Tag: US Market
Business Strategy & Outlook
The General Motors with a competitive lineup in all segments, combined with a reduced cost base, finally enabled it to have the scale to match its size. The head of Consumer Reports automotive testing even said Toyota and Honda could learn from the Chevrolet Malibu. The GM’s earnings potential is excellent because the company has a healthy North American unit and a nearly mature finance arm with GM Financial. Moving hourly workers’ retiree healthcare to a separate fund and closing plants drastically lowered GM North America’s breakeven point to U.S. industry sales of about 10 million-11 million vehicles, assuming 18%-19% share. The more scale to come from GM moving its production to more global platforms and eventually onto vehicle sets over the next few years for even more flexibility and scale. GM makes products that consumers are willing to pay more for than in the past. It no longer has to overproduce trying to cover high labor costs and then dump cars into rental fleets (which hurts residual values). GM now operates in a demand-pull model where it can produce only to meet demand and is structured to do no worse than break even at the bottom of an economic cycle when plants can be open. The result is higher profits than under old GM despite lower U.S. share. It now seeks roughly $300 billion in total revenue by 2030 with about $80 billion from many new high-margin businesses such as insurance, subscriptions, and selling data, while targeting 2030 total company adjusted EBIT margin of 12%-14%, up from 11.3% in 2021 and 7.9% in 2020. The actions such as buying Cruise, along with GM’s connectivity and data-gathering via OnStar, position GM well for this new era. Cruise is offering autonomous ride-hailing with its Origin vehicle, and GM targets $50 billion of Cruise revenue in 2030. GM is investing over $35 billion in battery electric and autonomous vehicles for 2020-25 and is launching 30 BEVs through 2025 with two thirds of them available in North America. Management also targets over 2 million annual BEV sales by mid decade and in early 2021 announced the ambition to only sell zero-emission vehicles globally by 2035.
Financial Strengths
GM’s balance sheet and liquidity were strong at the end of 2021, apart from $11.2 billion in underfunded pension and other postemployment benefit obligations, an improvement from $30.8 billion at year-end 2014. Management targets automotive cash and securities of $18 billion and liquidity of $30 billion-$35 billion. As per the calculation that at June 30, GM had automotive net cash and securities, excluding legacy obligations but including Cruise, of $4.6 billion, about $3.15 per diluted share. Global pension contributions in 2022 are expected at about $570 million, with about $500 million of that amount for non-U.S. plans. Auto and Cruise debt at June 30 is $16.9 billion, mostly from senior unsecured notes and capital leases. Credit line availability is about $17.5 billion across three lines with one of those lines being a 364-day $2 billion line allocated exclusively to GM Financial. The other two automotive lines are a $4.3 billion line expiring in April 2024 and an $11.2 billion line. The $11.2 billion line has $9.9 billion available until April 2026 while the remaining portion is available until April 2023. GM fulfilled its UAW VEBA funding obligations in 2010. As per calculation 2021 automotive and Cruise debt/adjusted EBITDA at 1.3, excluding legacy obligations and equity income. Automotive debt maturities including capital leases are about $463 million in 2022.
Bulls Say
- GMNA’s break even point of about 10 million-11 million units is drastically lower than it was under old GM. Earnings should grow rapidly as GM becomes more cost-efficient.
- GM’s U.S. hourly labor cost is about $5 billion compared with about $16 billion in 2005 under old GM.
- GM can charge thousands of dollars more per vehicle in light-truck segments. Higher prices with fewer incentive dollars allow GM to get more margin per vehicle, which helps mitigate a severe decline in light vehicle sales and falling market share.
Company Description
General Motors Co. emerged from the bankruptcy of General Motors Corp. (old GM) in July 2009. GM has eight brands and operates under four segments: GM North America, GM International, Cruise, and GM Financial. The United States now has four brands instead of eight under old GM. The company lost its U.S. market share leader crown in 2021 with share down 280 basis points to 14.6%, but the GM to reclaim the top spot in 2022 as 2021 suffered from the chip shortage. GM Financial became the company’s captive finance arm in October 2010 via the purchase of AmeriCredit.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook
The merger of Keurig Green Mountain and Dr Pepper Snapple into Keurig Dr Pepper created a North American beverage behemoth with strong brands and supply chain positioning. Despite being only one third and one sixth the size of Coke and Pepsi, respectively, Keurig Dr Pepper appears poised to augment the positioning of its cold business (60% of sales). However, it will have a more difficult time navigating various structural headwinds plaguing its hot business. Across soft drinks, the firm should be able to maintain a top-three position in its core categories. Although it’s disproportionately exposed to the beleaguered soda category, innovation will continue to resonate, owing to a core consumer gleaning a higher marginal benefit from consumption, affording continued pricing tailwinds. Moreover, the breadth of Keurig Dr Pepper’s selling apparatus facilitates exposure to high-growth segments, as smaller brands (like Polar Seltzer) leverage the firm for manufacturing or distribution.
