Categories
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Demand for Boats Remains Strong, Boosting Selling Prices and Profits at Narrow-Moat Malibu

Business Strategy & Outlook: 

Malibu is a long-established name in performance sport boats, venturing into the sterndrive and saltwater segments via acquisitions in recent years. It is believed that its brand, innovative products, and consistent pricing power contribute to a brand intangible asset, which underpins the narrow moat rating. Supporting its market leadership, it’s demonstrated an ability to meet evolving customer preferences, bringing new products to market quickly, with new models and 30-40 new features rolled out annually in the performance sport segment. And it has capitalized on its brand strength by expanding into adjacent categories, such as trailers and accessories, which shall continue. However, Malibu hasn’t rested only on innovation to grow profits, also curating savings through streamlined production and rising efficiencies (through vertical integration). As evidence, efforts at Pursuit’s new plant had increased the EBT margin at the brand to 14% in 2021 (from 9% in 2020). With continuous improvements to the manufacturing process, Malibu should be able to limit expense growth over time. Additionally, Malibu shall grow via strategic acquisitions. 

The addition of Cobalt, Pursuit, and Maverick within the last five years has provided robust sales growth for the firm (averaging 33%), thanks to a strategy based on fit and the ability to raise shareholder value. As a result, the model expects tie-ups every other year in the $140 million price range, providing a volume bump of more than 500 incremental units on average. While such transactions should drive sales growth, and remain confident in Malibu’s ability to also maintain consumer interest in its legacy brands. The Malibu’s sales shall grow 10% on average over the next decade, including acquisitions. While demand for outdoor recreational products has been elevated with social distancing measures due to the pandemic, and maintained sales growth stemming from market share gains and expansion into whitespace categories. As a result of its success, Malibu should generate competitive adjusted returns on invested capital, including goodwill, that average 24% over the next decade.

Financial Strengths:

Malibu has maintained a healthy balance sheet, with leverage historically rising modestly as a result of its acquisition strategy. However, with adjusted EBITDA growing faster than debt in recent years, the leverage ratio has remained at less than 1 at the end of fiscal 2021, barring the pursuit of any transformational acquisitions. For access to liquidity, Malibu has a $170 million revolving credit facility (2024 maturity) and a $100 million term loan (2022-24 maturity). The company drew down its revolver as a precaution as COVID-19 spread domestically, but had repaid the loan prior to 2020 year-end (and now has around $57 million outstanding as of March 31). In normal operating periods, expecting cash on hand, cash from operations, and utilization of the credit facility to allow Malibu to fund its capital expenditures, which finance projects, tooling, and production improvements. In addition, the firm has agreements with third-party lenders to provide floor plan financing for dealers. Furthermore, Malibu has historically maintained flexibility in its capital structure through stock repurchases. The board of directors authorized the repurchase of up to $70.0 million of Class A Common Stock and the LLC Units, which is valid until Nov. 8, 2022. However, the modest repurchases over the near term, given the team’s penchant to spend strategically on acquisitions. Over the long term, Malibu should be able to generate enough free cash flow to finance both acquisitions and consistent share repurchases.

Bulls Say:  

  • Vertical integration across the brand portfolio could provide margin expansion.
  • The firm’s long-term annual sales growth goal of 10% should be attainable thanks to Malibu’s penchant for consistent acquisitions in underpenetrated categories. 
  • Malibu’s strong balance sheet, with low leverage and healthy free cash flow/equity, should offer the company the flexibility to withstand cyclical downturns and finance bolt-on acquisitions from cash on hand.

Company Description: 

Malibu Boats is a leading designer and manufacturer of power boats in the United States. It is the market leader in performance sport boats, sold under its Malibu and Axis brands. It acquired Cobalt Boats, a leading producer of sterndrive boats, in 2017 number-one market share position in the U.S. in the 24-foot to 29-foot segment), and Pursuit Boats, which makes high-end offshore and outboard motorboats in 2018. In 2021, it purchased Maverick Boat Group, a leading seller of flat fishing boats, with exposure to bay, dual-console, and center-console boats. Malibu has also expanded into boat trailers and accessories, and in 2020 began producing its own engines for its performance sport boats. Malibu’s target market includes a wide range of water enthusiasts who embrace active lifestyles.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

nib holdings Ltd (NHF) reported revenue grew +8.3% to $1.4bn and is forecasted to become profitable in FY23

Investment Thesis:

