Categories
Shares Small Cap

Zip Shares Still Cheap After Walking Away from Sezzle, But Its Fundamentals Are Getting Murkier

Business Strategy & Outlook:    

Zip’s focus is on maximizing its addressable market. Its business is more diversified than single-product buy now, pay later, or BNPL, players, with varieties in financing options, transaction limits, and repayment schedules. Customers enjoy simple sign-up and checkouts, high acceptance by retailers and flexible financing solutions to help better manage their cash flows. Merchant partners may benefit from increased conversion rates, basket sizes, and transaction frequencies. Zip has a revolving credit business in Australia. ZipPay finances up to AUD 1,000, and ZipMoney AUD 1,000 and above. It also boasts a broader merchant base including retail, home, electronics, health, auto, and travel. Around 70% of revenue is derived from customers, mainly from account fees and interest. Meanwhile, Zip Business provides unsecured loans of up to AUD 500,000 to small and midsize enterprises. 

Zip adopts an installment financing model overseas, helping it scale up faster and keep up with competition in the underpenetrated global BNPL landscape. The acquisition of U.S. based Quad Pay materially boosts its growth prospects. It also operates in the U.K., Canada, Europe, Mexico, and the Middle East. Zip enhances customer stickiness via ongoing product add-ons. It has a Pay Anywhere function that lets users transact at a wide variety of avenues without being confined to merchant partners. Users also benefit from promotional offers, cash-back deals, or free credits. Newer features include crypto trading, credit reporting, and savings accounts. For merchant partners, Zip invests in co-marketing to help them acquire new customers. Zip has strong earnings prospects, but its margins will be increasingly under pressure and it will not achieve the same penetration and transaction frequency overseas as it had domestically. While it benefits from the growth of e-commerce and increasing preference for more convenient/cheaper forms of financing, anticipated heightened competition to its products. The capital-intensive domestic business cannot scale up as quickly, its fee structure potentially creates friction for customers, and its product offering in the U.S lacks clear differentiation.

Financial Strengths:  

While credit stress is creeping up, Zip remains overall in reasonable financial health. As of March 2022, the net bad debt ratio for its core ANZ business sits at 3.40% of receivables, while arrears are at 2.29%. But as a reprieve, Zip’s current financial position would be bolstered by: 1) its March equity raise; and 2) avoiding absorbing Sezzle’s net losses. Its debt/capital ratio is 56%, while the ratio of equity/receivables has improved to 52% in fiscal 2021 from 8.1% in fiscal 2017. Zip’s bad debts should stay manageable in a major credit event. Unlike some peers, Zip conducts a greater degree of background check before onboarding customers, such as collecting bank statements and pulling in information from a credit bureau. Soft credit checks are similarly performed when onboarding new customers overseas. This helps compensate for the fact that its receivables are higher-risk due to them having longer repayment periods and higher transaction value (notably for Zip Money) or it having a Pay Anywhere model. Its installment businesses have shorter turnover periods and lower transaction values, meaning it can know much earlier (relative to credit cards) if customers have trouble making payments and can therefore amend its risk controls accordingly. Most its Australian receivables are funded by its asset-based securitization program, with undrawn facilities totaling AUD 401.9 million as of March 2022. It also has USD 168.1 million and AUD 119.5 million of undrawn facilities to fund U.S and Zip Business’ receivables, respectively.

Bulls Say:  

  • Zip is well placed to continue growing its transaction volume, given its variety in financing options and retailer base, as well as its Pay Anywhere model which provides a greater avenue to spend using its products.
  • Zip benefits from an accelerated shift to e-commerce, increased adoption of cashless payments, and a growing need among merchants for effective marketing amid a challenging retail backdrop.
  • Zip faces lower regulatory risks than its BNPL rivals, as it already conducts a greater degree of background checks and ZipMoney is already regulated by the National Credit Act.

Company Description: 

Zip is a diversified finance provider, offering consumer financing via a line of credit (via ZipPay and ZipMoney) and installment-based finance (via Quad Pay, Spotii, Twisto, and PayFlex); as well as lending to small to midsize enterprises (via Zip Business). Zip’s fortunes are largely tied to the buy now, pay later, or BNPL, industry. Most of its products–ZipPay, Quad Pay (Zip U.S.), and PayFlex–do not charge interest based on outstanding balances. Around 60%-70% of Zip Pay’s/Zip Money’s revenue is derived from customers, mainly via account fees and interest. Meanwhile, its installment businesses primarily generate revenue by receiving a margin from merchants, which compensates it for accepting all nonpayment risk and for encouraging consumers to transact more frequently.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Investor Desk. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Investor Desk and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Investor Desk and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Investor Desk and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Investor Desk and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Investor Desk and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Investor Desk and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Investor Desk and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Investor Desk and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Investor Desk and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

The Star Entertainment Group Limited, an integrated resort company, provides gaming, entertainment, and hospitality services in Australia

Investment Thesis:

  • Trading below blended valuation (DCF & EV/EBITDA multiple). 
  • Additional cost measures announced to support earnings.
  • Monopolies in the casino industry in SGR’s operating geographies and is one of the market leaders in other games such as slots.
  • Economic moat in the nightlife landscape in Sydney given regulatory environment (such as lock-out laws).
  • Diversified business base across different types of entertainment, hotels, retail stores and food & beverage establishments.
  • Strong tourism growth once borders reopen is expected to be a tailwind for SGR.
  • Lower AUD could improve international spending in domestic markets.
  • Domestic table games segment remains strong.

