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Crown Draws Blood From a Blackstone

Business Strategy and Outlook

Morningstar analyst expect Crown Resorts to deliver strong earnings growth over the next decade, buoyed by the recovery from current coronavirus-induced lows as restrictions ease, the opening of Crown Sydney during calendar 2022 and continued solid performance from the core assets in Melbourne and Perth. Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth underpin the firm’s narrow economic moat. Crown is the sole operator in both jurisdictions, with long-dated licences. These properties have performed strongly, thanks to Crown’s solid track record of reinvestment, resulting in consistently high property quality, stable visitor growth, and earnings resilience. The quality of these assets, particularly Crown Melbourne, has driven strong growth in VIP gaming.

Indeed, the strong performance of Crown Melbourne helped the firm secure the second licence in Sydney to compete with The Star. As per Morningstar analyst view, the New South Wales government only issued the second licence because The Star’s performance significantly lagged Crown Melbourne in both revenue and EBITDA, depriving the state of taxation revenue. The Star Sydney’s EBITDA is roughly 60% of Crown Melbourne’s, despite Sydney being Australia’s largest city and the international gateway into Australia.

Morningstar analyst estimate Crown Sydney will not only take share from incumbent rival The Star, but will also grow the size of local casino gaming market–particularly in VIP. Morningstar analyst estimate VIP gaming will be a negligible share of revenue in fiscal 2022 amid border closures. However, it is expected that the segment to recover as border restrictions ease and tourism recovers. But VIP gaming can be highly volatile, ranging from over 30% of revenue in fiscal 2015 to 17% in fiscal 2017. Morningstar analysts estimate VIP gaming represents less than 20% of revenue at Crown Melbourne, less than 10% of revenue at Crown Perth, and will constitute more than half Crown Sydney’s sales-albeit at a lower margin than table gaming.

Crown Draws Blood From a Blackstone

Morningstar analyst have raised its fair value estimate for narrow-moat Crown by 8% to AUD 12.20 per share after directors supported an increased bid from narrow moat asset manager Blackstone. New York-based Blackstone, already Crown’s second largest shareholder with a stake of 10%, has been pursuing the beleaguered casino since March 2021 with prior bids unable to pique the interest of the Crown board. 

Crown had formally rejected Blackstone’s previous bid of AUD 12.35 and  the 1% improvement to AUD 12.50 would be unlikely to move the needle-particularly given regulatory uncertainty had eased with the Victorian Royal Commission stopping short of cancelling Crown Melbourne’s licence, instead providing Crown a roadmap to redemption. The AUD 13.10 offer is more compelling, representing a 16% premium to our standalone fair value estimate and a 32% premium to the undisturbed price on Nov. 18, 2021. Crown’s board flagged its unanimous intention to recommend shareholders vote in favour of the proposal, should a formal bid eventuate.

The increased offer is nonbinding and remains conditional on completion of due diligence, support from shareholders, unanimous approval from the board, final approval from Blackstone’s investment committees, and approvals from state gaming regulators. While Blackstone is prepared to proceed while Crown’s various regulatory investigations and consultations remain underway, negative outcomes arising in the meantime (such as the loss or suspension of a casino licence) could thwart the bid.

For the transaction to proceed, support from 37% shareholder Consolidated Press Holdings, or CPH, will be crucial. Via CPH, former executive chair James Packer’s major shareholding remains a headache for regulators. But the Blackstone deal could be seen as taking risk off the table for regulators, given the scrutiny on the relationship between Crown and CPH/James Packer since the commencement of the Bergin casino inquiry. Indeed, the Victorian commissioner’s report has since recommended CPH have until September 2024 to sell down its holding to less than 5%. 

Financial Strength

Despite near-term earnings weakness, Crown’s balance sheet remains robust. Debt levels have increased with the construction of the Crown Sydney casino and forced venue closures due to COVID-19. Crown’s net debt/EBITDA peaked at 3.7 in fiscal 2021, from 1.8 as at the end of June 2020, but still below the precarious 5.0 level (the covenant limit on Crown’s subordinated notes). We expect significant deleverage in fiscal 2022, aided by around AUD 450 million in further apartment sales from the Crown Sydney project and earnings recovery. We forecast fiscal 2022 net debt/EBITDA to fall to 0.5, and with an improved balance sheet, expect the firm to reinstate dividends from the second half of fiscal 2022 at around 75% of underlying earnings

Bulls Says

  • Long-dated licences to operate the only casino in Melbourne and Perth allow Crown to enjoy positive economic profitability in a regulated environment. 
  • Crown Sydney provides a long-term growth opportunity to capture share and expand gaming in Australia’s most populous market. 
  • Crown is well positioned to benefit from the emerging middle and upper class in China.

