Categories
Global stocks Shares

We Expect Avery Dennison Will Enjoy Another Year of Strong Growth in 2022

Business Strategy and Outlook

 Avery Dennison is the largest supplier of pressure-sensitive adhesive materials and passive radio frequency identifiers in the world. Rising consumer packaged goods penetration in emerging markets should add to label growth, while growth in omnichannel retailing will aid RFID sales at Avery Dennison.

Avery sells pressure-sensitive materials to a highly fragmented customer base that converts specialty film rolls into labels for companies such as Kraft Heinz or Amazon. The concentrated market positions of Avery and competitor UPM Reflactac give each bargaining power over their customers. The labels and graphics materials, or LGM, and industrial and healthcare materials, or IHM, segments account for roughly 74% of company revenue. They convert paper, vinyl, and adhesives into composite films that become shipping labels, automotive graphics, and special-use tapes and films. While demand for these products is stagnant in developed markets, and expect Avery’s large emerging market footprint (around 40% of revenue for these segments) to drive mid-single-digit revenue growth.

 Avery’s Retail Branding and Information Systems segment, or RBIS, makes up 26% of sales and produces a mixture of apparel graphics, product tags, and passive radio frequency identifiers or RFID. While RFID accounts for around 25% of the segment’s revenue, it has grown rapidly in recent years and has increasingly become the focus of Avery’s RBIS segment. RFID products are typically integrated into product tags in industries which have both a diverse inventory and where UPC scanning is cumbersome or labour-intensive, such as apparel. Avery’s recent strategy shift to focus on reducing both costs and prices of the technology in order to gain share demonstrates the commoditized nature of these products. Even so, and think Avery will at least be able to grow with the market, or between 15% and 20% per year. The remainder of segment revenue comes from the application and production of apparel graphics and tags. It is expected expect revenue growth of these end uses to remain mixed, dependent largely on shifting fashion preferences.

Financial Strength

Avery Dennison is in very good financial health. The company ended 2021 with net debt/EBITDA of roughly 2.2, which gives the firm room to manoeuvre with regard to additional acquisitions, opportunistic share buybacks, or to boost its dividend. This remains just below management’s target range of 2.3-2.6, aimed at preserving its BBB credit rating. Avery’s target range of debt remains manageable, and shouldn’t become a material burden even if economic conditions worsen. Thanks to the amount of business Avery derives from consumer staples, cash flows usually remain relatively stable throughout the economic cycle.

Bulls Say’s

  • Emerging-market adoption of consumer-packaged goods will provide a long runway for sales growth. 
  • As RFID technology becomes widely adopted, Avery’s growth should receive a hefty tailwind. 
  • Avery’s dominance in retail branding information systems should lead to widening segment margins

Company Profile 

Avery Dennison manufactures pressure-sensitive materials, merchandise tags, and labels. The company also runs a specialty converting business that produces radio-frequency identification inlays and labels. Avery Dennison draws a significant amount of revenue from outside the United States, with international operations accounting for the majority of total sales.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

J.B. Hunt’s Intermodal Rate Backdrop Holding Strong, 2022 Freight Outlook Favorable

Business Strategy and Outlook

 At its core, J.B. Hunt is an intermodal marketing company; it contracts with the Class I railroads for the line-haul movement of its domestic containers. It was one of the first for-hire truckload carriers to venture into intermodal shipping, forming a partnership with Burlington Northern Santa Fe in the West in 1990. Years later, it struck an agreement with Norfolk Southern in the East. Hunt has established a clear leadership position in intermodal shipping, with a 20%-plus share of a $22 billion-plus industry. The next-largest competitor is Hub Group, followed by Schneider National’s intermodal division and XPO Logistics’ intermodal unit. Intermodal made up slightly less than half of Hunt’s total revenue in 2021.

Hunt isn’t immune to downturns, but over the past decade-plus it’s reduced its exposure to the more capital-intensive truckload-shipping sector, which represents about 28% of sales (including for-hire and dedicated-contract business) versus 60% in 2005. Hunt is also shifting its for-hire truckload division to more of an asset-light model via its drop-trailer offering while investing meaningfully in asset-light truck brokerage and final-mile delivery.

