Tag: US Market
Business Strategy and Outlook
At its core, J.B. Hunt is an intermodal marketing company; it contracts with the Class I railroads for the line-haul movement of its domestic containers. It was one of the first for-hire truckload carriers to venture into intermodal shipping, forming a partnership with Burlington Northern Santa Fe in the West in 1990. Years later, it struck an agreement with Norfolk Southern in the East. Hunt has established a clear leadership position in intermodal shipping, with a 20%-plus share of a $22 billion-plus industry. The next-largest competitor is Hub Group, followed by Schneider National’s intermodal division and XPO Logistics’ intermodal unit. Intermodal made up slightly less than half of Hunt’s total revenue in 2021.
Hunt isn’t immune to downturns, but over the past decade-plus it’s reduced its exposure to the more capital-intensive truckload-shipping sector, which represents about 28% of sales (including for-hire and dedicated-contract business) versus 60% in 2005. Hunt is also shifting its for-hire truckload division to more of an asset-light model via its drop-trailer offering while investing meaningfully in asset-light truck brokerage and final-mile delivery.
Rates in the competing truckload market corrected in 2019, driving down intermodal’s value proposition relative to trucking. Thus, 2019 was a hangover year and fallout from pandemic lockdowns pressured container volume into early 2020. However, truckload capacity has since tightened drastically, contract pricing is rising nicely across all modes, and underlying intermodal demand has rebounded sharply on the spike in retail goods consumption (intermodal cargo is mostly consumer goods) and heavy retailer restocking. Hunt is grappling with near-term rail network congestion that’s constraining volume growth, but the firm is working diligently with the rails and customers to minimize the issue. The expectation is that 2.5%-3.0% U.S. retail sales growth and conversion trends to support 3.0%-3.5% industry container volume expansion longer term, with 2.0%-2.5% pricing gains on average, though Hunt’s intermodal unit should modestly outperform those trends given its favorable competitive positioning.
Financial Strength
J.B. Hunt enjoys a strong balance sheet and is not highly leveraged. It had total debt near $1.3 billion and debt/EBITDA of about 1 time at the end of 2021, roughly in line with the five-year average. EBITDA covered interest expense by a very comfortable 35 times in 2021, and expect Hunt will have no problems making interest or principal payments during our forecast period. Hunt posted more than $350 million in cash at the end of 2021, up from $313 million at the end of 2020. Historically, Hunt has held modest levels of cash, in part because of share-repurchase activity and its preference for organic growth (including investment in new containers and chassis, for example) over acquisitions. For reference, it posted $7.6 million in cash and equivalents at the end of 2018 and $14.5 million in 2017. The company generates consistent cash flow, which has historically been more than sufficient to fund capital expenditures for equipment and dividends, as well as a portion of share-repurchase activity. It is expected that trend to persist. Net capital expenditures will jump to $1.5 billion in 2022 as the firm completes its intermodal container expansion efforts, but after that it should also have ample room for debt reduction in the years ahead, depending on its preference for share buybacks. Overall, Hunt will mostly deploy cash to grow organically, while taking advantage of opportunistic tuck-in acquisitions (a deal in dedicated or truck brokerage isn’t out of the question, but and suspect the final mile delivery niche is most likely near term).
Bulls Say’s
- Intermodal shipping enjoys favorable long-term trends, including secular constraints on truckload capacity growth and shippers’ efforts to minimize transportation costs through mode conversions (truck to rail).
- It is believed that the intermodal market share in the Eastern U. S. still has room for expansion, suggesting growth potential via share gains from shorter-haul trucking.
- J.B. Hunt’s asset-light truck brokerage unit is benefiting from strong execution, deep capacity access, and tight market capacity. It’s also moved quickly in terms of boosting back-office and carrier sourcing automation.
Company Profile
J.B. Hunt Transport Services ranks among the top surface transportation companies in North America by revenue. Its primary operating segments are intermodal delivery, which uses the Class I rail carriers for the underlying line-haul movement of its owned containers (45% of sales in 2021); dedicated trucking services that provide customer-specific fleet needs (21%); for-hire truckload (7%); heavy goods final-mile delivery (6%), and asset-light truck brokerage (21%).
