Tag: US Market
Business Strategy and Outlook
Aggregates producer Vulcan Materials is well positioned to benefit from the ongoing recovery of U.S. construction spending. It is forecasted strengthening demand growth for the public sector and modest growth for the private sector. Accounting for roughly half of shipments, public-sector demand is generally more stable, and projects, primarily highway construction, are more aggregate-intensive per dollar of spending. At a national level, it is expected public infrastructure spending to grow by 6% per year on average, an acceleration from the last couple of decades. Federal funding power has weakened as better vehicle mileage and inflation have diminished the buying power of the $0.18 per gallon gasoline tax, unchanged since 1993. The FAST Act, passed in December 2015, provided stability and near-term funding certainty, but didn’t solve the still-weakening gas tax. However, long-term federal funding was passed in late 2021, totalling $1.2 trillion.
The outlook for road spending differs considerably from state to state. Differences in population growth, road conditions, funding mechanisms, and overall state fiscal health influence spending. Vulcan’s largest states by revenue–Texas, California, Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia–have significant road spending needs and strong finances to support high growth. Private-sector demand consists of residential and nonresidential construction, including commercial and industrial properties. Nonresidential construction is the most important driver in the category, as spending is more material-intensive per dollar than residential construction. It is forecasted that the nonresidential spending growth to slow to 4% in the longer term, as many key sectors to make more efficient use of their construction spending. Additionally, it is expected residential starts to converge the long-term housing-start forecast of 1.5 million by 2030. Residential construction historically supports nonresidential construction growth.
Financial Strength
At the end of the fourth quarter of 2021, net leverage was roughly 2.5 times net debt/adjusted EBITDA, compared with the company’s target of roughly 2-2.5 times. Continued improvement in construction markets should help leverage to improve further, falling below 1 times net debt/adjusted EBITDA by the end of 2024, all else equal. The weighted average debt maturity is 11 years (as of year-end 2021), so maturities look quite manageable.
In June 2021, Vulcan announced the acquisition of U.S. Concrete. Given the healthy balance sheet before the close, the deal is unlikely to hamper Vulcan’s financial health. This case is bolstered by the relatively smaller size of U.S. Concrete. With the poorly timed and expensive acquisition of Florida Rock Industries in 2007, Vulcan’s debt surged from roughly $500 million to $3.7 billion. Combined with the recession that devastated construction activity, Vulcan’s leverage soared to more than 8 times debt/adjusted EBITDA. The company took difficult but important steps to protect its cash flow and improve its balance sheet in the aftermath. The company learned a lesson, given its current approach to M&A with more discipline. The acquisition of Aggregates USA in 2017 exemplifies Vulcan’s more disciplined, balance sheet-friendly approach
Bulls Say’s
- Vulcan has a favourable geographic footprint in states that have a strong need for increased road work and the capability to fund it.
- Not-in-my-backyard tendencies make the permitting process incredibly difficult for new quarries, forming high barriers to entry and protecting Vulcan’s business from incoming entrants.
- Vulcan has made significant progress on its costcutting initiatives, demonstrated by its improving cost per ton despite relatively flattish demand.
Company Profile
Vulcan Materials is the United States’ largest producer of construction aggregates (crushed stone, sand, and gravel). Its largest markets include Texas, California, Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Alabama. In 2021, Vulcan sold 222.9 million tons of aggregates, 11.4 million tons of asphalt mix, and 5.6 million cubic yards of ready-mix. As of Dec. 31, 2021, the company had nearly 16 billion tons of aggregates reserves
(Source: Morning Star)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook
The Under Armour as lacking an economic moat, given its failure to build a competitive advantage over other athletic apparel firms. Between 2008 and 2016, Under Armour’s North American sales (around 70% of its consolidated base) increased to $4 billion from $700 million and it passed narrow-moat Adidas as the region’s second-largest athletic apparel brand (after wide-moat Nike). However, its North America sales have not grown over the past five years as it restructured and demand for performance gear, Under Armour’s primary category, has lagged that of athleisure. While sales of all activewear have been strong during the pandemic, the long-term benefits for Under Armour will be limited as compared with global brands wide-moat Nike and narrow-moat Adidas. A Under Armour has fallen behind on innovation and its product is not sufficiently differentiated.
