandemic), including $1.2 billion cash and $730 million available via on its credit revolver as of December 2021. Post has no intention to initiate a dividend. Instead, the firm plans to balance debt repayments, share repurchase, and acquisitions. Although it is likely that the firm will acquire additional businesses over the next several years, given the numerous uncertainties regarding these transactions, experts have opted to model free cash flow being used instead for share repurchase, which is foreseen as a good use of capital assuming it is executed at a value below analysts assessment of its intrinsic value.
Bulls Say’s
- The refrigerated foods segment, half of Post’s business, is benefiting from consumers’ evolving preference for fresh, unprocessed high-protein eggs, and fresh and convenient side dish options.
- Although growth in the cereal business has been stagnant, it reports attractive profits and cash flows.
- Despite inflation and the uncertain economic environment that could ensue, demand for Post’s products should be relatively stable.
Company Profile
Post Holdings operates in North America and Europe. For fiscal 2021 (restated for the separation of BellRing Brands), 47% of the company’s revenue came from cereal, with brands such as Honeycomb, Grape-Nuts, Pebbles, Honey Bunches of Oats, Malt-O-Meal, and Weetabix. Refrigerated food made up 52% of sales and services the retail (20% of company sales) and food-service channels (32%), providing value-added egg and potato products, prepared side dishes, cheese, and sausage under brands Bob Evans and Simply Potatoes. Post also holds a 60% stake in 8th Avenue, a private brands entity and a 14% stake in BellRing Brands, with protein-based products under the Premier Protein and Dymatize brands. Post launched a special purpose acquisition corp in 2021, but has not yet executed a transaction.
(Source: MorningStar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Approach
This fund uses full physical replication to capture the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index. The fund owns–to the extent that is possible and efficient–all the underlying constituents in the same proportion as its benchmark.
Portfolio
The S&P 500 is a free-float-adjusted market-capitalisation-weighted index of 500 US companies that offers both large- and mid-cap exposure. With a total value of over USD 40 trillion, the index covers around 80% of the free-float-adjusted market capitalisation of the US equity market. The US Index Committee maintains the S&P 500 and meets monthly. It aims to minimise index membership turnover. If a constituent no longer meets the entrance requirements, the committee will not remove the member immediately if it deems the change temporary. The index rebalances quarterly in March, June, September, and December. The largest sector exposure is information technology (29%), followed by healthcare (13%) and financials (12%). With the inclusion of Tesla TSLA and the continued success of many of the largest stocks in the index over 2020, the top 10 now represent over one fourth of the index. That said, concentration risk concerns remain subdued as the top 10 companies traditionally drive around 20% of the return, a fair attribution for many market-cap-weighted strategies.
Performance
Funds that track the S&P 500 Net Return Index have consistently outperformed the category average by a range of 0%-4% on a yearly rolling basis, making a strong investment case for low-cost passive instruments such as this when seeking broad US equity exposure. Further evidence is found in the superior risk-adjusted return profile of the S&P 500 relative to the average peer in the category. Passive funds in this category have generally had better or equal Sharpe ratios over short and long periods. In fact, this strategy has routinely captured more of the upside and less of the downside. Tracking error has also generally been tight, sitting at around 3-5 basis points. Valuations between large and small caps have shown some dispersion as US large caps rerated significantly following the volatility that markets saw in first-quarter 2020, suggesting that outperformance of larger companies over the last few years has come with steeper degrees of price risk.
Top Holdings of the fund
About the fund
The Fund employs a passive management – or indexing – investment approach, through physical acquisition of securities, and seeks to track the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index.The Index is comprised of large-sized company stocks in the US.
The Fund attempts to:
- Track the performance of the Index by investing in all constituent securities of the Index in the same proportion as the Index. Where not practicable to fully replicate, the Fund will use a sampling process.
- Remain fully invested except in extraordinary market, political or similar conditions.
(Source:Morningstar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Business Strategy and Outlook:
The coronavirus catalyzed sweeping changes across the restaurant industry, with operators scrambling to provide delivery-integration, build out e-commerce, and pivot to digital-driven models. For Domino’s, save for the firm’s rollout of contactless car-side carryout, very little changed. The operator’s historical investments in “anyware” ordering, a best-in-class e-commerce interface, and a mix that skewed toward delivery (55%) before the pandemic propelled global systemwide sales growth of 20%, despite the global food-service market remaining 11% below pre-pandemic levels at
the end of 2021, per our calculations and Euromonitor data.