 Rates in the competing truckload market corrected in 2019, driving down intermodal’s value proposition relative to trucking. Thus, 2019 was a hangover year and fallout from pandemic lockdowns pressured container volume into early 2020. However, truckload capacity has since tightened drastically, contract pricing is rising nicely across all modes, and underlying intermodal demand has rebounded sharply on the spike in retail goods consumption (intermodal cargo is mostly consumer goods) and heavy retailer restocking. Hunt is grappling with near-term rail network congestion that’s constraining volume growth, but the firm is working diligently with the rails and customers to minimize the issue. The expectation is that  2.5%-3.0% U.S. retail sales growth and conversion trends to support 3.0%-3.5% industry container volume expansion longer term, with 2.0%-2.5% pricing gains on average, though Hunt’s intermodal unit should modestly outperform those trends given its favorable competitive positioning.

Financial Strength

J.B. Hunt enjoys a strong balance sheet and is not highly leveraged. It had total debt near $1.3 billion and debt/EBITDA of about 1 time at the end of 2021, roughly in line with the five-year average. EBITDA covered interest expense by a very comfortable 35 times in 2021, and expect Hunt will have no problems making interest or principal payments during our forecast period. Hunt posted more than $350 million in cash at the end of 2021, up from $313 million at the end of 2020. Historically, Hunt has held modest levels of cash, in part because of share-repurchase activity and its preference for organic growth (including investment in new containers and chassis, for example) over acquisitions. For reference, it posted $7.6 million in cash and equivalents at the end of 2018 and $14.5 million in 2017. The company generates consistent cash flow, which has historically been more than sufficient to fund capital expenditures for equipment and dividends, as well as a portion of share-repurchase activity. It is expected that trend to persist. Net capital expenditures will jump to $1.5 billion in 2022 as the firm completes its intermodal container expansion efforts, but after that it should also have ample room for debt reduction in the years ahead, depending on its preference for share buybacks. Overall, Hunt will mostly deploy cash to grow organically, while taking advantage of opportunistic tuck-in acquisitions (a deal in dedicated or truck brokerage isn’t out of the question, but and suspect the final mile delivery niche is most likely near term).

Bulls Say’s

  •  Intermodal shipping enjoys favorable long-term trends, including secular constraints on truckload capacity growth and shippers’ efforts to minimize transportation costs through mode conversions (truck to rail). 
  • It is believed that the intermodal market share in the Eastern U. S. still has room for expansion, suggesting growth potential via share gains from shorter-haul trucking. 
  • J.B. Hunt’s asset-light truck brokerage unit is benefiting from strong execution, deep capacity access, and tight market capacity. It’s also moved quickly in terms of boosting back-office and carrier sourcing automation.

Company Profile 

J.B. Hunt Transport Services ranks among the top surface transportation companies in North America by revenue. Its primary operating segments are intermodal delivery, which uses the Class I rail carriers for the underlying line-haul movement of its owned containers (45% of sales in 2021); dedicated trucking services that provide customer-specific fleet needs (21%); for-hire truckload (7%); heavy goods final-mile delivery (6%), and asset-light truck brokerage (21%).

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

Mondelez’s management refraining from quantifying its cost-saving aims

Business Strategy and Outlook

Since taking the helm at Mondelez four years ago, CEO Dirk Van de Put has orchestrated a plan to drive balanced sales and profit growth by empowering local leaders, extending the distribution of its fare, and facilitating more agility as it relates to product innovation (aims that are hitting the mark). It wasn’t surprising reigniting the top line was at the forefront of its strategic direction. More specifically, Mondelez targets 3%-plus sales growth long term as it works to sell its wares in more channels and reinvests in new products aligned with consumer trends at home and abroad. Further, it has looked to acquire niche brands to build out its category and geographic exposure, which is seen to be prudent. 

But despite opportunities to bolster sales, it weren’t anticipated the pendulum to shift entirely to top-line gains under Van de Put’s watch; rather, based on his tenure at privately held McCain Foods and past rhetoric, it is alleged driving consistently profitable growth would be the priority. As such, the suggestion showcase that Mondelez is poised to realize additional efficiency gains through fiscal 2022 favorably. While management has refrained from quantifying its cost-saving aims, it is seen an additional $750 million in costs (a low- to mid-single-digit percentage of cost of goods sold and operating expenses, excluding depreciation and amortization) it could remove (on top of the $1.5 billion realized before the pandemic). It is foreseen this can be achieved by extracting further complexity from its operations, including rationalizing its supplier base, parting ways with unprofitable brands, and continuing to upgrade its manufacturing facilities. 