Company Profile

Crown Resorts is Australia’s largest hotel-casino company. Its flagship property is Crown Melbourne, an integrated complex with more than 2,600 electronic game machines, or EGMs, 540 tables, and three hotels. Crown also operates Crown Perth, a property with more than 2,500 EGMs, 350 tables, and three hotels. Crown has also obtained a licence to operate Sydney’s second casino, Crown Sydney, centred on the VIP and premium gaming market. The company also operates Aspinall’s, a boutique, premium-focussed casino in London.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Although Las Vegas Remains the Core Presence, MGM’s Macao Assets Should Benefit From a 2022 Recovery

Business Strategy and Outlook

No-moat MGM Resorts is facing material near-term headwinds from COVID-19 as well as elevated operational risk in Macao from government plans to increase supervision of casinos. Still, we think MGM has a healthy liquidity profile to see it through this turmoil and remains positioned for the attractive long-term growth opportunities in Macao (22% of pre-pandemic 2019 EBITDAR), U.S. sports betting, and Japan (accounting for an estimated 10% of 2027 EBITDAR, the first year of likely operation). 

We see solid Macao industry visitation over the next 10 years, as key infrastructure projects that alleviate Macao’s congested traffic (Pac on terminal expansion and Hong Kong Bridge in 2018, light-rail transit at the end of 2019, and reclaimed land in 2020-25) come on line, which will expand the region’s constrained carrying capacity and add attractions, thereby driving higher visitation and spending levels. As MGM holds one of only six gaming licenses, it stands to benefit from this growth. Further, MGM Resorts has expanded its room share in Macao to 8% from 3% with its Cotai property, which opened in February 2018. That said, the Macao market is highly regulated, and as a result, the pace and timing of growth are at the discretion of the government.

In the U.S. (78% of pre-pandemic 2019 EBITDA), MGM’s casinos are positioned to benefit from a multi-billion-dollar sports betting market, generating an estimated mid-single-digit percentage of the company’s 2024 sales. That said, the U.S. doesn’t offer the long-term growth potential or regulatory barriers of Macao; thus, we do not believe the region contributes a moat to MGM. Still, there have been very minimal industry supply additions this decade, and this should support solid industry Strip occupancy, which stood at around 90% in pre-pandemic 2019.

We expect MGM to be awarded one of only two urban gaming licenses in Japan, with a resort opening in 2027, generating attractive returns on invested capital in the teens.

Financial Strength

MGM entered 2020 in its strongest financial health of the past 10 years, in our view. This was illustrated by its 3.7 times debt/adjusted EBITDA in 2019 versus 13 times and 5.7 times in 2010 and 2015, respectively. It was also buoyed by MGM having recently exited an investment cycle, where the company spent $1.6 billion on average annually during 2015-19 to construct and renovate U.S. and Macao resorts versus the $271 million it spent on capital expenditure in 2020. We believe MGM has sufficient liquidity to remain a going concern even with zero revenue for a few years. The recent sales of underlying casino assets (Bellagio in November 2019, Circus Circus in December 2019, and MGM Grand/Mandalay Bay in February 2020) provided it with around $6.9 billion in cash. The company recently entered into leaseback asset sales of Aria, Vdara, and Springfield, raising over $4 billion in cash in 2021. Also, MGM is set to receive $4.4 billion in cash for its ownership in MGM Growth Properties, which is scheduled to be acquired by Vici in the first half of 2022. The firm has taken further action to lift its liquidity profile by reining in expenses, tapping its $1.5 billion credit facility (which has since been paid), suspending dividends and repurchases (which have since been reinstated), and raising debt. MGM has $1 billion of debt scheduled to mature in 2022.

Bulls Say’s

  • We expect MGM to be awarded one of only two urban Japanese gaming concessions due to its strong experience operating leading resorts in Las Vegas and its successful record of working with partners 
  • MGM is positioned to participate in Macao’s long-term growth opportunity (22% of pre-pandemic 2019 EBITDAR) and has seen its room share expand (to 8% from 3%) with the opening of its Cotai casino in February 2018.
  • MGM’s U.S. properties are positioned to benefit from the expansion of the multi-billion-dollar domestic sports betting market

Company Profile 

MGM Resorts is the largest resort operator on the Las Vegas Strip with 35,000 guest rooms and suites, representing about one fourth of all units in the market. The company’s Vegas properties include MGM Grand, Mandalay Bay, Mirage, Luxor, New York-New York, and CityCenter. The Strip contributed approximately 49% of total EBITDAR in the pre-pandemic year of 2019. MGM also owns U.S. regional assets, which represented 29% of 2019 EBITDAR. We estimate MGM’s U.S. sports and iGaming operations will be a mid-single-digit percentage of its total revenue by 2024. The company also operates the 56%-owned MGM Macau casinos with a new property that opened on the Cotai Strip in early 2018. Further, we estimate MGM will open a resort in Japan in 2027.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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PRICING AND SHRINKING TO STABALIZE AT  BED BATH AND BEYOND INC

