Category: Shares

Business Strategy & Outlook: 

Credit Suisse’s true underlying profitability has been masked for the better part of a decade by multiple restructuring charges and the cost of running down a legacy book of unprofitable assets. The new management team at the helm of Credit Suisse hoped that it addressed all issues during 2020, but new problematic exposures continue to crop up. This suggests a deeper risk management malaise at Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse has some very good, profitable, and generally asset-light business with good long-term secular growth prospects–especially in wealth management/private banking and the Swiss universal bank. The discount that the market has imposed on the rating of Credit Suisse relative to UBS and its other peers should, however, remain in place until Credit Suisse can convince investors that it has addressed its risk management deficiencies. 

Credit Suisse will have to report several quarters of results free from the large non-recurring items that have historically marred its results. There is a strong long-term secular trend that sees the wealth of high-net-worth individuals and families growing ahead of global nominal GDP. The ultra-high net worth and family office segment, where Credit Suisse has focused most of its attention, is a particularly attractive segment. The threat of digital disintermediation is reduced and the need for bespoke solutions and strong relationship between banker and client remains. The current negative interest rate environment obscures the benefits of Credit Suisse’s very strong deposit franchise that provides it with ample surplus liquidity. Currently, this is damaging to Credit Suisse’s net interest income–it needs to invest its excess liquidity in short-term risk-free assets that currently pays no or negative interest. Credit Suisse has, however, starting passing on these costs to selected clients.

Financial Strengths:

Credit Suisse has a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.4% currently, ahead of its own internal capital target of a 14% common equity Tier 1 ratio. This is comfortably ahead of its regulatory minimum capital requirement of 10%. However, Credit Suisse’s leveraged ratio of 4.2% is more of a constraint, with a regulatory minimum requirement of 3.5% and an internal target of 4.5%. Credit Suisse intends to pay out 25% of its earnings as a dividend and it has not announced new share buybacks.

Both Credit Suisse’s liquidity coverage ratio and its net stable funding ratio are comfortably above 100%, which indicates sound liquidity. These ratios, while helpful, do not fully capture the quality of a bank’s funding. One should also consider the structure of a bank’s funding–where the relatively lower importance of wholesale deposits in Credit Suisse’s funding mix is a clear positive. However, private banking/wealth management clients will typically be more sophisticated than the average retail banking client and therefore more likely to withdraw funds in times of stress. The private banking deposits are as sticky as general retail deposits, although they remains stickier than wholesale funding.

Bulls Say:

• Credit Suisse looks set to emulate UBS and transform its business model into a wealth manager with a complementary investment bank, which would increase profitability and reduce earnings volatility.
• Credit Suisse has run down a massive book of EUR 126 billion to EUR 45 billion over the past four years, incurring pretax losses of EUR 16 billion in the process. This has obscured the performance and profitability of the core business.
• Credit Suisse generates the bulk of its earnings in stable and low-risk private banking/wealth management and Swiss commercial banking.

Company Description:

Credit Suisse runs a global wealth management business, a global investment bank and is one of the two dominant Swiss retail and commercial banks. Geographically its business is tilted toward Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

(Source: Morningstar)

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Business Strategy & Outlook:

Carnival remains the largest company in the cruise industry, with nine global brands and 91 ships at 2021 fiscal year-end. The global cruise market has historically been underpenetrated, offering cruise companies a long-term demand opportunity. Additionally, in recent years, the repositioning and deployment of ships to faster-growing and under-represented regions like Asia-Pacific had helped balance the supply in high-capacity regions like the Caribbean and Mediterranean, aiding pricing. However, global travel has waned as a result of COVID-19, which has the potential to spark longer-term secular shifts in consumer behavior, challenging the economic performance of Carnival over an extended horizon. As consumers have slowly resumed cruising since the summer of 2021 (after a year-plus no-sail halt), the cruise operators will have to continue to reassure passengers of both the safety and value propositions of cruising. 