It isn’t likely that, these savings to merely boost profits, though. In this vein, management has stressed a portion of any savings realized would fuel added spending behind its brands in the form of research, development, and marketing, supporting the brand intangible asset underpinning Mondelez’s wide moat. This aligns with analysts forecast for research, development, and marketing to edge up to nearly 7% of sales on average over the next 10 years (or about $2.4 billion annually), above historical levels of 6% ($1.7 billion).

Financial Strength

In assessing Mondelez’s balance sheet strength, it isn’t foreseen any material impediments to its financial flexibility. In this vein, Mondelez maintained $3.5 billion of cash on its balance sheet against $19.5 billion of total debt as of the end of fiscal 2021. Experts forecast free cash flow will average around 15% of sales annually over Experts 10-year explicit forecast (about $5.2 billion on average each year). And it is in view that returning excess cash to shareholders will remain a priority. Analysts forecast Mondelez will increase its shareholder dividend (which currently yields around 2%) in the high-single-digit range on average annually through fiscal 2031 (implying a payout ratio between just north of 40%), while also repurchasing around 2%-3% of shares outstanding annually. It is held Mondelez has proven itself a prudent capital allocator and could also opt to add on brands and businesses that extend its reach in untapped categories and/or geographies from time to time–although it is unlikely believe it has much of an appetite for a transformational deal. It is alleged the opportunity to expand its footprint into untapped markets–such as Indonesia and Germany–or into other adjacent snacking categories (like health and wellness) could be in the cards. Recent deals have included adding Tate’s Bake Shop for $500 million in 2018, Perfect Snacks (in 2019, refrigerated snack bars), Give & Go (2020, an in-store bakery operator),and Chipita (2021, Central and Eastern European croissants and baked goods) to its fold. But at just a low-single-digit percentage of sales, none of these deals are material enough to move the needle on its overall results.

Bulls Say’s

  • Mondelez’s decision to empower in-market leaders and fuel investments behind its local jewels (which historically had been starved in favor of its global brands) stands to incite growth in emerging markets for some time. 
  • Experts suggest the firm is committed to maintaining a stringent focus on extracting inefficiencies from its business, including the target to shed more than 25% of its noncore stock-keeping units to reduce complexity. 
  • Management has suggested it won’t sacrifice profit improvement merely to inflate its near-term sales profile, which is foreseen as a plus.

Company Profile 

Mondelez has operated as an independent organization since its split from the former Kraft Foods North American grocery business in October 2012. The firm is a leading player in the global snack arena with a presence in the biscuit (47% of sales), chocolate (32%), gum/candy (10%), beverage (4%), and cheese and grocery (7%) aisles. Mondelez’s portfolio includes well-known brands like Oreo, Chips Ahoy, Halls, Trident, and Cadbury, among others. The firm derives around one third of revenue from developing markets, nearly 40% from Europe, and the remainder from North America. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

AIG Targeting for an underlying combined ratio below 90% by the end of 2022

Business Strategy and Outlook

The years since the financial crisis have shown that American International Group would have destroyed substantial value even if it had never written a single credit default swap, had noncore businesses it needed to shed, and had material issues in its core operations that it needed to fix. It is encouraging, however, by the recent progress in terms of improving underwriting margins, and the plan to take out $1 billion in costs by 2022 would be another material step. In 2020, the impact of the coronavirus has obscured the company’s progress, but it is held results over the past year have been encouraging. COVID-19 losses to date have been very manageable. As a percentage of capital, losses have stayed well within the range of historical events that the industry has successfully absorbed in the past. 

The longer-term picture looks relatively bright. The pricing environment has not been particularly favorable in recent years. However, in 2019, pricing momentum picked up in primary lines, and this positive trend only accelerated in 2020. More recently, pricing has started to plateau, but the industry has enjoyed the highest pricing increases it has seen since 2003. While higher pricing is necessary to some extent to offset lower interest rates and a rise in social inflation, pricing increases appear to be more than offsetting these factors. As a result, commercial P&C insurers are experiencing a positive trend in underlying underwriting profitability, and potential for a truly hard pricing market can be seen, similar to the period that followed 9/11. 