Business Strategy and Outlook

In October 2020, Bed Bath & Beyond put forth an updated strategy to revitalize its brand and regain customer confidence by focusing on its core properties. As such, the company divested peripheral brands such as Cost Plus and Linen Holdings in order to focus on the Bed Bath & Beyond, Buy Buy Baby, Harmon Face Value, and Decorist labels. To help elevate its brand perception, it has combined its online and in-store inventory management with its new “omni-always” initiative in the hopes of capturing more e-commerce business and avoiding the long restock times and uneven inventories that previously plagued the firm. Additionally, it’s investing heavily in both its digital and brick-and-mortar platforms, with a revamp to the website for a more frictionless checkout process and a remodel of its physical stores to offer a cleaner and more enjoyable shopping experience. The firm has attempted to rely less on its iconic blue coupons by giving consumers a good everyday value (it is concluded discounts will persist to some degree over the long term). It also plans to right size by shuttering underperforming Bed Bath stores, shrinking the total store base to around 1,000 by the end of 2021 (from 1,500 at the end of 2019). In contrast, management expects 50% sales growth at the baby label by 2023 via new markets, with the brand already set to deliver $1.3 billion in sales in 2021. It is seen total sales declining in 2021 as the footprint continues to contract before stabilizing at a low-single-digit growth rate in 2023.

Longer term, it is conjectured the 2030 operating margin to reach 5%-6%. This improvement is primarily supported by gross margin gains (which reach 37.7%, below the 38%-plus corporate goal) from a greater focus on private label, including the introduction of 10 new owned brands. It also benefits from a lower promotional cadence thanks to SKU rationalization and the utilization of more robust inventory management processes. However, it is foreseen these gains to be offset by higher investment as the home furnishing landscape remains highly fragmented and competitive, limiting profitability to levels that are structurally lower than in the past.

Financial Strength

Bed Bath & Beyond’s cash position is solid and efforts to reduce the firm’s debt load resulted in a positive net cash position at fiscal year-end 2020. Before the firm’s $1.5 billion debt raise in 2014, it had been debt-free since 1996 (excluding acquired debt), using cash generated from operations to fund new store openings and a handful of small bolt-on acquisitions. The firm has access to liquidity through its $1 billion credit facility, which expires in 2026 and captured another $600 million-plus in cash through the sale of Personalizationmall.com, Linen Holdings, Christmas Tree Shops, One Kings Lane, and Cost-Plus World Market brands. It reduced gross debt in 2020 (with long-term debt at $1.2 billion at November 2021 versus $1.5 billion at the end of fiscal 2019) and plans to continue paying down its debt, aiming to reach a gross debt ratio of 3 times by 2023. There is ample cash on hand (roughly $509 million as of Nov. 27, 2021) to cover near-term expenses like operating lease obligations.

Over the past five reported fiscal years, the firm has produced cumulative free cash flow (cash from operations minus capital expenditures) of $2.1 billion. However, it is anticipated this level to be tempered over 2021-23 as Bed Bath spends around $375 million annually to improve new stores, existing stores, its supply chain, and technology in this time frame. Free cash flow to equity has averaged about 4% of revenue during the past five reported years, which is decent for a mature company that is still spending to remain competitive, but it is likely this level to decline as secular headwinds weigh on performance and necessary investment levels pick up. Despite the higher spending ahead, Bed Bath has a plan to complete its share $1 billion in shares buy back by the end of fiscal 2021.

Bulls Say’s

  • Less discretionary categories such as linens, towels, and cookware offer some resiliency amid macroeconomic cyclicality. Registries across bridal, baby, and gift have historically provided a steady stream of customers.
  • The closure of numerous underperforming stores by the end of 2021 could help lift the profitability of the business faster than it can be anticipated as better performing stores make up a greater proportion of the fleet.
  • With a push into expanding the representation of owned brands (already accounting for 20% of sales), gross margin metrics could expand faster than it can get forecast.

Company Profile 

Bed Bath & Beyond is a home furnishings retailer, operating just under 1,000 stores in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico. Stores carry an assortment of branded bed and bath accessories, kitchen textiles, and cooking supplies. In addition to 809 Bed Bath & Beyond stores, the company operates 133 Buy Buy Baby stores and 53 Harmon Face Values stores (health/beauty care). In an effort to refocus on its core businesses, the firm has divested the online retailer Personalizationmall.com, One Kings Lane, Christmas Tree Shops and That (gifts/housewares), Linen Holdings, and Cost-Plus World Market.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Global stocks

Regulatory-Advantaged Wynn Positioned to Benefit From a Macao Demand Recovery in 2022-23

Business Strategy and Outlook

COVID-19 continues to materially impact Wynn’s Macao operations (50% of estimated 2024 EBITDA), which Mmorningstar analyst view as transitory. But the Macao government’s plans to increase supervision of the region’s casinos now elevates long-term operational risk. Specifically, Wynn has outsized exposure to the expected long-term shift away from VIP gaming revenue toward non gaming and mass play. Still, Morningstar analyst see an attractive long-term growth opportunity in Macao, with Wynn Resorts’ high-end iconic brand positioned to participate

On a Long term basis, Morningstar analysts view solid visitation and gaming growth for Macao, aided over the next several years as key infrastructure projects to alleviate the region’s congested traffic continue to come on line, which should expand constrained carrying capacity, thereby driving higher visitation and spending levels. Also, analysts expect upcoming developments that add attractions and improve Macao’s accessibility will improve the destination’s brand. With Wynn holding one of only six gaming licenses and plans to develop further with its Crystal Pavilion project, it stands to benefit from this growth. That said, the Macao market is highly regulated, and as a result, the pace and timing of growth are at the discretion of the government.