  •  Given Australia’s growing and ageing population, there will be increased demand for health care services. This will add additional pressure on Australia’s public health care system and the Federal budget and an increased dependence on private health care insurers. NHF offers exposure to the business model of providing a funding mechanism for the high-growth health care sector. Healthcare spending is expected to grow at 5-10% per annum, so without significant tax hikes, the government cannot afford for people to shift back to the public healthcare system.
  • Given underlying increases in average premium rates of around 5 – 6% p.a., some policyholder growth (especially at the 30-34-year-old segment), and exposure to upstart investments, we estimate that NHF offers close to double-digit underlying growth in the medium term.
  • Solid management team.
  • Cost-out strategy which improves the company’s expense ratio. 
  • Incentives and benefits encourage PHI take-up. They include 1. Tax benefits and penalties for Australian residents (via Lifetime Health Cover, Medicare Levy Surcharge and means tested rebate); and 2. Shorter wait times, a choice of specialist doctor/hospital and coverage of ancillary health services support.
  • Growth runways through the JV with Tasly Holdings Group, and also international expansion, through product offerings like NISS

Key Risks:

  • Intensifying competition between top 6 players, putting policy growth targets at risk and any Increases in expected marketing spend going forward will no doubt add further strain on earnings growth.
  • Policyholders decline unexpectedly despite the encouraging incentives and the Australian Government struggling with the rapid increase in healthcare spending and health services demand.
  • Registered health insurers cannot increase premium rates without approval from the Government/Minister for Health/PHIAC/APRA. This leaves NHF’s ROE and margins exposed to a political process and pressures if the company is deemed too profitable.
  • Regulatory changes especially relating to any changes to tax incentives and benefits which encourage take up of PHI. 
  • Higher than expected lapse rates and claims inflation as a result of poor insurance policy design, aging population, and costs of new medical equipment, procedures and treatments;
  • Poor negotiations with healthcare providers such as private hospital operators leading to unfavorable contractual terms;
  • Lower than expected investment returns

Key highlights:

nib holdings Ltd (NHF) reported 1H22 – relative to the pcp, group underlying revenue grew +8.3% to $1.4bn; Group underlying operating profit (UOP) increased +28.5% to $109.6m; NPAT of $81.2m was up +24.7%. NHF’s Arhi (Australian Residents Health Insurance) recorded an uplift in net arhi policyholder growth of +2.8% to 653,000 new policyholders; whilst NHF’s New Zealand segment reported strong performance, with revenue growth of +13.8%, partially offset by poor but expected performance in international inbound and travel businesses, which reported a loss of $7.4m, and -$7.9m, respectively, as the Government continues to enforce measure to contain Covid. On the conference call with NHF, management did expect in the near-term, the iihi and travel segment to gradually return to normal as countries reopen international borders. Both segments are forecasted to become profitable in FY23. 

  • 1H22 Results Highlights. Relative to the pcp: (1) Group underlying revenue $1.4bn, up +8.3%, driven by strong premium revenue growth of +8.2% upon uplift in policyholders, and Covid related disruption to elective surgery and allied healthcare, partially offset by NHF’s international students and travel insurance businesses. (2) Group claims expense $1.1bn, up +6.4% with ongoing uncertainty around deferred treatment and future claims. (3) Group underlying operating profit $109.6m, up +28.5%. (4) NPAT of $81.2m, up +24.7%. (5) The Board declared an interim dividend of 11.0cps, fully franked (versus 10.0cps in 1H21). (5) Management does “expect and account for an inevitable ‘catch-up’ in deferred treatment now estimated at $59.2m”.
  • Performance by Segments. Relative to the pcp: (1) Australian Residents Health Insurance (arhi). Premium revenue of $1,151.0 was up +7.8% driven by policyholder growth, up +2.8% to over 653k. Claims expense of $917.1m, was up +4.9%, as Covid impacts offset increase in deferred claims liability, and effect of catch up in pcp. UOP of $123.6m, was up +39.8%. Normalised net margin continues to be in the 6-7% range. (2) New Zealand. Premium revenue of $144.4m, was up +13.8% due to policyholder growth of +4.1%, price adjustments to reflect inflation and favorable FX. Claims expense increase +17.2% to $92.9m due to policyholder increase and +12.3% claims inflation. UOP of $9.2m was down -12.4%. Net margin declined to 6.3% reflecting investment in the core system. NHF noted “the outlook for our Kiwi business is positive with favorable market conditions and the acquisition of Kiwi Insurance Limited which should be completed in 2H22. We expect 3-5% growth in policyholders for FY22”. (3) International inbound health insurance (iihi). Premium revenue was up +2.7% to $59.9m on strong performance in workers business especially through the Pacific and Australia Labor Mobility (PALM) scheme, offset by NHF’s student business with restrictions on international students. Claims incurred of $47.9m was up +20.4%. Underlying operating loss of $7.4m, was weaker than the $0.3m profit in the pcp. (4) nib Travel. Operating income of $8.2m was materially stronger than the $4.4m in the pcp. Underlying operating loss of -$7.9m was -1.3% lower than the pcp. NHF’s management noted that nib Travel’s loss was as expected, with the business still heavily impacted by border closures and travel restrictions.
  • Outlook. While NHF did not provide specific quantitative earnings guidance, management did note: “Strong arhi performance and New Zealand and international workers profitability are offsetting current loss making in international students and travel. Expect that support to continue while necessary”. (1) Australian Residents Health Insurance (arhi). Net policyholder growth ~3%; Claims escalation associated with “catch up” in deferred treatment fully provisioned; Return to net margin target 6-7% over time. (2) New Zealand. FY22 net policyholder growth 3-5%; Kiwi Insurance acquisition expected to complete in 2H22. (3) International inbound health insurance (iihi). Gradual return of travel domestically and internationally in CY22; Return to profitability in FY23. (4) nib Travel. Heightened demand for skilled migration to continue; Gradual return of international students as travel restrictions ease; Return to profitability in FY23.