Key Risks:

  • Weakening VIP segment, potentially making Sydney less viable.
  • Further deterioration of consumer spending and household discretionary income 
  • Regulatory risks e.g., repeal of lockout laws could increase competition in the nightlife landscape in Sydney.
  • Establishment of a new Crown casino in Sydney will increase competition (especially amongst VIP customers) and could potentially dismantle SGR’s monopoly in Sydney.
  • Win-rate risk (if the casinos have a much lower win-rate than the mathematical expected value).
  • Potential scandals.

Key Highlights:

  • FY22 results summary. Compared to pcp: On a normalised basis, gross revenue declined -2% to $1.532bn, EBITDA declined -45% to $237m and NPAT was a loss of $32m (vs profit of $116m in pcp), impacted by Covid-19 related property shutdowns, operating restrictions, and border closures. Statutory net loss (post significant items) was $199m vs profit of $58m in pcp. Operating expenses increased +14% to $909m, reflecting Covid-19 related impacts, inflationary pressures, tight labour market and regulatory review costs (Bell Review, AUSTRAC enforcement investigation).
  •  Operating cash flow declined -61.5% to $181.3m with cash collection down -42% to 81%.  
  • Capex of $141m, within the guidance range of $125-150m and well below D&A expense of $208m. 
  • Balance sheet has ample liquidity position of $513m in cash and undrawn facilities. Net debt declined -2% YoY to $1.15bn, equating to gearing of 2.8x, with the Group fully compliant with June 2022 amended covenants and no covenant relief required for FY23 testing dates. (6) Final dividend scrapped.
  • By segments. Compared to pcp: Sydney revenue declined -6% to $781m and normalised EBITDA declined -60% to $82m, impacted by the closure of the property for 102 days and operating restrictions due to Covid-19, however, domestic revenues rebounded on opening with 4Q22 domestic revenue consistent with pre-Covid levels with slots revenue up +17% on pre-covid levels partially offset by -8% decline in domestic tables. 
  • Gold Coast domestic revenue was up +11% to $424m with non-gaming revenue up +50%, which combined with +27% increase in opex saw normalised EBITDA decline -20% to $90m. Domestic revenues rebounded in 4Q22, up +48% on pre-Covid level with slots revenue up +50%, domestic tables up +23% and non-gaming up +69%. 
  • Brisbane domestic revenue declined -6% to $326m and normalised EBITDA declined -43% to $65m, however, performance improved in April following removal of Covid-19 restrictions with domestic revenue in 4Q22 up +13% on pre-Covid levels with slots revenue up +26% while domestic tables down -4%. 
  • FY23 guidance and trading update. For FY23 capex of ~$150m (vs prior guidance of ~$175m), D&A expense of ~$200-205m, net funding costs of $60-65m and JV equity contributions of ~$115m.
  • Trading update (1 July 2022-18 August 2022) group domestic revenue increased +9% on pre-Covid levels (1 July 2019-18 August 2019) with Sydney domestic revenue in-line with pre-Covid levels, Gold Coast domestic revenue up +26% and Brisbane domestic revenue up +18%.
  • Key executive appointments. Robbie Cooke (ex-CEO Tatts Group and ex-MD Tyro Payments) appointed as MD and CEO. 
  • Scott Wharton appointed as CEO The Star Sydney and Group Head of Transformation.  

Company Description:

The Star Entertainment Group Limited, an integrated resort company, provides gaming, entertainment, and hospitality services in Australia. The Company operates through three segments: Sydney, Gold Coast, and Brisbane. It owns and operates The Star Sydney casino, which includes hotels, apartment complex, restaurants, and bars; The Star Gold Coast casino, which consists of hotels, theatre, restaurants, and bars; and Treasury casino in Brisbane that comprises hotel, restaurants, and bars. The company also manages the Gold Coast Convention and Exhibition Centre. The company was formerly known as Echo Entertainment Group Limited and changed its name to The Star Entertainment Group Limited in November 2015. 

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

ARB retained a strong balance sheet with cash reserves of $52.7m and no debt at FY22-end

Investment Thesis:

  • Current trading multiples adequately price in the near-term growth opportunities, in our view. 
  • Experienced management team and senior staff with a track record of delivering earnings growth.  
  • Strong balance sheet with no debt at FY22-end.
  • Strong presence and brands in the Australian aftermarket segment.
  • Growing presence in Europe and Middle East and potential to grow Exports.
  • Growth via acquisitions

Key Risks:

  • Higher than expected sales growth rates. 
  • Any delays or interruptions in production, especially in Thailand which happens on an annual basis.
  • Increased competition in the Australian Aftermarket especially with competitors’ tendency to replicate ARB products.
  • Slowing down of demand from OEMs. 
  • Poor execution of R&D.
  • Currency exposure

Key Highlights:

  • FY22 Results Highlights. Relative to the pcp: Sales of $694.5m, was up $71.5m or +11.5% over the previous year sales of $623.1m. Continuing sales growth was strong, driven by Australian Aftermarket and Export categories, whilst sales to Original Equipment Manufacturers were in line with last year as previously communicated, and considering the significant +33.9% sales growth achieved in the prior year, despite management highlighting “continuing constraints in new vehicle availability and ongoing personnel and supply chain challenges”. Management noted “sales to the Australian Aftermarket and Export markets were significantly impacted in the second half by the emergence of the Omicron Covid-19 variant in January and February 2022, resulting in abnormally high staff absenteeism, and by ongoing limited new vehicle availability. Sales into Export markets were also impacted in the second half by the outbreak of war in Ukraine”. 
  • Profit before tax of $165.7m, up +10.4% was broadly in line with sales revenue growth of +11.5%.
  • Earnings (NPAT) of $122.0m, up +8.1% on the reported NPAT of $112.9m in the previous year.
  • Cash flows generated from operations of $84.6m declined by $18.6m compared with the previous year due to an increase in inventories of $50.7m as ARB looked to mitigate increased supply chain lead times and ongoing disruptions. 
  • ARB currently has a larger than normal capex programme due to the anticipated completion of the new 30,000 square metre factory in Thailand in December 2022, ongoing construction of the corporate head office in Melbourne, Australia, and development of ARB New Zealand site in Hamilton, New Zealand, to consolidate the Beaut Utes and Proform businesses. 
  • The Board declared a final fully franked dividend of 32.0cps, which brings total dividends to 71.0cps fully franked, up +4.4% compared with last year. 
  • ARB retained a strong balance sheet with cash reserves of $52.7m and no debt at FY22-end. 
  • Performance Highlights by Segment. ARB saw strong sales growth of 25.6% in 1H22, which contrasts to a small decline of -1.1% in sales in 2H22, compared with the pcp. Comparing 2H22 versus 1H22: Australian Aftermarket. Sales of $183m in 2H22 versus $191m in 1H22 represent a -4.0% decline. Australian Aftermarket sales remained relatively consistent at 53.8% of ARB’s sales. According to management, “new vehicle sales in Australia declined by 2.1% over the last financial year, however new vehicle sales of ARB’s target vehicles, being four-wheel drive utilities and SUVs, grew by 0.3%. Demand for second hand 4WD vehicles globally continues to be strong and product sales for used 4WD vehicles remains an important part of ARB’s business”. ARB opened four new stores in Melton and Sale, Victoria, in Rutherford, New South Wales, and in Karratha, Western Australia. This brings the total number of ARB stores to 74, of which 30 are Company owned. 
  • Export. Sales grew +17.4% over FY22 and represented 38.7% of ARB’s sales, up slightly on FY21. Sales of $131m in 2H22 versus $138m in 1H22 represent a -5.1% decline.  Over FY22, sales growth was achieved in all regions: the Americas, Asia/Pacific and the Rest of the World, despite constraints in new vehicle availability especially in the UK where ARB’s operations are heavily reliant on product fitment to new vehicles rather than fitment to used vehicles”. 
  • Original Equipment Manufacturers. Segment sales equate to 7.5% of ARB’s total sales. Despite sales of $21m in 2H22 versus $30m in 1H22 representing a -29.8% decline, ARB saw overall FY22 OEM sales growth of +0.2% after a record +73.9% sales increase last year. According to management, the decline in 2H22 OEM sales “was expected and reflects the timing of new contracts and OEMs stocking up during calendar 2021 for new model releases”.

Company Description:

ARB Corporation Ltd (ARB) designs, manufactures, distributes, and sells 4-wheel drive vehicle accessories and light metal engineering works. It is predominantly based in Australia but also has presence in the US, Thailand, Middle East, and Europe. There are currently 61 ARB stores across Australia for aftermarket sales.

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Megaport has a stronger focus on growing revenue and EBITDA margins rather than chasing growth at any cost

Investment Thesis:

  • MP1 is a global Software Defined Network provider, focusing on cloud connectivity. As such, the Company is leveraged to the rapid growth of global cloud and data centres and is in a strong position to benefit from the rollout to new cloud and datacenter regions. Key macro tailwinds behind MP1’s sector: (1) adoption of cloud by new enterprises; (2) increased level of investment and expenditure by existing customers; and (3) more and more enterprises looking to use multiple cloud products/providers, which works well with MP1’s business model.  
  • MP1 has a scale advantage over competitors. MP1 has over 600 locations around the globe. MP1 has significant scale advantage over competitors and whilst replicating this scale is not necessarily the difficult task, it will take a number of years to do so during which time MP1 will continue to add locations and customers using the scale advantage.
  • Cash balance of $82.5m plus access to a $25m credit facility, management is confident in achieving positive FCF. 
  • Strong relationship with data centres (DC). MP1 has equipment installed in 400 data centres, so MP1 is a customer of data centres. MP1 also drives DCs interconnection revenue. Whilst several data centres like NEXTDC, Equinix provide SDN (Software Defined Network) services, it is unlikely data centres will look to change their relationship with (or restrict) MP1 given they are designed to be neutral providers to network operators. Further, given MP1’s existing customer base and connections with cloud service providers, it would be very difficult for data centres (without significant disruption to customers/cloud service providers) to change the rules for MP1.
  • MP1 has reported attractive trends in LTV to CAC ratio and customer churn (declining churn will also drive LTV to CAC ratio higher). 
  • Management has a stronger focus on growing revenue and EBITDA margins rather than chasing growth at any cost. 

Key Risks:

  • High level of execution risk (especially with respect to development). 
  • Revenue, cost and product synergies fail to eventuate from the InnovoEdge acquisition. 
  • Heavy reliance on third party partners (especially data centre providers and cloud service providers). 
  • Data centres like NEXTDC, Equinix provide SDN services and decide to restrict MP1 in providing their services. 
  • Disappointing growth (in terms of expanding data centre footprint, customers, ports, Megaport Cloud Router).