Financial Strength 

Wynn’s financial health is more stressed than peers Las Vegas Sands and MGM, but the company has taken steps to lift its liquidity profile, including suspending its dividend, cutting discretionary expenses, tapping credit facilities, and issuing debt. As a result, the company has enough liquidity to operate at near-zero revenue through 2022. Should the pandemic’s impact last longer, Morningstar analysts expect the company’s banking partners will continue to work with Wynn, given its intact regulatory intangible advantage (the source of its narrow moat), which drives cash flow generation potential. This view is supported by narrow-moat Wynn Macau surviving through 2014-15 when its debt/EBITDA temporarily rose to around 8 times, above the 4.5-5.0 covenants in those years.Wynn entered 2020 with debt/adjusted EBITDA of 5.7 times, but the metric turned negative in 2020 and was elevated in 2021 (estimated at 15.4), as demand for leisure and travel collapsed during the this period due to the COVID-19 outbreak. As demand recovers in the next few years, Morningstar analysts expect leverage to reach 10.0 times, 7.8 times, and 6.6 times in 2022, 2023, and 2024, respectively.

Bulls Say 

  • Wynn is positioned to participate in the long-term growth of Macao (76% of pre-pandemic 2019 EBITDA) and has room share of 9% with the opening of its Cotai Palace property in 2016. 
  • Wynn has a narrow economic moat, thanks to possessing one of only six licenses awarded to operate casinos in China. 
  • A focus on the high-end luxury segment of the casino industry allows the company to generate high levels of revenue and EBITDA per gaming position in the industry.

Company Profile

Wynn Resorts operates luxury casinos and resorts. The company was founded in 2002 by Steve Wynn, the former CEO. The company operates four megaresorts: Wynn Macau and Encore in Macao and Wynn Las Vegas and Encore in Las Vegas. Cotai Palace opened in August 2016 in Macao, Encore Boston Harbor in Massachusetts opened June 2019. Additionally, we expect the company to begin construction on a new building next to its existing Macao Palace resort in 2022, which we forecast to open in 2025. The company also operates Wynn Interactive, a digital sports betting and iGaming platform. The company received 76% and 24% of its 2019 pre pandemic EBITDA from Macao and Las Vegas, respectively.

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Global stocks Shares

PRICING AND SHRINKING TO STABALIZE AT  BED BATH AND BEYOND INC

Business Strategy and Outlook

In October 2020, Bed Bath & Beyond put forth an updated strategy to revitalize its brand and regain customer confidence by focusing on its core properties. As such, the company divested peripheral brands such as Cost Plus and Linen Holdings in order to focus on the Bed Bath & Beyond, Buy Buy Baby, Harmon Face Value, and Decorist labels. To help elevate its brand perception, it has combined its online and in-store inventory management with its new “omni-always” initiative in the hopes of capturing more e-commerce business and avoiding the long restock times and uneven inventories that previously plagued the firm. Additionally, it’s investing heavily in both its digital and brick-and-mortar platforms, with a revamp to the website for a more frictionless checkout process and a remodel of its physical stores to offer a cleaner and more enjoyable shopping experience. The firm has attempted to rely less on its iconic blue coupons by giving consumers a good everyday value (it is concluded discounts will persist to some degree over the long term). It also plans to right size by shuttering underperforming Bed Bath stores, shrinking the total store base to around 1,000 by the end of 2021 (from 1,500 at the end of 2019). In contrast, management expects 50% sales growth at the baby label by 2023 via new markets, with the brand already set to deliver $1.3 billion in sales in 2021. It is seen total sales declining in 2021 as the footprint continues to contract before stabilizing at a low-single-digit growth rate in 2023.

Longer term, it is conjectured the 2030 operating margin to reach 5%-6%. This improvement is primarily supported by gross margin gains (which reach 37.7%, below the 38%-plus corporate goal) from a greater focus on private label, including the introduction of 10 new owned brands. It also benefits from a lower promotional cadence thanks to SKU rationalization and the utilization of more robust inventory management processes. However, it is foreseen these gains to be offset by higher investment as the home furnishing landscape remains highly fragmented and competitive, limiting profitability to levels that are structurally lower than in the past.