Company Description: 

nib Holdings Limited (NHF) is the Australian private health insurer. NHF operates in four divisions which are private health insurance, life insurance, travel insurance and related health care activities. 

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

It is going to be challenging for Spirit to expand content on existing aircraft platforms organically

Business Strategy and Outlook

Spirit AeroSystems is the largest independent aerostructures manufacturer. The firm produces fuselages, wing structures, and structures that house and connect engines to aircraft. Spirit’s revenue has traditionally been almost entirely connected to the original production of commercial aircraft, but Spirit has a growing defense segment and recently acquired Bombardier’s maintenance, repair, and overhaul business. As commercial aerospace manufacturing is highly consolidated, it is unsurprising that Spirit has customer concentration. Historically, 80% of the company’s sales have been to Boeing and 15% have been to Airbus. Management targets a 40% commercial aerospace, 40% defense, and 20% commercial aftermarket revenue exposure. The firm acquired Fiber Materials, a specialty composite manufacturer focused on defense end markets, and Bombardier’s aftermarket business in 2020 to diversify revenue. It is likely Spirit will need significant additional inorganic growth to achieve its goals. 

Spirit AeroSystems was spun out of Boeing in 2005 and the company remains the sole-source supplier for the majority of the airframe content on the 737 and 787 programs. Spirit is particularly exposed to Boeing’s 737 program, which generally accounts for roughly half of the company’s revenue. Boeing retained all of the intellectual property when it spun out the company. It is alleged that the lack of intellectual property and these long-term supply agreements prevent Spirit from fully monetizing its sole-source supplier position. 

Spirit became an Airbus supplier in 2006 with the acquisition of BAE Aerostructures and has inorganically expanded content on Airbus products in recent years. It’s held in positivity: Spirit’s revenue diversification because it reduces the firm’s product concentration risk. It is probable that the firm will hold off from inorganic growth, as Spirit has taken substantial debt to fund unprofitable operations during the COVID-19 pandemic and will have few capital allocation options other than deleveraging during an aerospace recovery. It is believed that it will be challenging for Spirit to expand content on existing aircraft platforms organically.

Financial Strength

Spirit AeroSystems has raised and maintained a considerable amount of debt since the grounding of the 737 MAX began in 2019. The company had $1.5 billion of cash on the balance sheet and about $3.8 billion of debt at the end of 2021, and access to another $950 million of debt if it so needs. It is held roughly slightly below breakeven cash flow in 2022, and that the firm will be able to meet its goal of removing $1 billion of debt off its balance sheet in the three-year period leading to 2023. It is projected that Spirit will focus on deleveraging post-pandemic. The firm has $300 million debt coming due in 2021 and 2023, as well as $1.7 billion of debt coming due in 2025, and $700 million of debt coming due in 2028. Based on projections, it is regarded that the firm will be able to cover the debt maturities in cash, but it is likely the 2025 obligations will be the most difficult for the firm to cover. It is alleged that managing the debt maturity schedule will be the paramount issue Spirit faces in an aerospace recovery, and that shareholder remuneration will likely be a secondary focus for the firm.

Bulls Say’s

  • Commercial aerospace manufacturing has a highly visible revenue runway, despite COVID-19, from increasing flights per capita as the emerging market middle class grows wealthier. 
  • Spirit has restructured to become more efficient when aircraft manufacturing recovers. 
  • Spirit is diversifying its customer base, which is likely to make it less susceptible to customer specific risk.

Company Profile 

Spirit AeroSystems designs and manufactures aerostructures, particularly fuselages, for commercial and military aircraft. The company was spun out of Boeing in 2005, and the firm is the largest independent supplier of aerostructures. Boeing and Airbus are the firms and its primary customers, Boeing composes roughly 80% of annual revenue and Airbus composes roughly 15% of revenue. The company is highly exposed to Boeing’s 737 program, which generally accounts for about half of the company’s revenue. 

