Business Strategy & Outlook:
Credit Suisse’s true underlying profitability has been masked for the better part of a decade by multiple restructuring charges and the cost of running down a legacy book of unprofitable assets. The new management team at the helm of Credit Suisse hoped that it addressed all issues during 2020, but new problematic exposures continue to crop up. This suggests a deeper risk management malaise at Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse has some very good, profitable, and generally asset-light business with good long-term secular growth prospects–especially in wealth management/private banking and the Swiss universal bank. The discount that the market has imposed on the rating of Credit Suisse relative to UBS and its other peers should, however, remain in place until Credit Suisse can convince investors that it has addressed its risk management deficiencies.
Credit Suisse will have to report several quarters of results free from the large non-recurring items that have historically marred its results. There is a strong long-term secular trend that sees the wealth of high-net-worth individuals and families growing ahead of global nominal GDP. The ultra-high net worth and family office segment, where Credit Suisse has focused most of its attention, is a particularly attractive segment. The threat of digital disintermediation is reduced and the need for bespoke solutions and strong relationship between banker and client remains. The current negative interest rate environment obscures the benefits of Credit Suisse’s very strong deposit franchise that provides it with ample surplus liquidity. Currently, this is damaging to Credit Suisse’s net interest income–it needs to invest its excess liquidity in short-term risk-free assets that currently pays no or negative interest. Credit Suisse has, however, starting passing on these costs to selected clients.
Financial Strengths:
Credit Suisse has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.4% currently, ahead of its own internal capital target of a 14% common equity Tier 1 ratio. This is comfortably ahead of its regulatory minimum capital requirement of 10%. However, Credit Suisse’s leveraged ratio of 4.2% is more of a constraint, with a regulatory minimum requirement of 3.5% and an internal target of 4.5%. Credit Suisse intends to pay out 25% of its earnings as a dividend and it has not announced new share buybacks.
Both Credit Suisse’s liquidity coverage ratio and its net stable funding ratio are comfortably above 100%, which indicates sound liquidity. These ratios, while helpful, do not fully capture the quality of a bank’s funding. One should also consider the structure of a bank’s funding–where the relatively lower importance of wholesale deposits in Credit Suisse’s funding mix is a clear positive. However, private banking/wealth management clients will typically be more sophisticated than the average retail banking client and therefore more likely to withdraw funds in times of stress. The private banking deposits are as sticky as general retail deposits, although they remains stickier than wholesale funding.
Bulls Say:
- Credit Suisse looks set to emulate UBS and transform its business model into a wealth manager with a complementary investment bank, which would increase profitability and reduce earnings volatility.
- Credit Suisse has run down a massive book of EUR 126 billion to EUR 45 billion over the past four years, incurring pretax losses of EUR 16 billion in the process. This has obscured the performance and profitability of the core business.
- Credit Suisse generates the bulk of its earnings in stable and low-risk private banking/wealth management and Swiss commercial banking.
Company Description:
Credit Suisse runs a global wealth management business, a global investment bank and is one of the two dominant Swiss retail and commercial banks. Geographically its business is tilted toward Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook:
After emerging from outright government ownership ABN Amro is one of the simpler banks in Europe. It is essentially a retail and commercial bank with limited capital markets activities. Its strong retail deposit base supported above-average profitability until negative interest rates started to bite. Having a lending book dominated by fixed-rate mortgages does not help either. The long-duration lending book forces ABN Amro to use more expensive long-term funding in order to manage liquidity risk, which then compounds margin pressure in a declining interest-rate environment. ABN Amro offers investors exposure to the oligopolistic Dutch banking system where ABN Amro and its two main rivals hold more than 90% of all Dutch current accounts. This is in sharp contrast to the fragmented banking markets that are the norm in much of the eurozone. Historically this concentration supported higher levels of profitability for ABN Amro and its Dutch peers.
ABN Amro has a solid competitive position in Dutch retail banking with a 20% market share in Dutch personal current accounts and a 25% share of business current accounts. This provides ABN Amro with cheap, sticky funding and forms the base from which ABN Amro can cross-sell other products. In a negative interest-rate environment what should be a major competitive advantage has turned into a major headache. In a negative interest-rate environment banks earn negative interest on their surplus liquidity and with essentially a zero interest-rate floor on some of their deposits this leads to a margin squeeze. The injection of liquidity via monetary and fiscal interventions from central banks and governments following the coronavirus pandemic has just amplified this problem as banks are faced with even more deposits from clients flush with cash. ABN Amro cannot pass on negative interest rates to smaller depositors without damaging client goodwill. It is increasingly passing on higher costs to larger clients. Interest-rate hedges only provide protection against interest-rate volatility, not to a long-term decline in interest rates, especially not when rates go negative.