Merger synergies have fuelled Keurig Dr Pepper’s strategic initiatives, with $600 million in cost savings (around 5% of sales) to be realized by 2022 via consolidated distribution, procurement leverage, and administrative streamlining. Management noted at the 2021 investor day that these savings would be used to fund initiatives surrounding customer acquisition and company-owned delivery. Competition remains robust across Keurig Dr Pepper’s core categories, and growth prospects outside of North American markets are encumbered by the firm’s lack of ownership rights to key trademarks internationally. Still, its resonant brands, distribution prowess, and partner networks will allow the company to maintain its positioning.
Financial Strengths
KDP’s financial position is manageable, though far from stellar. Keurig was considered the acquirer from an accounting perspective for the merger and funded the purchase of DPS’ assets with roughly 60% debt. The net debt/adjusted EBITDA for the combined entity rose above 8 times in 2018 after the merger, precariously higher than peers. Still, the stability of its industries, in conjunction with its profitability and management team, has allowed the company to manage its debt load, which will continue. KDP’s net debt/adjusted EBITDA ratio fell to 2.9 times as of December 2021, completing management’s goal of sub-3 times by 2021. Leadership aims to remain above the investment-grade threshold, and the material reduction in Keurig’s debt levels subsequent to being taken private lends credence to its ability in this regard. Though business prospects remain bright despite COVID-19, management used the opportunity to restructure its debt profile through extended maturities and lower rates, which gives us even greater confidence that the firm will be able to maintain its investment-grade credit rating (Moody’s also upgraded the debt outlook from negative to stable in
February 2021). Liquidity should also not be an issue, as in addition to over $550 million in cash (as of June 2022), the firm has ample access to short-term liquidity by way of commercial paper and its structured payables program.
Bulls Say
- Cost synergies realized from the merger are allowing the company to invest in customer acquisition and other strategic assets like company owned distribution.
- The firm still touts the dominant ecosystem in the North American single-serve coffee category, which yields several self-perpetuating advantages.
- With a formidable distribution system, KDP is able to gain exposure to secularly advantaged categories through partnerships with upstart brands.
Company Description
Keurig Dr Pepper, the product of a 2018 merger between Dr Pepper Snapple and Keurig Green Mountain, is the third-largest non-alcoholic beverage company in North America. In addition to the eponyms, the firm’s flagship brands include 7UP, Canada Dry, Schweppes, Mott’s, and Bai. The company situates itself at different positions of the value chain depending on the segment (it reports four operating segments) and the product. It is primarily a brand owner in its beverage concentrates and Latin America beverages segments, as well as for the single-serve brewers within its coffee systems segment, and owns integrated production and distribution operations in its packaged beverages segment as well as for its K-cup pods.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook
Park Hotels & Resorts is the second largest U.S. lodging REIT, focusing on the upper-upscale hotel segment. The company was spun out of narrow-moat Hilton Worldwide Holdings at the start of 2017. Since the spinoff, the company has sold all the international hotels and 15 lower-quality U.S. hotels to focus on high-quality assets in domestic, gateway markets. Park completed the acquisition of Chesapeake Lodging Trust in September 2019, a complimentary portfolio of 18 high-quality, upper upscale hotels that should help to diversify Park’s hotel brands to include Marriott, Hyatt, and IHG hotels. In the short term, the coronavirus significantly impacted the operating results for Park’s hotels with high-double-digit RevPAR declines and negative hotel EBITDA in 2020. However, the rapid rollout of vaccinations across the country allowed leisure travel to quickly recover, leading to significant growth in 2021 and 2022. The company should continue to see strong growth as business and group travel also recover to Prepandemic levels with Park eventually returning to 2019 levels by 2024. However, the hotel industry will continue to face several long-term headwinds. Supply has been elevated in many of the biggest markets, and that is likely to continue for a few more years. Online travel agencies and online hotel reviews create immediate price discovery for consumers, preventing Park from pushing rate increases. Finally, while the shadow supply created by Airbnb doesn’t directly compete with Park on most nights, it does limit Park’s ability to push rates on nights where it would have typically generated its highest profits. Still, the Park does have some opportunities to create value. Management has only had control of the portfolio for three years, and there is some additional growth that can be squeezed out of current renovation projects. The Chesapeake acquisition should provide an additional source of growth as the company drives higher operating efficiencies across this new portfolio. The pandemic could create additional opportunistic ways for Park to grow the portfolio.
