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Dividend Stocks

Sun Life have to carefully weigh the capital required along with potential for disruption to its existing operations

Business Strategy and Outlook

Following the 2008-09 financial crisis, Sun Life made several positive changes to its business operations, most notably selling its lagging U.S. life insurance and annuities business. Sun Life’s medium-term objectives include underlying EPS growth of 8%-10%, underlying return on equity of 12%-14%, and a dividend payout rate of 40%-50%. Canada and the United States continue to have several demographic trends working in favor of insurers, especially with wealth- and asset-management businesses, as an aging population increasingly looks to manage its savings. However, areas of growth remain fiercely competitive, and life insurance will remain structurally difficult, making it hard for Sun Life to maintain any excess returns. Sun Life is also focused on expanding its operations in Asia, though it is skeptical of this initiative ultimately providing significant value, given the subpar returns on equity so far. 

It is also held for Sun Life to continue to invest in digital tools and apps. In 2018, Sun Life acquired Maxwell Health, a startup that offers a digital employee-benefits platform. On the distribution side, Sun Life is working to sell insurance through mobile banking apps in Asia. Sun Life has a “four-pillar” acquisition strategy in which any deal needs to meet at least one of the following: It must add scale, add capabilities, deliver lifetime return on equity with the firm’s medium-terms objective, or be accretive to earnings over a reasonable time frame. In asset management, it is alleged for more consolidation in the industry and expect Sun Life to participate. In 2019, it acquired real estate investment firm BentallGreenOak and in 2020 announced a majority stake in Crescent Capital and Infrared Capital Partners, both of which are alternative asset managers. While a large acquisition in the asset-management industry is possible, Sun Life would have to carefully weigh the capital required and the potential for disruption to its existing operations. In the insurance space, Sun Life swung big with its $2.5 billion acquisition of DentaQuest, which is expected to close midyear 2022.

Financial Strength

The life insurance business model typically entails significant leverage and potentially exposes the industry to outlier capital-market events and unanticipated actuarial changes. Sun Life was not immune to these risks and was hurt, like many of its peers, during the financial crisis. Since then, Sun Life has done a reasonably good job of reducing its debt by growing back its equity base while reducing absolute debt levels.As of Dec. 31, 2021, Sun Life has a total financial leverage ratio (the ratio of debt and preferred shares to total capital) of 25.5%, consistent with management’s long-term target of 25%. As of Dec. 31, 2020, Sun Life’s LICAT ratio was 145%. The Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test is the sum of the available capital, surplus allowance, and eligible deposits divided by the firm’s base solvency buffer. Life Insurers in Canada must have a minimum of 90%, suggesting that Sun Life has an adequate buffer from a regulatory perspective.

Bulls Say’s

  • Over the next 20 years, the retirement-age population will grow to about one in five, significantly increasing the demand for financial-protection products. 
  • When interest rates rise, earnings for insurers like Sun Life should increase. 
  • Given its strong operating margins, Sun Life’s MFS asset-management franchise should drive earnings growth during an equity market recovery.

Company Profile 

Sun Life Financial is one of Canada’s Big Three life insurance companies along with Great-West Lifeco and Manulife. Sun Life provides insurance, retirement, and wealth-management services to individual and corporate customers in Canada, the United States, and Asia. It also owns MFS Investment Management, a Boston-based asset-management firm. Sun Life generates about a third of its profit from asset-management operations. 

(Source: MorningStar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Commodities Trading Ideas & Charts

Fortescue Metals (FMG) delivered robust 1H22 results along with Capital Management Initiatives

Investment Thesis 

  • Improving sales mix towards higher grade products should continue to narrow the price discount FMG achieves to the market benchmark Platts 62% CFR Index. 
  • Global stimulus measures – fiscal and monetary policies – are positive for global growth and FMG’s products. 
  • Capital management initiatives – increasing dividends, potential share buybacks given the strength of the balance sheet.
  • Strong cash flow generation.
  • Quality management team.
  • Continues to be on the lower end of the cost curve relative to peers; with ongoing focus on C1 cost reductions should be supportive of earnings.

