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Global stocks

Seagate’s Mass Capacity Drives Poised to Capture Demand Swell, but Shares Still Rich; FVE up to $70

We expect demand for Seagate’s mass capacity drives for cloud customers and enterprises to more than offset secular declines in consumer hard drives over the next five years, leading to our stable trend rating and revised forecast for 2% compound annual sales growth through fiscal 2025. Nonetheless, we think Seagate’s recent price appreciation (61% since Jan. 1) has been a case of multiple expansion not rooted in fundamentals, and we view shares as overvalued even at our new fair value estimate.

Seagate is a leading designer and manufacturer of hard disk drives used for data storage in consumer and enterprise applications. We think Seagate is successfully transitioning its portfolio to focus on mass capacity drives for cloud providers and enterprises as consumer applications for legacy HDDs switch to faster flash-based solid-state drives, or SSDs. We expect sustained demand for mass capacity drives over the next five years as enterprises look to capture more data and use a multi-tiered storage approach, implementing both mass capacity HDDs and smaller enterprise grade SSDs as complements in data centers. Seagate has consistently driven costs down for its mass capacity HDDs by advancing to larger capacities, and we think it will continue to do so by leveraging new technologies like heat-assisted magnetic recording.

We note that a potential contributor to recent price appreciation has been strong demand for HDDs related to a new cryptocurrency called Chia that uses data storage alongside computing power to generate new coins. While we think this has led to some tighter supply in the HDD market, we think this is short-term in nature, and pales in comparison to the levels of demand for data center HDDs. Crypto demand doesn’t alter our long-term thesis.

We expect mass capacity HDD demand to offset consumer declines and drive revenue growth over the next five years, but don’t think Seagate’s drives allow it to establish an economic moat. We think HDDs are commodity like even at the enterprise level, with Seagate and Western Digital matching each other’s technological roadmaps and competing with one another for volume—preventing both from earning pricing power. In periods of tight supply and favorable pricing, Seagate can earn excess returns on invested capital, but when the market hits oversupply, pricing falls, bringing Seagate’s economic profits with it.

Going forward, we think Seagate will focus on expanding to new capacities for its enterprise drives, while implementing new technologies like heat-assisted magnetic recording that will help it drive costs down and expand margins. Still, we think technological advancements like these will be matched by rivals, and won’t shield Seagate from cyclical market downturns. Longer-term, we expect demand for mass capacity drives to slow as the cost gap with enterprise SSDs narrows further.

We think Seagate will try to create new growth opportunities through its module-like Lyve platform, which layers software onto multiple drives, but don’t think this business is large enough to offset a secular decline in HDD sales.

Nvidia Corp’s Company Profile

Seagate is a leading supplier of hard disk drives for data storage to the enterprise and consumer markets. It forms a practical duopoly in the market with its chief rival, Western Digital, both of whom are vertically integrated.

Source: Morningstar

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Shares

Metcash Is Falling Behind

Convenience and locally tailored product ranges remain a point of differentiation for smaller independent retailers, but consumers are increasingly willing to sacrifice convenience for value.Scale has proved to be an important attribute, enabling the larger retailers to pass on better pricing through purchasing power and the ability to spread the cost of distribution across a wider revenue base. The volumes that Woolworths and Coles flow through their supply chains are considerably larger than those for Metcash.