Financial Strengths
Park is in solid financial shape from a liquidity and a solvency perspective. The company seeks to maintain a solid but flexible balance sheet, which will serve stakeholders well. Park does not currently have an unsecured debt rating. Instead, Park utilizes secured debt on its high-quality portfolio. Currently, the majority of Park’s debt is secured by five of its largest hotels, leaving Park with 39 consolidated hotels that are free of debt encumbrance. Even if Park is unable to pay its debt obligations, the company can return the collateral secured by its debt to the lenders and proceed with its unencumbered business essentially debt free. That said, debt maturities in the near term should be manageable through a combination of refinancing, the company’s free cash flow, and the large cash position Park currently has on their balance sheet. Additionally, the company should be able to access the capital markets when acquisition opportunities arise. In 2024, which is the year hotel operations should return to normal, net debt/EBITDA and EBITDA/interest will be roughly 4.1 and 4.2 times, respectively, both of which suggest that the company should weather any future economic downturn and that it would be able to selectively acquire assets as the market recovers. As a REIT, Park is required to pay out 90% of its income as dividends to shareholders, which limits its ability to retain its cash flow. However, the company’s current run-rate dividend is easily covered by the company’s cashflow from operating activities, providing Park plenty of flexibility to make capital allocation and investment decisions. The Park will continue to be able to access the capital markets given its current solid balance sheet and its large, higher-quality, unencumbered asset base.
Bulls Say
- Potentially accelerating economic growth may prolong a robust hotel cycle and benefit Park’s portfolio and performance.
- Low leverage gives Park greater financial flexibility to be opportunistic with new investments or return more capital to shareholders through dividend growth or share buybacks.
- Park’s management identified several enhancement initiatives that it can execute to drive EBITDA higher on the newly acquired Chesapeake portfolio.
Company Description
Park Hotels & Resorts owns upper-upscale and luxury hotels with 27,224 rooms across 45 hotels in the United States. Park also has interests through joint ventures in another 4,297 rooms in seven U.S. hotels. Park was spun out of narrow-moat Hilton Worldwide Holdings at the start of 2017, so most of the company’s hotels are still under Hilton brands. The company has sold all its international hotels and 15 lower-quality U.S. hotels to focus on high-quality assets in domestic, gateway markets.
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.
Business Strategy & Outlook
Until recently, Carlsberg had underperformed its close peers. Although it has a very strong competitive positioning in its native Denmark and other Scandinavian markets, in other major developed markets it is a second-tier player and has suffered shelf space loss, including the high-profile removal of the flagship brand from Tesco’s shelves in 2015. In addition, Carlsberg’s second-largest market, Russia, has been undergoing volume declines since 2012 due to a decadelong government clampdown on the availability and affordability of beer and a shrinking drinking age population. Returns on invested capital were regularly below the cost of capital, and the low-teens operating margin was below that of the firm’s largest competitors. Yet, under new management at around the same time as the Tesco incident, Carlsberg has come out fighting and now looks in far better shape. SAIL’22, an umbrella for strategic initiatives designed to cut costs and reignite growth, has been a coherent set of strategies to deliver the margin opportunity that for several years was possible. Progress has been decent, with organic sales having grown by over 3% annually over the five years of the program, in spite of the COVID-19-related declines in 2020, and almost 200 basis points being added to the operating margin, which stood at 16.3% on an adjusted basis in 2021. Benchmarking against competitors, however, there is further room for improvement, and the encouragement was that the recently unveiled SAIL’27 strategy suggests more profitability improvement to come. Mix should play a pivotal role. Some of Carlsberg’s markets, including China, are undergoing structural premiumization, and Carlsberg’s premium and above portfolio, including the Tuborg and 1664 brands, as well as line extensions to the Carlsberg brand, should continue to grow at rates well above the market. Medium-term guidance under SAIL’27 is 3%-5% organic revenue growth. The medium-term growth slightly below the midpoint of that guidance, primarily because of Carlsberg’s heavy presence in developed markets, in which beer is likely to lose share to other categories including wine and spirits.