Key Risks

  • Decline in iron ore prices.
  • Cost blowouts/ production disruptions.
  • Cost out strategy fails to yield results. 
  • Company fails to deliver on adequate capital management initiatives.
  • Potential for regulatory changes.
  • Vale SA supply comes back on market sooner than expected. 
  • Growth projects delayed. 

1H22 Results Highlights   Relative to the pcp: 

  • FMG delivered record half year iron ore shipments of 93.1m tonnes (mt), up +3%. Revenue of US$8.1bn declined -13% per cent on 1H21. Average revenue of US$96/dry metric tonne (dmt) represented a 70% realisation of the average Platts 62% CFR Index (1H22: US$114/dmt, 90% realisation). C1 cost of US$15.28/wet metric tonne (wmt) was up +20% due to price escalation of key input costs, including diesel, other consumables and labour rates, the integration of Eliwana as well as mine plan driven cost escalation. 
  • Underlying EBITDA of US$4.8bn, with an Underlying EBITDA margin of 59% (-28% lower versus 1H21: US$6.6bn, 71% margin). 
  • NPAT of US$2.8bn was -32% lower than pcp. EPS of US$0.90 (A$1.24) was -32% weaker. 
  • Net cashflow from operating activities of US$2.1bn after payment of the FY21 final tax instalment of US$915m. 
  • Capex of US$1.5bn, inclusive of US$589m investment in the Iron Bridge growth project and the Pilbara Energy Connect decarbonisation project. 
  • The Board declared a fully franked interim dividend of A$0.86 per share, down -41% relative to the pcp. It equates to 70% 1H22 NPAT, and is consistent with FMG’s capital allocation framework and stated intent to target the top end of the dividend policy to payout 50 to 80% of full year NPAT. 
  • FMG retained a strong balance sheet with net debt of US$1.7bn at 31 December 2021, inclusive of cash on hand of US$2.9bn. FMG’s credit metrics remain strong with gross debt to last 12 months EBITDA of 0.3x and gross gearing of 23% as at 31 December 2021.

Company Profile

Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (FMG) engages in the exploration, development, production, processing, and sale of iron ore in Australia, China, and internationally. It owns and operates the Chichester Hub that consists of the Cloudbreak and Christmas Creek mines located in the Chichester Ranges in the Pilbara, Western Australia; and the Solomon Hub comprising the Firetail and Kings Valley mines located in the Hamersley Ranges in the Pilbara, Western Australia. The Company was founded in 2003 and is based in East Perth, Australia.

 (Source: Banyantree)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Technology Stocks

Praemium 1H22 FUA was up by 43% to $49bn; Merger with Powerwrap brings significant opportunities for synergies

Investment Thesis

  • Merger with Powerwrap creates a much better capitalized and resourced competitor in the market, with significant opportunities for synergies. 
  • Increasing diversification via geography and product offering. 
  • Increasing competition amongst platform providers such as Hub24, Wealth O2, BT Panorama, Netwealth, North Platform etc.
  • Very attractive Australian industry dynamics – Australian superannuation assets expected to grow at 8.1% p.a. to A$9.5 trillion by 2035. 
  • Disruptive technology and hold a leading position to grow funds under advice via SMAs. 
  • The fallout from the Royal Commission into Australian banking has led to increased inquiries for PPS’ products/services. 
  • Growing and maturing SMSF market = more SMSFs demand for tailored and specific solutions.  
  • Bolt-on acquisitions to supplement organic growth 
  • pFurther consolidation in the sector could benefit PPS. 

Key Risk

  • Execution risk – delivering on PPS’s strategy or acquisition. 
  • Contract or key client loss. 
  • Competitive platforms/offering (new technology). 
  • Associated risks in relation to system, technology and software.
  • Operational risks related to service levels and the potential for breaches.
  • Regulatory changes within the wealth management industry.
  • Increased competition from major banks and financial institutions