On the yield side, the Carnival is expected to see some pricing pressure as future cruise credits continue to be redeemed through 2022, a headwind partially mitigated by the return of capacity via full deployment of the fleet. And on the cost side, higher spend to maintain tighter cleanliness and health protocols should keep expenses inflated. Aggravating profits will be staggered reintroduction of the fleet through the first half of 2022, crimping near-term profitability and ceding previously obtained scale benefits. As of March 22, 2022, 75% of capacity was already deployed and the entire fleet should be sailing by the important summer season. These persistent concerns, in turn, should lead to average returns on invested capital including goodwill, that are set to languish below our 10.4% weighted average cost of capital estimate until 2026, which supports our no-moat rating. While Carnival has carved out a broad offering across demographics, the product still has to compete with other land-based vacations and discretionary spending for share of wallet. It could be harder to capture the same percentage of spending over the near term given the perceived risk of cruising, heightened by persistent media attention.

Financial Strengths:

Carnival has secured adequate liquidity to survive a slow resumption of domestic cruising, with around $7 billion in cash and investments at the end of February 2022. This should cover the company’s cash burn rate through the end of the redeployment ramp-up, which had run around $500 million or more in recent months due to higher ship startup costs. The company has raised significant levels of debt since the onset of the pandemic with $35 billion in total debt, up from around $12 billion at the end of 2019. The company has less than $3 billion in short term and $2 billion in long-term debt coming due over the next year (as of Feb. 28, 2022).

The company is focused on reducing debt service as soon as reasonably possible in order to reduce future interest expense. It has also actively pursued the extension of maturities, limiting the cash demand on debt service over the near term.  Carnival has just over one year’s worth of liquidity to operate successfully in a no-revenue environment. There is no anticipation on an imminent credit crunch in the near term, even with no associated revenue (which the company has successfully resumed capturing), as long as capital markets continue to function properly. Additionally, in order to free up cash to support operating expenses, Carnival eliminated its dividend in 2020 ($1.4 billion in 2019). Another $3 billion in current customer deposits were on the balance sheet, offering working capital that can be utilized to run the business and indicating demand for cruising still exists. And capital markets remain open to financing, with the company announcing a $500 million at-the-market equity raise at the end of January 2022, indicating access to cash is still plentiful.

Bulls Say:

• As Carnival deploys its fleet, passenger counts and yields could rise at a faster pace than we currently anticipate as capacity limitations are repealed.
• A more efficient fleet composition (after pruning 19 ships at the onset of the pandemic) may benefit the cost structure to a greater degree than initially expected, as sailings fully resume.
• The nascent Asia-Pacific market should remain promising post-COVID-19, as the four largest operators had capacity for nearly 4 million passengers in 2020, which provides an opportunity for long-term growth with a new consumer.

Company Description:

Carnival is the largest global cruise company, with 91 ships in its fleet at the end of fiscal 2021, with all of its capacity set to be redeployed by summer 2022. Its portfolio of brands includes Carnival Cruise Lines, Holland America, Princess Cruises, and Seabourn in North America; P&O Cruises and Cunard Line in the United Kingdom; Aida in Germany; Costa Cruises in Southern Europe; and P&O Cruises in Australia. Carnival also owns Holland America Princess Alaska Tours in Alaska and the Canadian Yukon. Carnival’s brands attracted about 13 million guests in 2019, prior to COVID-19.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy & Outlook:

Nordstrom continues to be a top operator in the competitive U.S. apparel market. The firm has, cultivated a loyal customer base on its reputation for differentiated products and service and has built a narrow moat based on an intangible brand asset. While the company was unprofitable in 2020 because of the COVID-19 crisis, its profitability returned in 2021, and its brand intangible asset is intact. Despite a rocky couple of years, the Nordstrom’s full-price and Rack off-price stores have competitive advantages over other apparel retailers.

Nordstrom is responding well to changes in its market. The company has about 100 full-price stores, with nearly all of them in desirable Class A malls (sales per square foot above $500) or major urban centers. This is viewed as an advantage, as some lower-tier malls are unlikely to survive. Moreover, Nordstrom has a presence in discount retail with Rack (about 250 stores) and significant e-commerce (42% of its sales in 2021). Still, the firm’s full-price business is vulnerable to weakening physical retail, and Rack competes with firms like no-moat Poshmark and narrow-moats TJX and Ross.

