Categories
Global stocks

Crown Resorts net operating cash outflows of $14m

Investment Thesis

  • Broader economic recovery and cashed up consumer.
  • Under normal trading conditions, CWN has quality mature assets, which are highly cash generative and difficult to replicate.
  • New Sydney casino (if allowed to retain the casino license) could offer a significant step change in earnings for CWN.
  • CWN is leveraged to growth in Australian tourism.
  • Corporate activity given the stronghold of a cornerstone investor is slowly eroding.
  • Capital management initiatives – additional special dividends or share buy-backs.

Key Risks

  • Competitive pressures, including international (for VIP play) and domestic competitors.
  • Return of international tourists to Australia ahead of expectations.
  • Credit-rating risk (given our expectation of significant capital expenditure over the next five years).
  • Regulatory risk – several inquiries are being held against various Crown casinos. Adverse outcomes to materially alter the outlook.
  • Capital expenditure fails to deliver adequate returns

FY21 Result Summary

  • Statutory revenue of $1,536.8m declined -31.3%, theoretical EBITDA before closure cand significant items) of $241.7m was down -52% (reported EBITDA of $114.1m down -77.4%) and theoretical NPAT attributable to the parent (before closure costs and significant items) a loss of $84.2m vs $161m profit in pcp (reported NPAT attributable to the parent a loss of $261.6m vs $79.5m profit in pcp).
  • Net significant items expense of $54.6m (net of tax) relating to Crown Sydney pre-opening costs, one-off allowance for expected credit losses, restructuring costs, asset impairments, and underpayments of casino tax by Crown Melbourne, offset by profit on disposal of Crown Sydney apartments which settled during the period.
  • The Board scrapped the final dividend.
  • Net operating cash outflow of $14m (vs net operating cash flow of $326.9m in pcp), reflecting severe impacts on the operations from the Covid-19 pandemic. Capex of $559.1m was down -25% over pcp, primarily relating to the continued construction of Crown Sydney.
  • Total liquidity (excluding working capital cash) was $560.8m comprising $390.1m in available cash and $170.7m in  committed undrawn facilities. Net debt position of $892.9m remained almost flat over pcp (though declined – 28% over 1H21).

Company Profile 

Crown Resorts Ltd (CWN) is Australia’s largest operator of casinos along with hotels and conference centre facilities. In Australia, CWN owns and operates Crown Melbourne Entertainment Complex and Crown Perth Entertainment Complex which services mass market and VIP segments. Overseas, CWN also owns and operates Crown Aspinall’s in London. CWN also has a portfolio of other gaming investments. CWN’s wagering and on-line social gaming operations include Betfair Australasia (a 100% owned, on-line betting exchange) and DGN Games (a 70% owned, on-line social gaming business based in Austin, Texas).

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Property

Solid 1H21 results reported by Scentre reflecting net property income up by 26.5%

Investment Thesis:

  • Currently trading below analysts’ valuation, with an attractive (and growing) distribution of ~5%
  • Management team is strong and experienced 
  • Highest quality property portfolio of any Australian listed retail REIT with SCG’s portfolio heavily weighted to the growth economies of Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne. Approx. 20 million people live within close proximity to SCG’s 42 Westfield Living Centres. 
  • Expectations of a continually low interest rate and ongoing fiscal measures should be supportive of consumer spending
  • Retail sales under potential recovery 
  • Strong Balance Sheet
  • Potential upside from its >$3bn redevelopment pipeline – if SCG undertakes ~$700m of developments p.a., c$80m of value per annum is expected. SCG expects in excess of 15% returns (development yields >7.0% and cap rates of ~5.5%; NOI growth with rent escalations of CPI +2% and development yield targets of >7%) 

Key Risks:

  • Covid-19 is prolonged with significant lockdowns re-introduced
  • Significant re-basing of rents
  • Structural shift continues to remove consumers/foot traffic from SCG’s centres 
  • Unexpected and aggressive increases in interest rates or deterioration in credit/capital markets 
  • Any slowdown in demand and net absorption for retail space
  • Any deterioration in property fundamentals especially delays with developments, declining asset values, retailer bankruptcies and rising vacancies 
  • Any delays in developments
  • Lower inflation (and deflation) affecting retailers