1H22 results summary: Compared to pcp 

  • Australian business saw revenue increased +21% to $30.3m, with Platform revenue up +31% to $21.7m driven by FUA increase of +28% to $21.1bn and Portfolio Services revenue up +7% to $8.5m driven by VMA software and VMA admin revenue growth of +5% and +28%, respectively. EBITDA (excluding corporate costs of $0.6m) declined -6% to $8.2m with margin declining -700bps to 27% amid investments in operations to support client growth and R&D to drive continued innovation in proprietary technology. Powerwrap contributed $10.1m in revenue, $0.8m in EBITDA and delivered $3.3m in annualized cost synergies. 
  • International (discontinued operations): revenue was up +41% to $8.9m with platform revenue up +53% to $5.4m from accelerating momentum in platform FUA which increased +58%, Planning software revenue up +91% to $2.1m amid increase in WealthCraft CRM and planning software licences in 2021 which grew +41% internationally, and Fund revenue down -24% to $0.6m. EBITDA loss declined -94% to a breakeven, comprising UK’s EBITDA of $0.1m, Hong Kong’s EBITDA profit of $0.8m and Dubai’s EBITDA loss of $1m.

International business divested – surplus net proceeds to be returned to shareholders. Management completed the sale of International business to Morningstar for $65m, with the transaction expected to be completed during Q2/Q3 of CY22 and the Board intending to return surplus net proceeds to shareholders. 

Expense growth to stabilize. Management expects further Powerwrap synergies post scheme migration ($4m in annualised synergies by 30 June 2022, with a further $2m annualised in FY23 from efficiencies and natural attrition). 

Company Profile

Praemium Limited (PPS) is an Australian fintech company which provides portfolio administration, investment platforms and financial planning tools to the wealth management industry.

 (Source: Banyantree)

  •                    Given the

shareCompany Profi                             General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Dividend Stocks

Western Union Is Shifting to Digital

Two young women talking together with a tablet in the living room. They sit spaced apart to prevent the virus.

Business Strategy and Outlook

Western Union’s primary macroeconomic exposure is to employment markets in the developed world, as the search for better economic opportunities is the fundamental driver for money transfers. While conditions have improved over time in the United States and Europe, with new entrants adding to the issues for legacy operators like Western Union. At this point, we don’t see a catalyst to improve the situation, and pandemic-related headwinds appear to be lingering. Recent geopolitical events could be an additional headwind. Another major issue for Western Union is the industry shift toward electronic methods of money transfer. The company has been actively building out its presence in electronic channels in recent years to adapt to the change in the industry. Western Union saw a sharp spike in digital transfers at the beginning of the pandemic, and growth has remained strong. Western Union achieved a 32% year-over-year increase in transaction growth in 2021 as this area of the company’s business jumped to about a quarter of revenue. 

Morningstar analysts believe the firm’s aggressive approach is the best strategy as Western Union positions itself to maintain its scale advantage despite the shift. From Morningstar analyst view, scale and market share across all channels will be the dominant factor in long-term competitive position, and Western Union appears to be maintaining its overall position. However, the growth that the company is seeing in digital transfers does not appear to be leading to strong overall growth.

Western Union Is Shifting to Digital

Western Union’s third-quarter results weren’t particularly impressive, as the company continues to battle some pandemic-related headwinds. However, from a long-term point of view,  focus is more on the company’s digital channel results, as Morningstar analysts believe sharing in this channel’s growth is key to maintaining the company’s scale advantage and wide moat over time. On that front, Western Union maintains double-digit growth in digital. Morningstar analysts view the company’s shares as undervalued, as the company has the potential to adapt to a shifting market. Thus, maintain a $26 fair value estimate.

Digital channels considered as the bright spot for the company. Growth in digital channels did moderate as the company lapped the spike it saw last year. However, year-over-year transaction and revenue growth of 19% and 15%, respectively, can be considered as a solid result. Digital transfers now account for about one quarter of revenue, and management believes it is on track to exceed $1 billion in digital revenue in 2021. As per Morningstar analysts perspective, Western Union’s ability to scale across both cash and digital channels is a significant advantage as the overall market shifts to digital.