(Source: MorningStar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Business Strategy and Outlook
Since taking the helm at Mondelez four years ago, CEO Dirk Van de Put has orchestrated a plan to drive balanced sales and profit growth by empowering local leaders, extending the distribution of its fare, and facilitating more agility as it relates to product innovation (aims that are hitting the mark). It wasn’t surprising reigniting the top line was at the forefront of its strategic direction. More specifically, Mondelez targets 3%-plus sales growth long term as it works to sell its wares in more channels and reinvests in new products aligned with consumer trends at home and abroad. Further, it has looked to acquire niche brands to build out its category and geographic exposure, which is seen to be prudent.
But despite opportunities to bolster sales, it weren’t anticipated the pendulum to shift entirely to top-line gains under Van de Put’s watch; rather, based on his tenure at privately held McCain Foods and past rhetoric, it is alleged driving consistently profitable growth would be the priority. As such, the suggestion showcase that Mondelez is poised to realize additional efficiency gains through fiscal 2022 favorably. While management has refrained from quantifying its cost-saving aims, it is seen an additional $750 million in costs (a low- to mid-single-digit percentage of cost of goods sold and operating expenses, excluding depreciation and amortization) it could remove (on top of the $1.5 billion realized before the pandemic). It is foreseen this can be achieved by extracting further complexity from its operations, including rationalizing its supplier base, parting ways with unprofitable brands, and continuing to upgrade its manufacturing facilities.
It isn’t likely that, these savings to merely boost profits, though. In this vein, management has stressed a portion of any savings realized would fuel added spending behind its brands in the form of research, development, and marketing, supporting the brand intangible asset underpinning Mondelez’s wide moat. This aligns with analysts forecast for research, development, and marketing to edge up to nearly 7% of sales on average over the next 10 years (or about $2.4 billion annually), above historical levels of 6% ($1.7 billion).
Financial Strength
In assessing Mondelez’s balance sheet strength, it isn’t foreseen any material impediments to its financial flexibility. In this vein, Mondelez maintained $3.5 billion of cash on its balance sheet against $19.5 billion of total debt as of the end of fiscal 2021. Experts forecast free cash flow will average around 15% of sales annually over Experts 10-year explicit forecast (about $5.2 billion on average each year). And it is in view that returning excess cash to shareholders will remain a priority. Analysts forecast Mondelez will increase its shareholder dividend (which currently yields around 2%) in the high-single-digit range on average annually through fiscal 2031 (implying a payout ratio between just north of 40%), while also repurchasing around 2%-3% of shares outstanding annually. It is held Mondelez has proven itself a prudent capital allocator and could also opt to add on brands and businesses that extend its reach in untapped categories and/or geographies from time to time–although it is unlikely believe it has much of an appetite for a transformational deal. It is alleged the opportunity to expand its footprint into untapped markets–such as Indonesia and Germany–or into other adjacent snacking categories (like health and wellness) could be in the cards. Recent deals have included adding Tate’s Bake Shop for $500 million in 2018, Perfect Snacks (in 2019, refrigerated snack bars), Give & Go (2020, an in-store bakery operator),and Chipita (2021, Central and Eastern European croissants and baked goods) to its fold. But at just a low-single-digit percentage of sales, none of these deals are material enough to move the needle on its overall results.
Bulls Say’s
- Mondelez’s decision to empower in-market leaders and fuel investments behind its local jewels (which historically had been starved in favor of its global brands) stands to incite growth in emerging markets for some time.
- Experts suggest the firm is committed to maintaining a stringent focus on extracting inefficiencies from its business, including the target to shed more than 25% of its noncore stock-keeping units to reduce complexity.
- Management has suggested it won’t sacrifice profit improvement merely to inflate its near-term sales profile, which is foreseen as a plus.
Company Profile
Mondelez has operated as an independent organization since its split from the former Kraft Foods North American grocery business in October 2012. The firm is a leading player in the global snack arena with a presence in the biscuit (47% of sales), chocolate (32%), gum/candy (10%), beverage (4%), and cheese and grocery (7%) aisles. Mondelez’s portfolio includes well-known brands like Oreo, Chips Ahoy, Halls, Trident, and Cadbury, among others. The firm derives around one third of revenue from developing markets, nearly 40% from Europe, and the remainder from North America.
(Source: MorningStar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Business Strategy and Outlook
The years since the financial crisis have shown that American International Group would have destroyed substantial value even if it had never written a single credit default swap, had noncore businesses it needed to shed, and had material issues in its core operations that it needed to fix. It is encouraging, however, by the recent progress in terms of improving underwriting margins, and the plan to take out $1 billion in costs by 2022 would be another material step. In 2020, the impact of the coronavirus has obscured the company’s progress, but it is held results over the past year have been encouraging. COVID-19 losses to date have been very manageable. As a percentage of capital, losses have stayed well within the range of historical events that the industry has successfully absorbed in the past.