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

The growth that the Western Union Co is seeing in digital transfers does not appear to be leading to strong overall growth

Business Strategy and Outlook

Western Union’s primary macroeconomic exposure is to employment markets in the developed world, as the search for better economic opportunities is the fundamental driver for money transfers. While conditions have improved over time in the United States and Europe, a region that is about equally important for Western Union as the U.S., growth remains modest, with new entrants adding to the issues for legacy operators like Western Union. At this point, it is unlikely for a catalyst to improve the situation. Pandemic-related headwinds appear to be lingering, and the decision to exit Russia will add pressure. It is still anticipated that Western Union has a wide moat based on its sizable scale advantage, but with a stagnant top line, the value of the moat over the next few years could be questioned. 

Another major issue for Western Union is the industry shift toward electronic methods of money transfer. The company has been actively building out its presence in electronic channels in recent years to adapt to the change in the industry. Western Union saw a sharp spike in digital transfers at the beginning of the pandemic, and growth has remained strong. Western Union achieved a 32% year-over-year increase in transaction growth in 2021 as this area of the company’s business jumped to about a quarter of revenue. It is alleged the firm’s aggressive approach is the best strategy as Western Union positions itself to maintain its scale advantage despite the shift. In analysts’ opinion, scale and market share across all channels will be the dominant factor in long-term competitive position, and Western Union appears to be maintaining its overall position. However, the growth that the company is seeing in digital transfers does not appear to be leading to strong overall growth, and this situation is unlikely to change.

Financial Strength

Western Union’s capital structure is fairly conservative, as management sees a strong credit profile as an advantage in attracting agents. The company carried $3.0 billion in debt at the end of 2021, resulting in debt/EBITDA of 2.3 times; this is a reasonable level, in experts’ reasoning, given the stability of the business. Western Union also typically holds a substantial amount of cash. Net debt at the end of 2021 was approximately $1.8 billion, and it is held, that the company might hold a net debt position of about $2 billion over time. Given recent changes to tax laws, it’s possible Western Union might not hold as much cash as it has historically, as it will no longer incur a tax penalty upon repatriation. This could help free management’s hand, as the company historically has returned the bulk of its free cash flow to shareholders through stock repurchases and dividends.

Bulls Say’s

  • The demographic factor that has historically driven industry growth–namely, the differential between population growth in developing and developed countries–remains in place for the foreseeable future. 
  • Western Union didn’t see a major drop-off during the last recession or the pandemic, highlighting the stability of the business. 
  • While the motives for immigrants to relocate to wealthier countries are well understood, developed countries also have incentive to open their borders, as negligible native population growth makes immigration a necessity for long-term GDP growth.

Company Profile 

Western Union provides domestic and international money transfers through its global network of about 500,000 outside agents. It is the largest money transfer company in the world and one of only a few companies with a truly global agent network. 

(Source: MorningStar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Australian Small Caps Small Cap

MYX’s NEXTSTELLIS launch momentum accelerating – Affordable Care Act to be a tailwind over the medium-term

Investment Thesis:

  • Any stabilization (competition or price) in the generic segment will be viewed as a positive.
  • New product launches and healthy development pipeline.
  • While generic brands are going through a tough trading environment at the moment, the long-term outlook remains positive given consumers and regulators need a healthy generics market to keep the price of medication down.
  • Positioning the product portfolio to higher margin products. 
  • Potential industry consolidation on lower growth outlook.
  • Leveraged to a falling AUD/USD.

Key Risks:

  • Intense competition from new products.
  • Lower demand. 
  • New product launches fail to deliver the growth expected by the market.
  • Regulatory changes.
  • Litigation.
  • Adverse currency movement.

Key Highlights:

  • Reported revenues of $196.4m, declined -6%, with +180% increase in BPD, +19.5% increase in MCS and +29.6% increase in MPI more than offset by -19.6% decline in PPD as retail generics business segment continued to erode due to sustained competitive pricing environment.
  • Expenses excluding NEXTSTELLIS launch investment declined -12%.
  • Reported EBITDA of $48.8m, was up +20%, affected by the non-cash NEXTSTELLIS deferred consideration reassessment due to Covid-19 and associated longer time period for physician and patient activation and higher cost of payer coverage and reimbursement (underlying EBITDA was down -38% to $23.7m and underlying EBITDA excluding NEXTSTELLIS launch investment was up +11% to $44.4m).
  • Reported net loss after tax was down -74% to $50.4m despite intangible asset impairment associated with the generic business. 
  • Net debt increased +10% over 2H21 and the Company remained compliant within all bank covenants with a leverage ratio 3.2x (covenant <4.25x), interest cover 7.7x (covenant >3x) and shareholders’ funds of $754m (covenant >$600m).
  • The launch of NEXTSTELLIS continues to gather momentum despite the headwinds of Covid-19 with 2,100 healthcare professionals (HCPs) have now written the product since launch (bulk of which came in the 2Q22) with the aided awareness of NEXTSTELLIS amongst target HCPs grown to 79%, and the Company approaching to acquiring 100 new writers.

