Category: Shares

Business Strategy and Outlook

Narrow-moat Trip.com competes in China’s crowded online travel agent (OTA) industry by leveraging the largest selection of both domestic and international hotels in China on its platform and relying on user stickiness as a one-stop shop for travel ticketing, accommodations, and packaged tours. The platform is now also generating revenue from advertisement in which it hopes to take 3-5% of the ad market, but nearly all its revenue streams are travel-related, and COVID-19 lockdowns in China has cratered demand due to the inability to travel or unwillingness to quarantine. 

It is anticipated 2022 to be another challenging year for the travel industry as it is valued Trip.com’s revenue to recover to only 65% of 2019 levels. The company believes it can reach long-term non-GAAP operating margins of 20-30% on the back of its international, outbound, and high-star hotel businesses given their higher monetization rates, but the lack of demand has impacted these businesses, and total international revenue has declined to less than 5% of the mix and caused operating margin to be negative. Prior to the pandemic in 2019, international revenue was 25% of the mix and non-GAAP operating margins were 19%. It is alleged that reaching its long-term margin will rely heavily on the recovery, but the pandemic has been a significant headwind and has delayed its progress. It is supposed that outbound international travel should eventually recover but visibility is still limited, and further COVID-related setbacks could add to the uncertainty and possibility that the company could fall short of its long-term outlook. 

The other key business that will drive margins is its high-star domestic hotels which generates the highest take-rate on its platform at 9-10%. Trip.com charges low rates for its budget hotels to attract new users and directs them to its high-star hotels for future bookings as its traffic acquisition strategy, where it hopes to retain users through its wide selection of hotel, ticketing, and packaged tour options. Currently, this business has already recovered to 62% of 2019 levels, and thus it is alleged that the imminent key catalyst for Trip.com will be its international business.

Financial Strength

Trip.com operates as an asset-lite company and tends to not commit heavy resources to capital expenditures other than acquisitions for its operations. As of third-quarter 2021, net debt was almost 0 as Trip.com had nearly identical CNY 57.414 billion of debt against CNY 57.411 of cash and investments. Short-term liquidity is also safe with a quick ratio of over 1 time which should reflect some margin of safety and is representative of Trip.com’s financial strength. Trip.com has CNY 45 billion of short-term debt due, and should COVID-19 headwinds continue, it is seen the company issue debt in order to cover short-term expenses to navigate through COVID-19 but given history of low net debt and 15%-20% EBITDA margin, it is not expected to be an issue. The online travel business is not capital-intensive and has historically generated positive free cash flows. The exceptions to Trip.com was mostly due to acquisitions and capitalized operating expenses. In 2014, negative free cash flow for Trip.com was mainly due to its large investment in fixed assets of CNY 4.8 billion, mostly due to its new office building of CNY 3 billion. In 2016, negative free cash flow was mainly due to the merger with Qunar, and Trip.com returned to free cash flow positive from 2017 to 2019. It is projected cash flow to be negative in 2021 due to COVID-19 but should be positive in 2022 even as revenue recover to only 65% of 2019 levels as given in our base-case scenario.

 Bulls Say’s

• The company can eventually reach its 20%-30% long-term operating margin target as COVID-19 subsides.
• International and outbound business will eventually recover and drive margins upwards. Margin expansion will be dictated by its higher-margin businesses, including international air and hotels. 
• The industry will see less competition in the future than before due to current headwinds faced, and thus lesser disruptions to its long-term business plan.