Financial Strength

Bed Bath & Beyond’s cash position is solid and efforts to reduce the firm’s debt load resulted in a positive net cash position at fiscal year-end 2020. Before the firm’s $1.5 billion debt raise in 2014, it had been debt-free since 1996 (excluding acquired debt), using cash generated from operations to fund new store openings and a handful of small bolt-on acquisitions. The firm has access to liquidity through its $1 billion credit facility, which expires in 2026 and captured another $600 million-plus in cash through the sale of Personalizationmall.com, Linen Holdings, Christmas Tree Shops, One Kings Lane, and Cost-Plus World Market brands. It reduced gross debt in 2020 (with long-term debt at $1.2 billion at November 2021 versus $1.5 billion at the end of fiscal 2019) and plans to continue paying down its debt, aiming to reach a gross debt ratio of 3 times by 2023. There is ample cash on hand (roughly $509 million as of Nov. 27, 2021) to cover near-term expenses like operating lease obligations.

Over the past five reported fiscal years, the firm has produced cumulative free cash flow (cash from operations minus capital expenditures) of $2.1 billion. However, it is anticipated this level to be tempered over 2021-23 as Bed Bath spends around $375 million annually to improve new stores, existing stores, its supply chain, and technology in this time frame. Free cash flow to equity has averaged about 4% of revenue during the past five reported years, which is decent for a mature company that is still spending to remain competitive, but it is likely this level to decline as secular headwinds weigh on performance and necessary investment levels pick up. Despite the higher spending ahead, Bed Bath has a plan to complete its share $1 billion in shares buy back by the end of fiscal 2021.

Bulls Say’s

  • Less discretionary categories such as linens, towels, and cookware offer some resiliency amid macroeconomic cyclicality. Registries across bridal, baby, and gift have historically provided a steady stream of customers.
  • The closure of numerous underperforming stores by the end of 2021 could help lift the profitability of the business faster than it can be anticipated as better performing stores make up a greater proportion of the fleet.
  • With a push into expanding the representation of owned brands (already accounting for 20% of sales), gross margin metrics could expand faster than it can get forecast.

Company Profile 

Bed Bath & Beyond is a home furnishings retailer, operating just under 1,000 stores in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico. Stores carry an assortment of branded bed and bath accessories, kitchen textiles, and cooking supplies. In addition to 809 Bed Bath & Beyond stores, the company operates 133 Buy Buy Baby stores and 53 Harmon Face Values stores (health/beauty care). In an effort to refocus on its core businesses, the firm has divested the online retailer Personalizationmall.com, One Kings Lane, Christmas Tree Shops and That (gifts/housewares), Linen Holdings, and Cost-Plus World Market.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Equifax Is Best Known for Its Credit Bureau, but Workforce Solutions Segment Driving Profit Growth

Business Strategy and Outlook

Along with TransUnion and Experian, Equifax is one of the big three credit bureaus. Given the fixed costs inherent in a data-intensive business, Equifax has been able to enjoy strong operating leverage from incremental revenue. As the U.S. credit bureau market is relatively mature, the company has been adding new capabilities and expanding its geographic footprint, both organically and through acquisitions. As an example of its bolt-on acquisition strategy, Equifax announced in January 2021 that it will acquire e-commerce fraud prevention platform Kount for $640 million. Kount builds on Equifax’s existing antifraud products and we think acquiring unique data and software assets makes sense.

Equifax’s star in recent years has been its workforce solutions segment; we expect workforce solutions revenue in 2021 to eclipse U.S. credit bureau revenue. Workforce solutions includes income verification (primarily for mortgages), and we don’t believe Equifax has meaningful direct competition for this service. We expect Equifax’s competitive position to persist as the large amount of existing records and the difficulty of convincing employers to share employee information would be too tough for new entrants to overcome. In the years ahead, we expect Equifax to focus on expanding use cases of income verification beyond mortgage to auto, credit card, and government services. Workforce solutions also includes employers’ services, which consist of employee onboarding solutions, I-9 management, tax form services, and unemployment claims processing, the last of which provided a meaningful source of countercyclical revenue amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

Equifax’s reputation took a beating after a well-publicized data breach in September 2017. This wasn’t the first time Equifax suffered a data breach; however, the depth and the breadth of the breach created ire among the public and showed that the company wasn’t prepared to handle customers data securely. Following the breach, Equifax has invested heavily in cybersecurity ($292 million in 2019) and incurred significant legal and product liability costs. In our view, Equifax has largely put the episode behind it.

Financial Strength

Equifax management has historically been reasonably conservative with the balance sheet, with leverage ratios (net debt/adjusted EBITDA) between 1.5 and 3.0 times in the past several years. Management has shown a willingness to increase debt after an acquisition. Following the acquisition of Veda in 2016, the leverage ratio went to 3.5 times, but the firm quickly paid some of its debt to reduce

leverage. Following the data breach in 2017, leverage increased as the firm incurred significant costs related to the breach. At the end of 2020, Equifax disclosed that it had $4.4 billion in long-term debt and $1.7 billion of cash. On a net leverage basis, we calculate Equifax’s leverage at the

end of the fourth quarter of 2020 was 1.8 times. Given this and the fact that a significant subset of the company’s business is either not very economically sensitive or countercyclical, we believe Equifax is on strong financial footing amid the coronavirus-induced macroeconomic uncertainty.

