Business Strategy and Outlook
Although the previous owners of the Hostess brand filed for bankruptcy in 2004 and 2012, we contend it was due not to a lack of brand equity but rather highly inefficient manufacturing and distribution systems, a powerful unionized workforce, and a high debt load. In the four years preceding the pandemic, Hostess averaged 6.4% organic growth, materially outpacing the sweet baked goods category. Market share gains were driven by regained shelf space that was lost during its 2012-13 hiatus, expansion into new channels (enabled by its differentiated direct-to-warehouse delivery system), and expanded breakfast and value brand offerings.
Hostess has created significant shareholder value via its disciplined acquisition strategy. Although the 2018 Cloverhill acquisition initially depressed margins, the business is now generating healthy profits, and the deal provided a breakfast platform and access to the club channel, where the firm is expanding the Hostess brand.
Financial Strength
Although previous owners of the brand filed bankruptcy in 2004 and 2012, that Hostess Brands is a much different company now, having shed the highly inefficient manufacturing and distribution systems, powerful unionized workforce, and high debt load responsible for the insolvencies. The current company is an entirely new entity. After the 2012 bankruptcy, investors purchased only the brand rights and recipes from the bankruptcy court, freeing them of employee benefits and other labor obligations that had weighed down the company. The new company has a highly efficient cost structure and operates with a cost-effective direct-to-warehouse model, whereas the predecessor firm operated with a more expensive direct-store-delivery model.
That said, the firm targets a 3-4 times net debt/adjusted EBITDA, a bit higher than most packaged-food companies, given its plan to expand into adjacent categories via acquisitions. As of September 2021, the ratio stood at 3.3 times. But the firm generates an impressive amount of free cash flow. Hostess’ free cash flow as a percentage of sales should average 12% over the next five years, comparable to most packaged food companies.
Bulls Say’s
- The firm’s DTW distribution model allows it to penetrate channels previously not accessible (channels difficult for the firm’s DSD competitors to access), providing attractive, untapped growth opportunities.
- Hostess’ acquisitions in the breakfast and cookie segments provide it with a great foundation to expand into adjacent categories.
- The Hostess brand has exhibited impressive staying power throughout its 100-year history, outlasting many nutritional and diet fads, and we think the firm’s commitment to invest behind further innovation should ensure this persists.
Company Profile
Hostess Brands is the second-largest U.S. provider of sweet baked goods under the Hostess, Voortman, and Dolly Madison group of brands, including Twinkies, Cupcakes, Ding Dongs, Ho Hos, Donettes, and Zingers. In 2018, Hostess expanded its breakfast offerings with the purchase of Aryzta’s breakfast assets (the Cloverhill business), including a branded business and private-label deals, and in 2020 entered the cookie category via the Voortman tie-up. Although its roots stem from the 1919 launch of the Hostess Cupcake, the company filed for bankruptcy in 2012. Investors purchased the brands and restarted production in 2013, followed by a 2016 initial public offering. Most products are sold in the U.S., although third parties distribute some product to Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
(Source: Morningstar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.