Company Profile 

Trip.com is the largest online travel agent in China and is positioned to benefit from the country’s rising demand for higher-margin outbound travel as passport penetration is only 12% in China. The company generated about 78% of sales from accommodation reservations and transportation ticketing in 2020. The rest of revenue comes from package tours and corporate travel. Prior to the pandemic in 2019, the company generated 25% of revenue from international business, which is important to its margin expansion. Most of sales come from websites and mobile platforms, while the rest come from call centers. The competes in a crowded OTA industry in China, including Meituan, Alibaba-backed Fliggy, Toncheng, and Qunar. The company was founded in 1999 and listed on the Nasdaq in December 2003. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

Although Pilgrim’s Pride is the second-largest poultry producer in the countries in which it operates, we don’t believe it has carved out an edge. About 70% of Pilgrim’s products are undifferentiated and therefore have difficulty commanding price premiums and higher returns. Further, its profit margins can be quite volatile, as several factors outside the firm’s control affect costs (weather, flock disease, global trade). Prices of feed ingredients can be quite volatile, surging in 2008 and leading to Pilgrim’s bankruptcy. Since then, the industry has moved to new pricing strategies, which are helping protect the processors from revenue/cost mismatches. However, despite Pilgrim’s size, we don’t believe this affords it a scale cost advantage, underpinning our no-moat rating. 

In August, JBS, which owns 80% of Pilgrim’s, proposed to buy the remaining 20% for $26.50 per share. The board is reviewing the deal, and if approved, it will be put to a shareholder vote (excluding JBS). The offer appears light, at a 20% discount to our $34 fair value estimate and at 6.5 times adjusted EBITDA, compared with the 9.1 times for which Sanderson Farms was acquired one week prior to the offer. 

As 50% of Pilgrim’s sales stem from food service, the pandemic impaired sales and margins in 2020; organic sales were down 2.4%, and adjusted operating margins fell 240 basis points to 3.7%. But trends are recovering as vaccines become more widely available, and we expect no lasting effects. We are optimistic on the long-term global demand for chicken, as developed market consumers have been shifting consumption of red meat toward poultry, and in emerging markets, a growing middle class is driving higher per capita consumption of protein. Pilgrim’s should benefit from strong demand in China, as the country eliminated its ban on U.S. chicken in late 2019. Further, China has a shortage of protein after a 2019 outbreak of African swine fever resulted in a 40% reduction in the country’s hog population. The disease is still not fully contained, so this supply shortage should support global protein prices once the pandemic subsides and should result in strong export demand.

Financial Strength

Pilgrim’s strong balance sheet (net debt/adjusted EBITDA at a very manageable 2.2 times as of September 2021) and sufficient liquidity ($1.5 billion cash on hand and available cash through its credit facilities) should help the firm withstand market volatility. Pilgrim’s has no debt maturities until 2023, does not pay a dividend, and has sufficient liquidity and debt capacity to fund $400 million in annual capital expenditures. Even beyond the pandemic, the business is inherently cyclical with many factors outside management’s control, but we applaud changes that have improved the predictability of earnings. Chicken pricing contracts now link costs and prices. In addition, Pilgrim’s now maintains diversified exposure to fresh chicken across large, tray pack, and small bird segments, which helps stabilize margins. The firm also maintains geographical diversification, with 62% of 2020 revenue from the U.S., 27% from Europe, and 11% from Mexico. The firm has stated its optimal net debt/adjusted EBITDA range is 2-3 times, which we think is manageable, but we wouldn’t want it to move above that range on a sustained basis, given the unpredictable nature of profits despite improvements. We think it’s likely that over the next few years Pilgrim’s will make acquisitions that we have not modelled, we don’t think leverage will exceed its 2-3 times target over an extended horizon. However, given the unpredictable size, timing, and characteristics, we have opted instead to model excess cash flow being allocated to special dividends beginning in 2026, as the company prefers this approach instead of regular dividends and share repurchases are constrained by limited float. We model dividends beginning at $2.17 per share in 2026 and gradually increasing to $2.86 per share throughout our explicit forecast.

Bulls Say’s

• The global protein shortage resulting from China’s African swine fever outbreak should support global protein prices, which should stabilize and enhance Pilgrim’s profit margins. 
• Pilgrim’s has an opportunity to unlock value through structurally boosting the profits of its European operations by applying best practices from the U.S. and Mexico and using its key customer strategy to change the producer/customer dynamic. 
• In November 2019, China eliminated its ban on imports of U.S. poultry, which should help boost Pilgrim’s exports.