  • The expansion of discount supermarket Aldi is likely to continue pressuring on profit margins in the Australian supermarket sector.
  • The larger supermarket groups are using their scale advantage to offer lower prices and take market share from independent retailers.
  • The expansion of its hardware business through the acquisition of the Home Timber & Hardware Group further diversified earnings, but the food and grocery business still accounts for the majority of earnings.
  • Metcash’s supermarket sales grew by 14% in the first quarter, still ahead of supermarket giant Coles. However, the temporary advantage of the many stores within Metcash’s network of independent IGAs is likely waning. While restrictions were severe, customers were more inclined to shop at their local grocer to avoid longer travel distances and crowds.
  • Metcash dominates the Australian wholesale distribution of packaged groceries to the independent retailer. From th small corner shop to the local independent supermarket, Metcash acts as a co-operative, funnelling independent sales volume through a single channel to derive buying power to negotiate volume discounts with manufacturers. Metcash is the fourth force in the supermarket and liquor industry, with 11% market share (IGA), with Woolworths and Coles accounting for 65%, and Aldi 9%.
  • The predominant supplier of packaged groceries to independent retailers provides a monopolistic market position to sustain above-average returns on capital.
  • Strategic and cost-cutting initiatives undertaken by Metcash are gaining traction. Also, independent supermarket operators across all states are stepping up investments in new stores, additional floor spare, and refurbishments.
  • Metcash’s acquisitive expansion of its hardware business has diversified the company’s earnings and cash flows away from the robust competition and lower margins experienced in the food and grocery business.
  • Intense competition between Coles, Woolworths, and Aldi is leading to price deflation to capture sales volume. A loss of volume from the independent channel could make it increasingly difficult for Metcash to match grocery pricing from its larger rivals.
  • Metcash’s customers (independent retailers) are effectively competing through differentiation of convenience, product range and service. These points of difference are likely to become marginalised in periods of economic constraint.

 (Source: Morningstar)

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General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Global stocks

Spark New Zealand Ltd

Vodafone New Zealand will have been under private equity ownership for close to three years by the time its fiscal 2022 ends in March 2022. During that time, its EBITDA is likely to have posted a CAGR of 2.3% to NZD 495 million, the midpoint of management’s fiscal 2022 guidance range. The lift has primarily been driven by cost-outs and efficiency gains, with revenue CAGR at just 0.3% but EBITDA margin lifting by 140 basis points to our estimated 24.7% in fiscal 2022. Over the same period (but with a June-end balance date), narrow-moat Spark could post EBITDAI CAGR of 1.7% based on our fiscal 2022 forecast. Margin has been consistent at just above 31%.

The stable competitive environment, with the two major players focused on margin optimisation against a stagnant revenue backdrop, has seen Spark grow its free cash flow to our forecast NZD 452 million in fiscal 2021. This represents a CAGR of 24.5% from fiscal 2019 (before Vodafone fell into private equity ownership), fortifying the NZD 0.25 annual dividend, come rain, hail, or COVID. The key issue for Spark is what Vodafone might do beyond fiscal 2022? Will Vodafone’s private equity owners be content to continue to chip away costs from the circa NZD 500 million EBITDA base (from NZD 463 million in fiscal 2019 before they took over)? Or will they take advantage of the recent heightened capital expenditure intensity to facilitate a step-up in Vodafone’s revenue which has remained static at NZD 2.0 billion since the takeover?

Our current intrinsic assessment for Spark largely assumes the status quo in competitive dynamics. But Vodafone owners’ actions from next year warrant close attention. For the record, Vodafone management is emphasising an intention to keep simplifying and digitising the business. It implies a continuation of the current cost-optimisation strategy, while lifting the utilisation of its network assets, including the 5G network being rolled out (for example, fixed wireless). That private equity 101 strategy has served Vodafone well to-date. In fiscal 2019 before the company fell under private equity ownership, its revenue was NZD 2.0 billion and EBITDA was NZD 463 million, at a margin of 23.3%. By fiscal 2022, we forecast stable revenue at around NZD 2.0 billion but EBITDA at NZD 495 million, equating to 24.7% margin.

Granted, fiscal 2022 may still have some remnant COVID impact, but the point remains that Vodafone’s earnings growth has been mostly cost-driven. Meanwhile, Vodafone’s capital expenditure/revenue averaged under 12% for four years before it was bought by private equity. Since then, its capital expenditure/revenue has steadily increased to over 13%. This is designed not only to address previous under-investment under Vodafone plc ownership, but also as an important prerequisite to realising management’s long-term aspiration to lift Vodafone’s EBITDA margin to Spark’s 30%-plus level. To achieve this, we believe cost-out can only go so far and revenue growth resuscitation must play a role. This is in part why we forecast Spark’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation, and investment income, or EBITDAI, margin to drift slightly towards the 30% level longer-term.