Company Description:

Mayne Pharma Group (MYX) Mayne Pharma is a specialty pharmaceutical company focused on applying its drug delivery expertise to commercialize branded and generic pharmaceuticals. Mayne Pharma provides contract development and manufacturing services to more than 100 clients worldwide. Mayne Pharma has an extensive portfolio of branded and generic drugs in multiple therapeutic areas, including women’s health, oncology, dermatology and cardiology.

(Source: Banyantree)

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Upon U.S. federal legalization, Tilray to own 21% of the U.S. multistate operator

Business Strategy and Outlook

Tilray cultivates and sells cannabis in Canada and exports into the global medical market. It also sells CBD products in the U.S. The company is the result of legacy Aphria acquiring legacy Tilray in a reverse merger and renaming itself Tilray in 2021. Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018. Since then, recreational sales have come to represent an increasingly larger portion of sales for producers. The Canadian market is overly crowded with producers, so Tilray faces stiff competition to develop consumer brands that can lead to meaningful pricing power. Buoyed by attractive deal terms, Tilray’s acquisition of HEXO’s senior secured convertible notes could potentially help drive necessary market consolidation.

Legacy Aphria had an extensive international distribution business, which generated the majority of its net revenue, a far larger portion than many of its Canadian cannabis peers. Legacy Tilray had also entered the global medical market. With both companies’ international capabilities intact, Tilray looks well positioned. The global market looks lucrative given higher realized prices and growing acceptance of the medical benefits of cannabis. Exporters must pass strict regulations to enter markets, which protects early entrants. It is foreseen, roughly 15% average annual growth through 2030 for the global medicinal market excluding Canada and the U.S.

In 2020, legacy Aphria acquired SweetWater, a U.S. craft brewery. Legacy Tilray previously acquired Manitoba Harvest to distribute CBD products in the U.S. It finally secured a toehold into U.S. THC when it acquired some of MedMen’s outstanding convertible notes. Upon U.S. federal legalization, Tilray would own 21% of the U.S. multistate operator. Furthermore, Tilray paid a great price while also getting downside protection as a debtholder. It is held, the U.S. offers the fastest growth of any market globally. However, the regulatory environment is murky with individual states legalizing cannabis while it remains illegal federally. It is alleged federal law will eventually be changed to allow states to choose the legality of cannabis within their borders

Financial Strength

At the end of its third fiscal quarter 2022, Tilray had about $710 million in total debt, excluding lease liabilities. This compares to market capitalization of about $4 billion.In addition, Tilray had about $279 million in cash, which will allow it to fund future operations and investments. Management has been deliberate with its SG&A spending given the slow rollouts and regulatory challenges the Canadian market has faced. Legacy Aphria was the first major Canadian producer to reach positive EBITDA, with legacy Tilray reaching positive EBITDA in the quarter immediately preceding its acquisition. However, the combined company continues to generate negative free cash flow to the firm, which pressures its financial health.The proposed deal to purchase $211 million in HEXO senior secured convertible notes is unlikely to add any pressure to Tilray’s financial health.With most of its development costs completed, it is anticipated Tilray will have moderate capital needs in the coming years. As such, it is held, debt/adjusted EBITDA to decline. It is alleged Tilray is unlikely to require significant raises of outside capital. In September 2021, the company received shareholder approval for increasing its authorized shares in order to rely on equity for future acquisitions. This bodes well for keeping its financial health strong.

Bulls Say’s

  • Legacy Aphria’s acquisition of Legacy Tilray created a giant with leading Canadian market share, expanded international capabilities, and U.S. CBD and beer operations.
  • Tilray’s management focuses on strategic SG&A spending and running a lean business model, benefiting its financial health in the early growth stage industry.
  • Tilray management’s careful approach to expansion has allowed it to reach profitability faster than any of its Canadian peers.

Company Profile

Tilray is a Canadian producer that cultivates and sells medical and recreational cannabis. In 2021, legacy Aphria acquired legacy Tilray in a reverse merger and renamed itself Tilray. The bulk of its sales are in Canada and in the international medical cannabis export market. U.S. exposure consists of CBD products through Manitoba Harvest and beer through SweetWater.

(Source: MorningStar)

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Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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COE’s results with production of 1.57 MMboe, up +31%; sales volumes of 2.02 MMboe, up +67%, and sales revenue of $95.4m, up +96%.