Company Profile 

Pilgrim’s Pride is the second-largest poultry producer in the U.S. (62% of 2020 sales), Europe (27%), and Mexico (11%). The 2019 purchase of Tulip, the U.K.’s largest hog producer, marks the firm’s entrance into the pork market, which represented 11% of 2020 sales. Pilgrim’s sells its protein to chain restaurants, food processors, and retail chains under brand names Pilgrim’s, Country Pride, Gold’n Plump, and Just Bare. Channel exposure is split evenly between retail and food service, with most of the food-service revenue coming from quick-service restaurants. JBS owns 80% of Pilgrim’s outstanding shares.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

Lamb Weston, the largest provider of frozen potatoes to North American restaurants, has secured a narrow moat, based on the firm’s cost advantages and entrenched restaurant relationships. The North American commercial potato market is highly concentrated with only four players: Lamb Weston (42%-43% share), McCain (30%), Simplot (20%), and Cavendish (7%-8%). Lamb Weston and Simplot both secure their raw potatoes solely from the Idaho and Columbia Basin region, an area ideally suited for growing potatoes, with very high yields. These firms secure potatoes at a cost 10% to 20% below the average price per pound. There is minimal unused land and water resources in this fertile area, so it is expected this advantage to hold for at least the next 10 years. Further, as the dominant player, Lamb Weston maintains a scale advantage. Given the high fixed costs in this capital-intensive industry, scale benefits are meaningful. Lamb Weston’s long-standing strategic partnerships with its customers provide another facet of the firm’s competitive edge. French fries are the most profitable food product for restaurants, and a key menu item. 

Lamb Weston is facing many headwinds that will dampen its earnings near term, but its long-term prospects should remain intact. The omicron variant will cause the traffic recovery in full-service restaurants (19% of sales) to pause, but consolidated sales should return to prepandemic levels in fiscal 2022, given resilience in quick-serve restaurants (58%) and retail (16%). Inflation, shortages, and a poor-quality potato crop should impair margins the next several quarters, but profitability should be fully restored by fiscal 2024. 

French fries are an attractive category, as consumers across the globe are increasing consumption, with volumes up low single digits in developed markets and up mid to high single digits in emerging markets. Lamb Weston is investing in additional capacity in China and the U.S. to meet this growing demand. While capacity utilization was uncharacteristically low during the pandemic, as herd immunity increases, French fry demand should recover, absorbing additional supply.

Financial Strength

When Lamb Weston separated from Conagra in November 2016, the firm initially reported net debt to adjusted EBITDA of 3.7 times, but leverage fell to 3.0 times last year (even considering the impact from the pandemic), and it will moderate to a very manageable 2.1 times by fiscal 2024. In addition, it can be guaranteed about the Lamb Weston’s ability to service its debt, with interest coverage (GAAP EBITDA/interest expense) averaging 7 times the past three years, and our forecast calling for a 8 times average over the next five years. As Lamb Weston’s business is capital intensive, the primary use of cash is capital expenditures, which averaged 9% of sales the three years before the pandemic, as the firm expanded capacity to meet strong customer demand. The industry began to operate at a more level utilization rate (mid-90s expected even before the pandemic hit in 2020, after 100% experienced the previous two years) causing capital expenditures to moderate to 4%-5% of sales during the pandemic. Investments should increase to 11% and 17% of sales in 2022 and 2023, respectively, as Lamb Weston expands capacity in China and the U.S. and range from 5.5% to 6.0% over the remainder of the decade. Dividends should be another significant use of cash, and It is expected for dividends to increase at a high-single-digit rate annually, generally maintaining a long-term pay-out ratio in the low-30%s, in line with management’s target. Lamb Weston has made a few small tuck-in international acquisitions in recent years, and is suspected that this may continue, but analyst have not modelled future unannounced tie-ups, given the uncertain timing and magnitude of such transactions. Instead, Analyst have opted to model excess cash being used for share repurchase, which is viewed as a prudent use of cash when shares trade below our assessment of its intrinsic value.