Bulls Say’s

  • The workforce solutions segment is a fast-growing business built on unique data and can contribute meaningfully to earnings growth. Equifax can increase use cases in nonmortgage applications for income verification. 
  • Equifax’s businesses lines are capital-light, and incremental revenue tends to flow to the bottom line, generating high returns on invested capital and operating margin expansion
  • Equifax’s acquisitions can further solidify its moat and diversify its lines of business.

Company Profile 

Along with Experian and TransUnion, Equifax is one of the leading credit bureaus in the United States. Equifax’s credit reports provide credit histories on millions of consumers, and the firm’s services are critical to lenders’ credit decisions. In addition, about a third of the firm’s revenue comes from workforce solutions, which provides income verification and employer human resources services. Equifax generates over 20% of its revenue from outside the United States.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Equifax: one of the big three credit bureaus, taking the limelight is the Workforce

Business Strategy and Outlook

Along with TransUnion and Experian, Equifax is one of the big three credit bureaus. Given the fixed costs inherent in a data-intensive business, Equifax has been able to enjoy strong operating leverage from incremental revenue. As the U.S. credit bureau market is relatively mature, the company has been adding new capabilities and expanding its geographic footprint, both organically and through acquisitions. As an example of its bolt-on acquisition strategy, Equifax announced in January 2021 that it will acquire e-commerce fraud prevention platform Kount for $640 million. Kount builds on Equifax’s existing antifraud products and it is anticipated, acquiring unique data and software assets makes sense.

Equifax’s star in recent years has been its workforce solutions segment; and it is supposed workforce solutions revenue in 2021 to eclipse U.S. credit bureau revenue. Workforce solutions includes income verification (primarily for mortgages), and it is not in certain of Equifax to have meaningful direct competition for this service. It is believed Equifax’s competitive position to persist as the large amount of existing records and the difficulty of convincing employers to share employee information would be too tough for new entrants to overcome. In the years ahead, it is foreseen Equifax to focus on expanding use cases of income verification beyond mortgage to auto, credit card, and government services. Workforce solutions also includes employers’ services, which consist of employee onboarding solutions, I-9 management, tax form services, and unemployment claims processing, the last of which provided a meaningful source of countercyclical revenue amid the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Equifax’s reputation took a beating after a well-publicized data breach in September 2017. This wasn’t the first time Equifax suffered a data breach; however, the depth and the breadth of the breach created ire among the public and showed that the company wasn’t prepared to handle customers data securely. Following the breach, Equifax has invested heavily in cybersecurity ($292 million in 2019) and incurred significant legal and product liability costs. It is seen, Equifax has largely put the episode behind it

Financial Strength

Equifax management has historically been reasonably conservative with the balance sheet, with leverage ratios (net debt/adjusted EBITDA) between 1.5 and 3.0 times in the past several years. Management has shown a willingness to increase debt after an acquisition. Following the acquisition of Veda in 2016, the leverage ratio went to 3.5 times, but the firm quickly paid some of its debt to reduce leverage. Following the data breach in 2017, leverage increased as the firm incurred significant costs related to the breach. At the end of 2020, Equifax disclosed that it had $4.4 billion in long-term debt and $1.7 billion of cash. On a net leverage basis, we calculate Equifax’s leverage at the end of the fourth quarter of 2020 was 1.8 times. Given this and the fact that a significant subset of the company’s business is either not very economically sensitive or countercyclical, it is seen, Equifax is on strong financial footing amid the coronavirus-induced macroeconomic uncertainty

 Bulls Say’s

  • The workforce solutions segment is a fast-growing business built on unique data and can contribute meaningfully to earnings growth. Equifax can increase use cases in nonmortgage applications for income verification.
  • Equifax’s businesses lines are capital-light, and incremental revenue tends to flow to the bottom line, generating high returns on invested capital and operating margin expansion. 
  • Equifax’s acquisitions can further solidify its moat and diversify its lines of business.

Company Profile 

Along with Experian and TransUnion, Equifax is one of the leading credit bureaus in the United States. Equifax’s credit reports provide credit histories on millions of consumers, and the firm’s services are critical to lenders’ credit decisions. In addition, about a third of the firm’s revenue comes from workforce solutions, which provides income verification and employer human resources services. Equifax generates over 20% of its revenue from outside the United States.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dollar Tree’s Price Hike Should Help, but Long-Term Competition Remains a Concern

Business Strategy and Outlook:

Dollar Tree’s namesake banner has a long history of strong performance, enabled by its differentiated value proposition, but, before the pandemic, its Family Dollar unit (acquired in 2015) struggled to generate top-line and margin growth. Dollar Tree banner is better positioned long-term, but do not believe the aggregated firm benefits from a durable competitive edge, as competitive pressure in a fast-changing retail environment amid minimal switching costs limits results.