Key highlights:

  • Scentre Group (SCG) reported solid 1H21 results reflecting net property income of $833.2m, up by 26.5%
  • Despite government restrictions due to Covid-19, SCG collected $1.2bn of gross rent, up by 37% or $325m compared to 1H21
  • The Group continues to target a distribution of 14cps for the year to 31 December 2021
  • SCG retained a strong balance sheet with 27.9% gearing, 3.3x interest cover, 12.0% FFO (Funds from Operations) to debt, 5.5x debt to EBITDA
  • SCG currently has available liquidity of $5.7bn, sufficient to cover all debt maturities to early 2024. Weighted average debt maturity is 4.5years.
  • S&P, Fitch and Moody’s upgraded SCG’s outlook to Stable
  • SCG achieved gross cash inflow of $1,383.9m, up by 30.6%
  • Net operating cash surplus (after interest, overheads and tax) of $487.7m. Statutory Profit was $400.4m.
  • Net asset value of $4.27 per security was largely unchanged from the $4.26 at December 2020
  • 1H21 distribution was 7.00cps, an improvement from 1H20, when no distributions were paid

Company Description: 

Scentre Group (SCG) is an Australia Retail A-REIT. The company derives earnings from operating, managing and developing retail assets. SCG has interests in 42 high-quality Westfield malls across Australia and New Zealand, worth ~$38.2bn. SCG owns 7 of the top 10 centres in Australia, and 4 of the top 5 centres in New Zealand. SCG earmarked ~$3bn in potential development.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Praemium Ltd balance sheet remains strong with cash reserves of $26.7m

Investment Thesis

  • Merger with powerwrap creates a much better capitalized and resourced competitor in the market, with significant opportunities for synergies.
  • Increase diversification via geography and product offering.
  • Increase competition amongst platform providers such as HUB24, Wealth O2, BT panorama, Netwealth, North Platform, etc.
  • Very attractive Australian industry dynamics – Australian superannuation assets expected to grow at 8.1% p.a to A$9.5 trillion by 2035.
  • Disruptive technology and hold a leading position to grow funds under advice via SMAs.
  • The fallout from the Royal Commission into Australian banking has led to increased inquiries for PPS’ product/services.
  • Growing and maturing SMSF market = more SMSF demand for tailored and specific solutions.
  • Both-on acquisitions to supplement organic growth.
  • Further consolidation in the sector could benefit PPS.

Key Risks

  • Execution risk – delivering on PPS’s strategy or acquisition.
  • Contract or key client loss.
  • Competitive platform/offering.
  • Associated risks in relation to system, technology and software.
  • Operational risks related to service levels and the potential for breaches.
  • Regulatory changes within the wealth management industry.
  • Increased competition from major banks and financial institutions.

FY21 Results Summary

  • Australian business segment delivered revenue growth of +37% over pcp to $53.1m, driven by Platform revenue increase of+73% to $36.5m with Powerwrap revenue of $16.3m amid strong underlying growth from record platform inflows and Portfolio services revenue increase of +6% to $16.1m with VMAAS revenue up +40% from continued portfolio on-boarding. EBITDA declined -2% to $19m, primarily due to the transition of the Powerwrap cost base and some cost expansion to support growth and service across sales, marketing and operations (EBITDA margins declined -14% to 36%), however, management forecast growth investments and scale benefits from Powerwrap synergies will drive improved earnings into FY22.
  • International net revenue (net of product commissions) increased +6% over pcp to $12.5m, driven by Platform revenue growth of +30% to $8.1m from record inflows driving International platform FUA to $5bn (up+ 55%), partially offset by declines in the Smartfund range of managed funds, with fund revenue down -47% to $1.5m. Expenses were up +2% to $16.4m from operational capability to support growth, partially offset by continued cost management. EBITDA loss declined -7% to $3.9m, comprising UK’s EBITDA loss of $1.4m (27% improvement), Asia’s EBITDA loss of $0.9m (1% increase) and the inclusion of Dubai’s cost centre of $1.6m (up 17%).