Under Armour has recently had problems in both its direct-to-consumer and wholesale businesses. Although sales through its direct-to-consumer channels increased to $2.3 billion in 2021 from $1.5 billion in 2016 (calendar years), Nike and others have experienced much greater direct-to-consumer growth in this period. Under Armour has opened its own stores as wholesale distribution has slowed, but 90% of them in North America are off-price. Still, its direct-to-consumer revenue will rise to 61% of total revenue in fiscal 2032 from 42% in its last fiscal year. This should allow Under Armour to have better control over its brand, but one cannot see evidence that it allows for premium pricing and see it as a defensive move. The Under Armour’s international segment will produce growth over the long term, but the firm faces significant competition from global and native operators with established brands and distribution networks. According to Euromonitor, the combined sportswear markets in Asia-Pacific and Western Europe were about $160 billion in 2021, greater than North America’s roughly $140 billion. As Under Armour generates only about 30% of its revenue in Europe and Asia-Pacific, it has room for growth, but it lacks strong retail partnerships and brand recognition.
Financial Strengths
The Under Armour has enough liquidity to get through COVID-19 even as the effects have not fully passed. Prior to the crisis, the firm’s long-term debt consisted only of $593 million in 3.25% senior unsecured notes that mature in 2026. Then, in May 2020, Under Armour completed an offering of $500 million in 1.5% convertible senior notes that mature in 2024. However, as this additional funding has proven to be unnecessary, the firm has already paid down more than 80% of this convertible debt. Even after these debt repayments, at the end of March 2022, the firm had $1 billion in cash and $1.1 billion in borrowing capacity under its revolver. Thus, the Under Armour to operate in a net cash position for the foreseeable future. Under Armour’s free cash flow to equity has recovered from the pandemic impact, totaling about $850 million over the past two fiscal years. The forecast about $5.6 billion in free cash flow generation over the next decade. Although the firm does not pay dividends, it recently authorized its first share buyback program. The firm repurchased $300 million in shares in February 2022, and the forecast another $20 million in buybacks in fiscal 2023. Moreover, Under Armour’s restructuring has reduced base operating expenses by about $200 million, and the forecast its capital expenditures will remain low at about 2% of sales. The firm may use some of its free cash flow for acquisitions, but one cannot forecast acquisitions due to the uncertainty concerning timing and size. Although its growth has been largely organic, the firm acquired three fitness apps for a combined $710 million in past years as part of a strategy that has been mostly abandoned. It has also made some smaller investments, such as an investment of $39.2 million in its Japanese licensee, Dome, in 2018 to raise its ownership stake to 29.5%. Under Armour later had to write down this investment because of restructuring at Dome.
Bulls Say
- Under Armour quickly became no-moat Kohl’s second biggest brand after its introduction in 2017. This partnership allows Under Armour to reach more female customers. Kohl’s is expanding shelf space for activewear.
- Under Armour’s restructuring has produced an average annual savings of $200 million. The firm can reinvest these savings into marketing and international expansion while improving its operating margins.
- Under Armour could gain shelf space and distribution as Nike has reduced or eliminated shipments to some major sportswear retailers.