Nordstrom unveiled a new strategic plan, Closer to You, in early 2021 that emphasizes e-commerce, growth in key cities (through Local and other initiatives), and a broader off-price offering. Among

the merchandising changes, Nordstrom intends to increase its private-label sales (to 20% of sales from 10% now) and greatly expand the number of items offered through partnerships (to 30% from 5% now). The firm set medium-term targets of annual revenue of $16 billion-$18 billion, operating margins above 6%, annual operating cash flow of more than $1 billion, and returns on invested capital in the low teens. Nordstrom will consistently generate more than $1 billion in operating cash flow, achieve ROICs in the teens, and reach $16 billion in annual revenue in 2024. However, they will trend higher, the operating margins will be slightly below 6% in the long run due to intense competition, but this could change if some of the new initiatives are more successful than expected.

Financial Strengths:

The Nordstrom is in good financial shape and will overcome the virus-related downturn in its business. The firm closed 2021 with more than $300 million in cash and $800 million available on its revolving credit facility. Although it also had $2.9 billion in long-term debt, most of this debt does not mature until after 2025. Nordstrom had net debt/EBITDA of a reasonable 2.5 times at the end of 2021. Nordstrom generated $200 million in free cash flow to equity in 2021, but this amount to rise through reductions in operating expenses, working capital management, and moderate capital expenditures. As per forecast an annual average of about $840 million in free cash flow to equity over the next decade. As Nordstrom’s results have improved, it has resumed cash returns to shareholders. In 2021, about $250 million in share repurchases and dividends totaling $0.76/share (23% payout ratio). Also, to conserve cash, Nordstrom has suspended its dividends and share repurchases (used more than $400 million combined in cash in 2019), but to anticipate both will resume in 2022. Over the next decade, the buybacks of about $340 million per year and an average dividend payout ratio of about 23%. Nordstrom’s capital expenditures were quite elevated prior to 2020. Its store count has increased from 292 at the end of 2014 to about 360 today as more than 60 Rack stores have opened

since 2014 and the company has expanded into Canada and New York City. Nordstrom has estimated its total investment in Canada and New York at $1.1 billion for 2014-19. The estimated Nordstrom’s yearly capital expenditures will average about $650 million over the next decade, well below 2019’s $935 million. 

Bulls Say:

• ONordstrom’s online sales exceeded $6 billion in 2021, making it one of the largest e-commerce firms in the U.S.

• ONordstrom suspended dividends and share repurchases   when the pandemic hit but has resumed cash returns to shareholders. The projected annual combined dividends and share purchase above $400 million over the next five years.

• ONordstrom serves an affluent customer base in its full line stores, which separates it from the many midlevel retailers in malls. Most of its stores are in productive malls that are not expected to close.

Company Description:

Nordstrom is a fashion retailer that operates approximately 100 department stores in the U.S. and Canada and approximately 250 off-price Nordstrom Rack stores. The company also operates both full- and off-price e-commerce sites. Nordstrom’s largest merchandise categories are women’s apparel (28% of 2021 sales), shoes (25% of 2021 sales), men’s apparel (14% of 2021 sales) and women’s accessories (14% of 2021 sales). Nordstrom, which traces its history to a shoe store opened in Seattle in 1901, continues to be partially owned and managed by members of the Nordstrom family.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

Overnight delivery pioneer FedEx is one of three large national carriers that dominate the for-hire small-parcel delivery landscape–FedEx and UPS are the major U.S. incumbents, while DHL Express leads Europe. Rival UPS has been around much longer in the U.S. ground market, forging a density advantage and higher margins, but FedEx has gradually enhanced its ground positioning over the past decade, with help from its speed advantage over UPS and capacity investment.

Leading up to the pandemic, ground margins were grappling with heavy network investment, the gradual mix shift to lower-margin B2C deliveries, lost Amazon revenue, and a pullback in B2B shipments. That said, the pandemic driven e-commerce shift and related surge in residential package delivery demand, coupled with a massive uptick in parcel carriers’ pricing power drove a resurgence in FedEx’ profitability. Recovering B2B activity has also played a material role. Material labor constraints emerged in recent quarters, setting margins back . Therefore, Morningstar analysts assuming management will be able to mitigate some of these headwinds with increased productivity, and ground margins should see some recovery in the quarters ahead.