Bulls Say’s

• Lamb Weston’s geographical and scale-based cost advantages should help ensure the firm remains a dominant player in the industry. 
• Lamb Weston is a valued supplier of restaurants’ most profitable food product, and restaurants are hesitant to switch so as not to disrupt supply and quality. 
• French fries are an attractive category, as per capita consumption is increasing in both developed and developing markets.

Company Profile 

Lamb Weston is the world’s second-largest producer of branded and private-label frozen potato products, such as French fries, sweet potato fries, tots, diced potatoes, mashed potatoes, hash browns, and chips. The company also has a small appetizer business that produces onion rings, mozzarella sticks, and cheese curds. Including joint ventures, 52% of fiscal 2021 revenue was U.S.-based, with the remainder stemming from Europe, Canada, Japan, China, Korea, Mexico, and several other countries. Lamb Weston’s customer mix is 58% quick-serve restaurants, 19% full-service restaurants, 8% other food service (hotels, commercial cafeterias, arenas, schools), and 16% retail. Lamb Weston became an independent company in 2016 when it was spun off from Conagra.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

Philips is a one-stop shop for imaging-related devices with an established footprint in many hospitals, which positions it to benefit from long-term healthcare trends like the transition to nonor minimally invasive procedures, increased hospital demand for efficiencies or detection of sleep apnea. Through several divestitures and acquisitions Philips has transformed itself from an industrial-medical conglomerate into a healthcare company and primary supplier across hospitals, which facilitates the introduction of new products and the displacement of smaller suppliers with more depth in a single product line, but lack of breadth. In many of its underlying markets the company operates an oligopoly where significant market share is controlled by a few players. Several of the company’s products require proprietary software or service, which provide stability to cash flows and help to lock in the customer. In addition the company has carried out several divestments and acquisitions, which is supposed to have reinforced the company’s positioning. The company continues to narrow its business focus, with the sale of its domestic appliances business in 2021. 

It is alleged the company has room to improve its margins through improved operations management and cost efficiencies. Philips has made inroads on this front with a manufacturing footprint consolidation, where it has moved from 50 factories to less than 35 in five years. In D&T Philips has a large installed base built during many decades, which is suspected, has potential for improved service retention rates through remote monitoring, product sophistication and risk-sharing agreements. In connected care, Philips had a significant product recall on its sleep apnea installed base in 2021, which is assumed will result in a permanent loss of market share against Resmed. It is foreseen a long-term conversion pathway in toothbrushes from manual to electric, as a large percentage of the population still brushes manually. It is expected.6 the monitoring market will be a long-term beneficiary of COVID-19 due to hospitals realizing the need for efficiencies in patient management when hospital occupancy is high.

Financial Strength

As of September 2021, Philips had EUR 3.8 billion in net debt, which represented a 1.3 net debt/EBITDA ratio. Debt is denominated in euros and U.S. dollars, with an average interest rate of 2.0% and an average duration of around eight years. It is counter thought, Philips’ indebtedness level will be problematic given its relatively stable cash flow generation, and it is alleged, the company will have additional room for acquisitions, investments and dividends/buybacks. In the first quarter of 2021 Philips announced the sale of its domestic appliances business for EUR 4.4 billion. The proceeds will strengthen Philips’ balance sheet even more, giving the company more room to reinvest in the healthcare business, where it holds a stronger competitive position.

Bulls Say’s

• Philips’ large installed base in imaging devices and existing footprint in many hospitals is an advantage that allows them to cross-sell and introduce new products with less effort than other smaller players.
• Philips is a market leader in large unpenetrated markets such as sleep obstructive apnea and electric toothbrushes, where there are significant growth opportunities ahead.
• The firm’s divestments are reducing the conglomerate perception Philips has among investors, which will provide more visibility on cash flows and future growth opportunities.