Key Highlights:

  • FY22 results summary. Group revenue was up +40% to $109.7m, driven by growth across regions with the North American market (NAM) delivering the largest growth at +49% YoY to $57.8m. American is MP1’s single biggest contributor to NAM and accounted for 51% of group revenues in June-22, with the majority of the contracts now denominated in U.S. dollars (USD). Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR) of $10.7m at the end of June-22 was up +43% YoY suggests solid momentum going into FY23. Revenue performance by region: North America up +49% to $57.8m; Asia Pacific up +30% to $33.5m; and Europe up +33% to $18.4m.
  • key operating metrics performance YoY – data centres up +3% to 787; Cloud On Ramps up +19% to 278; Ports up +24% to 9,545; Megaport Cloud Router (MCR) up +46% to 731; Megaport Virtual Edge (MVE) up +248% to 73; and Total Services up +26% to 27,383. 
  • Gross profit (profit after direct network cost and partner commissions) was up +62% to $68.3m, with GP margin improving +800bps to 62%. Direct network costs were up +8% YoY with 26 new data centres added to the network and capacity upgrades on intra-regional routes. Partner commissions were up +36% YoY, in line with revenue growth and expected to grow as Company builds momentum in the indirect sales channel. Normalised operating earnings (EBITDA) loss of $10.2m was +23% above FY21 loss of $13.3m, with margin improving from -17% to -9%. Operating expenses of $78.5m were up +42% YoY driven by investments in Scale Up and Scale Out projects. Management noted 4Q22 EBITDA was positive with the business starting to realise the benefits from operating leverage. The Company ended the year with cash and equivalents position of $82.5m, down from $136.3m in pcp. However, the Company remains well funded and has access to a $25m credit facility to provide additional flexibility.
  • Tightening the belt and focusing on margins. Other key items of note from the results: There is a strong focus on growing revenue and EBITDA margins in FY23, which is a positive in the current environment where investors are questioning the ability of high growth companies to deliver margin and profit growth. The group exit EBITDA margin for 4Q22 was positive – Group 5%, APAC 64%, EMEA 45% and NAM 23%. Further, with the current cash and credit facility, management is confident in achieving positive FCF. 
  • Management provided good colour around customer churn, showing a significant drop in customer churn after 2 years. Overall, MP1 has a customer churn of approx. 7% p.a. and is expected to continue to decline. 
  •  MP1 reported LTV (Lifetime Value) to CAC (Customer Acquisition Cost) ratio of 6.3x for FY22, which is below FY21 levels as MP1 invested in additional sales capabilities (indirect sales channel). Nonetheless this is an attractive LTV-CAC ratio, and, with a declining customer churn, management expects this ratio to trend higher going forward.  

Company Description:

Megaport Ltd (MP1) is a software-based elastic connectivity provider – that is, it is a global Network as a Service (NaaS) provider. MP1 develops an elastic connectivity platform providing customers interconnectivity and flexibility between other networks and cloud providers connected to the platform. 

(Source: Banyantree)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Bread Financial Faces Challenges as It Looks to Resume Growth After Spinning Off Assets

Business Strategy & Outlook

After the sale of Epsilon in 2019 and spinoff of LoyaltyOne in 2021, Bread Financial is now solely a consumer credit company, with its private label credit cards and buy now-pay later businesses being its only two product lines. However, Bread’s retail credit card business is under pressure. The company has historically targeted midsize retailers for its partnerships. This strategy has led to a partnership base that is weighted toward mall-based retailers, which are in decline due to increased online shopping. Many of Bread’s retail partners have already filed for bankruptcy, including the Ascena Retail Group in July 2020 and Forever 21 in 2019. Bread has also suffered defections, losing Wayfair and Meijer to Citi in 2020 and BJ’s Wholesale Club to Capital One at the start of 2022. The retail partner loss is an ongoing threat to Bread as the firm does not have a competitive advantage that would give it an edge in retaining partnerships during contract renewal negotiations.

Bread must also now contend with rising competitive threats from buy now-pay later firms, which are targeting the U.S. retail market and seek to sign agreements with Bread’s partners. These firms are still a relatively small part of U.S. retail, but Bread takes the threat seriously. The company’s acquisition of the original Bread, a buy now pay later company, as well its decision to adopt its name as its own was done with the intent of accelerating the deployment of its own competing offering. As part of the spinoff of LoyaltyOne, Bread used the proceeds from the transaction to reduce its considerable debt load. This strategy favorably as Bread is heavily leveraged, especially when considering the low credit quality of its receivable portfolio, which has historically seen net charge-offs well above industry averages. More needs to be done to put Bread in a good financial position, but the spinoff and the related debt reduction are a material improvement to Bread’s balance sheet. However, this does place Bread in an awkward position should credit conditions deteriorate industry wide, as the bank is among the most credit sensitive firms that cover.