This would be below the 31.2% we project for fiscal 2022—a level Spark management is aspiring to maintain on a sustainable basis. Of course, Spark shareholders would prefer to see the current competitive stability continue. In fiscal 2019 before Vodafone’s ownership change, Spark’s EBITDAI was NZD 1,090 million at a margin of 31.0%, while producing free cash flow of NZD 292 million.

By fiscal 2021, we project Spark’s EBITDAI to have increased to NZD 1,120 million (inclusive of NZD 50 million of COVID-related hit), at a margin of 31.2%, while producing free cash flow of NZD 452 million. However, we suspect even Spark management will not expect this competitive stability to continue indefinitely. This may well be why the group is keen to showcase its non-telco businesses such as its IT and managed services division. It is a unit that accounts for a third of group revenue, 28% of group gross margin and with solid fundamentals to lift its share in an NZD 6.0 billion market that is growing at 4% to 6% per year.

Source:Morningstar

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General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Commodities Trading Ideas & Charts

Origin Energy– Outlook Is Poor

To drive earnings growth, Origin developed the Australia Pacific liquefied natural gas, or APLNG, project, which started exporting LNG from Queensland in 2016. But the project saddled the firm with too much debt and earnings have disappointed because of the low oil price. We forecast a sharp deterioration in earnings and credit metrics in fiscal 2021 on lower oil prices and headwinds in the utility business.

Key Considerations

  • Profits are supported by the relatively defensive utility business, while the oil price is a swing factor.
  • The massive Australia Pacific LNG project should generate strong cash flows in fiscal 2020 but recent falls in oil and spot LNG prices suggest major downside in 2021.
  • Origin’s credit metrics are forecast to deteriorate significantly in 2021 and could require remedial action.
  • Origin’s energy markets division is one of Australia’s largest energy utilities. It has some competitive advantages from being a major player in the concentrated national electricity market, or NEM, and vertical integration. But its generation fleet lacks cost advantages to major peers, and it’s difficult to build a moat in the competitive retail market.

  • Origin is one of the largest energy retailers in Australia, with more than one third of the market. Energy retailing is not a moat business, as the product is commodity-like, while barriers to entry and customer switching costs are low.
  • The Australia Pacific LNG project is the largest coal seam gas to LNG project in Australia and could significantly increase earnings if oil prices strengthen.
  • Origin’s energy retail business is the market leader and should benefit from cost-saving initiatives. OOrigin’s cash flow base is diversified, and the company is less susceptible to the vagaries of the market than a nonintegrated energy provider.
  • The value of APLNG is highly uncertain, given volatility in the oil price and the relatively high operating and financial leverage.
  • Falling wholesale electricity, gas and carbon credit prices have created a headwind for earnings. Retail price caps and competition should force Origin to pass lower wholesale prices through to customers.
  • The oil price slump should hurt earnings and credit metrics in 2021.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks

Nanosonics Rebounds but Outlook Remains Uncertain

While this is a promising rebound, the outlook continues to remain uncertain as the world battles a more severe third wave of coronavirus, particularly in Nanosonics’ key geographies. Our forecast for fiscal 2021 revenue growth of 19% and EPS growth of 25% is unchanged, and we think early performance is tracking in line with our full-year expectations.

Shares continue to screen as overvalued, reflecting the market’s more optimistic view of Nanosonics’ new product in infection prevention, which remains undefined but is expected to begin commercialisation in fiscal 2022.

Despite improvements in hospital access for the company’s sales team, new trophon units installed still declined 9% pcp, with 19% growth in the EMEA segment but a 10% decline in North America. We view the differing growth rates as indicative of the company finding it increasingly difficult to sell additional units in North America where it’s enjoyed most of its success. New capital sales in North America contributed 87% of the total in fiscal 2020 but fell 18% and have fallen 13% on average over the last three years.

Total installed base growth rate to slow to 10% on average over the next three years, followed by lower growth once the device patent expires in 2025 and the more easily addressable markets are heavily penetrated. We maintain our five-year group revenue and EPS CAGR forecasts of 15% and 32%, respectively.