Company Profile 

Philips is a diversified global healthcare company operating in three segments: diagnosis and treatment, connected care, and personal health. About 48% of the company’s revenue comes from the diagnosis and treatment segment, which features imaging systems, ultrasound equipment, image-guided therapy solutions and healthcare informatics. The connected care segment (27% of revenue) encompasses monitoring and analytics systems for hospitals and sleep and respiratory care devices, whereas the personal health business (remainder of revenue) includes electric toothbrushes and men’s grooming and personal-care products. In 2020, Philips generated EUR 19.5 billion in sales and had 80,000 employees in over 100 countries.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

No-moat MGM Resorts is facing material near-term headwinds from COVID-19 as well as elevated operational risk in Macao from government plans to increase supervision of casinos. Still, we think MGM has a healthy liquidity profile to see it through this turmoil and remains positioned for the attractive long-term growth opportunities in Macao (22% of pre-pandemic 2019 EBITDAR), U.S. sports betting, and Japan (accounting for an estimated 10% of 2027 EBITDAR, the first year of likely operation). 

We see solid Macao industry visitation over the next 10 years, as key infrastructure projects that alleviate Macao’s congested traffic (Pac on terminal expansion and Hong Kong Bridge in 2018, light-rail transit at the end of 2019, and reclaimed land in 2020-25) come on line, which will expand the region’s constrained carrying capacity and add attractions, thereby driving higher visitation and spending levels. As MGM holds one of only six gaming licenses, it stands to benefit from this growth. Further, MGM Resorts has expanded its room share in Macao to 8% from 3% with its Cotai property, which opened in February 2018. That said, the Macao market is highly regulated, and as a result, the pace and timing of growth are at the discretion of the government.

In the U.S. (78% of pre-pandemic 2019 EBITDA), MGM’s casinos are positioned to benefit from a multi-billion-dollar sports betting market, generating an estimated mid-single-digit percentage of the company’s 2024 sales. That said, the U.S. doesn’t offer the long-term growth potential or regulatory barriers of Macao; thus, we do not believe the region contributes a moat to MGM. Still, there have been very minimal industry supply additions this decade, and this should support solid industry Strip occupancy, which stood at around 90% in pre-pandemic 2019.

We expect MGM to be awarded one of only two urban gaming licenses in Japan, with a resort opening in 2027, generating attractive returns on invested capital in the teens.

Financial Strength

MGM entered 2020 in its strongest financial health of the past 10 years, in our view. This was illustrated by its 3.7 times debt/adjusted EBITDA in 2019 versus 13 times and 5.7 times in 2010 and 2015, respectively. It was also buoyed by MGM having recently exited an investment cycle, where the company spent $1.6 billion on average annually during 2015-19 to construct and renovate U.S. and Macao resorts versus the $271 million it spent on capital expenditure in 2020. We believe MGM has sufficient liquidity to remain a going concern even with zero revenue for a few years. The recent sales of underlying casino assets (Bellagio in November 2019, Circus Circus in December 2019, and MGM Grand/Mandalay Bay in February 2020) provided it with around $6.9 billion in cash. The company recently entered into leaseback asset sales of Aria, Vdara, and Springfield, raising over $4 billion in cash in 2021. Also, MGM is set to receive $4.4 billion in cash for its ownership in MGM Growth Properties, which is scheduled to be acquired by Vici in the first half of 2022. The firm has taken further action to lift its liquidity profile by reining in expenses, tapping its $1.5 billion credit facility (which has since been paid), suspending dividends and repurchases (which have since been reinstated), and raising debt. MGM has $1 billion of debt scheduled to mature in 2022.

Bulls Say’s

• We expect MGM to be awarded one of only two urban Japanese gaming concessions due to its strong experience operating leading resorts in Las Vegas and its successful record of working with partners 

• MGM is positioned to participate in Macao’s long-term growth opportunity (22% of pre-pandemic 2019 EBITDAR) and has seen its room share expand (to 8% from 3%) with the opening of its Cotai casino in February 2018.