It is seen AIG has made material progress in improving its under/over the past couple of years, and has set a target for an underlying combined ratio below 90% by the end of 2022. Assuming an average level of catastrophe losses, it is likely this is a level that would allow P&C operations to achieve an acceptable level of return, and a harder pricing market may make hitting this target easier.

Financial Strength

It is alleged AIG’s balance sheet is sound, although the company is arguably in a somewhat weaker position than peers until it can improve profitability. Equity/assets was 13% at the end of 2021. This level is lower than P&C peers but reasonable if AIG’s life insurance operations, which operate with higher balance sheet leverage, are considered. During 2014, the company reduced its debt load by about $10 billion and eliminated much of its high-coupon debt, which improved its financial flexibility. Barring any unforeseen events, it is anticipated the company has room to continue to return capital to shareholders, and management had been returning a lot of capital to shareholders, in part through divestitures and some restructuring, although in recent years management has curtailed buybacks as AIG pivoted toward growth and acquisitions have become part of the strategic plan

Bulls Say’s

  • The aftermath of AIG’s issues during the financial crisis occupied much of management’s attention for quite some time. With these issues resolved, management can focus on the company’s operations, and there could be ample scope for improvement. 
  • AIG has demonstrated progress in improving underwriting margins in its P&C business. 
  • The current focus on risk-adjusted returns sets a proper course for the company, and just increasing profitability to the level of its peers would represent a material improvement.

Company Profile 

American International Group is one of the largest insurance and financial services firms in the world and has a global footprint. It operates through a wide range of subsidiaries that provide property, casualty, and life insurance. Its revenue is split roughly evenly between commercial and consumer lines. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Long term Narrative Intact for Domino’s, but Driver Shortage and Inflation Pose Near-Term Concerns

Business Strategy and Outlook:

The coronavirus catalyzed sweeping changes across the restaurant industry, with operators scrambling to provide delivery-integration, build out e-commerce, and pivot to digital-driven models. For Domino’s, save for the firm’s rollout of contactless car-side carryout, very little changed. The operator’s historical investments in “anyware” ordering, a best-in-class e-commerce interface, and a mix that skewed toward delivery (55%) before the pandemic propelled global systemwide sales growth of 20%, despite the global food-service market remaining 11% below pre-pandemic levels at 

the end of 2021, per our calculations and Euromonitor data. 

Domino’s 2020 results strongly validated management’s strategies (automation of core processes, a focus on volume-driven traffic growth, shrinking service radii, and transparent delivery pricing), and encouraged by their relevance looking beyond the 2020 and 2021. Moving forward, the biggest challenges facing the firm are likely to be the democratization of delivery services (expanding consumer optionality and increasing price sensitivity as groceries and convenience stores enter the mix) and input cost inflation, both of which are at least partially addressed by current strategies. While peers have turned to menu diversification and quality to carve out a niche, Domino’s commitment to value and convenience as disciplined, doubling down on core competencies. Menu diversification is risky, with no guarantee that operators can provide competitive products, while adding stock-keeping units and operational risk. Minimizing delivery times and emphasizing the higher-margin carryout business through fortressing, while maintaining strong value positioning should allow Domino’s to effectively compete in a world where expanded consumer choice demands quality, convenience, and competitive pricing.

Financial Strength:

Domino’s remains in good financial health, with a steady stream of royalty receipts handily covering interest obligations throughout the explicit forecast. While forecast 5.9 times debt/EBITDA at the end of 2021 (on the upper end of management’s 3-6 times targeted range) appears high at first blush, it is consistent with other heavily franchised operators in our coverage (Restaurant Brands International sports 5-6 times, while Yum Brands targets 5), and debt service represents a manageable average annual outlay of 26.5% of operating income through 2026. Further, the projected free cash flow conversion (or cash flow to the firm as a percentage of net revenue) of 14% over the same period offers ample flexibility to channel capital toward its most efficient use- whether new unit growth, software development, store remodeling, or shareholder distributions.