Investment Thesis:

  • Strong FY22 guidance provided by management. 
  • Sole will provide significant uplift in production and free cash flow. 
  • Sole’s volumes are mostly contracted out, which provides greater certainty at reduced exposure to price movements. 61% of COE’s 2P reserves (Proved and probable reserves) are under take-or-pay contracts, with uncontracted gas predominantly from 2024 onwards. 
  • Upside from COE’s exploration activity around Gippsland and Otway Basin. 
  • Strong management team led by CEO/MD David Maxwell, who has over 25 years industry / developing LNG projects with companies such as BG Group, Woodside Petroleum and Santos Ltd. 
  • Favorable industry conditions on the east coast gas market – with tight supply could lead to higher gas prices. 
  • Potential M&A activity – especially considering recent de-rating.

Key Risks:

  • Execution risk – Drilling and exploration risk.
  • Commodity price risk – movement in oil & gas price will impact uncontracted volumes. 
  • Regulatory risk – such as changes in tax regimes which adversely impact profitability. 
  • M&A risk – value destructive acquisition in order to add growth assets.
  • Financial risk – potentially deeply discounted equity raising to fund operating & exploration activities should debt markets tighten up due external macro factors.

Key Highlights:

  • COE’s management announced strong guidance relative to FY21: FY22 production guidance 3.0 – 3.4 MMboe (FY21: 2.63 MMboe); sales volume 3.7 – 4.0 MMboe (FY21: 3.01 MMboe); underlying EBITDAX $53 – $63m (FY21: $30m); capex of $24 – 28m (FY21: $32.3m).
  • COE achieved record results with production of 1.57 MMboe, up +31%; sales volumes of 2.02 MMboe, up +67%, and sales revenue of $95.4m, up +96%.
  • The +31% increase in total production to 1.57 MMboe, was driven by higher production from the Sole field and higher sales volumes contributed to a +163% increase in underlying EBITDAX to $25.5m.
  • COE was able to improve performance at Orbost Gas Processing Plant to drive earnings: Underlying EBITDAX up +163% to $25.5m; underlying net loss after tax of $6.0m (H1 FY21: $17.4m loss).
  • Step-change in total company gas production: H1 FY22 average daily rate of 50TJ/day, up +39% relative to 1H21 average daily rate of 36 TJ/day.
  • Athena Gas Plant sales began after successful commissioning.
  • COE retained a solid balance sheet with $92.2m in cash reserves at 31 December 2021.

Company Description:

Cooper Energy Ltd (COE) is an oil & gas exploration company focusing on its activities in the Cooper Basin of South Australia. The Company’s exploration portfolio includes six tenements located throughout the Basin. Gas accounts for the major share of the Company’s sales revenue, production and reserves. COE’s portfolio includes: (1) gas production of approximately 7PJ p.a. from the Otway Basin, most of which comes from the Casino Henry gas project which it operates. (2) COE is developing the Sole gas field to supply 24 PJ of gas p.a. from 2019. (3) Oil production of approximately 0.3 million barrels p.a. from low-cost operations in the Cooper Basin.   

(Source: Banyantree)

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Airbnb Limiting Pebblebrook To Push Its Rates

Business Strategy and Outlook

Pebblebrook Hotel Trust is the largest U.S. lodging REIT focused on owning independent and boutique hotels. After Pebblebrook merged with LaSalle Hotel Properties in December 2018, the company owns 53 upper-upscale hotels, with more than 13,000 rooms located in urban, gateway markets. Pebblebrook’s combined portfolio has a higher revenue per available room price point and EBITDA margin than its hotel REIT peers. 

The recent merger with LaSalle provides Pebblebrook some new avenues to create value for shareholders. The company doubled in size while taking on only a portion of the general and administrative costs, making the combined company more efficient. Pebblebrook’s CEO, Jon Bortz, previously ran LaSalle and acquired many of the hotels in that portfolio. His knowledge of those hotels combined with management’s demonstrated ability to maximize margins should allow him to implement cost-saving initiatives that drive up margins. Additionally, management has begun an extensive renovation program across both the LaSalle portfolio and the legacy portfolio that will drive EBITDA gains over time. 

In the short term, the coronavirus outbreak significantly affected the operating results for Pebblebrook’s hotels, with high-double-digit revPAR declines and negative hotel EBITDA in 2020. However, the rapid rollout of vaccinations allowed leisure travel to quickly return, driving high growth in 2021. It is held the company should continue to see strong growth in 2022 and beyond as business and group travel eventually returns to 2019 levels by 2024 in analysts base-case scenario. However, there are several factors that will remain headwinds for hotels over the long term. Supply has been elevated in many of the biggest markets, and that is likely to continue for a few more years. Online travel agencies and online hotel reviews create immediate price discovery for consumers, preventing hotels from pushing rate increases even though it is nearing full occupancy on many nights. Finally, while the shadow supply created by Airbnb doesn’t directly compete most nights, it does limit Pebblebrook’s ability to push rates on nights when it would have typically generated its highest profits.