Financial Strength 

Financial Strength Western Union’s capital structure is fairly conservative, as management sees a strong credit profile as an advantage in attracting agents. The company carried $3.0 billion in debt at the end of 2021, resulting in debt/EBITDA of 2.3 times; this is a reasonable level, given the stability of the business. Western Union also typically holds a substantial amount of cash. Net debt at the end of 2021 was approximately $1.8 billion, and we expect the company to hold a net debt position of about $2 billion over time. Given recent changes to tax laws, it’s possible Western Union might not hold as much cash as it has historically, as it will no longer incur a tax penalty upon repatriation. This could help free management’s hand, as the company historically has returned the bulk of its free cash flow to shareholders through stock repurchases and dividends

Bulls Say

  • The demographic factor that has historically driven industry growth–namely, the differential between population growth in developing and developed countries–remains in place for the foreseeable future. 
  • Western Union didn’t see a major drop-off during the last recession or the pandemic, highlighting the stability of the business. 
  • While the motives for immigrants to relocate to wealthier countries are well understood, developed countries also have incentive to open their borders, as negligible native population growth makes immigration a necessity for long-term GDP growth.

Company Profile

Western Union provides domestic and international money transfers through its global network of about 500,000 outside agents. It is the largest money transfer company in the world and one of only a few companies with a truly global agent network.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

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Commodities Trading Ideas & Charts

PG&E Investing Heavily in California Energy Policy Projects

Business Strategy and Outlook

PG&E emerged from bankruptcy on July 1, 2020, after 17 months of negotiating with 2017-18 Northern California fire victims, insurance companies, politicians, lawyers, and bondholders. The new PG&E is well positioned to grow rapidly, given the investment needs to meet California’s aggressive energy and environmental policies. PG&E is set to invest more than $8 billion annually for the next five years, leading to 8% annual growth. California’s core ratemaking regulation is highly constructive with usage-decoupled rates, forward-looking rate reviews, and allowed returns well above the industry average. Morningstar analysts expect California regulators to support premium allowed returns to encourage energy infrastructure investment to support the state’s clean energy goals, including a carbon-free economy by 2045. This upside is partially offset by the uncertain future of PG&E’s natural gas business, which could shrink as California decarbonizer its economy.

PG&E will always face public and regulatory scrutiny as the largest utility in California. That scrutiny has escalated with the deadly wildfires and power outages. Legislative and regulatory changes during and since the bankruptcy have reduced PG&E’s financial risk, but the state’s inverse condemnation strict liability standard remains a concern. CEO Patti Poppe faces a tall task restoring PG&E’s reputation among customers, regulators, politicians, and investors. 

Financial Strength 

Following the bankruptcy restructuring, PG&E has substantially the same capital structure as it did entering bankruptcy with many of the same bondholders after issuing $38 billion of new or reinstated debt. PG&E’s $7.5 billion securitized debt issuance would eliminate $6 billion of temporary debt at the utility and further fortify its balance sheet. The post bankruptcy equity ownership mix is much different. PG&E raised $5.8 billion of new common stock and equity units in late June 2020, representing about 30% ownership. Another $3.25 billion of new equity came from a group of large investment firms.  analysts expect PG&E to maintain investment-grade credit ratings. Morningstar analysts estimate PG&E will invest more than $8 billion annually during the next few years. Tax benefits and regulatory asset recovery should result in minimal new equity and debt needs at least through 2023.Morningstar analysts expect PG&E will be prepared to reinitiate a dividend in 2024 after meeting the terms of its bankruptcy settlement. 

Bulls Says

  • California’s core rate regulation is among the most constructive in the U.S. with usage-decoupled revenue, annual rate true-up adjustments, and forward-looking rate setting. 
  • Regulators continue to support the company’s investments in grid modernization, electric vehicles, and renewable energy to meet the state’s progressive energy policies. 
  • State legislation passed in August 2018 and mid-2019 should help limit shareholder losses if PG&E faces another round of wildfire liabilities.

Company Profile

PG&E is a holding company whose main subsidiary is Pacific Gas and Electric, a regulated utility operating in Central and Northern California that serves 5.3 million electricity customers and 4.6 million gas customers in 47 of the state’s 58 counties. PG&E operated under bankruptcy court supervision between January 2019 and June 2020. In 2004, PG&E sold its unregulated assets as part of an earlier post bankruptcy reorganization

 (Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Technology Stocks

GM Will Likely Look Very Different and More High Tech in 2030 Than It Is Now

Business Strategy and Outlook:

GM is having a competitive lineup in all segments, combined with a reduced cost base, finally enabling the firm to have the scale to match its size. The head of Consumer Reports automotive testing even said Toyota and Honda could learn from the Chevrolet Malibu. The GM’s earnings potential is excellent because the company has a healthy North American unit and a nearly mature finance arm with GM Financial. Moving hourly workers’ retiree healthcare to a separate fund and closing plants have drastically lowered GM North America’s break-even point to U.S. industry sales of about 10 million-11 million vehicles. It has more scale to come from GM moving its production to more global platforms and eventually onto vehicle sets over the next few years for even more flexibility and scale. Exiting most U.S. sedan segments also helps.

