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Fletcher’s Turnaround of Its Australia Division Is on Firmer Footing in Late Fiscal 2021

In its home market, Fletcher has strong brands and a leading distribution channel, and it dominates market share in key categories. The building materials segment in general, however, is subject to easy product substitution, low switching costs, and limited pricing power, making a competitive advantage difficult to sustain. Together with a poor track record of acquisitions, Fletcher has been unable to earn a sustainable return above its cost of capital.

Key Aspects

  • A number of Fletcher’s businesses have good competitive positioning, including the PlaceMakers distribution business and its plasterboard operations. But earnings visibility and returns on capital are low, given a complex structure.
  • The recovery in New Zealand and Australian housing construction is nearing. However, the associated cyclical benefit to Fletcher’s earnings is priced in.
  • Fletcher has divested its Formica business and is backing away from commercial construction. But Fletcher could benefit from a more broad-based restructure to refocus on its core businesses.

Company Profile

Fletcher Building is the largest building materials company in New Zealand, after it emerged from the Fletcher Challenge group in 2001. Its diverse range of business interests span building product manufacture and distribution in New Zealand and Australia, as well as commercial and residential property development. Operations have been refocused on New Zealand and Australia, following divestment of the global laminates business in fiscal 2019.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Funds Funds

Fidelity Low-Priced Stock K6

As a long-term investor, he looks for resilient companies with staying power and doesn’t chase fads. He tries to avoid firms that lack an enduring competitive advantage, steers clear of those loaded up with too much debt, and scrutinizes their leadership’s integrity and prowess. The strategy stands out for its sprawling portfolio of 800-plus stocks drawn from across the globe and market-cap spectrum. Once solidly small-cap-focused, it now orients toward mid-caps but distinguishes itself from that category by owning an above-average stake of large caps (34% of assets) and small caps (30%). Its generous helping of European and Japanese firms, which have tended to enhance the strategy’s risk-adjusted returns, also sticks out.

Altogether, foreign stocks regularly soak up more than 35% of the portfolio, typically the highest share in the category. Tillinghast’s partiality for high-quality fare reveals itself through the portfolio’s average returns on equity, which are far higher than the Russell Midcap Value Index’s, and its aggregate debt/capital ratio, which is consistently lower. Tillinghast’s risk-conscious approach doesn’t have much of a thrill factor. It can lead to results that lag well behind its peers during bull markets.

Yet the strategy’s typically subdued volatility and durability in market drawdowns have consistently made up for its seemingly pedestrian results in rallies. Over the past decade through April 2021, its Sharpe ratio (a measure of risk-adjusted returns) beat 95% of funds in either the small- or mid-cap categories (excluding growth funds). The strategy’s ability to maintain its edge, despite its massive asset base of more than $41 billion, underscores its advantages.

The fund’s older version has posted phenomenal absolute and risk-adjusted returns under Joel Tillinghast, who has managed it for more than three decades. From its 1989 inception through April 2021, the fund gained 13.7% annualized, among best showings of any surviving fund in the mid- or small-cap categories. It exhibited lower volatility than relevant benchmarks and the average midvalue and mid-blend fund (its current and former category, respectively) despite an above-average foreign-equity stake. The fund has also consistently preserved capital better than its rivals during stress periods.

For example, during 2020’s pandemic-induced bear market (Feb. 21-March 23), the fund dropped 36.6% versus the Russell Midcap Value Index’s 43.7% loss. The fund’s resilience and steady gains have reliably made for outstanding risk-adjusted returns, despite its at-times less-than-thrilling total returns.

The fund’s gains only matched the index over the past decade, but earned its returns with an ample cash cushion and steadier returns. The strategy’s girth does make outperformance more difficult than in the early years; Tillinghast cannot invest as easily in the smalland mid-cap fare that he favors. He’s done better at Fidelity Series Intrinsic Opportunities FDMLX, which is his smaller, more nimble fund available for investment only by other of Fidelity’s products

Source:Morningstar

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

Ramsay Health Care Ltd

Ramsay’s offer of GBP 2.40 per Spire share represents an enterprise value of GBP 2 billion or EV/EBITDA multiple of 10.9 on pre coronavirus fiscal 2019 earnings. Post-acquisition, our EPS for fiscal years 2023 to 2025 increases by an average of 11%, slightly ahead of the high-single-digit EPS accretion management guided for fiscal 2024. However, we still view the transaction price as fair, with shares still screening as overvalued.

We expect Spire’s revenue to grow at a low-single-digit percent and operating margin to largely be maintained at 10%. In addition, we factor in GBP 26 million in annualised cost synergies from fiscal 2024 through procurement benefits, capacity utilisation and a reduction in administrative costs. The scheme is first subject to a Spire shareholder vote expected in July 2021, followed by a likely 12-month review process by the U.K. Competition Market Authority, or CMA. Ramsay’s 8% market share combined with Spire’s 17% would create the largest independent hospital operator in the U.K., but at most we anticipate CMA may require Ramsay to divest certain hospitals or clinics. Accordingly, we forecast full integration and control in fiscal 2023 and full realization of synergies in fiscal 2024.

We view the acquisition as strategically sound, in addition to extending Ramsay’s geographic reach. Spire provides more exposure to private revenue streams and higher acuity inpatient admissions. This complements and balances Ramsay’s U.K. case mix, which is dominated by day patients and revenue sourced from the National Health Service. We anticipate Ramsay to fund the deal through existing debt facilities and still afford a 50% dividend payout ratio. However, Ramsay indicated potential capital management initiatives or asset sales to deleverage its balance sheet if needed.

Profile.

Ramsay Health Care is the fifth-largest global private hospital operator with approximately 480 locations in 11 countries. The key markets in which it operates are Australia, France, the U.K., Sweden and Norway. It is the largest private hospital group in each of these markets other than Norway where it is number two and the U.K. where it ranks fourth. Ramsay Health Care has a history of acquisitive growth, with the most recent acquisition being that of Stockholm-listed Capio AB in November 2018. 51%-owned Ramsay General de Sante is listed on Euro next Paris. Ramsay Health Care undertakes both private and publicly funded healthcare.

Source:Morningstar

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.