With restaurants often featuring negative working capital, attributable to longer-dated payables and a cash-focused business model, the solvency metrics as a more appropriate evaluation of operator’s financial health. An average EBITDA coverage ratio of 4.1 times through 2026, which appears sound. An effective interest rate of just 3.8% in 2021 corroborates this view, with Domino’s recent issues hovering around investment-grade breakpoints (as they are secured by future royalties and intellectual property). The firm’s debt maturities are adequately spaced out, with a negligible amount of principal coming due over the next three years. The firm relies on approximately biannual recapitalization transactions to pay down maturing issues, repurchase shares, and maintain leverage targets (with the intention of minimizing the firm’s weighted average cost of capital), with the most recent occurring in April 2021. Dominos also maintains a $200 million variable note funding facility, of which $155.8 million was available as of Dec. 31, 2021.

Bulls Say:

  • Category-leading margins and a cohesive franchise network will continue to drive unit growth outperformance for Domino’s.
  • The firm’s fortressing strategy allows it to capitalize on core competencies (price and convenience), cementing its leading role in the U.S. QSR pizza market.
  • Master franchise relationships continue to push impressive unit growth in underpenetrated markets like Latin America, India, and China, which offer substantial space for greenfield development.

Company Profile:

Domino’s Pizza is a restaurant operator and franchiser with nearly 18,850 stores across more than 90 international markets. The firm generates revenue through the sales of pizza, wings, salads, and sandwiches at company-owned stores, royalty and marketing contributions from franchise-operated stores, and its network of 26 domestic (and five Canadian) dough manufacturing and supply chain facilities, which centralize purchasing, preparation, and last-mile delivery for the firm’s U.S. and Canadian restaurants. With roughly $17.7 billion in 2021 system sales, Domino’s is the largest player in the global pizza market, ahead of Pizza Hut, Papa John’s, and Little Caesars.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

InterContinental Hotels Group PLC with over 100 million loyalty members

Business Strategy and Outlook

It is alleged InterContinental to retain its brand intangible asset (a source of its narrow moat rating) and expand room share in the hotel industry in the next decade. Renovated and newer brands supporting a favorable next-generation traveler position as well as its industry-leading loyalty program will drive this growth. The company currently has a mid-single-digit percentage share of global hotel rooms and 11% share of all industry pipeline rooms. It is seen its total room growth averaging 3%-4% over the next decade, above the 1.8% supply increase is projected for the U.S. industry. 

With 99% of rooms managed or franchised, InterContinental has an attractive recurring-fee business model with high returns on invested capital and significant switching costs (a second moat source) for property owners, as managed and franchised hotels have low fixed costs and capital requirements, and contracts lasting 20-30 years have meaningful cancellation costs for owners. 

It is anticipated InterContinental’s brand and switching cost advantage to strengthen, driven by new hotel brands, renovation of existing properties, technology integration, and a leading loyalty program, which all drive developer and traveler demand for the company. InterContinental has added six brands since 2016; it now has 16 in total. InterContinental announced in August 2021 a new luxury brand, with details to be provided soon. Additionally, the company announced a midscale concept in June 2017, Avid, which the company sees as addressing an underserved $20 billion market with 14 million guests, under a normal demand environment. Also, InterContinental has recently renovated its Crowne Plaza (13% of total room base) and Holiday Inn/Holiday Inn Express (62%) properties, which will support its brand advantage. Beyond this, the firm has over 100 million loyalty members, providing an immediate demand channel for third-party hotel owners joining its brand.

Financial Strength

InterContinental’s financial health remains good, despite COVID-19 challenges. InterContinental entered 2020 with net debt/EBITDA of 2.5 times, and its asset-light business model allows the company to operate with low fixed costs and stable unit growth, which led to $584 million in cash flow generation in 2021. During 2020, InterContinental took action to increase its liquidity profile, including suspending dividends and deferring discretionary capital expenditures. Also, the company tapped $425 million of its $1.3 billion credit facility, which has since been repaid. As a result, InterContinental has enough liquidity to operate at near zero revenue into 2023. It is likely banking partners would work to provide InterContinental liquidity as needed, given that the company holds a brand advantage, which will drive healthy cash flow as travel demand returns. InterContinental’s EBIT/interest coverage ratio of 5.4 times for 2019 was healthy, and it is held for it to average 9.1 times over the next five years after temporarily dipping to 3.4 times in 2021. It is projected the company generates about $2.3 billion in free cash flow (operating cash flow minus capital expenditures) during 2022-26, which it uses to pay down debt, distribute dividends, and repurchase shares (with the last two starting in 2022).