• MGM’s U.S. properties are positioned to benefit from the expansion of the multi-billion-dollar domestic sports betting market

Company Profile 

MGM Resorts is the largest resort operator on the Las Vegas Strip with 35,000 guest rooms and suites, representing about one fourth of all units in the market. The company’s Vegas properties include MGM Grand, Mandalay Bay, Mirage, Luxor, New York-New York, and CityCenter. The Strip contributed approximately 49% of total EBITDAR in the pre-pandemic year of 2019. MGM also owns U.S. regional assets, which represented 29% of 2019 EBITDAR. We estimate MGM’s U.S. sports and iGaming operations will be a mid-single-digit percentage of its total revenue by 2024. The company also operates the 56%-owned MGM Macau casinos with a new property that opened on the Cotai Strip in early 2018. Further, we estimate MGM will open a resort in Japan in 2027.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

In October 2020, Bed Bath & Beyond put forth an updated strategy to revitalize its brand and regain customer confidence by focusing on its core properties. As such, the company divested peripheral brands such as Cost Plus and Linen Holdings in order to focus on the Bed Bath & Beyond, Buy Buy Baby, Harmon Face Value, and Decorist labels. To help elevate its brand perception, it has combined its online and in-store inventory management with its new “omni-always” initiative in the hopes of capturing more e-commerce business and avoiding the long restock times and uneven inventories that previously plagued the firm. Additionally, it’s investing heavily in both its digital and brick-and-mortar platforms, with a revamp to the website for a more frictionless checkout process and a remodel of its physical stores to offer a cleaner and more enjoyable shopping experience. The firm has attempted to rely less on its iconic blue coupons by giving consumers a good everyday value (it is concluded discounts will persist to some degree over the long term). It also plans to right size by shuttering underperforming Bed Bath stores, shrinking the total store base to around 1,000 by the end of 2021 (from 1,500 at the end of 2019). In contrast, management expects 50% sales growth at the baby label by 2023 via new markets, with the brand already set to deliver $1.3 billion in sales in 2021. It is seen total sales declining in 2021 as the footprint continues to contract before stabilizing at a low-single-digit growth rate in 2023.

Longer term, it is conjectured the 2030 operating margin to reach 5%-6%. This improvement is primarily supported by gross margin gains (which reach 37.7%, below the 38%-plus corporate goal) from a greater focus on private label, including the introduction of 10 new owned brands. It also benefits from a lower promotional cadence thanks to SKU rationalization and the utilization of more robust inventory management processes. However, it is foreseen these gains to be offset by higher investment as the home furnishing landscape remains highly fragmented and competitive, limiting profitability to levels that are structurally lower than in the past.

Financial Strength

Bed Bath & Beyond’s cash position is solid and efforts to reduce the firm’s debt load resulted in a positive net cash position at fiscal year-end 2020. Before the firm’s $1.5 billion debt raise in 2014, it had been debt-free since 1996 (excluding acquired debt), using cash generated from operations to fund new store openings and a handful of small bolt-on acquisitions. The firm has access to liquidity through its $1 billion credit facility, which expires in 2026 and captured another $600 million-plus in cash through the sale of Personalizationmall.com, Linen Holdings, Christmas Tree Shops, One Kings Lane, and Cost-Plus World Market brands. It reduced gross debt in 2020 (with long-term debt at $1.2 billion at November 2021 versus $1.5 billion at the end of fiscal 2019) and plans to continue paying down its debt, aiming to reach a gross debt ratio of 3 times by 2023. There is ample cash on hand (roughly $509 million as of Nov. 27, 2021) to cover near-term expenses like operating lease obligations.

Over the past five reported fiscal years, the firm has produced cumulative free cash flow (cash from operations minus capital expenditures) of $2.1 billion. However, it is anticipated this level to be tempered over 2021-23 as Bed Bath spends around $375 million annually to improve new stores, existing stores, its supply chain, and technology in this time frame. Free cash flow to equity has averaged about 4% of revenue during the past five reported years, which is decent for a mature company that is still spending to remain competitive, but it is likely this level to decline as secular headwinds weigh on performance and necessary investment levels pick up. Despite the higher spending ahead, Bed Bath has a plan to complete its share $1 billion in shares buy back by the end of fiscal 2021.