Company Profile 

Praemium Limited (PPS) is an Australian fintech company which provides portfolio administration, investment platforms and financial planning tools to the wealth management industry.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Despite Covid-19 disruptions, Virtus FY21 results show turnaround in earnings

Investment Thesis:

  • Ageing Australian population and increased age of mothers (especially with the trend of more females choosing career over family until their early thirties) will provide favorable demographic tailwinds
  • Potential accretive acquisitions domestically and internationally
  • Domestic acquisition of other laboratories will consolidate VRT geographic expansion strategy along the eastern seaboard of Australia
  • Earnings increasingly become diversified as international segments are expected to become a larger contributor 
  • Solid balance sheet with flexibility to execute expansion strategies
  • New management for Victorian business to turn results around 
  • Market-leading position with ~40% of domestic market share

Key Risks:

  • Regulatory risk as changes in government funding may increase patient’s out-of-pocket expenses and thereby decrease volume demand 
  • Fluctuations in the availability and size of Medicare rebates may negatively influence the number of IVF cycles administered and overall industry revenue 
  • Weakening cycle activity continues to adversely impact revenues
  • Increased competition from low-cost providers 
  • Weakening economic activity resulting in increased unemployment leading to less disposable income to be spent in IVF treatment 
  • Execution of international forays goes poorly 
  • Population of males and females with fertility problems decline

Key highlights:

  • Total market capitalization of Virtus Health Ltd. is A$538.9m
  • Relative to the pcp, revenue was up +25.4%, adjusted EBITDA up +44.2%, and adjusted NPAT up more than 100%, driven by global fresh IVF cycles of 23,994, up +26.4%
  • Separate to FY21 results, VRT announced the acquisition of Adora Fertility and 3 day hospitals from Healius Ltd (ASX: HLS) for $45.0m.
  • Revenue $324.6m was up +25.4%
  • Reported EBITDA of $93.4m, was up significantly from $46.2m in FY20
  • Reported NPAT of $43.1m improved significantly from $0.5m in FY20
  • VRT’s leverage ratio (Net Debt / Adjusted EBITDA) declined to 1.5x (vs 2.2x in FY20)
  • Total dividends of 24.0cps vs 12cps in pcp. Forward dividend payout guidance was reduced to 45-55% (from 60-70% historically)
  • By segments, financials are as follows:
    • Australia: Revenue of $259.5m was up +24.4%, which drove segment EBITDA up +30.1% to $97.6m
    • International: EBITDA of $15.3m was up +68.1%

Company Description: 

Virtus Health Ltd (ASX: VRT) is a global provider of assisted reproductive services. The group’s main activity is providing patients with Assisted Reproductive Services such as specialized diagnostics, fertility clinics and day hospital services. It has 116 fertility specialists who are supported by over 1100 professional staff and is the largest network and provider of fertility services in Australia and Ireland, with a growing presence in Singapore. Virtus is one of three major players which collectively control more than 80% of market share and was the first infertility treatment company in the world to float on the stock market.

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

Temple & Webster Group delivered solid FY21 results driven by customer’s adoption of online shopping

Investment Thesis

  • Operates in a large addressable market – B2C furniture and homewares category is approx. $16bn. 
  • Structural tailwinds – ongoing migration to online in Australia in the homewares and furniture segment. At the moment less than 10% of TPW’s core market is sold online versus the U.S. market where the penetration rate is around 25%. 
  • Strong revenue growth suggests TPW can continue to win market share and become the leader in its core markets. 
  •  Active customer growth remains strong, with revenue per customer also increasing at a solid rate. 
  •  Management is very focused on reinvesting in the business to grow top line growth and capture as much market share as possible. Whilst this comes at the expense of margins in the short term, the scale benefits mean rapid margin expansion could be easily achieved. 
  • Strong balance sheet to take advantage of any in-organic (M&A) growth opportunities, however management is likely to be very disciplined. 
  •  Ongoing focus on using technology to improve the customer experience – TPW has invested in merging the online with the offline experience through augmented reality (AR).