Bulls Say’s

  • InterContinental’s current mid-single-digit percentage of hotel industry room share is set to increase as the company controls 11% of the rooms in the global hotel industry pipeline. 
  • InterContinental is well positioned to benefit from the increasing presence of the next-generation traveler though emerging lifestyle brands Kimpton, Avid, Even, Hotel Indigo, Hualuxe, and Voco. 
  • InterContinental has a high exposure to recurring managed and franchised fees (around 95% of total operating income), which have high switching costs and generate strong ROIC.

Company Profile 

InterContinental Hotels Group operates 880,000 rooms across 16 brands addressing the midscale through luxury segments. Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn Express constitute the largest brand, while Hotel Indigo, Even, Hualuxe, Kimpton, and Voco are newer lifestyle brands experiencing strong demand. The company launched a midscale brand, Avid, in summer 2017 and closed on a 51% stake in Regent Hotels in July 2018. It acquired Six Senses in February 2019. Managed and franchised represent 99% of total rooms. As of Dec. 31, 2021, the Americas represents 57% of total rooms, with Greater China accounting for 18%; Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa make up 25%. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

ARB Corporation Ltd reported strong 1H22 results, reflecting strong sales and earnings growth

Investment Thesis

  • Experienced management team and senior staff with a track record of delivering earnings growth.  
  • Strong balance sheet with little leverage.
  • Strong presence and brands in the Australian aftermarket segment.
  • Growing presence in Europe and Middle East and potential to grow Exports.
  • Growth via acquisitions
  • Current trading multiples adequately price in the near-term growth opportunities.

Key Risks

  • Higher than expected sales growth rates. 
  • Any delays or interruptions in production, especially in Thailand which happens on an annual basis.
  • Increased competition in the Australian Aftermarket especially with competitors’ tendency to replicate ARB products.
  • Slowing down of demand from OEMs. 
  • Poor execution of R&D.
  • Currency exposure

1H22 result highlights

Relative to the pcp: 

  • Sales of $359m, up +26.5%, underpinned by solid customer demand across all segments. Sales Margin was maintained. 
  •  Profit after tax of $68.9m, and NPAT of $92.0m, were both up +27.6% relative to the pcp. 
  • The Board declared an interim fully franked dividend of 39.0cps compared with 29.0cps fully franked last year. Dividend payout ratio of 46% was higher than the 43% ratio in the pcp. 
  • Net cash provided by operating activities of $28.6m in 1H22, was driven by the profit after tax of $68.9m, offset by higher inventory holdings of $40.5m, as ARB sought to increase inventories in a challenging supply chain environment to facilitate continued sales growth. 
  • ARB retained a cash balance of $58.3m, a decrease of $26.4m from the June 2021 financial year end mainly due to expansionary capital purchases of PP&E for $27.0m and dividends paid to shareholders in October 2021 of $25.4m.

Company Profile

ARB Corporation Ltd (ARB) designs, manufactures, distributes, and sells 4-wheel drive vehicle accessories and light metal engineering works. It is predominantly based in Australia but also has presence in the US, Thailand, Middle East, and Europe. There are currently 61 ARB stores across Australia for aftermarket sales.

(Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Caesars Continues to See Strong U.S. Physical and Digital Demand, but Not Enough to Warrant a Moat

Business Strategy and Outlook

As a result of the acquisition of the legacy Caesars business by Eldorado (closed July 2020), we estimate Caesars holds more than a 10% revenue share of the domestic casino gaming market; this represents around 100% of the company’s total EBITDA. Caesars has realized over $1 billion in combined revenue and cost synergies from its merger with Eldorado, representing around a 30% increase to pro forma 2019 EBITDAR. Despite this successful acquisition record, Morningstar analysts don’t believe Las Vegas and other U.S. gaming regions contribute to a moat for Caesars. U.S. gaming demand is lower than in Asian regions like Macao and Singapore, where the propensity to gamble is much higher. Also, the 1,000 commercial and tribal casinos in the U.S. serve a total population of 330 million, well in excess of the 41 and 2 casinos found in Macao and Singapore, respectively, with Chinese and Singaporean populations of 1.4 billion and 5.9 million, respectively. Further, supply growth in U.S. gaming is increasing in 2021-23, with two resorts opening in Las Vegas that add a mid-single-digit percentage to market room supply. This compares with negligible additions in either Macao or Singapore, where we see no additional licenses for the foreseeable future.