GM makes products that consumers are willing to pay more for than in the past. It no longer has to overproduce trying to cover high labor costs and then dump cars into rental fleets (which hurts residual values). GM now operates in a demand-pull model where it can produce only to meet demand and is structured to do no worse than break even at the bottom of an economic cycle when plants can be open. The result is higher profits than under old GM despite lower U.S. share. It now seeks roughly $300 billion in revenue by 2030 from many new high-margin businesses such as insurance, subscriptions, and selling data, while targeting 2030 total company adjusted EBIT margin of 12%-14%, up from 11.3% in 2021 and 7.9% in 2020. GM takes actions such as buying Cruise, along with GM’s connectivity and data-gathering via OnStar, position GM well for this new era. Cruise is offering autonomous ride-hailing with its Origin vehicle and GM targets $50 billion of Cruise revenue in 2030. GM is investing over $35 billion in battery electric and autonomous vehicles for 2020-25 and is launching 30 BEVs through 2025 with two thirds of them available in North America. Management also targets over 2 million annual BEV sales by mid-decade and in early 2021 announced the ambition to only sell zero-emission vehicles globally by 2035.

Financial Strengths:

GM’s balance sheet and liquidity were strong at the end of 2021, apart from $11.2 billion in underfunded pension and other postemployment benefit obligations, an improvement from $30.8 billion at year-end 2014. Management targets automotive cash and securities of $18 billion and liquidity of $30 billion-$35 billion. GM had calculated that at year-end 2021, the automotive net cash and securities, excluding legacy obligations but including Cruise, of $7.7 billion, about $5.26 per diluted share. Global pension contributions in 2022 are expected at about $570 million, with about $500 million of that amount for non-U.S. plans. 

Auto and Cruise debt at Dec. 31 is $17.0 billion, mostly from senior unsecured notes and capital leases. Credit line availability after an April 2021 renewal is about $17.2 billion across three lines with one of those lines being a 364-day $2 billion line allocated exclusively to GM Financial. The other two automotive lines are a $4.3 billion line expiring in April 2024 and an $11.2 billion line. The $11.2 billion line has $9.9 billion available until April 2026 while the remaining portion is available until April 2023. GM fulfilled its UAW VEBA funding obligations in 2010. GM had calculated in 2021 that the automotive and Cruise debt/adjusted EBITDA at 1.3, excluding legacy obligations and equity income. Automotive debt maturities including capital leases are about $463 million in 2022.

Bulls Say:

  • GMNA’s break-even point of about 10 million-11 million units is drastically lower than it was under the old GM. The company’s earnings should grow rapidly as GM becomes more cost-efficient.
  • GM’s U.S. hourly labor cost is about $5 billion compared with about $16 billion in 2005 under the old GM.
  • GM can charge thousands of dollars more per vehicle in light-truck segments. Higher prices with fewer incentive dollars allow GM to get more margin per vehicle, which helps mitigate a severe decline in light- vehicle sales and falling market share.

Company Profile:

General Motors Co. emerged from the bankruptcy of General Motors Corp. (old GM) in July 2009. GM has eight brands and operates under four segments: GM North America, GM International, Cruise, and GM Financial. The United States now has four brands instead of eight under old GM. The company lost its U.S. market share leader crown in 2021 with share down 280 basis points to 14.6%, but it is expected that GM to reclaim the top spot in 2022 due to 2021 suffering from the chip shortage. GM Financial became the company’s captive finance arm in October 2010 via the purchase of AmeriCredit.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Technology Stocks

GM Will Likely Look Very Different and More High Tech in 2030 Than It Is Now

Business Strategy and Outlook:

GM is having a competitive lineup in all segments, combined with a reduced cost base, finally enabling the firm to have the scale to match its size. The head of Consumer Reports automotive testing even said Toyota and Honda could learn from the Chevrolet Malibu. The GM’s earnings potential is excellent because the company has a healthy North American unit and a nearly mature finance arm with GM Financial. Moving hourly workers’ retiree healthcare to a separate fund and closing plants have drastically lowered GM North America’s break-even point to U.S. industry sales of about 10 million-11 million vehicles. It has more scale to come from GM moving its production to more global platforms and eventually onto vehicle sets over the next few years for even more flexibility and scale. Exiting most U.S. sedan segments also helps.