The longer-term picture looks relatively bright. The pricing environment has not been particularly favorable in recent years. However, in 2019, pricing momentum picked up in primary lines, and this positive trend only accelerated in 2020. More recently, pricing has started to plateau, but the industry has enjoyed the highest pricing increases it has seen since 2003. While higher pricing is necessary to some extent to offset lower interest rates and a rise in social inflation, pricing increases appear to be more than offsetting these factors. As a result, commercial P&C insurers are experiencing a positive trend in underlying underwriting profitability, and potential for a truly hard pricing market can be seen, similar to the period that followed 9/11.
It is seen AIG has made material progress in improving its under/over the past couple of years, and has set a target for an underlying combined ratio below 90% by the end of 2022. Assuming an average level of catastrophe losses, it is likely this is a level that would allow P&C operations to achieve an acceptable level of return, and a harder pricing market may make hitting this target easier.
Financial Strength
It is alleged AIG’s balance sheet is sound, although the company is arguably in a somewhat weaker position than peers until it can improve profitability. Equity/assets was 13% at the end of 2021. This level is lower than P&C peers but reasonable if AIG’s life insurance operations, which operate with higher balance sheet leverage, are considered. During 2014, the company reduced its debt load by about $10 billion and eliminated much of its high-coupon debt, which improved its financial flexibility. Barring any unforeseen events, it is anticipated the company has room to continue to return capital to shareholders, and management had been returning a lot of capital to shareholders, in part through divestitures and some restructuring, although in recent years management has curtailed buybacks as AIG pivoted toward growth and acquisitions have become part of the strategic plan
Bulls Say’s
- The aftermath of AIG’s issues during the financial crisis occupied much of management’s attention for quite some time. With these issues resolved, management can focus on the company’s operations, and there could be ample scope for improvement.
- AIG has demonstrated progress in improving underwriting margins in its P&C business.
- The current focus on risk-adjusted returns sets a proper course for the company, and just increasing profitability to the level of its peers would represent a material improvement.
Company Profile
American International Group is one of the largest insurance and financial services firms in the world and has a global footprint. It operates through a wide range of subsidiaries that provide property, casualty, and life insurance. Its revenue is split roughly evenly between commercial and consumer lines.
(Source: MorningStar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Business Strategy and Outlook
Post has a unique portfolio of businesses. After spinning off its majority stake in the fast-growing BellRing Brands in March 2022, nearly half of its sales mix is cereal, which is highly profitable, but experiencing declining volumes. The other half of its portfolio consists primarily of egg and potato products, which possess a better growth profile, but carry low profit margins. It is alleged a competitive edge remains elusive, as Post has not demonstrated strong brand equities, preferred relationships with customers, or a cost advantage, which are the most likely moat sources for a packaged food company.
The cereal business has been experiencing declining per capita consumption (prior to the pandemic) as consumers have shifted away from processed, high-sugar, high-carbohydrate fare. Adding to the challenge, no-moat Post, the third-largest player, has had to compete for ever-decreasing shelf-space with market leaders narrow-moat General Mills and wide-moat Kellogg. That said, Post’s cereal business is very profitable, with EBITDA margins around mid-20% and low-30% for the U.S. and European businesses, respectively.
The refrigerated segments (52% of 2021 sales, with 32% food service and 20% retail) consists primarily of egg and potato products, but also side dishes, cheese, and sausage sold under brands such as Bob Evans and Simply Potatoes. While this business has more attractive growth prospects than cereal (growing 1%-2% versus cereal’s modest declines), agricultural commodities are difficult to differentiate and therefore generally do not command a price premium. As a result, this business has relatively low EBITDA margins (16%-18%) and does not offer the firm a competitive advantage, in analysts view.