Company Description
Under Armour develops, markets, and distributes athletic apparel, footwear, and accessories in North America and other territories. Consumers of its apparel include professional and amateur athletes, sponsored college and professional teams, and people with active lifestyles. The company sells merchandise through wholesale and direct-to-consumer channels, including e-commerce and more than 400 total global factory house and brand house stores. Under Armour also operates a digital fitness app called MapMyFitness. The Baltimore-based company was founded in 1996.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook
The Shopee e-commerce platform to be Sea’s main growth driver for the long term; the company’s valuation will be predicated on this business. Per Euromonitor, Shopee has 30% share of its main market, Indonesia, and it estimated about 30%-35% share in the rest of Southeast Asia. It has built leading market share quickly using subsidies, free shipping, and incentives that attracted consumers to its platform, but in the process, it incurred heavy cash burn and has not yet seen positive EBITDA. While positive macro signs exist and Shopee enjoys a market-leading position currently, that it is too early to tell who the ultimate long-term winners will be. E-commerce is still in the early stages in Southeast Asia, and outside of a slight lead in market share, one cannot see obvious distinct advantages for Shopee. As user growth has been highly contingent on subsidies that heavily increased sales and marketing expenses, the growth could decelerate sharply once these incentives stop and when Sea becomes more focused on profitability.
The massive potential for Sea is evident as e-commerce is 7%-8% of overall retail sales in Southeast Asia, compared with 22% for China. It forecasted a 23% five-year compound annual growth rate for the digital economy in the region. China’s e-commerce is expected to grow 11% in the same period. Given the robust macro backdrop, this should provide a conducive landscape for Shopee to succeed. Despite a massive opportunity, Shopee remains vulnerable to increased sales and marketing expenses and low switching costs. Other platforms can offer the same products with subsidies to consumers who are cost-conscious. This also implies the possibility of new competitors in e-commerce in the region that can replicate the same strategy. Given the lack of differentiation for Shopee, one can see further heavy subsidies in order to ward off threats and maintain market share, which could be impossible to continue in the long term in the pursuit of profitability. The company has indicated a goal for Shopee to be cash flow positive by 2025, but this could be a challenge without clear key advantages.
Financial Strengths
One cannot believe that Sea has any financial issues outside of the concerns about heavy cash burn. It has cash and short-term investments of USD 11.7 billion against only USD 3.3 billion total debt as of the end of 2021. Short-term liquidity is not an issue as the firm has USD 286 million of short-term debt and its current ratio is 2 times. The main concern is that the cash balance could erode quickly if sales and marketing and research and development expenses continue at this rate. In 2021, cash (excluding stock-based compensation and depreciation) operating expenses were USD 5.0 billion, which implies that Sea should be able to withstand cash burn for at least two years in a worst-case scenario where it generates zero revenue. It would not surprise us if Sea raises additional capital in order to have more of a cash buffer, but one cannot believe this poses any risk for now should the company become profitable. Outside of cash burn concerns, there are no red flags concerning leverage nor interest expenses.
Bulls Say
- Sea could maintain its leading market share as Southeast Asia e-commerce expands without having to sacrifice profitability through increased sales and marketing spending.
- Garena could find another hit game that increases bookings in addition to Free Fire. Also, India could rescind its sanctions on Free Fire
- SeaMoney could increase its market share above its current 3% and become the one of the preferred payment options in Southeast Asia.
Company Description
Sea operates Southeast Asia’s largest e-commerce company, Shopee, in terms of gross merchandise value and number of transactions. Sea started as a gaming business, Garena, but in 2015 expanded into e-commerce, which is now the main growth driver. Shopee is a hybrid C2C and B2C marketplace platform operating in eight core markets. Indonesia accounts for 35% of GMV, with the rest split mainly among Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. For Garena, Free Fire was the most downloaded game in January 2022 and accounted for 74% of gaming revenue in 2021. Sea’s third business, SeaMoney, facilitates e-wallet payments on Shopee and offline and provides other digital financial services such as credit lending.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy and Outlook
Beyond Meat is a pioneer in the plant-based meat, or PBM, industry, offering the first burger to look and taste like meat, although it was soon followed by Impossible Foods and many others. Given the rapidly changing marketplace, although it is too early to tell if Beyond’s first-mover advantage will result in an enduring market leadership position.