GM makes products that consumers are willing to pay more for than in the past. It no longer has to overproduce trying to cover high labor costs and then dump cars into rental fleets (which hurts residual values). GM now operates in a demand-pull model where it can produce only to meet demand and is structured to do no worse than break even at the bottom of an economic cycle when plants can be open. The result is higher profits than under old GM despite lower U.S. share. It now seeks roughly $300 billion in revenue by 2030 from many new high-margin businesses such as insurance, subscriptions, and selling data, while targeting 2030 total company adjusted EBIT margin of 12%-14%, up from 11.3% in 2021 and 7.9% in 2020. GM takes actions such as buying Cruise, along with GM’s connectivity and data-gathering via OnStar, position GM well for this new era. Cruise is offering autonomous ride-hailing with its Origin vehicle and GM targets $50 billion of Cruise revenue in 2030. GM is investing over $35 billion in battery electric and autonomous vehicles for 2020-25 and is launching 30 BEVs through 2025 with two thirds of them available in North America. Management also targets over 2 million annual BEV sales by mid-decade and in early 2021 announced the ambition to only sell zero-emission vehicles globally by 2035.

Financial Strengths:

GM’s balance sheet and liquidity were strong at the end of 2021, apart from $11.2 billion in underfunded pension and other postemployment benefit obligations, an improvement from $30.8 billion at year-end 2014. Management targets automotive cash and securities of $18 billion and liquidity of $30 billion-$35 billion. GM had calculated that at year-end 2021, the automotive net cash and securities, excluding legacy obligations but including Cruise, of $7.7 billion, about $5.26 per diluted share. Global pension contributions in 2022 are expected at about $570 million, with about $500 million of that amount for non-U.S. plans. 

Auto and Cruise debt at Dec. 31 is $17.0 billion, mostly from senior unsecured notes and capital leases. Credit line availability after an April 2021 renewal is about $17.2 billion across three lines with one of those lines being a 364-day $2 billion line allocated exclusively to GM Financial. The other two automotive lines are a $4.3 billion line expiring in April 2024 and an $11.2 billion line. The $11.2 billion line has $9.9 billion available until April 2026 while the remaining portion is available until April 2023. GM fulfilled its UAW VEBA funding obligations in 2010. GM had calculated in 2021 that the automotive and Cruise debt/adjusted EBITDA at 1.3, excluding legacy obligations and equity income. Automotive debt maturities including capital leases are about $463 million in 2022.

Bulls Say:

  • GMNA’s break-even point of about 10 million-11 million units is drastically lower than it was under the old GM. The company’s earnings should grow rapidly as GM becomes more cost-efficient.
  • GM’s U.S. hourly labor cost is about $5 billion compared with about $16 billion in 2005 under the old GM.
  • GM can charge thousands of dollars more per vehicle in light-truck segments. Higher prices with fewer incentive dollars allow GM to get more margin per vehicle, which helps mitigate a severe decline in light- vehicle sales and falling market share.

Company Profile:

General Motors Co. emerged from the bankruptcy of General Motors Corp. (old GM) in July 2009. GM has eight brands and operates under four segments: GM North America, GM International, Cruise, and GM Financial. The United States now has four brands instead of eight under old GM. The company lost its U.S. market share leader crown in 2021 with share down 280 basis points to 14.6%, but it is expected that GM to reclaim the top spot in 2022 due to 2021 suffering from the chip shortage. GM Financial became the company’s captive finance arm in October 2010 via the purchase of AmeriCredit.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Dividend Stocks Expert Insights

Star Entertainment Group reflects gross revenue declined -22% to $580m, EBITDA declined -87% to $29m and NPAT loss of $74m

Investment Thesis:

  • Additional cost measures announced to support earnings.
  • Monopolies in the casino industry in SGR’s operating geographies and is one of the market leaders in other games such as slots.
  • Economic moat in the nightlife landscape in Sydney given regulatory environment (such as lock-out laws).
  • Diversified business base across different types of entertainment, hotels, retail stores and food & beverage establishments.
  • Strong tourism growth once borders reopen is expected to a tailwind for SGR.
  • Lower AUD could improve international spending in domestic markets.
  • Domestic table games segment remains strong.