Bulls Say’s

• Less discretionary categories such as linens, towels, and cookware offer some resiliency amid macroeconomic cyclicality. Registries across bridal, baby, and gift have historically provided a steady stream of customers.
• The closure of numerous underperforming stores by the end of 2021 could help lift the profitability of the business faster than it can be anticipated as better performing stores make up a greater proportion of the fleet.
• With a push into expanding the representation of owned brands (already accounting for 20% of sales), gross margin metrics could expand faster than it can get forecast.

Company Profile 

Bed Bath & Beyond is a home furnishings retailer, operating just under 1,000 stores in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico. Stores carry an assortment of branded bed and bath accessories, kitchen textiles, and cooking supplies. In addition to 809 Bed Bath & Beyond stores, the company operates 133 Buy Buy Baby stores and 53 Harmon Face Values stores (health/beauty care). In an effort to refocus on its core businesses, the firm has divested the online retailer Personalizationmall.com, One Kings Lane, Christmas Tree Shops and That (gifts/housewares), Linen Holdings, and Cost-Plus World Market.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook

In October 2020, Bed Bath & Beyond put forth an updated strategy to revitalize its brand and regain customer confidence by focusing on its core properties. As such, the company divested peripheral brands such as Cost Plus and Linen Holdings in order to focus on the Bed Bath & Beyond, Buy Buy Baby, Harmon Face Value, and Decorist labels. To help elevate its brand perception, it has combined its online and in-store inventory management with its new “omni-always” initiative in the hopes of capturing more e-commerce business and avoiding the long restock times and uneven inventories that previously plagued the firm. Additionally, it’s investing heavily in both its digital and brick-and-mortar platforms, with a revamp to the website for a more frictionless checkout process and a remodel of its physical stores to offer a cleaner and more enjoyable shopping experience. The firm has attempted to rely less on its iconic blue coupons by giving consumers a good everyday value (it is concluded discounts will persist to some degree over the long term). It also plans to right size by shuttering underperforming Bed Bath stores, shrinking the total store base to around 1,000 by the end of 2021 (from 1,500 at the end of 2019). In contrast, management expects 50% sales growth at the baby label by 2023 via new markets, with the brand already set to deliver $1.3 billion in sales in 2021. It is seen total sales declining in 2021 as the footprint continues to contract before stabilizing at a low-single-digit growth rate in 2023.

Longer term, it is conjectured the 2030 operating margin to reach 5%-6%. This improvement is primarily supported by gross margin gains (which reach 37.7%, below the 38%-plus corporate goal) from a greater focus on private label, including the introduction of 10 new owned brands. It also benefits from a lower promotional cadence thanks to SKU rationalization and the utilization of more robust inventory management processes. However, it is foreseen these gains to be offset by higher investment as the home furnishing landscape remains highly fragmented and competitive, limiting profitability to levels that are structurally lower than in the past.

Financial Strength

Bed Bath & Beyond’s cash position is solid and efforts to reduce the firm’s debt load resulted in a positive net cash position at fiscal year-end 2020. Before the firm’s $1.5 billion debt raise in 2014, it had been debt-free since 1996 (excluding acquired debt), using cash generated from operations to fund new store openings and a handful of small bolt-on acquisitions. The firm has access to liquidity through its $1 billion credit facility, which expires in 2026 and captured another $600 million-plus in cash through the sale of Personalizationmall.com, Linen Holdings, Christmas Tree Shops, One Kings Lane, and Cost-Plus World Market brands. It reduced gross debt in 2020 (with long-term debt at $1.2 billion at November 2021 versus $1.5 billion at the end of fiscal 2019) and plans to continue paying down its debt, aiming to reach a gross debt ratio of 3 times by 2023. There is ample cash on hand (roughly $509 million as of Nov. 27, 2021) to cover near-term expenses like operating lease obligations.

Over the past five reported fiscal years, the firm has produced cumulative free cash flow (cash from operations minus capital expenditures) of $2.1 billion. However, it is anticipated this level to be tempered over 2021-23 as Bed Bath spends around $375 million annually to improve new stores, existing stores, its supply chain, and technology in this time frame. Free cash flow to equity has averaged about 4% of revenue during the past five reported years, which is decent for a mature company that is still spending to remain competitive, but it is likely this level to decline as secular headwinds weigh on performance and necessary investment levels pick up. Despite the higher spending ahead, Bed Bath has a plan to complete its share $1 billion in shares buy back by the end of fiscal 2021.