That said, Caesars’ U.S. casinos are positioned to benefit from the multi-billion-dollar sports betting and iGaming market. Caesars plans to invest around $1 billion in its digital assets in the next few years, which supports Morningstar analysts forecast for about 8% of the company’s total revenue to be generated from this segment in 2026.

After reviewing Caesars’ fourth-quarter results, Morningstar analyst have decreased its fair value estimate to $108 per share from $113, driven by increased digital spend. Morningstar analyst’s valuation places a 10 times enterprise value/EBITDA multiple on analysts’ 2023 EBITDAR forecast. Drivers of forecast remain anchored in revenue and EBITDAR margins across the company’s Las Vegas and regional assets.

Financial Strength 

Caesars’ debt levels are elevated. In 2019, excluding financial lease obligations, legacy Caesars’ debt/adjusted EBITDA measured a hefty 7.8 times, while legacy Eldorado came in at 3.7 times. Morningstar analysts see Caesars’ debt/adjusted EBITDA reaching 7.9 times in 2022 and then 6.4 times in 2023 as global leisure and travel market demand continue to recover from the pandemic, aided by company cost and revenue synergies that analysts estimate to total over $1 billion. Morningstar analysts expect the $7.5 billion in free cash flow in 2022-26 as focused on reducing debt levels and investing in the digital sports and iGaming markets, with share repurchases and dividends not occurring until 2025. Caesars has no meaningful debt maturity until 2024, when $4.8 billion is scheduled to come due. 

Bull Says

  • Caesars’ best-of-breed management stands to generate cost and revenue synergies from its merger with Eldorado. 
  • Caesars has the largest property (around 50 domestic casinos versus roughly 20 for MGM) and loyalty presence (65 million members versus MGM’s roughly high-30 million), which presents cross-selling opportunities. 
  • Morningstar analysts see Caesars’ domestic properties as well positioned to benefit from the $6.2 billion U.S. sports betting revenue opportunity in 2024.

Company Profile

Caesars Entertainment includes around 50 domestic gaming properties across Las Vegas (50% of 2021 EBITDAR before corporate and digital expenses) and regional (63%) markets. Additionally, the company hosts managed properties and digital assets, the latter of which produced material EBITDA losses in 2021. Caesars’ U.S. presence roughly doubled with the 2020 acquisition by Eldorado, which built its first casino in Reno, Nevada, in 1973 and expanded its presence through prior acquisitions to over 20 properties before merging with legacy Caesars. Caesars’ brands include Caesars, Harrah’s, Tropicana, Bally’s, Isle, and Flamingo. Also, the company owns the U.S. portion of William Hill (it plans to sell the international operation in early 2022), a digital sports betting platform.

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks Shares

MetLife’s Elevated 2021 Variable Investment Income Not Likely to Last

Business Strategy & Outlook:

MetLife, like other life insurers, has its financial results tied to interest rates. It’s unlikely that interest rates will return to pre-financial-crisis levels, and MetLife has forecasted to face this headwind for the future. The returns of equity just shy of 10% over the next five years. MetLife has taken steps to simplify its business. In 2017, it spun off Brighthouse, its retail arm focused on variable annuities. MetLife also is divesting its property and casualty insurance (auto) business, which makes sense as there is minimal strategic benefit to having a small auto insurance business in its portfolio.

MetLife’s business is relatively undifferentiated. Whether sold individually or to employers, the pricing is the primary driver for MetLife’s customers. Given the relatively low fixed costs of an insurer’s income statement, this does not lend itself to MetLife having a competitive advantage. Some of MetLife’s entries into new markets (such as pet insurance and health savings accounts) are potentially more differentiated, but these are unlikely to be material in the near to medium term. In 2012, MetLife launched MetLife Investment Management, which currently manages $181 billion of institutional third-party client assets, a fraction of the $669 billion managed through the general account and a fraction of what some of its peers manage. Asset management is viewed as potentially moaty, but given the size of MetLife’s third-party asset management, it is viewed as material to the firm’s overall financial results.