Key Risks:

  • Weakening VIP segment, potentially making Sydney less viable.
  • Further deterioration of consumer spending and household discretionary income 
  • Regulatory risks e.g. repeal of lockout laws could increase competition in the nightlife landscape in Sydney.
  • Establishment of new Crown casino in Sydney will increase competition (especially amongst VIP customers) and could potentially dismantle SGR’s monopoly in Sydney.
  • Win-rate risk (if the casinos have a much lower win-rate than the mathematical expected value).
  • Potential scandals.

Key Highlights:

  • On a normalised basis, gross revenue declined -22% to $580m, EBITDA declined -87% to $29m and NPAT was a loss of $74m, impacted by Covid-19 related property shutdowns, operating restrictions, and border closures. Statutory EBITDA of $31m (pre significant items) was down -87% and statutory net loss was $74m (post significant items) vs profit of $49.7m in pcp.
  • Operating expenses increased +23.6% to $401m, reflecting Covid-19 related inefficiencies and investment in staff to position the properties for re-opening.
  • Net debt increased by +4% over 2H21 to $1.2bn with net leverage increasing to 5.2x, impacted by property shutdowns. However, SGR received full waiver of debt covenants for the December 2021 testing date and an amendment of the covenant ratios for the June 2022 testing date.
  • SGR has liquidity of $520m in cash and undrawn facilities.
  • Asset sale continued (to release capital from non-core or low-yielding assets), with SGR selling VIP jet for ~$40m, entering into agreement for the sale of an interest in the Treasury Brisbane assets for $248m (ex GST) and continuing work on the potential sale and leaseback (or similar transaction) of a minority holding in The Star Sydney property. 
  • Operating cashflow declined -96% to $11m with cash collection down -90% to 45%.
  • Capex of $125-150m (FY23 guidance is ~$175m).
  • D&A expense of ~$205m.
  • Net funding costs of $50-55m.
  • JV equity contributions of ~$35m, primarily relating to Gold Coast Tower 2.
  • Cost pressures to continue in 2H22 driven by wages, insurance, energy, Covid-19 related challenges and further investment in headcount in regulatory and compliance functions.
  • Trading Update – in the period from 1 January 2022 to 13 February 2022, total revenue was up +7% YoY with Sydney revenue up +20% (gaming revenue up +17% and non-gaming revenue up +46%) and Queensland revenue is down -6% (gaming revenue down -12% and non- gaming revenue up +32%) with Omicron impact peaking in mid-January and progressively easing. 

Company Description:

The Star Entertainment Group Limited, an integrated resort company, provides gaming, entertainment, and hospitality services in Australia. The Company operates through three segments: Sydney, Gold Coast, and Brisbane. It owns and operates The Star Sydney casino, which includes hotels, apartment complex, restaurants, and bars; The Star Gold Coast casino, which consists of hotels, theatre, restaurants, and bars; and Treasury casino in Brisbane that comprises hotel, restaurants, and bars. The company also manages the Gold Coast Convention and Exhibition Centre. The company was formerly known as Echo Entertainment Group Limited and changed its name to The Star Entertainment Group Limited in November 2015.

(Source: Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
Technology Stocks

Carsales.com Ltd (CAR) reported strong 1H22 results & Balance sheet position; Declared fully franked dividend of 25.5cps

Investment Thesis

  • Leading market position in online car classifieds. 
  • Overseas expansion provides new growth opportunities from the challenging core Australian market. 
  • Heavily reliant on two growth stories (South Korea and Brazil).
  • Diversified geographic coverage.
  • Bolt-on acquisitions provide opportunities to supplement organic growth.
  • The Company can sustain high single-digit and low double-digit revenue growth. 
  • CAR’s move into adjacent products and industries. 
  • Increasing pricing in South Korea to boost margins.
  • Looking to take more of the car buying experience online with dealers (i.e. increasing its total addressable market). 