Our five-year revenue growth forecast reflects 17% CAGR in capital sales and 11% CAGR in consumables and service.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks

National Storage REIT – Continues Its Acquisition Strategy

It’s the largest owner-operator of self-storage centres in Australia and New Zealand. This gives it another lever to increase earnings by developing centres in its existing portfolio. Its short lease terms, averaging less than two years over its portfolio, also provide it with levers such as dynamic occupancy and rental price management to generate earnings. Shorter rental agreements and reliance on its acquisition strategy make it more sensitive than the average passive REIT to a downturn in economic activity, and availability of capital.

Key Considerations

  • The highly fragmented self-storage industry in Australia and New Zealand provides scope for National Storage to implement its acquisition strategy.
  • National Storage is the largest owner-operator of selfstorage centres in Australia and New Zealand. Its extensive portfolio provides it with the opportunity to generate earnings growth from occupancy and revenue management and via developing existing centres.
  • Its short lease terms and capital-intensive acquisition and development strategy require it to be able to access capital markets and make it riskier than a more passive REIT.
  • Acquiring and developing self-storage centres in a fragmented self-storage industry in Australia and New Zealand is a key part of National Storage REIT’s strategy. National Storage operates under a REIT structure, with the consolidated group comprising a shareholding in National Storage Holdings Limited and a unit in National Storage of its storage centres are located within a 20-kilometre radius of major city CBDs in Australia and New Zealand, and about 10% of its revenue is also sourced from sale of storage packaging, design, development, and project management fees.
  • Australia’s fragmented self-storage industry and National Storage’s relationships with self-storage vendors and stakeholders such as local councils provide it with significant opportunity to successfully implement its acquisition strategy.
  • Its current extensive portfolio of self-storage properties also enables it to generate earnings growth via its development strategy and its dynamic pricing and occupancy techniques.
  • It has had a strong stable management team with strong industry experience in the specialised selfstorage industry that has generated strong underlying earnings per share and net tangible asset growth per share since listing on the ASX.
  • We believe the barriers to entry in self-storage are low. Increased competition and supply of self-storage will likely affect earnings.
  • NSR’s acquisition and development strategy means it is reliant on access to the equity and debt markets. A tightening of credit markets and fall in equity markets may inhibit its ability to implement its acquisition and development strategy.
  • Its short lease terms mean it is more sensitive than the average passive REIT to macroeconomic conditions such as the availability of finance and slowdowns in economic activity and population growth.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Shares

Netwealth Group -Still Racing Higher and Looking Increasingly Overvalued

However, with low switching costs, we expect strong FUMA growth to be offset by industry fee compression, as platform providers largely compete on price. We expect Netwealth to generate a revenue CAGR of 12% over the next decade, and the relatively fixed-cost nature of the business and associated operating leverage should drive margin expansion and a 13% EBIT CAGR over the decade.

Key Considerations

Netwealth is the largest independent investment administration platform in Australia but still only comprises around 3% of the market.

The wealth management sector is experiencing fee compression as a result of technological innovation, and we expect this trend to continue.

Administration platform fees could potentially compress to close to zero, as they have done in the U.S., where platform managers monetise their intellectual property via transactional revenue.

Netwealth provides investment administration software as a service, or SaaS, in Australia via its proprietary software platform, which includes investment portfolio administration, investment management tools, and investment and managed account services. The company charges for its software based on the value of funds under management on its platform, comprising over 95% of group revenue, in addition to providing Netwealth-branded investment products, which are managed by third-party investment managers.

In contrast to the independent platforms, the large vertically integrated wealth managers have narrow economic moat ratings. With the wealth business contributing less than 10% of earnings for most of these companies, their economic moats don’t necessarily reflect their platform businesses or even their wealth management businesses, as these companies are very large and diversified financial services organisations. However, IOOF, which only owns a vertically integrated wealth management business, has a narrow economic moat based on switching costs and intangible assets.

Netwealth may be affected by the requirement that financial advisors act in their clients’ “best interests” if financial advisors feel obliged to move their clients onto the cheapest administration platform. This could create significant downward fee pressure for platforms.