Financial Strengths

When viewed as a single consolidated company, Bread Financial is a heavily leveraged firm. Bread finished 2021 with a tangible asset to tangible equity ratio of 15.1. The company accomplished this leverage by holding its banks as subsidiaries and keeping around $2 billion of its debt at the parent level. With the spinoff of LoyaltyOne now complete there are no longer any revenue-generating assets held at the parent level, and Bread will need to reconsolidate itself as a single entity or have its subsidiary banks make regular distributions up to the parent company to support its debt. The banks themselves are well capitalized with $3.3 billion in equity and a combined common equity Tier 1 ratio of 20.1% as of the end of June 2022. However, the banks are guarantors of the parent company’s debt, and the company will likely have to rely on further distributions from the banks. The degree of leverage also restricts Bread’s flexibility to invest in its businesses and respond to competitive threats. One of the key reasons that Bread sold its Epsilon business was that the firm did not believe it had the ability to make the kind of investments necessary to support the enterprise. There is precious little room for the company to maneuver, and its debt costs have already risen. In late 2020, the company issued 7% unrated debt to do a partial paydown of its credit line, which at the time was costing the company roughly 1.9%. The debt paydown that was a part of the LoyaltyOne spinoff, and in the future, one would like to see the company continue to manage its debt levels, particularly as economic fears intensify.

Bulls Say

  • Bread Financial’s restructuring efforts have been highly successful at reducing the company’s costs. This has allowed it to adjust effectively for its smaller size and retain profitability. 
  • Many of Bread Financial’s partners rely on it for data collection and loyalty programs. Switching costs protect these partnerships from competitive threats. 
  • The company’s credit card business is well capitalized, which will help protect the firm if credit results deteriorate.

Company Description

Formed by a combination of J.C. Penney’s credit card processing unit and The Limited’s credit card bank business, Bread Financial is a provider of private label and co-branded credit cards, loyalty programs, and marketing services. The company’s most financially significant unit is its credit card business that partners with retailers to jointly market Bread’s credit cards to their customers. The company also retains minority interest in its recently spun off LoyaltyOne division, which operates the largest airline miles loyalty program in Canada and offers marketing services to grocery chains in Europe and Asia.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Small Cap

United Malt Should Benefit from Improving Barley Crops and Normalizing Beer Demand

Business Strategy & Outlook:   

United Malt is the fourth-largest global malt producer, with operations in four countries and a diverse range of customers. The business has capacity to process about 1.25 million tons of malt annually, or roughly 5% of the global 23 million tons produced. This capacity primarily serves the U.S. and Canada beer market, with additional facilities in Australia (serving domestic brewing and exports to Asia) and the U.K. (selling to Scotch whisky distillers). The primary use for malt is for brewing beer–more than 90% of demand–and softening beer consumption in the developed world has offset rising intake in emerging markets. However, malt demand has risen at a faster clip over the past several years given the contribution from rising craft beer demand. Craft beers use a greater amount of malt given heavier taste profiles and, in the U.S., the use of adjunct grains such as rice and corn in mainstream light beer recipes. This demand is expected to grow further, albeit at a slower pace given the already high number of craft brewers globally. 

The primary raw material cost for malting companies is barley. While any given year’s cost for malting barley will depend heavily on weather conditions in key global growing areas, the expected average cost of barley will track broader inflation, as supply and demand roughly equal in a typical growing year. The malting industry is relatively concentrated. Commercial maltsters–those independent from brewer ownership–control the vast majority of total industry malting capacity, with the top four controlling nearly half of this portion. Brewers make up the bulk of the remaining one quarter of malting capacity, but have also remained rational. Barring a sizable strategic shift, which appears unlikely, brewers are not forecasted to offer substantial competition to the commercial malt industry. United Malt is one of the major commercial maltsters in each of the four countries in which it operates. It ensures a reliable supply of barley, good relationships with key customers, and the ability to pass through costs in periods of higher barley prices.

Financial Strengths:  

United Malt is in good financial health. The capital structure is straightforward, and interest coverage is sound. Cash conversion (the ratio of net operating cash flows less capital expenditure, interest and tax to EBITDA) has averaged close to 90% over the two years to fiscal 2020, reflecting its stable earnings profile in a mature industry. United Malt’s capital requirements are lower than other GrainCorp divisions, and the targeted dividend payout ratio is manageable, supported by its cash flows. United Malt’s capital structure is customary for an agribusiness of its nature. It is funded by debt and equity, with debt mostly associated with the funding of inventory and plant, property and equipment. Cash flow and working capital requirements can be volatile due to swings in crop prices, hence a working capital facility is also in place for on-demand debt drawdowns. Debt facilities total above AUD 700 million, and are renewed regularly to align with the business’ seasonal requirements. As at Sept. 30, 2021, the company had AUD 312 million in net debt, representing a 2.1 multiple to EBITDA. United Malt aims to maintain a net debt/EBITDA ratio of 2.0 to 2.5 times–unchanged since its original acquisition by GrainCorp in 2009–but the business’ seasonality and associated working capital requirements mean this target may occasionally be exceeded. United Malt has good coverage over its debt. The forecasted net interest cover (EBIT/net interest expense) to improve to about 9 by fiscal 2024 from the COVID-19-affected 3 in fiscal 2022. 

Bulls Say: 

  • Underlying earnings are stable, supported by long- term client contracts and its ability to pass through costs during periods of high barley prices.
  • United Malt benefits from rising craft beer production globally, which requires greater malt volumes and attracts higher prices.
  • Opportunities exist for further penetration into relatively underdeveloped beer markets, such as Asia and Latin America.

Company Description: 

United Malt processes grains into malt, primarily for brewing into beer. The company is the fourth largest global malt processor and works with some of the world’s largest breweries and distillers as well as fast growing craft producers. The business has capacity to process about 1.25 million metric tons of malt annually, primarily housed in the U.S. and Canada, serving the North American beer market, with additional facilities in Australia (serving both domestic brewing and exports to Asia) and the U.K. (selling to Scotch whisky distillers).