Key Risk

  • Rich and demanding valuation.
  • Competitive pressures, that is car dealer driven substitute platform or the No. 2 & 3 player gain ground on CAR.
  • Motor vehicle sales remain subdued.  
  • Value destructive acquisition / execution risk with international strategy.
  • Not immune from broader downturn in economy (consumer likely to delay a significant purchase in time of uncertainty). 

1H22 Results Highlights. Relative to the pcp: 

  • Look-through revenue of $282m, up +30% and Look-through EBITDA was up +15% to $149m, driven by strong domestic results in the Private and Media segments, growth in Encar in South Korea and good cost discipline. 
  • Adjusted NPAT of $89m up 20% and adjusted EPS of 31.4c. 
  • CAR reported strong cash flow with Reported EBITDA to operating cash flow conversion of 100%. The Board declared a fully franked interim dividend of 25.5cps, consistent with longstanding dividend payout policy of 80%.

Company Profile

Carsales.com Ltd (CAR), founded in 1997, operates the largest online automotive, motorcycle and marine classifieds business in Australia. Carsales is regarded as one of Australia’s original disruptors and has expanded to include a large number of market-leading brands. The Company employs over 800 and develops world leading technology and advertising solutions in Melbourne. CAR has also expanded to numerous global markets, such as South Korea, Brazil, and other countries in Latin America.

  • 1H22 Results Highlights. 

 (Source: Banyantree)

  •                    Given the

shareCompany Profi                             General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.

Categories
ETFs ETFs

Large- to mid-cap exposure to US equities at an attractive fee

Tile letter on red rack in word ETF (abbreviation of Exchange Traded Fund) on wood background

Approach 

This fund uses full physical replication to capture the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index. The fund owns–to the extent that is possible and efficient–all the underlying constituents in the same proportion as its benchmark. 

Portfolio 

The S&P 500 is a free-float-adjusted market-capitalisation-weighted index of 500 US companies that offers both large- and mid-cap exposure. With a total value of over USD 40 trillion, the index covers around 80% of the free-float-adjusted market capitalisation of the US equity market. The US Index Committee maintains the S&P 500 and meets monthly. It aims to minimise index membership turnover. If a constituent no longer meets the entrance requirements, the committee will not remove the member immediately if it deems the change temporary. The index rebalances quarterly in March, June, September, and December. The largest sector exposure is information technology (29%), followed by healthcare (13%) and financials (12%). With the inclusion of Tesla TSLA and the continued success of many of the largest stocks in the index over 2020, the top 10 now represent over one fourth of the index. That said, concentration risk concerns remain subdued as the top 10 companies traditionally drive around 20% of the return, a fair attribution for many market-cap-weighted strategies.

Performance

Funds that track the S&P 500 Net Return Index have consistently outperformed the category average by a range of 0%-4% on a yearly rolling basis, making a strong investment case for low-cost passive instruments such as this when seeking broad US equity exposure. Further evidence is found in the superior risk-adjusted return profile of the S&P 500 relative to the average peer in the category. Passive funds in this category have generally had better or equal Sharpe ratios over short and long periods. In fact, this strategy has routinely captured more of the upside and less of the downside. Tracking error has also generally been tight, sitting at around 3-5 basis points. Valuations between large and small caps have shown some dispersion as US large caps rerated significantly following the volatility that markets saw in first-quarter 2020, suggesting that outperformance of larger companies over the last few years has come with steeper degrees of price risk.

Top Holdings of the fund

About the fund

The Fund employs a passive management – or indexing – investment approach, through physical acquisition of securities, and seeks to track the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index.The Index is comprised of large-sized company stocks in the US.

The Fund attempts to:

  • Track the performance of the Index by investing in all constituent securities of the Index in the same proportion as the Index. Where not practicable to fully replicate, the Fund will use a sampling process.
  • Remain fully invested except in extraordinary market, political or similar conditions.

 (Source:Morningstar)

General Advice Warning

Any advice/ information provided is general in nature only and does not take into account the personal financial situation, objectives or needs of any particular person.