Domino’s 2020 results strongly validated management’s strategies (automation of core processes, a focus on volume-driven traffic growth, shrinking service radii, and transparent delivery pricing), and encouraged by their relevance looking beyond the 2020 and 2021. Moving forward, the biggest challenges facing the firm are likely to be the democratization of delivery services (expanding consumer optionality and increasing price sensitivity as groceries and convenience stores enter the mix) and input cost inflation, both of which are at least partially addressed by current strategies. While peers have turned to menu diversification and quality to carve out a niche, Domino’s commitment to value and convenience as disciplined, doubling down on core competencies. Menu diversification is risky, with no guarantee that operators can provide competitive products, while adding stock-keeping units and operational risk. Minimizing delivery times and emphasizing the higher-margin carryout business through fortressing, while maintaining strong value positioning should allow Domino’s to effectively compete in a world where expanded consumer choice demands quality, convenience, and competitive pricing.
Financial Strength:
Domino’s remains in good financial health, with a steady stream of royalty receipts handily covering interest obligations throughout the explicit forecast. While forecast 5.9 times debt/EBITDA at the end of 2021 (on the upper end of management’s 3-6 times targeted range) appears high at first blush, it is consistent with other heavily franchised operators in our coverage (Restaurant Brands International sports 5-6 times, while Yum Brands targets 5), and debt service represents a manageable average annual outlay of 26.5% of operating income through 2026. Further, the projected free cash flow conversion (or cash flow to the firm as a percentage of net revenue) of 14% over the same period offers ample flexibility to channel capital toward its most efficient use- whether new unit growth, software development, store remodeling, or shareholder distributions.
With restaurants often featuring negative working capital, attributable to longer-dated payables and a cash-focused business model, the solvency metrics as a more appropriate evaluation of operator’s financial health. An average EBITDA coverage ratio of 4.1 times through 2026, which appears sound. An effective interest rate of just 3.8% in 2021 corroborates this view, with Domino’s recent issues hovering around investment-grade breakpoints (as they are secured by future royalties and intellectual property). The firm’s debt maturities are adequately spaced out, with a negligible amount of principal coming due over the next three years. The firm relies on approximately biannual recapitalization transactions to pay down maturing issues, repurchase shares, and maintain leverage targets (with the intention of minimizing the firm’s weighted average cost of capital), with the most recent occurring in April 2021. Dominos also maintains a $200 million variable note funding facility, of which $155.8 million was available as of Dec. 31, 2021.
Bulls Say:
- Category-leading margins and a cohesive franchise network will continue to drive unit growth outperformance for Domino’s.
- The firm’s fortressing strategy allows it to capitalize on core competencies (price and convenience), cementing its leading role in the U.S. QSR pizza market.
- Master franchise relationships continue to push impressive unit growth in underpenetrated markets like Latin America, India, and China, which offer substantial space for greenfield development.
Company Profile:
Domino’s Pizza is a restaurant operator and franchiser with nearly 18,850 stores across more than 90 international markets. The firm generates revenue through the sales of pizza, wings, salads, and sandwiches at company-owned stores, royalty and marketing contributions from franchise-operated stores, and its network of 26 domestic (and five Canadian) dough manufacturing and supply chain facilities, which centralize purchasing, preparation, and last-mile delivery for the firm’s U.S. and Canadian restaurants. With roughly $17.7 billion in 2021 system sales, Domino’s is the largest player in the global pizza market, ahead of Pizza Hut, Papa John’s, and Little Caesars.
(Source: Morningstar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Business Strategy and Outlook
It is alleged InterContinental to retain its brand intangible asset (a source of its narrow moat rating) and expand room share in the hotel industry in the next decade. Renovated and newer brands supporting a favorable next-generation traveler position as well as its industry-leading loyalty program will drive this growth. The company currently has a mid-single-digit percentage share of global hotel rooms and 11% share of all industry pipeline rooms. It is seen its total room growth averaging 3%-4% over the next decade, above the 1.8% supply increase is projected for the U.S. industry.
With 99% of rooms managed or franchised, InterContinental has an attractive recurring-fee business model with high returns on invested capital and significant switching costs (a second moat source) for property owners, as managed and franchised hotels have low fixed costs and capital requirements, and contracts lasting 20-30 years have meaningful cancellation costs for owners.