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Small Cap

Bread Financial Faces Challenges as It Looks to Resume Growth After Spinning Off Assets

Business Strategy & Outlook

After the sale of Epsilon in 2019 and spinoff of Loyalty One in 2021, Bread Financial is now solely a consumer credit company, with its private label credit cards and buy now pay later businesses being its only two product lines. However, Bread’s retail credit card business is under pressure. The company has historically targeted midsize retailers for its partnerships. This strategy has led to a partnership base that is weighted toward mall-based retailers, which are in decline due to increased online shopping. Many of Bread’s retail partners have already filed for bankruptcy, including the Ascena Retail Group in July 2020 and Forever 21 in 2019. Bread has also suffered defections, losing Wayfair and Meijer to Citi in 2020 and BJ’s Wholesale Club to Capital One at the start of 2022. The retail partner loss is an ongoing threat to Bread as the firm does not have a competitive advantage that would give it an edge in retaining partnerships during contract renewal negotiations. 

Bread must also now contend with rising competitive threats from buy now pay later firms, which are targeting the U.S. retail market and seek to sign agreements with Bread’s partners. These firms are still a relatively small part of U.S. retail, but Bread takes the threat seriously. The company’s acquisition of the original Bread, a buy now pays later company, as well its decision to adopt its name as its own was done with the intent of accelerating the deployment of its own competing offering. As part of the spinoff of LoyaltyOne, Bread used the proceeds from the transaction to reduce its considerable debt load. This strategy favorably as Bread is heavily leveraged, especially when considering the low credit quality of its receivable portfolio, which has historically seen net charge-offs well above industry averages. More needs to be done to put Bread in a good financial position, but the spinoff and the related debt reduction are a material improvement to Bread’s balance sheet. However, this does place Bread in an awkward position should credit conditions deteriorate industry wide, as the bank is among the most credit sensitive firms covered.

Financial Strengths

When viewed as a single consolidated company, Bread Financial is a heavily leveraged firm. Bread finished 2021 with a tangible asset to tangible equity ratio of 15.1. The company accomplished this leverage by holding its banks as subsidiaries and keeping around $2 billion of its debt at the parent level. With the spinoff of LoyaltyOne now complete there are no longer any revenue-generating assets held at the parent level, and Bread will need to reconsolidate itself as a single entity or have its subsidiary banks make regular distributions up to the parent company to support its debt. The banks themselves are well capitalized with $3.2 billion in equity and a combined common equity Tier 1 ratio of 20%. However, the banks are guarantors of the parent company’s debt, and the company will likely have to rely on further distributions from the banks. This is problematic as additional distributions will force the banks to continue to rely on broker CDs and securitizations to finance its credit card receivables, pushing up its cost of funding and making the company more reliant on capital market availability. The degree of leverage also restricts Bread’s flexibility to invest in its businesses and respond to competitive threats. One of the key reasons that Bread sold its Epsilon business was that the firm did not believe it had the ability to make the kind of investments necessary to support the enterprise. There is precious little room for the company to maneuver and its debt costs have already risen. In late 2020, the company issued 7% unrated debt to do a partial paydown of its credit line, which at the time was costing the company roughly 1.9%. The debt paydown that was a part of the LoyaltyOne spinoff, and in the future, the company continues to manage its debt levels, particularly as economic fears intensify.

Bulls Say

  • Bread Financials’ restructuring efforts have been highly successful at reducing the company’s costs. This has allowed it to adjust effectively for its smaller size and retain profitability. 
  • Many of Bread Financials’ partners rely on it for data collection and loyalty programs. Switching costs protect these partnerships from competitive threats. 
  • The company’s credit card business is well capitalized, which will help protect the firm if credit results deteriorate.

Company Description

Formed by a combination of J.C. Penney’s credit card processing unit and The Limited’s credit card bank business, Bread Financial is a provider of private label and co-branded credit cards, loyalty programs, and marketing services. The company’s most financially significant unit is its credit card business that partners with retailers to jointly market Bread’s credit cards to their customers. The company also retains minority interest in its recently spun off LoyaltyOne division, which operates the largest airline miles loyalty program in Canada and offers marketing services to grocery chains in Europe and Asia.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Small Cap

Bega has transformed from a dairy processor with a focus on B2B operations to a branded consumer food company with a more diversified earnings base

Business Strategy and Outlook 

Despite Bega Cheese’s strategic shift toward a more diverse product offering, dairy products continue to represent the majority of Bega’s sales over the next decade, exposing the firm to commodity pricing and volatile input costs. Bega has not carved an economic moat required to consistently generate economic profits, and the firm’s powerful customers to limit margin growth potential. Bega has transformed from a dairy processor with a focus on business-to-business operations to a branded consumer food company with a more diversified earnings base and less exposure to volatile milk prices. While dairy will remain a key category for Bega Cheese, the focus will be on high value products such as cream cheese and infant formula. In January 2021, Bega finalised the acquisition of Lion Dairy and Drinks from Kirin Group for AUD 534 million. As part of the acquisition, Bega acquired leading brands in milk-based beverages and yoghurt, white milk, and plant-based beverages, in addition to 13 manufacturing sites and Australia’s largest national cold chain distribution network.