Financial Strengths:
Even after taking into consideration the more onerous capital guidelines under Basel IV ABN Amro is one of the best-capitalised banks in Europe. At the end of 2020 ABN Amro indicated that on a Basel IV basis it has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of over 15%, compared with its internal target of 13%. With an enviable retail deposit base ABN Amro is one of the banks in Europe with the soundest liquidity profile. Retail deposits tend to be sticky as retail depositors are less likely to move to other banks in the search of higher yields. Wholesale funding are much more likely to disappear during periods of stress in the funding markets. Wholesale funding makes up only around 26% of ABN Amro’s total funding.
Bulls Say:
- ABN Amro is one of the three leading banks in the oligopolistic Dutch banking sector.
- It has an attractive funding mix with low reliance on wholesale funding.
- It has a simple, clear, and focused business model and strategy.
Company Description:
ABN Amro Bank is a Dutch bank, and the Netherlands accounts for around 90% of its operating profit. Operationally, retail and commercial banking contributes the bulk of its operating profit, while ABN Amro continues to reduce its exposure to corporate and investment banking. It views private banking as one of its key growth areas.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook:
Vivendi’s transformation into a pure-play media firm, completed in 2014, left it with two primary business units: Canal+, the largest pay-TV company in France, and Universal Music Group, the largest global music label. However, controlling shareholder Vincent Bollore has dragged Vivendi back to its inglorious past as a conglomerate, exemplified by the purchases of Havas, the world’s sixth-largest ad agency holding company, and Editis, a French-language book publisher. Bollore also led the spinout of UMG, the firm’s crown jewel, in September 2021 with Vivendi holding on to a 10% stake in the music label. As a result of the UMG transaction, Canal+ is now the largest segment for Vivendi, representing 60% of revenue. While Canal+ appears to be returning to growth after years of decline, the core French pay-TV business remains a drag on growth. The growth for Canal+ will continue be driven by overseas operations via subscriber growth and new country launches.
Canal+ is attempting to transition from a traditional pay-TV business to a content aggregator. Companies that depend heavily on buying or aggregating content from other creators may find themselves squeezed, particularly in markets with multiple aggregators. Now the second-largest segment with roughly 25% of revenue, Havas is heavily leveraged to Europe and North America, which account for over 80% of revenue. Havas competes against larger players in these regions; the only GDP-level growth in these mature markets and further expansion into Asia-Pacific and Latin America, largely via acquisitions of local agencies. Editis now generates roughly 10% of total revenue for Vivendi. The firm is the second-largest French-language publishing group, with 50 publishing houses covering everything from children’s books to popular literature to dictionaries to manga.
Financial Strengths:
While Vivendi has done an admirable job of cleaning up the mess from the early 2000s, it remains in flux in terms of how to use its cash and where it invests. The large number of divestitures, including the sale of 30% of Universal Music, over the last few years has left the company with a net debt position of only $1.9 billion as of June 2021. However, management continues to use cash to buy stakes in firms in peripheral industries such as the Telecom Italia and Mediaset. The firm will look for additional acquisitions over time to releverage the balance sheet. The firm shall rush into an acquisition and overpay for it.
Bulls Say:
- The spinout of Universal Music Group should reduce the conglomerate discount that has plagued the stock.
- StudioCanal is a leading studio that benefits from the increased global demand for French-language original content.
- Vivendi will return much of the cash from the UMG sale to shareholders via special dividends.
Company Description:
Vivendi’s transformation into a pure-play media firm was completed in 2014, but recent acquisitions and the spinout of Universal Music Group have again changed the firm. The company now operates multiple divisions with one very large core segment: Canal+, a leading producer and distributor of film and TV content in France, produces over 80% of revenue. It also owns Havas, the world’s sixth-largest ad agency holding company; Editis, a French-language book publisher; Gameloft, a mobile game publisher; and minority stakes in multiple companies in Europe.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