In general, FedEx’ extensive international shipping network is extraordinarily difficult to duplicate and domestic/international e-commerce tailwinds should remain favorable for years to come (outside a major recession). Despite Amazon insourcing more of its own U.S. last-mile package deliveries, FedEx continues to bolster its ground and express capabilities and is well positioned to serve the myriad other retail shippers pursuing e-commerce, not to mention its entrenched relationships in B2B delivery. The TNT integration has made headway, and expects efforts to bear more fruit in Europe as FedEx finalizes the integration by May 2022.

Financial Strength

Total debt approached $21 billion as of fiscal year-end 2021 (ended May), down slightly from $22 billion in fiscal 2020. Since May 2017, FedEx has borrowed around $7 billion (net) to finance aircraft purchases, sorting facility expansion and automation, pension funding, dividends, and periodic share repurchases. This partly reflects $3 billion of unsecured debt issued in April 2020 to increase financial flexibility as the pandemic hit, and to pay off part of its commercial paper program. FedEx ended fiscal 2021 with $7 billion in cash and equivalents, up from $5 billion. Total debt/adjusted EBITDA came in near 2 times in fiscal 2021, which represents improvement from 3.3 times in fiscal 2020, as the operating backdrop improved significantly. We expect that metric to hold relatively steady in fiscal 2022. Adjusted EBITDA excludes mark-to-market pension charges and nonrecurring costs.

Bull Says

• Outside a prolonged recession, FedEx’s U.S. ground package delivery operations should continue to enjoy robust growth tailwinds rooted in favorable ecommerce trends.
• FedEx’s massive package sortation footprint, immense air and delivery fleet, and global operations knit together a presence that’s extraordinarily difficult to replicate.
• During its nearly five-decade history, FedEx has weathered multiple economic cycles. While short term results may suffer, the firm’s powerful parcel delivery network is firmly established.

Company Profile

FedEx pioneered overnight delivery in 1973 and remains the world’s largest express package provider. In its fiscal 2020 (ended May 2020), FedEx derived 51% of revenue from its express division, 33% from ground, and 10% from freight, its asset-based less-than-truckload shipping segment. The remainder comes from other services, including FedEx Office, which provides document production/shipping, and FedEx Logistics, which provides global forwarding. FedEx acquired Dutch parcel delivery firm TNT Express in 2016. TNT was previously the fourth-largest global parcel delivery provider.

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

 Avery Dennison is the largest supplier of pressure-sensitive adhesive materials and passive radio frequency identifiers in the world. Rising consumer packaged goods penetration in emerging markets should add to label growth, while growth in omnichannel retailing will aid RFID sales at Avery Dennison.

Avery sells pressure-sensitive materials to a highly fragmented customer base that converts specialty film rolls into labels for companies such as Kraft Heinz or Amazon. The concentrated market positions of Avery and competitor UPM Reflactac give each bargaining power over their customers. The labels and graphics materials, or LGM, and industrial and healthcare materials, or IHM, segments account for roughly 74% of company revenue. They convert paper, vinyl, and adhesives into composite films that become shipping labels, automotive graphics, and special-use tapes and films. While demand for these products is stagnant in developed markets, and expect Avery’s large emerging market footprint (around 40% of revenue for these segments) to drive mid-single-digit revenue growth.

 Avery’s Retail Branding and Information Systems segment, or RBIS, makes up 26% of sales and produces a mixture of apparel graphics, product tags, and passive radio frequency identifiers or RFID. While RFID accounts for around 25% of the segment’s revenue, it has grown rapidly in recent years and has increasingly become the focus of Avery’s RBIS segment. RFID products are typically integrated into product tags in industries which have both a diverse inventory and where UPC scanning is cumbersome or labour-intensive, such as apparel. Avery’s recent strategy shift to focus on reducing both costs and prices of the technology in order to gain share demonstrates the commoditized nature of these products. Even so, and think Avery will at least be able to grow with the market, or between 15% and 20% per year. The remainder of segment revenue comes from the application and production of apparel graphics and tags. It is expected expect revenue growth of these end uses to remain mixed, dependent largely on shifting fashion preferences.