Financial Strength
Post has a unique capital allocation strategy, preferring to carry a heavier debt load than most packaged food peers. Net debt/adjusted EBITDA has averaged 5.3 times the last 10 years, increasing following acquisitions and gradually declining as the firm uses free cash flow to pay down debt. Leverage stood at 5.5 times at the end of fiscal 2021 including BellRing Brands, and it is being modelled that the ratio remains above 5 times for the duration of experts forecast. Post’s legacy domestic cereal business generates significant free cash flow (about 12% of revenue, above the 10% peer average), although after acquiring the refrigerated foods, BellRing, and private brands businesses, this metric fell to a mid- to high-single-digit average in 2013 and beyond, now slightly below the peer average. Post’s interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest expense) has averaged 2.5 times over the past three years, compared with the 7 times peer average. While this ratio is quite tight, the firm has ample access to liquidity (even considering the uncertain environment caused by the pandemic), including $1.2 billion cash and $730 million available via on its credit revolver as of December 2021. Post has no intention to initiate a dividend. Instead, the firm plans to balance debt repayments, share repurchase, and acquisitions. Although it is likely that the firm will acquire additional businesses over the next several years, given the numerous uncertainties regarding these transactions, experts have opted to model free cash flow being used instead for share repurchase, which is foreseen as a good use of capital assuming it is executed at a value below analysts assessment of its intrinsic value.
Bulls Say’s
- The refrigerated foods segment, half of Post’s business, is benefiting from consumers’ evolving preference for fresh, unprocessed high-protein eggs, and fresh and convenient side dish options.
- Although growth in the cereal business has been stagnant, it reports attractive profits and cash flows.
- Despite inflation and the uncertain economic environment that could ensue, demand for Post’s products should be relatively stable.
Company Profile
Post Holdings operates in North America and Europe. For fiscal 2021 (restated for the separation of BellRing Brands), 47% of the company’s revenue came from cereal, with brands such as Honeycomb, Grape-Nuts, Pebbles, Honey Bunches of Oats, Malt-O-Meal, and Weetabix. Refrigerated food made up 52% of sales and services the retail (20% of company sales) and food-service channels (32%), providing value-added egg and potato products, prepared side dishes, cheese, and sausage under brands Bob Evans and Simply Potatoes. Post also holds a 60% stake in 8th Avenue, a private brands entity and a 14% stake in BellRing Brands, with protein-based products under the Premier Protein and Dymatize brands. Post launched a special purpose acquisition corp in 2021, but has not yet executed a transaction.
(Source: MorningStar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
Approach
This fund uses full physical replication to capture the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index. The fund owns–to the extent that is possible and efficient–all the underlying constituents in the same proportion as its benchmark.
Portfolio
The S&P 500 is a free-float-adjusted market-capitalisation-weighted index of 500 US companies that offers both large- and mid-cap exposure. With a total value of over USD 40 trillion, the index covers around 80% of the free-float-adjusted market capitalisation of the US equity market. The US Index Committee maintains the S&P 500 and meets monthly. It aims to minimise index membership turnover. If a constituent no longer meets the entrance requirements, the committee will not remove the member immediately if it deems the change temporary. The index rebalances quarterly in March, June, September, and December. The largest sector exposure is information technology (29%), followed by healthcare (13%) and financials (12%). With the inclusion of Tesla TSLA and the continued success of many of the largest stocks in the index over 2020, the top 10 now represent over one fourth of the index. That said, concentration risk concerns remain subdued as the top 10 companies traditionally drive around 20% of the return, a fair attribution for many market-cap-weighted strategies.
Performance
Funds that track the S&P 500 Net Return Index have consistently outperformed the category average by a range of 0%-4% on a yearly rolling basis, making a strong investment case for low-cost passive instruments such as this when seeking broad US equity exposure. Further evidence is found in the superior risk-adjusted return profile of the S&P 500 relative to the average peer in the category. Passive funds in this category have generally had better or equal Sharpe ratios over short and long periods. In fact, this strategy has routinely captured more of the upside and less of the downside. Tracking error has also generally been tight, sitting at around 3-5 basis points. Valuations between large and small caps have shown some dispersion as US large caps rerated significantly following the volatility that markets saw in first-quarter 2020, suggesting that outperformance of larger companies over the last few years has come with steeper degrees of price risk.
Top Holdings of the fund
About the fund
The Fund employs a passive management – or indexing – investment approach, through physical acquisition of securities, and seeks to track the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index.The Index is comprised of large-sized company stocks in the US.
The Fund attempts to:
- Track the performance of the Index by investing in all constituent securities of the Index in the same proportion as the Index. Where not practicable to fully replicate, the Fund will use a sampling process.
- Remain fully invested except in extraordinary market, political or similar conditions.
(Source:Morningstar)
General Advice Warning
Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.