It is anticipated InterContinental’s brand and switching cost advantage to strengthen, driven by new hotel brands, renovation of existing properties, technology integration, and a leading loyalty program, which all drive developer and traveler demand for the company. InterContinental has added six brands since 2016; it now has 16 in total. InterContinental announced in August 2021 a new luxury brand, with details to be provided soon. Additionally, the company announced a midscale concept in June 2017, Avid, which the company sees as addressing an underserved $20 billion market with 14 million guests, under a normal demand environment. Also, InterContinental has recently renovated its Crowne Plaza (13% of total room base) and Holiday Inn/Holiday Inn Express (62%) properties, which will support its brand advantage. Beyond this, the firm has over 100 million loyalty members, providing an immediate demand channel for third-party hotel owners joining its brand.
Financial Strength
InterContinental’s financial health remains good, despite COVID-19 challenges. InterContinental entered 2020 with net debt/EBITDA of 2.5 times, and its asset-light business model allows the company to operate with low fixed costs and stable unit growth, which led to $584 million in cash flow generation in 2021. During 2020, InterContinental took action to increase its liquidity profile, including suspending dividends and deferring discretionary capital expenditures. Also, the company tapped $425 million of its $1.3 billion credit facility, which has since been repaid. As a result, InterContinental has enough liquidity to operate at near zero revenue into 2023. It is likely banking partners would work to provide InterContinental liquidity as needed, given that the company holds a brand advantage, which will drive healthy cash flow as travel demand returns. InterContinental’s EBIT/interest coverage ratio of 5.4 times for 2019 was healthy, and it is held for it to average 9.1 times over the next five years after temporarily dipping to 3.4 times in 2021. It is projected the company generates about $2.3 billion in free cash flow (operating cash flow minus capital expenditures) during 2022-26, which it uses to pay down debt, distribute dividends, and repurchase shares (with the last two starting in 2022).
Bulls Say’s
- InterContinental’s current mid-single-digit percentage of hotel industry room share is set to increase as the company controls 11% of the rooms in the global hotel industry pipeline.
- InterContinental is well positioned to benefit from the increasing presence of the next-generation traveler though emerging lifestyle brands Kimpton, Avid, Even, Hotel Indigo, Hualuxe, and Voco.
- InterContinental has a high exposure to recurring managed and franchised fees (around 95% of total operating income), which have high switching costs and generate strong ROIC.
Company Profile
InterContinental Hotels Group operates 880,000 rooms across 16 brands addressing the midscale through luxury segments. Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn Express constitute the largest brand, while Hotel Indigo, Even, Hualuxe, Kimpton, and Voco are newer lifestyle brands experiencing strong demand. The company launched a midscale brand, Avid, in summer 2017 and closed on a 51% stake in Regent Hotels in July 2018. It acquired Six Senses in February 2019. Managed and franchised represent 99% of total rooms. As of Dec. 31, 2021, the Americas represents 57% of total rooms, with Greater China accounting for 18%; Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa make up 25%.
(Source: MorningStar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Business Strategy and Outlook
As a result of the acquisition of the legacy Caesars business by Eldorado (closed July 2020), we estimate Caesars holds more than a 10% revenue share of the domestic casino gaming market; this represents around 100% of the company’s total EBITDA. Caesars has realized over $1 billion in combined revenue and cost synergies from its merger with Eldorado, representing around a 30% increase to pro forma 2019 EBITDAR. Despite this successful acquisition record, Morningstar analysts don’t believe Las Vegas and other U.S. gaming regions contribute to a moat for Caesars. U.S. gaming demand is lower than in Asian regions like Macao and Singapore, where the propensity to gamble is much higher. Also, the 1,000 commercial and tribal casinos in the U.S. serve a total population of 330 million, well in excess of the 41 and 2 casinos found in Macao and Singapore, respectively, with Chinese and Singaporean populations of 1.4 billion and 5.9 million, respectively. Further, supply growth in U.S. gaming is increasing in 2021-23, with two resorts opening in Las Vegas that add a mid-single-digit percentage to market room supply. This compares with negligible additions in either Macao or Singapore, where we see no additional licenses for the foreseeable future.
That said, Caesars’ U.S. casinos are positioned to benefit from the multi-billion-dollar sports betting and iGaming market. Caesars plans to invest around $1 billion in its digital assets in the next few years, which supports Morningstar analysts forecast for about 8% of the company’s total revenue to be generated from this segment in 2026.
After reviewing Caesars’ fourth-quarter results, Morningstar analyst have decreased its fair value estimate to $108 per share from $113, driven by increased digital spend. Morningstar analyst’s valuation places a 10 times enterprise value/EBITDA multiple on analysts’ 2023 EBITDAR forecast. Drivers of forecast remain anchored in revenue and EBITDAR margins across the company’s Las Vegas and regional assets.