Financial Strength

Avery Dennison is in very good financial health. The company ended 2021 with net debt/EBITDA of roughly 2.2, which gives the firm room to manoeuvre with regard to additional acquisitions, opportunistic share buybacks, or to boost its dividend. This remains just below management’s target range of 2.3-2.6, aimed at preserving its BBB credit rating. Avery’s target range of debt remains manageable, and shouldn’t become a material burden even if economic conditions worsen. Thanks to the amount of business Avery derives from consumer staples, cash flows usually remain relatively stable throughout the economic cycle.

Bulls Say’s

• Emerging-market adoption of consumer-packaged goods will provide a long runway for sales growth. 
• As RFID technology becomes widely adopted, Avery’s growth should receive a hefty tailwind. 
• Avery’s dominance in retail branding information systems should lead to widening segment margins

Company Profile 

Avery Dennison manufactures pressure-sensitive materials, merchandise tags, and labels. The company also runs a specialty converting business that produces radio-frequency identification inlays and labels. Avery Dennison draws a significant amount of revenue from outside the United States, with international operations accounting for the majority of total sales.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

Since taking the helm at Mondelez four years ago, CEO Dirk Van de Put has orchestrated a plan to drive balanced sales and profit growth by empowering local leaders, extending the distribution of its fare, and facilitating more agility as it relates to product innovation (aims that are hitting the mark). It wasn’t surprising reigniting the top line was at the forefront of its strategic direction. More specifically, Mondelez targets 3%-plus sales growth long term as it works to sell its wares in more channels and reinvests in new products aligned with consumer trends at home and abroad. Further, it has looked to acquire niche brands to build out its category and geographic exposure, which is seen to be prudent. 

But despite opportunities to bolster sales, it weren’t anticipated the pendulum to shift entirely to top-line gains under Van de Put’s watch; rather, based on his tenure at privately held McCain Foods and past rhetoric, it is alleged driving consistently profitable growth would be the priority. As such, the suggestion showcase that Mondelez is poised to realize additional efficiency gains through fiscal 2022 favorably. While management has refrained from quantifying its cost-saving aims, it is seen an additional $750 million in costs (a low- to mid-single-digit percentage of cost of goods sold and operating expenses, excluding depreciation and amortization) it could remove (on top of the $1.5 billion realized before the pandemic). It is foreseen this can be achieved by extracting further complexity from its operations, including rationalizing its supplier base, parting ways with unprofitable brands, and continuing to upgrade its manufacturing facilities. 

It isn’t likely that, these savings to merely boost profits, though. In this vein, management has stressed a portion of any savings realized would fuel added spending behind its brands in the form of research, development, and marketing, supporting the brand intangible asset underpinning Mondelez’s wide moat. This aligns with analysts forecast for research, development, and marketing to edge up to nearly 7% of sales on average over the next 10 years (or about $2.4 billion annually), above historical levels of 6% ($1.7 billion).

Financial Strength

In assessing Mondelez’s balance sheet strength, it isn’t foreseen any material impediments to its financial flexibility. In this vein, Mondelez maintained $3.5 billion of cash on its balance sheet against $19.5 billion of total debt as of the end of fiscal 2021. Experts forecast free cash flow will average around 15% of sales annually over Experts 10-year explicit forecast (about $5.2 billion on average each year). And it is in view that returning excess cash to shareholders will remain a priority. Analysts forecast Mondelez will increase its shareholder dividend (which currently yields around 2%) in the high-single-digit range on average annually through fiscal 2031 (implying a payout ratio between just north of 40%), while also repurchasing around 2%-3% of shares outstanding annually. It is held Mondelez has proven itself a prudent capital allocator and could also opt to add on brands and businesses that extend its reach in untapped categories and/or geographies from time to time–although it is unlikely believe it has much of an appetite for a transformational deal. It is alleged the opportunity to expand its footprint into untapped markets–such as Indonesia and Germany–or into other adjacent snacking categories (like health and wellness) could be in the cards. Recent deals have included adding Tate’s Bake Shop for $500 million in 2018, Perfect Snacks (in 2019, refrigerated snack bars), Give & Go (2020, an in-store bakery operator),and Chipita (2021, Central and Eastern European croissants and baked goods) to its fold. But at just a low-single-digit percentage of sales, none of these deals are material enough to move the needle on its overall results.