Netwealth operates in a commoditised industry and is much smaller than many of its competitors. We expect the larger administration platforms to continue improving the functionality of their platforms and compete more

aggressively on price.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks Shares

NIB Holdings Ltd – Grow Earnings Over Time

Approximately 53% of the population is covered by private health insurance because of taxation benefits, shorter wait times, a choice of doctor and hospital, and cover of ancillary health services. NIB demutualised and listed on the Australian Securities Exchange in 2007. It is Australia’s fourth-largest health fund. Attractive long-term industry dynamics are supported by a growing population, government taxation incentives and penalties, and regulated pricing.

  • By spending on customer acquisition NIB can continue to take share, but annual growth in policyholders is expected to be low given affordability issues.
  • NIB can continue to generate attractive returns, using scale benefits and modest switching costs in a highly regulated industry. NIB could also participate in industry consolidation if smaller players become unprofitable.
  • We forecast mid-single digit earnings and dividend growth, with NIB’s 60% to 70% dividend payout ratio lower than peers being a reflection of the firm’s strategy to make small acquisitions to strengthen the private health business and diversify revenue.
  • NIB made two acquisitions to grow its travel insurance offering in recent years, with the rationale to diversify revenue outside of private health insurance, add exposure and scale in an industry expected to experience long-term growth, and leverage its claims management capability and existing distribution channels. We believe NIB will find success in cross-selling, but the business remains dependent on travel activity and being commoditised, is vulnerable to pricing pressure. While leveraging the NIB brand in Australia may come with some success, we do not believe insurers can build a competitive advantage on intangible assets.
  • Industry growth is tied to a steadily increasing population, ageing demographics and the unavoidable rise in healthcare spending. Governments will continue to incentivise participation in private health insurance to share the burden of escalating healthcare costs.
  • Premium growth is generally tied to the increasing cost of healthcare. The government regulator approves/rejects price increases as part of an annual review. Very few have been rejected which helps reduce uncertainty around insurance margins.
  • The symbiotic relationship of private hospital operators, and buyer power over general practitioners, is a key strength of NIB’s business model. Private hospitals are reliant on the private insurance system, as the majority of private hospital income is paid by the insurers.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks Shares

United Malt Group Ltd – Result as a Public Company Offers Optimism

Nonetheless, the company is the fourth-largest global malt processor and works with some of the world’s largest breweries and distillers as well as fast-growing craft producers. Although management expects United to face higher near-term costs related to its recent public listing, we think this will be offset by longer-term savings. But despite some attractive aspects of the business, we don’t think United has carved an economic moat. It is a commodity processor, with a high degree of fixed costs and limited ability to substantially differentiate its product.

Key Considerations

  • Although we anticipate craft beer consumption–a key driver for malt demand–will rise as a proportion of overall beer in United’s primary markets, the rate of growth is likely to slow, owing to the already high amount of craft brewers globally and flat overall beer volume trends.
  • Long-term client contracts, and the ability to pass through costs in periods of high barley prices help underpin a stable earnings stream and a manageable dividend policy.
  • We expect slowing end-market demand and limited barriers to supply additions driving returns on invested capital about equal to the company’s weighted average cost of capital.
  • Underlying earnings are stable, supported by longterm client contracts and its ability to pass through costs during periods of high barley prices.
  • United Malt benefits from rising craft beer production globally, which requires greater malt volumes and attracts higher prices.
  • Opportunities exist for further penetration into relatively underdeveloped beer markets, such as Asia and Latin America.
  • The commodity products that United Malt provide are readily available from competitors, and the company has little pricing power over the products it buys and sells, making for slim margins.
  • Barley acreage has declined in favour of other adjunct grains like corn or soybean in recent years, which could lead to periods of short supply and higher short-term costs.
  • The loss of key brewing customers, especially if they become self-sufficient for malt, could materially threaten its earnings stream.