Revenue is expected from the branded segment, which includes spreads, grocery products and Lion’s Dairy and Drinks portfolio, to expand at a CAGR of 15% to fiscal 2026, underpinned by new product innovation and bolt-on acquisitions. There are virtually no switching costs in the consumer foods category and the rising adoption of online shopping has made it easier for smaller, niche brands to take share as physical shelf space becomes less relevant. This reinforces the need for Bega to invest in its brands to maintain share. Historically, Bega Cheese has made limited investment in its brands, particularly in Australia where Fonterra is the licensee of the Bega brand, however since acquiring the spreads and grocery business in 2018, marketing spend as proportion of revenue has increased to 3% from 1% and it will remain in the higher level.

Financial Strength

Bega’s balance sheet is sound. Leverage, measured as net debt/EBITDA improved to 2.3 at June 30, 2021, from 2.4 at the prior period and comfortably below covenants. This is a pleasing position post the major acquisition of Lion Dairy and Drinks in fiscal 2021 which was funded through AUD 267 million of new and extended debt facilities and AUD 401 million equity raising. Further deleveraging in coming years as acquisition synergies are achieved, earnings improve and non core assets are divested, with net debt/EBITDA falling below 2.0 by 2024. Bega will continue to explore potential bolt-on acquisitions and partake in industry rationalisation. While the timing and scale of further acquisitions is uncertain, Bega has the capacity to pursue smaller acquisitions while maintaining a dividend payout ratio of 50% normalised EPS. Maintaining a relatively conservative balance sheet is prudent to weather potentially volatile earnings and afford capacity for future acquisitions should opportunities arise.

Bulls Say’s

  • Bega Cheese’s strategic shift away from dairy products lowers its exposure to volatile milk prices and diversifies the firm’s earnings. 
  • Bega has scope to improve margins through participating in industry consolidation, maximising plant utilisation and rationalising operations after several acquisitions in recent years. 
  • Bega is shifting investment to the spreads business, which is less commoditised and higher margin than dairy, with strong niche positions in Vegemite and peanut butter.

Company Profile 

Bega Cheese is an Australian based dairy processor and food manufacturer of well-known brands including Bega Cheese and Vegemite. Bega Cheese operates two segments: the branded segment which produces consumer packaged goods primarily sold through the supermarket and foodservice channels and the bulk segment which produces commodity dairy ingredients primarily sold through the business-to-business channel.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice. The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities. Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document. The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Zip Shares Still Cheap After Walking Away from Sezzle, But Its Fundamentals Are Getting Murkier

Business Strategy & Outlook:
Zip’s focus is on maximizing its addressable market. Its business is more diversified than single-product buy now, pay later, or BNPL, players, with varieties in financing options, transaction limits, and repayment schedules. Customers enjoy simple sign-up and checkouts, high acceptance by retailers and flexible financing solutions to help better manage their cash flows. Merchant partners may benefit from increased conversion rates, basket sizes, and transaction frequencies. Zip has a revolving credit business in Australia. ZipPay finances up to AUD 1,000, and ZipMoney AUD 1,000 and above. It also boasts a broader merchant base including retail, home, electronics, health, auto, and travel. Around 70% of revenue is derived from customers, mainly from account fees and interest. Meanwhile, Zip Business provides unsecured loans of up to AUD 500,000 to small and midsize enterprises.

Zip adopts an installment financing model overseas, helping it scale up faster and keep up with competition in the underpenetrated global BNPL landscape. The acquisition of U.S. based Quad Pay materially boosts its growth prospects. It also operates in the U.K., Canada, Europe, Mexico, and the Middle East. Zip enhances customer stickiness via ongoing product add-ons. It has a Pay Anywhere function that lets users transact at a wide variety of avenues without being confined to merchant partners. Users also benefit from promotional offers, cash-back deals, or free credits. Newer features include crypto trading, credit reporting, and savings accounts. For merchant partners, Zip invests in co-marketing to help them acquire new customers. Zip has strong earnings prospects, but its margins will be increasingly under pressure and it will not achieve the same penetration and transaction frequency overseas as it had domestically. While it benefits from the growth of e-commerce and increasing preference for more convenient/cheaper forms of financing, anticipated heightened competition to its products. The capital-intensive domestic business cannot scale up as quickly, its fee structure potentially creates friction for customers, and its product offering in the U.S lacks clear differentiation.

Financial Strengths:
While credit stress is creeping up, Zip remains overall in reasonable financial health. As of March 2022, the net bad debt ratio for its core ANZ business sits at 3.40% of receivables, while arrears are at 2.29%. But as a reprieve, Zip’s current financial position would be bolstered by: 1) its March equity raise; and 2) avoiding absorbing Sezzle’s net losses. Its debt/capital ratio is 56%, while the ratio of equity/receivables has improved to 52% in fiscal 2021 from 8.1% in fiscal 2017. Zip’s bad debts should stay manageable in a major credit event. Unlike some peers, Zip conducts a greater degree of background check before onboarding customers, such as collecting bank statements and pulling in information from a credit bureau. Soft credit checks are similarly performed when onboarding new customers overseas. This helps compensate for the fact that its receivables are higher-risk due to them having longer repayment periods and higher transaction value (notably for Zip Money) or it having a Pay Anywhere model. Its installment businesses have shorter turnover periods and lower transaction values, meaning it can know much earlier (relative to credit cards) if customers have trouble making payments and can therefore amend its risk controls accordingly. Most its Australian receivables are funded by its asset-based securitization program, with undrawn facilities totaling AUD 401.9 million as of March 2022. It also has USD 168.1 million and AUD 119.5 million of undrawn facilities to fund U.S and Zip Business’ receivables, respectively.