Financial Strengths
Carlsberg is in sound financial shape, and after a multiyear period of paying down debt, it is now less leveraged than Heineken and AB InBev. Following the S&N acquisition in 2008, Carlsberg’s net debt/EBITDA ratio increased to 4.1 times. Since that time, debt has fallen from DKK 48 billion to just DKK 29 billion at year-end 2021, when the adjusted net debt/EBITDA ratio stood at just under 1.4 times. Under the SAIL’22 initiative, management targets a net debt/EBITDA ratio of 2 times, so Carlsberg has some room for releveraging for M&A, increasing the dividend, or repurchasing shares. Carlsberg increased its annual dividend 60% in 2018 and after a further 9% increase in 2021, its payout ratio was 49% last year. This is more or less in line with the large-cap consumer staples peer group. The free cash flow to average over DKK 12 billion over the next five years, and with leverage under control and an average of DKK 4 billion paid out in dividends at the new annualized rate, Carlsberg now has more balance sheet optionality than it has had in several years. The company completed a share-repurchase program of DKK 4 billion and announced an additional program to repurchase a further DKK 1 billion in the first quarter of 2022. Acquisitions could be one use of the company’s excess cash. That said, it showed little interest publicly in the assets being divested by AB InBev as part of the SABMiller acquisition, and most deals have been bolt-on in nature in recent years. The Grolsch and Peroni brands, sold to Asahi, had the potential to be value-accretive to Carlsberg. With cash and stock, Carlsberg could enter into a transformative deal, especially as the company delivers on its SAIL’22 and SAIL’27 targets of strengthening the core business.
Bulls Say
- Although Carlsberg is under indexed in premium segments, it does have a presence with brands such as Tuborg and 1664 Blanc, and the premiumization of the portfolio could be seen as a long-term opportunity.
- Carlsberg is present in the attractive market of Vietnam and has the opportunity to raise its economic interest in its local subsidiary, Habeco.
- Management’s medium-term guidance around its SAIL’27 strategy implies that there is more margin expansion to come in the years ahead, which will further close the financial performance gap to Heineken.
Company Description
Carlsberg is the fourth-largest brewer in the world following the combination of Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller, with major operations in Russia, Europe, and Asia. It holds leading shares in Russia, Scandinavia, Laos, Cambodia, and parts of western China. Its key brands include Carlsberg, Tuborg, Baltika, Holsten, and Somersby. The company’s 2021 beverage volume was split among Northern and Western Europe (30%), Eastern Europe (39%), and Asia (31%).
(Source: Morningstar)
DISCLAIMER for General Advice: (This document is for general advice only).
This document is provided by Laverne Securities Pty Ltd T/as Laverne Investing. Laverne Securities Pty Ltd, CAR 001269781 of Laverne Capital Pty Ltd AFSL No. 482937.
The material in this document may contain general advice or recommendations which, while believed to be accurate at the time of publication, are not appropriate for all persons or accounts. This document does not purport to contain all the information that a prospective investor may require. The material contained in this document does not take into consideration an investor’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the advice, investors should consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the investor’s objectives, financial situation, and needs. The material contained in this document is for sales purposes. The material contained in this document is for information purposes only and is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation with respect to the subscription for, purchase or sale of securities or financial products and neither or anything in it shall form the basis of any contract or commitment. This document should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and recipients should seek independent advice.
The material in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be true but neither Laverne and Banyan Tree nor its associates make any recommendation or warranty concerning the accuracy or reliability or completeness of the information or the performance of the companies referred to in this document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Any opinions and or recommendations expressed in this material are subject to change without notice and, Laverne and Banyan Tree are not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. References made to third parties are based on information believed to be reliable but are not guaranteed as being accurate.
Laverne and Banyan Tree and its respective officers may have an interest in the securities or derivatives of any entities referred to in this material. Laverne and Banyan Tree do and seek to do business with companies that are the subject of its research reports. The analyst(s) hereby certify that all the views expressed in this report accurately reflect their personal views about the subject investment theme and/or company securities.
Although every attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the document, liability for any errors or omissions (except any statutory liability which cannot be excluded) is specifically excluded by Laverne and Banyan Tree, its associates, officers, directors, employees, and agents. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Laverne and Banyan Tree, its directors, employees and agents accept no liability or responsibility for any loss or damage of any kind, direct or indirect, arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. Recipients of this document agree in advance that Laverne and Banyan Tree are not liable to recipients in any matters whatsoever otherwise; recipients should disregard, destroy or delete this document. All information is correct at the time of publication. Laverne and Banyan Tree do not guarantee reliability and accuracy of the material contained in this document and are not liable for any unintentional errors in the document.
The securities of any company(ies) mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to all categories of investors. This document is provided to the recipient only and is not to be distributed to third parties without the prior consent of Laverne and Banyan Tree.