Financial Strength
Caesars’ debt levels are elevated. In 2019, excluding financial lease obligations, legacy Caesars’ debt/adjusted EBITDA measured a hefty 7.8 times, while legacy Eldorado came in at 3.7 times. Morningstar analysts see Caesars’ debt/adjusted EBITDA reaching 7.9 times in 2022 and then 6.4 times in 2023 as global leisure and travel market demand continue to recover from the pandemic, aided by company cost and revenue synergies that analysts estimate to total over $1 billion. Morningstar analysts expect the $7.5 billion in free cash flow in 2022-26 as focused on reducing debt levels and investing in the digital sports and iGaming markets, with share repurchases and dividends not occurring until 2025. Caesars has no meaningful debt maturity until 2024, when $4.8 billion is scheduled to come due.
Bull Says
- Caesars’ best-of-breed management stands to generate cost and revenue synergies from its merger with Eldorado.
- Caesars has the largest property (around 50 domestic casinos versus roughly 20 for MGM) and loyalty presence (65 million members versus MGM’s roughly high-30 million), which presents cross-selling opportunities.
- Morningstar analysts see Caesars’ domestic properties as well positioned to benefit from the $6.2 billion U.S. sports betting revenue opportunity in 2024.
Company Profile
Caesars Entertainment includes around 50 domestic gaming properties across Las Vegas (50% of 2021 EBITDAR before corporate and digital expenses) and regional (63%) markets. Additionally, the company hosts managed properties and digital assets, the latter of which produced material EBITDA losses in 2021. Caesars’ U.S. presence roughly doubled with the 2020 acquisition by Eldorado, which built its first casino in Reno, Nevada, in 1973 and expanded its presence through prior acquisitions to over 20 properties before merging with legacy Caesars. Caesars’ brands include Caesars, Harrah’s, Tropicana, Bally’s, Isle, and Flamingo. Also, the company owns the U.S. portion of William Hill (it plans to sell the international operation in early 2022), a digital sports betting platform.
(Source: Morningstar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Business Strategy & Outlook:
MetLife, like other life insurers, has its financial results tied to interest rates. It’s unlikely that interest rates will return to pre-financial-crisis levels, and MetLife has forecasted to face this headwind for the future. The returns of equity just shy of 10% over the next five years. MetLife has taken steps to simplify its business. In 2017, it spun off Brighthouse, its retail arm focused on variable annuities. MetLife also is divesting its property and casualty insurance (auto) business, which makes sense as there is minimal strategic benefit to having a small auto insurance business in its portfolio.
MetLife’s business is relatively undifferentiated. Whether sold individually or to employers, the pricing is the primary driver for MetLife’s customers. Given the relatively low fixed costs of an insurer’s income statement, this does not lend itself to MetLife having a competitive advantage. Some of MetLife’s entries into new markets (such as pet insurance and health savings accounts) are potentially more differentiated, but these are unlikely to be material in the near to medium term. In 2012, MetLife launched MetLife Investment Management, which currently manages $181 billion of institutional third-party client assets, a fraction of the $669 billion managed through the general account and a fraction of what some of its peers manage. Asset management is viewed as potentially moaty, but given the size of MetLife’s third-party asset management, it is viewed as material to the firm’s overall financial results.
Financial Strength:
The life insurance business model typically entails significant leverage and potentially exposes the industry to outlier capital market events and unanticipated actuarial changes. MetLife is not immune to these risks, and during the financial crisis, its returns on equity decreased. Overall, MetLife has generally been prudent, but the risks inherent to the industry should not be ignored.
Equity/assets (excluding separate accounts) was 11.6% at the end of 2021, higher than the 11.1% average since 2010. In Japan, MetLife’s solvency margin ratio was 911% (as of Sept. 30, 2021), well above the 200% threshold before corrective action would be required. The solvency margin ratio measures an insurer’s ability to pay out claims in unfavorable conditions.
Bulls Says:
- MetLife’s international operations, particularly Asia and Latin America, provide opportunities for growth.
- MetLife’s reorganization will lead to a more transparent entity that produces steadier cash flow.
- If interest rates were to rise, MetLife would benefit through higher reinvestment yields.
Company Profile:
MetLife–once a mutual company before the 2000 demutualization–is the largest life insurer in the U.S. by assets and provides a variety of insurance and financial services products. Outside the United States, MetLife operates in Japan and more than 40 countries in Latin America, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.
(Source: Morningstar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.