However, it is still optimistic on the prospects for the meat like PBM market. It is expected that a primary growth driver to be the 20% of consumers willing to adjust their habits to benefit the environment, as Beyond’s products emit 90% less greenhouse gases and require 93% less land, 99% less water, and 46% less energy to produce than their meat equivalents. The PBMs will be very successful abroad, in China and India in particular, the world’s two most populated countries, each with 1.4 billion people. The products offer a great solution for China, which does not have enough arable land to feed its huge population, and a great fit for India’s large vegetarian population. Both countries are highly amenable to the products, with surveys showing 96% of China’s and 94% of India’s populations are likely to try the products, compared with 75% of U.S. consumers. It’s expected the global PBM market will grow from $6 billion in 2021, according to Euromonitor, to $31 billion by 2031 (a 19% compound annual growth rate), as PBMs grow from 1.1% of the ground meat market to nearly 5%. The model Beyond’s market share is increasing from 8.4% in 2021 to 12% in 2031 as PBMs gain a larger share of the overall meat category and Beyond’s brand continues to win with consumers, given its strong performance in taste tests and ongoing R&D investments. Beyond is the global preferred supplier of McDonald’s McPlant patty (expected to launch in various countries in 2022-24) and will co-create products with Yum Brands to be used at KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell across the globe. It is expected that these deals will collectively result in over $200 million in incremental annual revenue by 2025, supporting $72 fair value estimate for Beyond Meat
Financial Strength
In March 2021, Beyond issued $1 billion in 0% coupon convertible notes that expire in 2027. This should provide adequate liquidity until the firm generates positive free cash flow, which is expected to occur in 2026. As of March 2022, Beyond held $548 million cash, which should be sufficient to meet its needs in 2022, specifically about $230 million to fund operations and $50 million in capital expenditures. However, if demand for Beyond’s products falls short of the forecast, or costs exceed the expectations, Beyond could opt to issue additional debt or shares, which could dilute current shareholders. It is continued to expect capital expenditures to be the primary use of cash, as the company will spend a significant portion of sales to build capacity in order to meet growing demand. But the level of investment should moderate from 2021, when Beyond invested $136 million (29% of sales) to build capacity ahead of product launches with McDonald’s and Yum Brands. In 2022 and beyond, it is expected that the capital investments between 6% and 8% of sales annually for the remainder of 10-year explicit forecast (still above the average for packaged food peers as the firm continues to expand capacity). The firm will not initiate a dividend over the next 10 years, but it is expected there will be sufficient cash on hand for moderate share repurchases, which is a model beginning in 2028. It can be viewed this as a prudent use of cash when shares trade below the assessment of its intrinsic value
Bulls Say’s
- Plant-based meats should continue to gain share from traditional meat, driven by significant environmental benefits and consumers’ shift away from red meat. Beyond Meat should be a major beneficiary, given its first-mover advantage and strong performance in taste tests.
- Europe and Asia represent large opportunities for Beyond, where consumers are more favourable to PBMs than in the U.S., and Impossible Foods is banned in Europe, as its products contain GMOs.
- New deals with McDonald’s and Yum Brands should be material catalysts in 2022-24, representing over $200 million in sales
Company Profile
Beyond Meat is a provider of plant-based meats, such as burgers, sausage, ground beef, and chicken. Unlike other vegetarian products, Beyond Meat seeks to replicate the look, cook, and taste of meat, is targeted to omnivores and vegetarians alike, and is sold in the meat case. The products are widely available across the U.S. and Canada and in 83 additional countries as well. International revenue represented 31% of 2021 sales. The firm’s products are available in retail stores and the food-service channel. In 2019, before the pandemic struck, sales were evenly split between these two channels, although mix stood at 70% retail/30% food service in 2021.