Key Risk

  • Rising competitive pressures. 
  • Any issues with supply chain, especially because of the impact of Covid-19 on logistics, which affects earnings / expenses. 
  •  Rising cost pressures eroding margins (e.g., more brand or marketing investment required due to competitive pressures). 
  • Disappointing earnings update or failing to achieve growth rates expected by the market could see the stock price significantly re-rate lower. 
  •  Trading on high PE-multiples / valuations means the Company is more prone to share price volatility.

FY21 results highlights

  • Group revenue was up +85% to $326.2, with 4Q21 revenue up +26% YoY despite cycling a period which saw growth of +130%. 
  •  Gross profit was up +88% to $148m, with gross profit margin increasing to 45.4% from 44.6%. This was primarily driven by increasing private label penetration, which increased to 26% of group sales vs 19% in the prior year. Private labels had higher margin vs drop-ship sales (i.e., drop-ship means TPW takes no inventory risk and works with their >500 local distributors), given TPW source directly from the factory.  
  • Delivered margin increased +87% to $100.7m, however was impacted by one-off distribution costs in the 2H21 due to some local shortages in 3PL space and TPW had to store product in more expensive alternate sites. 
  •  Contribution margin after one-off distribution came in at 14.6% as percentage of revenue vs 15.5% in pcp. Management is aiming to keep the contribution margin in the range of 12 – 15% over the short to medium term to support their reinvestment strategy to aggressively target market share via improved pricing, tactical promotional activity, and higher investment in brand building initiatives. 
  • Group adjusted EBITDA of $20.5m was significantly higher (up +141%) than $8.5m in the pcp, with a margin of 6.3% (vs 4.8% in pcp). 
  •  Balance sheet is solid, with cash balance of $97.5m

Trending Update:“The year got off to a fantastic start with a 39 percent increase in income from July 1 to July 24. TPW benefit from tailwinds, such as the adoption of online shopping as a result of these structural and demographic developments, as well as the acceleration of transitive Covid. Following that, an increase in discretionary spending due to travel constraints and, as we all know, the housing market’s continuous resurgence. As Mark stated, “we will continue to engage in growth there as a business, vastly increasing our online market leadership and driving market share.”

Company Profile

Temple & Webster Group (TPW) is a leading online retailer in Australia, which offers consumers access to furniture, homewares, home décor, arts, gifts, and lifestyle products.

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Funds Funds

Top pick within global listed property

of stocks within a range of real estate sectors across developed markets (North America, U.K, Europe, and Asia Pacific). The Fund’s objective is to exceed the total returns of the Benchmark (FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed Index (AUD) Net TRI) after fees on a rolling 3-year basis.

Approach

Resolution mixes top-down thematic and bottom-up fundamental research to arrive at a relatively

concentrated 40- to 60-stock portfolio with little resemblance to the benchmark. The first step filters the 450- plus stock universe down to a manageable size. Macroeconomic drivers play a part, based on the team’s company visitation schedule. Resolution also uses its proprietary screening database to filter out stocks with undesirable characteristics such as high debt/EBIT ratios and balance-sheet risk.

Portfolio

Resolution has managed global property since 2006, but this vehicle was founded in 2008 during the depths of the global financial crisis, when some low-quality REITs flirted with bankruptcy. Resolution didn’t avoid all the underperformers, but it did better than rivals at avoiding the worst offenders. Its focus on sustainability and corporate governance helped, as did the chosen UBS Global Investors Index, which focused more on rent collectors and less on risky development. Being brand new gave Resolution a clean slate, helping the team to buy quality REITs at bargain prices. The quality preference also keeps a lid on portfolio turnover, which oscillates between 30% and 55%–not as low as an index fund but lower than the average active strategy. However, Resolution has been willing to make occasional substantial portfolio shifts. In the first half of 2019, Resolution saw some industrial property such as Goodman as expensive and was underweight in this name, favouring industrial exposure through ProLogis and Segro. During the following 12 months (to 30 April 2021), Resolution preferred residential, data centre, and tower exposure, specifically in the US. The strategy managed AUD 14.4 billion as at 30 April 2021.