Bulls Say:
Zip is well placed to continue growing its transaction volume, given its variety in financing options and retailer base, as well as its Pay Anywhere model which provides a greater avenue to spend using its products.
Zip benefits from an accelerated shift to e-commerce, increased adoption of cashless payments, and a growing need among merchants for effective marketing amid a challenging retail backdrop.
Zip faces lower regulatory risks than its BNPL rivals, as it already conducts a greater degree of background checks and ZipMoney is already regulated by the National Credit Act.

Company Description:
Zip is a diversified finance provider, offering consumer financing via a line of credit (via ZipPay and ZipMoney) and installment-based finance (via Quad Pay, Spotii, Twisto, and PayFlex); as well as lending to small to midsize enterprises (via Zip Business). Zip’s fortunes are largely tied to the buy now, pay later, or BNPL, industry. Most of its products–ZipPay, Quad Pay (Zip U.S.), and PayFlex–do not charge interest based on outstanding balances. Around 60%-70% of Zip Pay’s/Zip Money’s revenue is derived from customers, mainly via account fees and interest. Meanwhile, its installment businesses primarily generate revenue by receiving a margin from merchants, which compensates it for accepting all nonpayment risk and for encouraging consumers to transact more frequently.

(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
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Sonic will have scale relative to a small dealer and can get better terms from vendors for supplies

Business Strategy & Outlook

Sonic Automotive is undergoing many changes. Rollout of its omnichannel Digital One Stop process and the CarCash app allows consumers to shop digitally or in-store and helps Sonic procure more used-vehicle inventory. Management has also worked to make the car-buying process nearly paperless, place the customer with only one person for the entire transaction, and enable the customer to take delivery of a vehicle in an hour or less after deciding which one to buy. In October 2013, Sonic announced its intention to compete with CarMax in used vehicles with EchoPark used-vehicle stores. 

The U.S. used-vehicle market is highly fragmented at about 40 million units a year, with late-model used vehicles as old as six years often making up at least 15 million units, so there is certainly room for both firms to pursue their strategies. Openings started in late 2014 in the Denver area and as of March 2022, the EchoPark segment has 47 stores with plans to add 25 a year between 2021 and 2025. It will take time for EchoPark to reach the scale to compete with CarMax’s over 220 stores. The stores will not have a big-box retail format and are not capital-intensive due to most eventually being delivery and buy centers that only cost $1 million-$2 million each. These centers will be served by larger hub stores in a region that each cost between $7 million and $25 million. EchoPark will not do home delivery. Sonic does not plan a captive finance arm like CarMax enjoys. In July 2020, management announced a $14 billion 2025 revenue target for EchoPark, up from $2.3 billion in 2021, with 140 nationwide points. This is not impossible because EchoPark intentionally undercuts competitors on price, then recovers a small loss on the vehicle by arranging loans with third-party lenders and selling extended warranties, targeting over $2,000 gross profit per unit. In 2021, Sonic said it is reviewing alternatives for EchoPark. Sonic will have scale relative to a small dealer and can get better terms from vendors for supplies, computer systems, and health insurance compared with a small dealer. It also captures lucrative service workover repair shops through its warranty business.

Financial Strengths

Sonic’s largest debt maturity at year-end 2021 through 2026 is $118.2 million in 2024, mostly from about $90 million of mortgage line borrowing coming due in November. The credit facility matures in April 2025 and is undrawn at the end of 2021 with $281.4 million available for borrowing. Total liquidity at the end of 2021 is $702.8 million including $299.4 million of cash. Management has told us that the used floorplan line is like a revolver. Net Debt/adjusted EBITDA was about 1.80 times at year-end 2021. Leverage in 2019 declined from about the 3.7 times level thanks to the early redemption of the firm’s $289.3 million 5% notes due in May 2023. Sonic also has $346.2 million of mortgage notes with 62% of the balance at fixed rates ranging between 2.05% to 7% and maturities at various dates through 2033. The company owns about half its real estate, but has not disclosed how much unencumbered real estate it has. In October 2021, Sonic issued $1.15 billion of 2029 ($650 million at 4.625%) and 2031 notes ($500 million at 4.875%) to help fund the $950 million purchase of RFJ Auto Partners in December 2021, but no one is concerned about balance sheet health. The firm’s debt profile is not going to be a challenge for management to maintain.

Bulls Say

  • Auto dealerships are well-diversified businesses that have lucrative parts and servicing operations, which help them be profitable in almost any environment. 
  • EchoPark could prove to be a very lucrative business this decade if it can scale up. 
  • Sonic has the potential to generate significant economies of scale as vehicle demand rebounds and if EchoPark grows.

Company Description

Sonic Automotive is one of the largest auto dealership groups in the United States. The company has 110 franchised stores in 17 states, primarily in metropolitan areas in California, Texas, and the Southeast, plus 47 EchoPark and Northwest Motorsport brand used-vehicle stores. In addition to new and used-vehicle sales, the company derives revenue from parts and collision repair, finance, insurance, and wholesale auctions. Luxury and import dealerships make up about 88% of new-vehicle revenue, while Honda, BMW, Mercedes, and Toyota constitute about 60% of new-vehicle revenue. BMW is the largest brand at over 26%. 2021’s revenue was $12.4 billion, with EchoPark’s portion totaling $2.3 billion. Sonic bought RFJ Auto in December 2021, which added $3.2 billion in sales.

(Source: Morningstar)

DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).

This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.

The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require.  The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.

The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.

Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.

Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents.  Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material.  Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.

The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.