Accounting for around half of sales, the Dollar Tree banner’s wide assortment of products at $1.25 or less has appealed to customers, drawing a broad range of low to middle-income consumers. We believe the concept has room to grow (with square footage rising by a low- to mid-single-digit percentage long term), expanding in new markets while also increasing density. The chain’s fast-changing assortment creates a treasure hunt experience that has a history of drawing customers (posting nearly 3% same-store sales growth on average over the past five years) and has been hard for online retailers to match.

Financial Strength:

Though it took on considerable debt to fund its 2015 purchase of Family Dollar, Dollar Tree’s leverage-reduction efforts have left it on sound financial footing. Its strong balance sheet and free cash flow generation should suffice to fund growth and investments necessary to maintain low price points and respond to competitive pressure. The firm ended fiscal 2020 with net debt at less than three-quarters adjusted EBITDA, the latter of which covered interest expense more than 17 times. Furthermore, capital expenditures to fuel store growth are fairly discretionary, so Dollar Tree should be able to curb targets if needed in the event of financial strain.

Bulls Say:

  • Dollar Tree’s $1.25 price point concept is differentiated, holding absolute dollar costs low for customers while allowing the retailer to realize higher margins than conventional retailers. 
  • Small ticket sizes make it difficult for online retailers to contend with Dollar Tree’s single-price-point model as shipping costs weigh on their ability to compete profitably. 
  • As its two banners become more closely integrated and the store network expands, Dollar Tree should leverage its supply chain and distribution infrastructure investments, generating resources to fuel its low-price model.

Company Profile:

Dollar Tree operates discount stores in the U.S. and Canada, including over 7,800 shops under both its namesake and Family Dollar units (nearly 15,700 in total). The eponymous chain features branded and private-label goods, generally at a $1.25 price. Nearly 50% of Dollar Tree stores’ fiscal 2020 sales came from consumables (including food, health and beauty, and household paper and cleaning products), just over 45% from variety items (including toys and housewares), and 5% from seasonal goods. Family Dollar features branded and private-label goods at prices generally ranging from $1 to $10, with over 76% of fiscal 2020 sales from consumables, 9% from seasonal/electronic items (including prepaid phones and toys), 9% from home products, and 6% from apparel and accessories.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Dollar Tree Inc: Distinguished by its $1.25 price point concept

Business Strategy and Outlook

Dollar Tree’s namesake banner has a long history of strong performance, enabled by its differentiated value proposition, but, before the pandemic, its Family Dollar unit (acquired in 2015) struggled to generate top-line and margin growth. It is suspected the Dollar Tree banner is better positioned long-term, but do not believe the aggregated firm benefits from a durable competitive edge, as competitive pressure in a fast-changing retail environment amid minimal switching costs limits results. We expect the pandemic’s effects to be confined to the near term, leaving the long-term competitive dynamic intact. 

Accounting for around half of sales, the Dollar Tree banner’s wide assortment of products at $1.25 or less has appealed to customers, drawing a broad range of low to middle-income consumers. The concept has room to grow (with square footage rising by a low- to mid-single-digit percentage long term), expanding in new markets while also increasing density. The chain’s fast-changing assortment creates a treasure hunt experience that has a history of drawing customers (posting nearly 3% same-store sales growth on average over the past five years) and has been hard for online retailers to match. With basket sizes small and the average transaction resulting in a modest bill, we consider the segment relatively well insulated from the digital threat. 

Prospects are murkier at Family Dollar, which has struggled since its acquisition, though the pandemic has provided a fleeting sales lift. Evenly distributed between urban and rural areas, it is anticipated that the chain’s presence in cities is especially susceptible to competitive pressures from a bevy of convenience stores, mass merchandisers, and grocers. While its mix of low prices and convenience carries appeal, particularly among customers that do not have nearby alternatives, It is expected that the benefits of operational improvements and tighter integration with Dollar Tree will largely be offset by competitive strain.

Despite the headwinds, both chains should deliver long-term top-line and margin growth in aggregate, capitalizing on consumers’ desire for convenience and value even as the landscape becomes more challenging.

Financial Strength

Though it took on considerable debt to fund its 2015 purchase of Family Dollar, Dollar Tree’s leverage-reduction efforts have left it on sound financial footing, in our view. Its strong balance sheet and free cash flow generation should suffice to fund growth and investments necessary to maintain low price points and respond to competitive pressure. With the stores remaining open and catering to essentials, we expect little difficulty with navigating the challenges presented by the pandemic. The firm ended fiscal 2020 with net debt at less than three-quarters adjusted EBITDA, the latter of which covered interest expense more than 17 times, neither mark troubling. Despite aggressive growth in the Dollar Tree banner (from under 4,000 stores at the start of fiscal 2010 to more than 7,800 at the end of fiscal 2020) and performance improvement investments at Family Dollar, cash generation has been strong. It is expected to have free cash flow to the firm to average 5% of sales over our explicit forecast. Furthermore, capital expenditures to fuel store growth are discretionary, so Dollar Tree should be able to curb targets if needed in the event of financial strain. Annual outlays to average 3%-4% of sales over the next decade, or just over $1 billion. We do not anticipate Dollar Tree will introduce a dividend. Instead, we expect it to direct excess funds to share repurchases, consistent with its practice before the Family Dollar purchase (the firm bought back an average of just under $500 million in shares annually from fiscal 2010 to 2014, adding $200 million in fiscal 2019 and $400 million in fiscal 2020). In the long term, we assume the company uses around 60% of its cash flow from operations to buy shares.