Source: Morningstar

General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
ETFs ETFs

The fund offers simple approach, portfolio, and low fee

but with some additional trade-offs of the listed structure, including brokerage costs and variable bid-ask spreads. The AsiaPacific investment strategy group and global asset-allocation committee are responsible for setting and reviewing the strategic asset allocation. The methodology starts by defining reasonable investment horizons for each portfolio and alloates to broad asset-class exposures such as equities and fixed interest based on the defensive/growth split. Then, subasset allocation within classes follows a market-cap-weighting approach, while allowing for behavioural biases and regulatory factors specific to each local market. The SAA determination is aided by the Vanguard Capital Markets Model, which forecasts asset-class returns through scenario analysis. An annual review may identify major structural shifts that can lead to a revised SAA, such as a change in the taxation of an asset class. Underlying sector exposures are realised through in-house index-tracking funds. Vanguard does not use tactical asset allocation and cites illiquidity, low transparency,

and cost as reasons for avoiding alternatives

Portfolio

Vanguard’s straightforward approach applies a strategic asset allocation that is updated periodically and broadly mirrors its equivalent unlisted fund range. Dynamic and tactical asset allocation are not used. Vanguard sticks to the traditional asset classes of equities, fixed interest, and cash, while avoiding alternatives and unlisted assets. The four diversified options are designed to suit different investor objectives and risk profiles. Vanguard Conservative has a defensive/growth split of 70/30, Balanced is 50/50, Growth is 30/70, and High Growth is 10/90. In-house index funds are relied on. Vanguard’s SAA, inclusive of both listed and unlisted vehicles, is strikingly similar to the Morningstar Category benchmarks. It hedges 30% of the international equities to keep the non-Australian-dollar exposure roughly steady. Since inception to June 2021, Vanguard’s multisector ETFs have on average traded with a bid-ask spread of 8-25 basis points, though it has elevated during bouts of volatility like most listed structures.

Performance

The Vanguard Diversified Index ETFs were launched in November 2017. Given the consistency in approach to the long-running unlisted iterations, we believe its extended track record is more informative. Vanguard’s inexpensive cost has been a key pillar in leading this strategy to strong medium-term return. Returns have historically closely mirrored the Morningstar Category benchmarks over time, typifying the limited opportunity to exceed the hurdle given the structural likeness between the two. In comparison to unlisted peers, all ETFs sit in the top quartile over a trailing three-year time period as at June 2021. Calendar-year results between 2018 and 2020 have been consistently in the first and second quartiles, surpassing the average manager in each year. Maintaining interest-rate duration has aided peer-relative performance, particularly in the more-defensive options. This structural stance also helped amid the crisis market environment in the first quarter of 2020. Albeit, the more-defensive ETFs lagged the category average over the last year to June 2021 because of its higher allocation to defensive assets relative to peers. Record-low interest rates globally suppressed returns from fixed-income securities over this period but favoured growth

assets, resulting in the more-growth oriented portfolios keeping pace with peers.

Source: Morningstar

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Shares Small Cap

Super Retail’s attractive loyalty program with 8 million member

Investment Thesis

  • Trading below our valuation and on attractive trading multiples and dividend yield. 
  • Strong tailwinds/fundamentals in SUL’s four core segment. For instance, sales for vehicle aftermarket continue to remain strong (with increase in secondhand vehicle sales (Supercheap); travelers seeking social distancing and hencemoving away from public transport (Supercheap); with Covid lockdown measures in forced, more people are spending their holidays domestically (BCF; macpac), utilising their vehicles (Supercheap); growing awareness of fit and healthy lifestyles (rebel). 
  • Solid capital position. 
  • Strong brands in BCF, macppac, rebel and Supercheap with solid industry positions in largely oligopolies and solid store network. 
  • Transitioning to an omni-channel business. Whilst previously the business has been modeled on like-to-like store numbers, management now thinks of business metrics based on club members and has been able to grow the active club membership much faster than store numbers (store numbers in last 5 years have grown +2% CAGR vs active club members at +10% CAGR), providing it with an opportunity to expand customer base and therefore revenue base without significant capex for investment in stores (most of the customers are omni channel). 
  • Management continues to push towards expanding its online sales (Covid-19 added to this tailwind), with online sales penetration of ~13-15% of total sales currently and expected to reach 20-25% over the next 5 years. 
  • Attractive loyalty members program, with over 8 million members.