(Source:MorningStar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do, business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and is not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook:
Starbucks is the largest specialty coffee chain in the world, generating some $29 billion in sales during fiscal 2021. The firm’s attention to premium-quality coffee distinguishes it from chained competitors (alleviating pressure from quick-service restaurant competitors and at-home consumption), allowing Starbucks to charge substantially higher prices while creating a buzz around what has historically been a commoditized product. While the subindustry has attracted significant competitive attention, Starbucks’ premium positioning has allowed the firm to outflank competitors, leveraging its brand to raise prices 6.8% annually in the U.S. over the last five years, healthily in excess of category inflation. Commanding unit economics, with payback periods in the ballpark of a year and a half (against three to six years in the broader QSR space), should pave the way for mid-single-digit unit growth through 2031, as the firm increases penetration in its core company-owned markets (the U.S. and China), and with license partners in more than 80 global markets.
Starbucks’ recent strategic focus on streamlined operations, adjacent menu innovation, digital engagement, and selective store closures strikes us as appropriate, with new openings concentrated in underpenetrated middle America and Chinese markets. While the firm’s trade area initiative created growth headwinds in 2020, as the firm closed 800 underperforming units in the U.S. and Canada, it should provide a durable foundation for unit development as the chain adjusts to a world that seems poised to skew toward off-premises sales, closer to home. Finally, the firm’s ongoing investments in its loyalty program, with nearly 27 million active users in the U.S. at the end of the second quarter of 2022, should resonate with an audience that has grown increasingly amenable to digital ordering, with more than half of order volume now driven by program participants. Starbucks remains a compelling long-term “growth at scale” story and the anticipating average top-line growth of nearly 11% through 2026 and adjusted EPS growth averaging 12.2% in base-case scenario.
Financial Strengths:
Starbucks’ financial strength as sound. The company targets a lease-adjusted debt/EBITDAR of 3 times, consistent with an investment-grade credit rating. The calculations suggest that it was in compliance with this target at the end of fiscal 2021, with a lease adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio of 2.6 times. The firm also has access to an untapped $3 billion credit facility and a $3 billion commercial paper program. With few hard assets, the operating income-based leverage metrics are a more appropriate proxy for restaurant businesses’ liquidity and solvency. Starbucks’ debt/EBITDA returned to normalized levels in fiscal 2021, finishing the year around 2.3 times leverage, well below 5.3 times during a trying 2020. The EBITDA/interest coverage (11.6 times) in fiscal 2022. Starbucks’ strong free cash flow to the firm conversion (averaging 8.9% of sales through 2024) offers the flexibility to invest in technological improvements, new restaurant openings, and menu innovation. The firm shall prioritize growth capital expenditures (estimated at $5.7 billion through 2024), dividends ($7.2 billion), and share repurchases ($11.5 billion), with management targeting a long-term 50% dividend payout ratio. While share repurchases were suspended during the second quarter of fiscal 2022, and expect them to be ultimately reinstated in fiscal 2023 based on the firm’s investment opportunity priorities and $4.0 billion in cash and cash equivalents on the balance sheet at the end of the second quarter of fiscal 2022.
Bulls Say:
- Starbucks’ “stars for everyone” initiative should drive continued adoption of the firm’s loyalty program, materially increasing customer lifetime value.
- Leading market share in China and exposure to a growing middle class contribute to a compelling growth narrative for the company.
- Strength in the cold beverage platform could drive volume toward underpenetrated afternoon dayparts, helping prop up average unit volume with minimal incremental labor costs.
Company Description:
Starbucks is one of the most widely recognized restaurant brands in the world, operating nearly 34,000 stores across more than 80 countries as of the end of fiscal 2021. The firm operates in three segments: North America, international markets, and channel development (grocery and ready-to-drink beverage). The coffee chain generates revenue from company-operated stores, royalties, sales of equipment and products to license partners, ready-to-drink beverages, packaged coffee sales, and single-serve products.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
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