 (Source: Morningstar)

Disclaimer

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Funds Funds

First Eagle US Value A

First Eagle’s multifaceted global value team runs the strategy. Its co-heads, Matt McLennan and Kimball Brooker, each have more than 25 years of investing experience and have cooperated as managers here since March 2010. They also spearhead siblings First Eagle Global SGIIX and First Eagle Overseas SGOIX. Comanager Matt Lamphier directs the research team whose coverage ranges from equities to sovereign bonds and investment-grade credits–all fair game for this portfolio. The manager team added depth in May 2021 with Mark Wright’s promotion to full-fledged comanager after two years of honing his skills as an associate manager.

The team takes a risk-averse approach. With capital preservation in mind, it invests mostly in large-cap equities having what it sees as margins of safety–or prices well below the value of those firms’ average earnings or profitability over a business cycle, their hard assets (such as forest lands), or the strength of their balance sheets. The managers also hold cash (often 10%- 20% of assets) and gold (5%-15%), with gold serving as a hedge against economic calamity.

The Fund’s Approach

This risk-averse approach works well on sibling strategies with broader geographic reach but is less effective for this U.S.-focused offering. It warrants an Average Process rating. Whether investing internationally or in the U.S., First Eagle’s global value team takes an uncommon line. Its managers prioritize capital preservation. While sticking mostly with large-cap equities, they will also hold bonds, gold bullion, and cash. The managers target investments with a margin of safety–that is, a price well below intrinsic value–and assets (real or intangible) that should hold value even during economic distress. The team takes a long-term view, looking at average earnings and profit margins over a business cycle, earnings stability, and balance-sheet health to determine valuations. They often keep annual portfolio turnover under 20%.

Cash and gold stakes are key to this defensive approach. The managers typically keep around 10% of assets in cash–more if opportunities are scarce–and 5%-15% in gold and the equities of gold miners as hedges against economic calamity. The team’s prowess outside the U.S. has served First Eagle’s global and international strategies well, but this U.S.-focused version has struggled to compete. Keeping so much cash and gold on the side-lines has held it back in equity bull markets, and mediocre stock selection over time hasn’t helped.

The Fund’s Portfolio

This portfolio stands out in many ways. With so much cash and gold and so few bonds, equities typically account for 60%-80% of total assets, unlike the equity-only S&P 500 prospectus benchmark and many allocation–70% to 85% equity peers who wade more into bonds. The managers usually own 70-90 stocks. Cash had never been less than 12% of assets at the end of any month in manager Matt McLellan’s 12- year tenure until April 2020; it went on to hit a low of 2% in October 2020 before rising to nearly 10% in March 2021. The portfolio’s gold stake had hovered around 10% going into 2020; it appreciated to more than 15% in July 2020 before dropping back to 10% in early 2021.

The portfolio’s equity exposure is also distinctive. It has tended to be light on consumer cyclicals relative to peers (1.5% of total assets in March compared with the 8.9% category norm) but heavy on energy (7% versus 2%) and basic materials (6% to 3%). The basic-materials stake can be larger if the team is buying the stocks of gold miners such as Newmont NEM and Barrick Gold ABX, but it pared most of those as the price of gold rallied in 2020. Firms with hard assets– such as Weyerhaeuser WY, which owns forest lands, and integrated oil firm Exxon Mobil XOM– also suit this portfolio’s conservative bent.

The Fund’s Performance

This fund’s track record is middling, though a recent category change offers better points of comparison. The portfolio’s gold and cash stakes made it a poor match for its equity-only S&P 500 prospectus benchmark in the decade-long bull market for stocks following the 2007-09 global financial crisis. The strategy’s value tilt didn’t help either, as growth stocks drove much of the rally. A December 2020 Morningstar Category change to allocation–70% to 85% equity from large blend improves the picture somewhat. From manager Matt McLennan’s January 2009 start through April 2021, the fund’s I share class gained 10.6% annualized; that beat the allocation category’s 10.2% average but trailed the S&P 500’s 15.3% and the large-blend category norm of 13.5%. The fund also lagged a custom index approximating the fund’s historical asset exposures (to stocks, cash, gold, and bonds), albeit by a narrower 1.3-percentage-point margin.

Source: Morningstar

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.