Financial Strength:

The life insurance business model typically entails significant leverage and potentially exposes the industry to outlier capital market events and unanticipated actuarial changes. MetLife is not immune to these risks, and during the financial crisis, its returns on equity decreased. Overall, MetLife has generally been prudent, but the risks inherent to the industry should not be ignored. 

Equity/assets (excluding separate accounts) was 11.6% at the end of 2021, higher than the 11.1% average since 2010. In Japan, MetLife’s solvency margin ratio was 911% (as of Sept. 30, 2021), well above the 200% threshold before corrective action would be required. The solvency margin ratio measures an insurer’s ability to pay out claims in unfavorable conditions.

Bulls Says:

  • MetLife’s international operations, particularly Asia and Latin America, provide opportunities for growth.
  • MetLife’s reorganization will lead to a more transparent entity that produces steadier cash flow.
  • If interest rates were to rise, MetLife would benefit through higher reinvestment yields.

Company Profile:

MetLife–once a mutual company before the 2000 demutualization–is the largest life insurer in the U.S. by assets and provides a variety of insurance and financial services products. Outside the United States, MetLife operates in Japan and more than 40 countries in Latin America, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Global stocks

Domino’s Pizza Enterprises food inflation anticipated in 2H22

Investment Thesis:

  • Trading below our valuation. 
  • Potential for solid growth in Europe and Japan, substantial opportunities, that the Company is positioned to take advantage of.
  • Strong market position in all of DMP’s existing geographies.
  • DMP is ahead of the curve with the use of technology and innovative offerings for its customers.
  • Acquisition in Europe to bring in top line revenue growth.
  • Strong management team.
  • Improving margin outlook (i.e., operating leverage benefits).

Key Risks:

  • Acquisition integrations not going to plan.
  • Missing market expectations on sales and earnings growth. 
  • Dietary concerns that drive customers to healthier alternatives.
  • Increased cost in ingredients and labor.
  • Market pressures from the competition. 
  • Departure of key management personnel. 
  • Corporate office having to increase financial support to struggling franchisees.  
  • Any further negative media articles especially around underpayment of wages at the franchisee level.
  • Any emerging concerns around store rollout (such as cannibalization or demographics not supportive of new stores).
  • Increase in commodity prices due to ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Key Highlights:

  • Trading update: For first 6 weeks of 2H22, Network Sales up +6.0% (+1.7% on a same store sales basis) vs +20.9% (+10.1% on same store basis) in pcp and new organic store additions of 23 (vs 11 in pcp) with the Company remaining on track to expand its network by +500 during FY22 (including Taiwan acquisition).
  • Food inflation anticipated in 2H22.
  • FY22 same store sales growth slightly below 3–5-year outlook of +3-6%.
  • 3–5-year annual outlook of +3-6% same store sales growth, +9-12% new organic store additions and ~$100-150m net capex remains intact.
  • Group milestone of 6,650 stores by 2033 with total opportunity of 2.1x current market size (Europe milestone of 3,050 stores by 2033 with total opportunity of 2.3x current market size, ANZ store target of 1200 by 2025-2028 with total opportunity of 1.4x current market size, and Asia milestone of 2,400 stores by 2033 with total market opportunity of 2.3x current market size).   
  • Australia region Highlight includes Network Sales grew +6.4% over pcp to $689.6m (same store sales up +1.7%), however, EBIT declined -6.1% over pcp to $60.3m with margin declining -180bps to 15%, reflecting investment in franchisees (Project Ignite ~$6m) and full & partial temporary store closures arising from Covid-19 (NZ was closed for 4 full weeks during August with Auckland stores closed for a more extended period of time). Online penetration grew with online sales growing +9.7% over pcp to $545.1m and online now representing 79% of total network sales, up +230bps over pcp. The Company opened 3 new stores increasing total store count to 863. 

Company Description:

Domino’s Pizza Enterprises Limited (DMP) operates retail food outlets. The Company offers franchises to the public and holds the franchise rights for the Domino’s brand and network in Australia, New Zealand, Europe and Japan. 

(Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.