Financial Strength

Pebblebrook is in solid financial shape from a liquidity and a solvency perspective after the merger with LaSalle, but it is alleged that additional assets sales will put the company in great financial shape. The company seeks to maintain a solid but flexible balance sheet, which is anticipated will serve stakeholders well. Pebblebrook does not currently have an unsecured debt rating. Instead, it uses secured debt on its high-quality portfolio and takes out unsecured term loans. Debt maturities in the near term should be manageable through a combination of refinancing and the company’s free cash flow. Additionally, the company should be able to access the capital markets when acquisition opportunities arise. It is projected 2024, the year it is likely operations will fully return to normal, net debt/EBITDA and EBITDA/interest will be roughly 7.4 and 4.2 times, respectively, both of which are slightly outside of the long-term range for the company but should continue to improve over time.As a REIT, Pebblebrook is required to pay out 90% of its income as dividends to shareholders, which limits its ability to retain its cash flow. However, the company’s current run-rate dividend is easily covered by the company’s cash flow from operating activities, providing plenty of flexibility for capital allocation and investment decisions. It is held Pebblebrook will continue to be able to access the capital markets given its current solid balance sheet and its large, higher-quality, unencumbered asset base.

Bulls Say’s

  • Potentially accelerating economic growth may prolong a robust hotel cycle and benefit Pebblebrook’s portfolio and performance. 
  • The acquisition of the LaSalle Hotel Trust portfolio provides management many renovation opportunities to drive revenue and margin growth. 
  • After the merger, Pebblebrook’s larger size could increase the company’s negotiating power with online travel agencies.

Company Profile 

Pebblebrook Hotel Trust currently owns upper-upscale and luxury hotels with 13,247 rooms across 53 hotels in the United States. Pebblebrook acquired LaSalle Hotel Properties, which owned 10,451 rooms across 41 U.S. hotels, in December 2018, the company current Pebblebrook CEO founded in 1998, though management has sold many of those hotels over the past few years. Pebblebrook’s portfolio consists mostly of independent hotels with no brand affiliations, though the combined company does own and operate some hotels under Marriott, Starwood, InterContinental, Hilton, and Hyatt brands. 

(Source: MorningStar)

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Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Qantas Airways – Omicron impact on 2H22 underlying EBITDA of ~$650m

Investment Thesis:

  • Attractive way to play the Covid reopen trade for investors.  
  • Aiming for all segments to deliver return on invested capital > weighted average cost of capital.
  • Strong position in the domestic market (Qantas Domestic and Jetstar continue to remain the two highest margin earning airlines in the domestic market).
  • Jetstar is well positioned for growth and rising demand in Asia. 
  • Partnership with Woolworths for Loyalty bodes well for membership and earnings.
  • Oil price hedging in FY22 could contribute to performance.
  • Increased competition in the international segment.
  • Relative to peers, strong balance sheet strength; investment grade credit rating.

Key Risks:

  • Disasters that could hurt the QAN brand.
  • Earnings recovery gets pushed out again due to travel restrictions or return of another Covid-19 variant. 
  • Ongoing price led competition forcing QAN to cut prices affecting margins.
  • Leveraged to the price of oil. 
  • Adverse currency movements result in less travel.
  • Labor strikes. 
  • Depressed economic conditions leading to less discretionary income to spend on travel. 

Key Highlights:

  • Omicron impact on 2H22 underlying EBITDA of ~$650m (after mitigations) with operating expenses for 2H22 to include ~$180m of inefficiencies and ramp up costs.
  • Domestic capacity to be 68% of pre-Covid levels in 3Q22, increasing to 90-100% in 4Q22, equating to total FY22 capacity of ~60%.
  • International capacity to be 22% of pre-Covid levels in 3Q22, increasing to 44% in 4Q22, equating to FY22 capacity of 18%.
  • Loyalty on track to deliver more than $1bn gross cash receipts in FY22 and remains committed to its target of $500-600m underlying EBIT by FY24 after returning to double-digit growth by end of CY22.
  • Net capex (excluding land proceeds) in FY22 of $850m and in FY23 of $2.3-2.4bn.
  • Underlying D&A in FY22 of $1.8bn.
  • Net debt within the $4.4-5.5bn target range by end of FY22 and at the bottom half of range from FY23 onwards.
  • The Recovery Plan delivered $840m in savings since the start of the program and remains on track to deliver greater than $900m by the end of FY22.
  • Balance Sheet repair continued with net debt reduction of -9.8% over pcp to $5.5bn (now within target range), refinancing A$300m bond maturing in May 2022.
  • Total liquidity of $4.3bn including $2.7bn cash and committed undrawn facilities of $1.6bn maturing in FY23 and FY24.
  • Investment grade credit rating of Baa2 from Moody’s maintained. 
  • Shareholder distributions remain on hold. 
  • 1H22 fuel cost declined -75% compared to pre-Covid-19 to $0.5bn, primarily due to a -74% reduction in fuel consumption. 