Key Risks

  • Rising competitive pressures.des 
  • Any issues with supply chain,especially as a result of the impact of Covid-19 on logistics which affects earnings. 
  • Rising cost pressures eroding margins (e.g. more brand or marketing investment required due to competitive pressures). 
  • Disappointing earnings update or failing to achieve growth rates expected by the market could see the stock price significantly re-rate lower.

FY21 Results Highlights

  • Total Group sales of $3.45bn, up +22% (Group like-for-like sales growth of +23%).Online sales of $415.6m, up +43% and nowaccounts for ~12% of total sales. On the impact of Covid -19 lockdowns, management noted its “omni-retail capability enabled it to pivot to online channels to meet consumer demand through both Click & Collect and home delivery”.
  • Segment EBIT of $476.8m was up +80%. 
  • Segment normalised PBT of $435.8m, up +108%.
  • Normalised NPAT up +107% to $306.8m. Basic EPS up +139% to 133.4cps.
  • The Board declared a fully franked final dividend of 55.0cps, bringing the full year dividend to 88.0cps, significantly higher than 19.5cps in FY20. Dividend equates to 65%, which is in line with SUL’s 65% payout ratio policy.
  • Management guided capex in FY22 of $125m to fund expanded store development and investment in omni and digital capability.

Company Profile 

Super Retail Group (SUL) is one of Australasia’s Top 10 retailers. SUL comprises four core segments. (1) BCF: Australia’s largest outdoor retailer focused on selling Boating, Camping and Fishing products. (2) macpac: retailer of apparel and equipment with their own designs focused on outdoor adventurers. (3) rebel: retailer of branded sporting and leisure goods and equipment for casual and serious fitness enthusiast. (4) Supercheap Auto: specialty retail business which specialises in automotive parts and accessories. 

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

OOh!media is strongly-positioned but shares are overvalued relative to our intrinsic assessment

In the nine years to 2019, advertising dollars flowing to the Australian outdoor medium increased at a CAGR of 9%.

Our view is based on three structurally related tailwinds:

 First, unlike other traditional media, the outdoor audience is increasing. 

Second, a key Achilles heel for the outdoor advertising industry was the lack of reliable audience measurement. However, with the 2010 launch of measurement of Outdoor Visibility and Exposure, or MOVE, the medium now has greater legitimacy and offers a more robust way for marketers to assess the return on money allocated to outdoor advertising. 

Third, in contrast to its debilitating impact on other traditional media, digital technology is a growth facilitator for the outdoor industry. We estimate converting a static site to a digital site can lift advertising revenue three- to four-fold, potentially doubling the margin and vastly lifting the return on capital. 

We view these drivers as long-dated, and will continue to be exploited by oOh!media. Management is investing in further technological, data, and analytics capability. While adding to near-term costs, these investments are designed to more effectively convince marketers of the benefits of outdoor advertising, in terms of greater sophistication in audience targeting, resulting in longer-term sustainability.

Our fair value estimate for oOh!media is AUD 1.40 per share, which implies fiscal 2021 enterprise/EBITDA of 11.9 times but Shares in oOh!media are trading 30% above our AUD 1.40 fair value estimate. We are not ignorant of the stock’s appeal to investors lusting after high-beta, COVID-19 recovery trades ahead of imminent reopening of the New South Wales and Victorian economies.

Bulls Say 

  • Outdoor advertising is a growth medium benefiting from structural tailwinds such as increasing audience, more reliable measurement, and conversion of inventory to digital.
  • Australian outdoor’s 5% share of the total advertising pie still lags Canada (8%), the U.K. (7%), and the global average of 6%-plus. 
  • OOOh!media may have failed in its attempt to merge with APN Outdoor in 2017, but it completed the acquisition of Adshel in September 2018 and there is an opportunity to extract sizable synergies from the combination.