Bulls Say’s

  • Dollar Tree’s $1.25 price point concept is differentiated, holding absolute dollar costs low for customers while allowing the retailer to realize higher margins than conventional retailers. 
  • Small ticket sizes make it difficult for online retailers to contend with Dollar Tree’s single-price-point model as shipping costs weigh on their ability to compete profitably. 
  • As its two banners become more closely integrated and the store network expands, Dollar Tree should leverage its supply chain and distribution infrastructure investments, generating resources to fuel its low-price model.

Company Profile 

Dollar Tree operates discount stores in the U.S. and Canada, including over 7,800 shops under both its namesake and Family Dollar units (nearly 15,700 in total). The eponymous chain features branded and private-label goods, generally at a $1.25 price. Nearly 50% of Dollar Tree stores’ fiscal 2020 sales came from consumables (including food, health and beauty, and household paper and cleaning products), just over 45% from variety items (including toys and housewares), and 5% from seasonal goods. Family Dollar features branded and private-label goods at prices generally ranging from $1 to $10, with over 76% of fiscal 2020 sales from consumables, 9% from seasonal/electronic items (including prepaid phones and toys), 9% from home products, and 6% from apparel and accessories.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

Nike’s Powerful Brand and E-Commerce Position It Well Despite Some Short-Term Issues

Business Strategy and Outlook

We view Nike as the leader of the athletic apparel market and believe it will overcome the challenge of COVID-19 despite near-term supply issues. Morningstar analyst think Nike’s strategies allow it to maintain its leadership position. In mid-2017, Nike announced a consumer-focused realignment. It is investing in its direct-to-consumer network while reducing the number of retail partners that carry its product. In North America and elsewhere, the firm is reducing its exposure to undifferentiated retailers while increasing distribution through a small number of retailers that bring the Nike brand closer to consumers, carry a full range of products, and allow it to control the brand message. Nike’s consumer plan is led by its Triple Double strategy to double innovation, speed, and direct connections to consumers. Triple Double includes cutting product creation times in half, increasing membership in Nike’s mobile apps, and improving the selection of key franchises while reducing its styles by 25%. We think these strategies will allow Nike to hold share and pricing.

Although its recent results in China have been inconsistent due to supply issues and a political controversy, Morningstar analyst still believe Nike has a great opportunity for growth there and in other emerging markets. Moreover, with worldwide distribution and huge e-commerce that totaled about $9.3 billion in fiscal 2021, Nike should benefit as more people in China, Latin America, and other developing regions move into the middle class and gain broadband access.

Financial Strength

 Nike is in excellent financial shape to weather the COVID-19 crisis. At the end of fiscal 2021’s second quarter, Nike had $9.4 billion in long-term debt but $15.1 billion in cash and short-term investments.Nike does not have any long-term debt maturities until May 1, 2023, when its $500 million in 2.25% senior unsecured debt matures, but it does have significant endorsement commitments that, as of the end of fiscal 2021, totaled at least $5.5 billion over the ensuing five fiscal years. The firm produced nearly $19 billion in free cash flow to equity over the past five years, and Morningstar anlayst estimate it will generate more than $38 billion in free cash flow to equity over the next five. Nike issued $1.6 billion in dividends in fiscal 2021 and analyst forecast an average annual dividend payout ratio of about 30% over the next decade. Over the next five fiscal years, Morningstar analyst forecast that Nike will repurchase about $19 billion in stock and issue $11 billion in dividends. 

Bull Says

  • Nike has a great opportunity in fast-growing markets like China. More than 70% of Nike’s growth over the next five years may come from outside North America. 
  • Nike’s Triple Double strategy of increased innovation, direct-to-consumer sales, and speed may improve margins and share. Membership growth in its digital channel has exceeded expectations. 
  • Nike’s gross margins may expand by a couple dozen basis points per year through automation, ecommerce, and higher prices. Nike is actively shifting sales to differentiated retail in North America to increase full-priced sales

Company Profile

Nike is the largest athletic footwear and apparel brand in the world. It designs, develops, and markets athletic apparel, footwear, equipment, and accessories in six major categories: running, basketball, soccer, training, sportswear, and Jordan. Footwear generates about two thirds of its sales. Nike’s brands include Nike, Jordan, and Converse (casual footwear). Nike sells products worldwide and outsources its production to more than 300 factories in more than 30 countries. Nike was founded in 1964 and is based in Beaverton, Oregon

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.