Bulls Say’s

• Mondelez’s decision to empower in-market leaders and fuel investments behind its local jewels (which historically had been starved in favor of its global brands) stands to incite growth in emerging markets for some time. 
• Experts suggest the firm is committed to maintaining a stringent focus on extracting inefficiencies from its business, including the target to shed more than 25% of its noncore stock-keeping units to reduce complexity. 
• Management has suggested it won’t sacrifice profit improvement merely to inflate its near-term sales profile, which is foreseen as a plus.

Company Profile 

Mondelez has operated as an independent organization since its split from the former Kraft Foods North American grocery business in October 2012. The firm is a leading player in the global snack arena with a presence in the biscuit (47% of sales), chocolate (32%), gum/candy (10%), beverage (4%), and cheese and grocery (7%) aisles. Mondelez’s portfolio includes well-known brands like Oreo, Chips Ahoy, Halls, Trident, and Cadbury, among others. The firm derives around one third of revenue from developing markets, nearly 40% from Europe, and the remainder from North America. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

The years since the financial crisis have shown that American International Group would have destroyed substantial value even if it had never written a single credit default swap, had noncore businesses it needed to shed, and had material issues in its core operations that it needed to fix. It is encouraging, however, by the recent progress in terms of improving underwriting margins, and the plan to take out $1 billion in costs by 2022 would be another material step. In 2020, the impact of the coronavirus has obscured the company’s progress, but it is held results over the past year have been encouraging. COVID-19 losses to date have been very manageable. As a percentage of capital, losses have stayed well within the range of historical events that the industry has successfully absorbed in the past. 

The longer-term picture looks relatively bright. The pricing environment has not been particularly favorable in recent years. However, in 2019, pricing momentum picked up in primary lines, and this positive trend only accelerated in 2020. More recently, pricing has started to plateau, but the industry has enjoyed the highest pricing increases it has seen since 2003. While higher pricing is necessary to some extent to offset lower interest rates and a rise in social inflation, pricing increases appear to be more than offsetting these factors. As a result, commercial P&C insurers are experiencing a positive trend in underlying underwriting profitability, and potential for a truly hard pricing market can be seen, similar to the period that followed 9/11. 

It is seen AIG has made material progress in improving its under/over the past couple of years, and has set a target for an underlying combined ratio below 90% by the end of 2022. Assuming an average level of catastrophe losses, it is likely this is a level that would allow P&C operations to achieve an acceptable level of return, and a harder pricing market may make hitting this target easier.

Financial Strength

It is alleged AIG’s balance sheet is sound, although the company is arguably in a somewhat weaker position than peers until it can improve profitability. Equity/assets was 13% at the end of 2021. This level is lower than P&C peers but reasonable if AIG’s life insurance operations, which operate with higher balance sheet leverage, are considered. During 2014, the company reduced its debt load by about $10 billion and eliminated much of its high-coupon debt, which improved its financial flexibility. Barring any unforeseen events, it is anticipated the company has room to continue to return capital to shareholders, and management had been returning a lot of capital to shareholders, in part through divestitures and some restructuring, although in recent years management has curtailed buybacks as AIG pivoted toward growth and acquisitions have become part of the strategic plan

Bulls Say’s

• The aftermath of AIG’s issues during the financial crisis occupied much of management’s attention for quite some time. With these issues resolved, management can focus on the company’s operations, and there could be ample scope for improvement. 
• AIG has demonstrated progress in improving underwriting margins in its P&C business. 
• The current focus on risk-adjusted returns sets a proper course for the company, and just increasing profitability to the level of its peers would represent a material improvement.

Company Profile 

American International Group is one of the largest insurance and financial services firms in the world and has a global footprint. It operates through a wide range of subsidiaries that provide property, casualty, and life insurance. Its revenue is split roughly evenly between commercial and consumer lines. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.