Financial Strength

 At the end of June 2021, net debt/EBITDA was 1.1 times, pre AASB 16. We forecast this to fall to 0.7 by the end of 2021, within the renegotiated 3.25-3.50 covenant limit for 2021. The current dividend payout policy is reasonably conservative at between 40% and 60% of net profits after tax but before amortisation acquired intangibles, allowing further investment in inventory digitisation. However, due to the uncertain impact of the coronavirus outbreak, there were no dividends in 2020 and we forecast resumption of just AUD 0.04 in 2022.

Company Profile

OOh!media operates a network of outdoor advertising sites with a sizable share of the Australian market of around 30%, and has a presence in New Zealand. It boasts a diverse portfolio of locations to service the needs of outdoor advertisers, and is particularly strong in the roadside billboard and retail (such as shopping malls) segments. OOh!media offers these services by entering into lease arrangements with owners of outdoor sites–effectively an intermediary allowing site owners to monetise their visible space in high-traffic areas. In late September 2018, the group completed the acquisition of Adshel from HT&E for AUD 570 million, a deal that cements its competitive position in the face of industry consolidation.

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

Digital Realty Continues Deepening its Global Footprint and Transitioning Away From Wholesale Only

power, and connection needs. Along with Equinix, we think this makes Digital Realty one of only two data center providers that can offer this breadth and set itself apart from the pack.

Before its acquisition of Telx in 2015, Digital Realty garnered almost 95% of its total revenue from wholesale data centers and had virtually no interconnection revenue. At the end of 2020, a year in which Digital Realty also acquired Interxion, a firm with almost exclusively co-location and interconnection revenue, we estimate that annualized rent from the largest customers–those taking greater than 1 megawatt of power–made up only about half of total annualized revenue, and interconnection revenue was about 9% of the total.

In Digital Realty’s data centers, tenants can directly connect to their cloud providers or other partners, resulting in reduced latency and superior security. Even when in different Digital Realty locations, customers can bypass the public Internet to connect with other Digital Realty data centers via direct fiber connections within cities or through a software-defined network between cities. 

Steady Performance in Q3 for Digital Realty as It Continues Pursuing New Opportunities 

Digital Realty’s third-quarter results were consistent with recent performance, with a solid level of new bookings and re-leasing spreads that remain sluggish. 

The firm’s 11% year-over-year revenue growth was significantly boosted by higher utilities revenue, which simply reflects higher energy costs that Digital passes on to its customers.Rental revenue, which excludes pass-through revenue, was up 6%. Renewal spreads remain under pressure as the firm continues working off below-market contracts with its larger deployments, but this quarter’s negative 6% cash re-leasing spread was misleading, as it was the result of a 30- megawatt renewal combined with a very large new lease.

New bookings totaled $113 million in annualized revenue, with space and power bookings just over $100 million for the third straight quarter, and interconnection bookings in the $12 million-$13 million range for the fifth straight quarter-every quarter since Digital acquired Interxion. While this level of bookings is solid, it is believed that the moves the firm is making will lead them to pick up in the future. Key moves Digital made during or after the third quarter include entries into both India and Nigeria, both through joint ventures. The firm also made an investment in AtlasEdge data centers in Europe to propel its edge ambitions.

Bulls Say 

  • Digital Realty’s shift toward connection and colocation exposes it to the most attractive parts of the data center business and the growth tailwinds of cloud providers and data connectivity. 
  • Digital Realty’s global offering and high exposure to cloud providers gives it an advantage over competitors that operate in more narrow geographies or can only offer retail colocation space.
  • Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, and other innovations that increase the public’s demand for data and connectivity require more hardware and connections in data centers.

Company Profile

Digital Realty owns and operates nearly 300 data centers worldwide. It has more than 35 million rentable square feet across five continents. Digital’s offerings range from retail colocation, where an enterprise may rent a single cabinet and rely on Digital to provide all the accommodations, to “cold shells,” where hyperscale cloud service providers can simply rent much, or all, of a barren, power-connected building. In recent years, Digital Realty has de-emphasized cold shells and now primarily provides higher-level service to tenants, which outsource their related IT needs to Digital. Digital Realty has also moved more into the co-location business, increasingly serving enterprises and facilitating network connections. Digital Realty operates as a real estate investment trust.

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.