Company Description:

Qantas Airways Ltd (QAN) provides passenger and freight air transportation services in Australia and internationally. QAN also operates a frequent flyer loyalty program. QAN was founded in 1920 and is headquartered in Mascot, Australia.

(Source: Banyantree)

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Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Norwegian liberally accessing the debt and equity markets since the start of the pandemic

Business Strategy and Outlook

Changes to consumer behavior surrounding travel–cruising in particular–as a result of the coronavirus could alter the economic performance of Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings over an extended horizon. As consumers resume cruising after the 15-month sailing halt that began in March 2020, cruise operators have had to add COVID-19-related protocols to reassure passengers of the safety of cruising in addition to the value proposition the holiday provides. On the yield side, it is anticipated Norwegian could intermittently see pricing competition to entice cruisers back onto the product once operators are back at full deployment. Further, there could be some pressure from the redemption of future cruise credits through 2022. On the cost side, higher spending to implement cleanliness and health protocols and oil prices could keep spending inflated. And the entire fleet will not be deployed until the second quarter of 2022, crimping near-term profits and ceding some scale benefits.

These concerns lead to average returns on invested capital, including goodwill, that is viewed, are set to fall below analysts’ 10.4% weighted average cost of capital estimate over a multiyear period, supporting analysts no-moat rating. While it is alleged Norwegian has carved out a compelling position in cruising thanks to its freestyle offering, the product still has to compete with other land-based vacations and discretionary spending for wallet share. It is resisted that it could be harder to capture the same percentage of spending over the near term, given the perceived risk of cruising, heightened by previous media attention. 

While liquidity issues remain concerning for cruise operators, Norwegian has liberally accessed the debt and equity markets since the beginning of the pandemic. Such capital market efforts signal Norwegian’s dedication to weathering a return to normalcy for demand. Given that the firm indicated cash burn is set to escalate to $390 million per month as it restarts the fleet, the $1.5 billion in cash of Norwegian’s balance sheet at year-end buys it sometime (even if there is no associated revenue) to facilitate a tactical full deployment strategy.

Financial Strength

Norwegian has accessed significant liquidity since the beginning of the pandemic, raising around $8 billion in debt and equity. In analysts’ opinion, these efforts signal Norwegian’s dedication to attempt to weather the duration of COVID-19. Given that the firm indicated cash burn should rise to around $390 million per month as it digests higher costs to restart the fleet, cash available to the firm should allow Norwegian time to successfully execute a tactical re-entry to sailing the seas, offering liquidity even in a tempered revenue scenario in 2022.With Norwegian’s 28 ships at the end of 2021, it is likely solid capacity expansion once cruising resumes, although it is likely some growth could be reconfigured, given shipyard closures. However, including recent debt and equity raises, Norwegian is likely to remain above its 2.5-2.75 times net debt/adjusted EBITDA target it had previously sought to achieve.  It is not seen Norwegian reaching around this range until 2028. The firm surpassed its debt/capital covenant of less than 70%, ending 2021 at around 84% (with restrictive covenants waived into 2022). The company is set to remain cash flow negative in 2022, but it is alleged could achieve positive EBITDA performance in the second half of 2022 (delayed a bit by omicron’s impact).Longer term, it is still held  that management will continue to order ships for delivery approximately every 18 months (and at least one per year in 2022-27) at its namesake brand and will opportunistically finance new ships through either compelling pricing in the debt markets or low-cost export credit agency guaranteed loans.

Bulls Say’s

  • As Norwegian is smaller than its North American cruise peers, it has the ability to deploy its assets nimbly as cruising demand rises, allowing for strategic pricing tactics. 
  • The rescission of restrictive COVID-related policies could allow cruises to appeal to a wider cohort of consumers, leading to near-term demand growth faster than is currently anticipated. 
  • Norwegian has capitalized on leisure industry knowledge from its prior sponsors as well as the addition of high-end Regent Seven Seas and Oceania brands, gathering best practices and leverage with vendors.

Company Profile 

Norwegian Cruise Line is the world’s third-largest cruise company by berths (at nearly 60,000), operating 28 ships across three brands (Norwegian, Oceania, and Regent Seven Seas), offering both freestyle and luxury cruising. The company is set to have its entire fleet back in the water in the second quarter of 2022. With nine passenger vessels on order among its brands through 2027 (representing 24,000 incremental berths), Norwegian is increasing capacity faster than its peers, expanding its brand globally. Norwegian sailed to around 500 global destinations before the pandemic. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.