Bulls Say’s

• Less discretionary categories such as linens, towels, and cookware offer some resiliency amid macroeconomic cyclicality. Registries across bridal, baby, and gift have historically provided a steady stream of customers.
• The closure of numerous underperforming stores by the end of 2021 could help lift the profitability of the business faster than it can be anticipated as better performing stores make up a greater proportion of the fleet.
• With a push into expanding the representation of owned brands (already accounting for 20% of sales), gross margin metrics could expand faster than it can get forecast.

Company Profile 

Bed Bath & Beyond is a home furnishings retailer, operating just under 1,000 stores in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico. Stores carry an assortment of branded bed and bath accessories, kitchen textiles, and cooking supplies. In addition to 809 Bed Bath & Beyond stores, the company operates 133 Buy Buy Baby stores and 53 Harmon Face Values stores (health/beauty care). In an effort to refocus on its core businesses, the firm has divested the online retailer Personalizationmall.com, One Kings Lane, Christmas Tree Shops and That (gifts/housewares), Linen Holdings, and Cost-Plus World Market.

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Business Strategy and Outlook:

Dollar Tree’s namesake banner has a long history of strong performance, enabled by its differentiated value proposition, but, before the pandemic, its Family Dollar unit (acquired in 2015) struggled to generate top-line and margin growth. Dollar Tree banner is better positioned long-term, but do not believe the aggregated firm benefits from a durable competitive edge, as competitive pressure in a fast-changing retail environment amid minimal switching costs limits results.

Accounting for around half of sales, the Dollar Tree banner’s wide assortment of products at $1.25 or less has appealed to customers, drawing a broad range of low to middle-income consumers. We believe the concept has room to grow (with square footage rising by a low- to mid-single-digit percentage long term), expanding in new markets while also increasing density. The chain’s fast-changing assortment creates a treasure hunt experience that has a history of drawing customers (posting nearly 3% same-store sales growth on average over the past five years) and has been hard for online retailers to match.

Financial Strength:

Though it took on considerable debt to fund its 2015 purchase of Family Dollar, Dollar Tree’s leverage-reduction efforts have left it on sound financial footing. Its strong balance sheet and free cash flow generation should suffice to fund growth and investments necessary to maintain low price points and respond to competitive pressure. The firm ended fiscal 2020 with net debt at less than three-quarters adjusted EBITDA, the latter of which covered interest expense more than 17 times. Furthermore, capital expenditures to fuel store growth are fairly discretionary, so Dollar Tree should be able to curb targets if needed in the event of financial strain.

Bulls Say:

• Dollar Tree’s $1.25 price point concept is differentiated, holding absolute dollar costs low for customers while allowing the retailer to realize higher margins than conventional retailers. 
• Small ticket sizes make it difficult for online retailers to contend with Dollar Tree’s single-price-point model as shipping costs weigh on their ability to compete profitably. 
• As its two banners become more closely integrated and the store network expands, Dollar Tree should leverage its supply chain and distribution infrastructure investments, generating resources to fuel its low-price model.

Company Profile:

Dollar Tree operates discount stores in the U.S. and Canada, including over 7,800 shops under both its namesake and Family Dollar units (nearly 15,700 in total). The eponymous chain features branded and private-label goods, generally at a $1.25 price. Nearly 50% of Dollar Tree stores’ fiscal 2020 sales came from consumables (including food, health and beauty, and household paper and cleaning products), just over 45% from variety items (including toys and housewares), and 5% from seasonal goods. Family Dollar features branded and private-label goods at prices generally ranging from $1 to $10, with over 76% of fiscal 2020 sales from consumables, 9% from seasonal/electronic items (including prepaid phones and toys), 9% from home products, and 6% from apparel and accessories.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.